The Naval Operations Concept 2010 has finally been released. This document is intended to implement the Maritime Strategy, 2007. After only a quick skim, it is apparent that the Coast Guard was well represented in writing the document. If anything the number of references to the Coast Guard are surprisingly high, considering the relative size of the service. The document calls out a number of requirements for Coast Guard forces, both currently filled and anticipated.
In view of the frequent question of whether the Coast Guard is a “Naval Service,” it was gratifying to see this straight forward statement on page 7, “The Naval Service is comprised of the active and reserve components and the civilian personnel of the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard.”
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
Thanks for the note Chuck!
My USCG sources indicate there will be an ALCOAST on the board shortly with a msg from ADM Allen regarding the NOC and it’s importance at outlining the CG’s National Defense mission and what unique capabilities they provide the nation while they partner with the Navy and Marine Corps.
In short, the NOC provides a unified view, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard of the naval operating environment. It provides a framework and conceptual basis from which we will plan our future naval operations. It describes in greater detail at how exactly we will execute the Maritime Strategy centered around six core capabilities specified in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (CS-21): Forward Presence, Maritime Security, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response, Sea Control, Power Projection, and Deterrence.
NOC is not designed for serious reading as it outlines not wony what the naval service (USN/USMC/USCG) is doing now, but what we can expect to be doing in the future.
Stay Thirsty My Friend,
Surface Force
Surface Force, Good to see you here. Did you have something to do with this document?
Also appears to provide some funding justification in that it talks about things like rotating major cutters through Global Fleet Station and the need for more LEDETs than currently provided.
Thanks Chuck.
The NOC is the opportunity for the service(s) to tell their story. As you mention, it indicates the increasing operational demand signal for CG forces in support of the GCC’s (especially for Phase I/shaping operations). The demand clearly outweighs the capacity at this time. Accordingly, it paints the right picture IMO for the Executive and Legislative branches as to what type of naval force is required for the future (pay special attention to the footnotes for CG forces and types of Navy/CG ships outlined in chapter 10). You nailed it right on with the LEDETs too…big increase in demand there in recent years, especially from EUCOM and AFRICOM where such deployments are supported “out of hide” right now from what the CG has to support CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM.
For the Navy as well, this document also validates their 30 year Shipbuilding Plan.
More later.
Best,
Surface Force
Wait and see is the best course on the NOC. I’ve not finished reading it.
However, it appears to be another in a long line of such outlines beginning in 1916. I will say the tone is much better than the CNO telling the Coast Guard in 1947 that we don’t really need you but if we do we will call. However, the navy would take whatever extra ships and officers the Coast Guard did not need.
I wonder if Title 10 will be changed to include the Coast Guard in the official definition of “naval?’ Right now it is only Navy and Marine Corps. The “naval” language in the NOC is but a return to that of 1916. It is strange how these things keep rotating through history. Some early historiographers claimed history is cyclical, others not. However, not knowing history ensures the wheel will be reinvented from time to time.
Surface Force, presume these are the footnotes you were referring to. For those who may not realize this, I’ll note that generally this translates to three ships required for each ship deployed.
“29 Combatant commander demand calls for a 2.0 major cutter presence to meet theater campaign
plan requirements (to include security cooperation and security force assistance) in Mediterranean/
African littoral waters and the Western Pacific/Indian Ocean. Demand for the Eastern Pacific and
Caribbean Basin calls for a 6.0 cutter presence.
“30 The current Icebreaker demand requires a 1.0 presence in the Arctic and 1.0 in the Antarctic.
“31 Icebreakers support Forward Presence. They also support Maritime Security, HA/DR, Sea
Control and Deterrence in ice-covered and ice-diminished waters; Coast Guard icebreakers are the
only means of providing assured surface access.
I also found this interesting, especially the note that they were working on common patrol craft systems, I don’t know if that means a common hull or common sub-systems like weapons, comms, tactical data systems:
“Patrol Craft
“Patrol craft are designed for domestic littoral missions as well as overseas
coastal interdiction operations. Overseas, these small combatant craft
conduct both maritime security and coastal sea control missions. In the
past the Navy and Coast Guard have transferred craft between Services
to meet transitory requirements. While successful in the short term,
this approach is not effective in a security environment that demands
significant domestic and overseas patrol craft capacity. To overcome
this challenge, the Naval Service will continue to pursue development
of common patrol craft systems to reduce procurement costs and ensure
interoperability. The Coast Guard is also in the process of replacing a
portion of its patrol boat (PB) fleet with the fast response cutter (FRC).
“The Coast Guard inventory must maintain sufficient capacity to support
geographic combatant commander TSC plans, expeditionary require-
ments requested through the Global Force Management process; and
overseas contingency operations; in addition to its full suite of statutory
domestic missions.”
Chuck,
“To overcome this challenge, the Naval Service will continue to pursue development
of common patrol craft systems to reduce procurement costs and ensure interoperability. ”
Okay, which Naval Service? From “The Naval Service is comprised of the active and reserve components and the civilian personnel of the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard.”
All three? I wonder if these camels will have one hump or two or three? The U. S. Navy has never been good at small patrol craft. Just look at the SWIFT boats. The USN knew they were not suited for the work, yet they kept building them without research into other kinds. I suppose that small is the operative word. Just how small and common are they to be? I was surprised to hear the FRC had such short endurance legs. Even the 82s in Vietnam could stay on patrol for a week–some longer if they bummed fuel and water.
Chuck, my sources tell me, common systems more than hulls. As Bill points out below, Patrol Craft traditionally are an economy of scale priority for the Navy historically. This coupled with the cultural emphasis on the blue water force vice the littorals…that is until it bites them you know where. Like anywhere, common components reduce production/maintence/logistics costs; so long as what is provided is what is needed, obviously that is a good thing. 🙂
Think the “five days” is just contracting jargon. FRC certainly has fuel to go further. If you really need to stay out longer you can pack them like U-boats with canned food in the corridors.
Chuck, my sources tell me, common systems more than hulls. As Bill points out below, Patrol Craft traditionally are an economy of scale priority for the Navy historically. This coupled with the cultural emphasis on the blue water force vice the littorals…that is until it bites them you know where. Like anywhere, common components reduce production/maintence/logistics costs; so long as what is provided is what is needed, obviously that is a good thing. 🙂