U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Douglas Denman (WPC-1149), U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kukui (WLB-203), U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Haddock (WPB-87347), U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Barracuda (WPB-87301) and U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Forrest Rednour (WPC-1129) transit in formation during a photo exercise off the coast of San Diego, July 23, 2026. The underway formation highlighted the Coast Guard’s diverse fleet of surface assets operating together in the maritime domain. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Chris Sappey)

Below is a District Arctic news release. Can’t help but think this is a symptom of cutter shortage in Pacific Area.

It also seems to indicate the continued usefulness of WPBs, although there is, as yet, no plan to procure a direct replacement, even though we have begun decommissioning them.  Apparently in some cases they are replaced by Webber class WPC and in others by Response Boat, Mediums. I still think there is a requirement for true Response Boat, Large.

In smaller ports the new larger motor surf boat might serve this purpose, but in more critical ports we need a capable response to any over water terrorist attack.

• 19 meter (62 foot) Motor Surf Boat, Maybe a Small Port WPB Alternative, July 2019
• The 87 foot WPB Replacement, an Addendum, Apr. 2019
• Marine Protector class WPB replacement? Its Time!, Sept. 2017

Douglas Denman’s ship U.S. Navy high-speed transport USS Colhoun (APD-2) underway to Guadalcanal. She carried units of the 1st Marine Raider Battalion in the initial assault landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and continued to serve as both transport and antisubmarine vessel in support of the invasion. At 1400 on 30 August, while Colhoun was on patrol off Guadalcanal, she was sunk in a Japanese air raid.

M-SHORAD is short for Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense. Photo by Christopher Kaufmann

Defense Blog reports,

• Leonardo DRS said its SGT STOUT M-SHORAD system defeated Group 1-2 drone threats during a U.S. government test event using only software updates.
• The Army has fielded SGT STOUT battalions to Germany, Fort Sill, Fort Hood and Fort Bragg, with 36 vehicles per battalion.

I am looking at the mount and the high definition, short range radars, much like what we saw on the PATFORSWA cutters.

That tells us this system is effective against all classes of one way “Kamikaze” attack drones, helicopters and low flying aircraft. It should have a capability against glide bombs and cruise missiles too.

If we traded one of the four pack of Stinger missiles for a pair of Hellfire or JAGM we would have a very capable anti-surface weapon with a range out to 8,000 meters–8.5 nautical miles if JAGM-MR is used. Hellfire has a proven capability to forcibly stop even large merchant ships which I see as a capability requirement implicit in the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions and one which would be required to enforce a blockade, a likely wartime mission.

These mounts are small enough to put on any cutter. They could replace .50 calibers and  arm buoy tenders and icebreakers without significant impact on ship’s stability or manning requirements. They could turn all cutters into mobile defensive positions to protect assets in harbors. All large cutters should probably have two mounts to provide 360 degree fields of fire.

There are of course other short range air defense systems and other remote weapons stations, but this one is relatively small, already proven, and in quantity production.

Navy/Coast Guard Cooperation. USCG Cmdr Harold S. Berdine of cutter Spencer talking with US Navy Capt Paul Heineman of the Escort Group A-3 after sinking German submarine U-175, North Atlantic, 500 nautical miles WSW of Ireland, 17 Apr 1943. US Coast Guard photo by Jack January

CIMSEC provides a study of the command structure of Naval/Coast Guard activities in the Western Hemisphere.

“The United States should designate the U.S. Coast Guard as its lead agency for maritime security in the Western Hemisphere. In military command and control terminology, this would make the Coast Guard the “supported” service with all other armed services and federal agencies as “supporting” services. Such a designation would reverse the customary approach for the Navy to lead at sea, but this reversal is long overdue.”

The author has a rather unique background.

“Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022 as a member of the U.S. Senior Executive Service. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career U.S. Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the assistant commandant for capability in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive.”

It is a complex article, some of which I agree with, some not so much, but highly recommended.

Surveillance, Tracking, Intelligence, Network Services, Global Reconnaissance, Analysis, and Interceptions (STINGRAI) in support of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

Below is an HII news release. Certainly something the Coast Guard is interested in. Will this track aircraft as well as surface contacts? Subsurface? Do we want something similar for Maritime Domain Awareness off the US coast? What is the system’s classification level?

This could be very important.

McLean, Va., August 11, 2026 — HII (NYSE: HII) announced today that its Mission Technologies division has been awarded a $2.2 billion task order to deliver advanced Surveillance, Tracking, Intelligence, Network Services, Global Reconnaissance, Analysis, and Interceptions (STINGRAI) in support of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

STINGRAI will enhance SOUTHCOM’s ability to detect, monitor, and disrupt illicit activity across Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, while strengthening integrated intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities essential to defending the U.S. homeland and national interests.

HII will lead an integrated team to provide SOUTHCOM and partner nations with a comprehensive suite of intelligence gathering capabilities, advanced technologies and adaptable innovative all-domain platforms for high-level operational readiness and preparedness.

“This award is an incredible opportunity and goes right to the heart of what SOUTHCOM needs — clearer visibility, faster decision making, and the ability to stay ahead of rapidly changing threats. Our team understands the complexity of this region, and we’re proud to support the command with solutions that help protect U.S. interests and strengthen security across the hemisphere,” said Andy Green, executive vice president of HII and president of HII’s Mission Technologies division.

The program supports SOUTHCOM’s mission to counter transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and drug trafficking organizations, and provides commanders with greater flexibility to respond to emerging threats and shifts in regional security dynamics.

The task order was awarded under the General Services Administration (GSA) ASTRO Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, issued by GSA Assisted Acquisition Services (AAS) Defense and has a period of performance of one base year with six option years.

USCGC Duane conducting Naval Gun Fire Support in South Vietnam.

I got a question on an earlier post about a very heavily armed small offshore patrol vessel. TTECJJ5 asked, “Who determines what armaments come to the Coast Guard?”

I started writing an answer, but as it got longer, I realized this needs to be a separate post so hopefully, more people will see it.

I think there is a really planning void in how Coast Guard vessels (and aircraft) are armed. The Navy does not seem really interested (Don’t want to push things on to the Coast Guard–don’t want to divert money from Navy programs) and the Coast Guard does not seem to be advocating for additional capability (Let’s just do the same thing we have done since we got rid of the ASW capability after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 35 years ago).

The 57mm Mk110 gun is an exception in a way, in that the Bertholf was the first US ship equipped with the weapon, but, in capability, it has basically the same tasks 5″ and 3″ guns had on CG ships since the 1940s. It is not as good at naval gun fire support as the 5″, which cutter did a lot of in Vietnam. The 57mm became a standard USN weapon. Unfortunately while it was probably an improvement over the 80 round per minute 76mm gun on the WMEC270s, it was not as good as the much improved super rapid 120 round per minute 76mm that had been introduced in 1988.

We have missed the opportunity to use recycled 5″/54 Mk45 guns from decommissioned Navy ships on the NSCs and we are now missing the opportunity to recycle more modern 5″/62 guns onto the OPCs. With 5″ guns cutters could have had a role as naval gun fire support specialists.

Basically I think there is not much thought given to what Coast Guard ships will do in a war with Russia and/or China. They really need an ASW capability.

There also does not seem to be much consideration given to our Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission. As I have noted many times, we are not equipped to stop even medium sized merchant ships that might be used in a terrorist attack.

The emergence of the threat of unmanned systems also seems to demand that the Coast Guard should start to do things differently.

Bottom line, to do our peacetime missions,

• we need to be able to defend our units and near by assets from unmanned air and surface threats
• we need to be able to defend our units and near by assets from suicidal attacks by general aviation aircraft.
• we need to be able to destroy small surface craft and forcibly stop any surface vessel up to and including super tanker size to keep it from getting to its target long enough for more capable weapons to arrive.

In addition, to play a useful role in wartime our large ships need

• to be able to cooperate fully in a multiunit formation, we need “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)”
• the ability to support Navy MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters including provision for storage of sonar buoys and torpedoes
• a towed array active/passive sonar system
• self defense capability against cruise missiles, glide bombs, and low altitude aircraft–like SeaRAM

Less urgent perhaps, but something useful, Mk41 VLS which would allow the ship to provide additional magazine space for ESSM and VL ASROC for the ship’s own use or Standard missiles and Tomahawk, that could be controlled by other units though CEC.

United Arab Emirates’ Falaj 3 offshore patrol vessel underway. Edge Group

TWZ (The War Zone) reports on the first of four of the United Arab Emirates’ Falaj 3 or Altaf class of “Offshore Patrol Vessels,” noting “…at around 670 tons full load displacement, and a crew of just 39, it may be one of the most heavily armed warships anywhere in the world for its size.”

Installed systems include:

• Leonardo 76mm OTO Super Rapid gun equipped with the STRALES guided ammunition system
• eight-cell vertical launch system loaded with MBDA VL MICA surface-to-air missiles
• 21-cell Raytheon Mk 49 launcher for the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM)
• four MM40 Exocet Block 3C anti-ship missiles
• two 12-cell Low-cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR) guided rocket launchers
• two Electro Optic Systems (EOS) R400-M 30mm remote weapon stations

They lack ASW and aviation facilities.

A rendering of the Falaj 3 reveals the locations of the various weapons and sensors. Edge Group

Since these are nominally Offshore Patrol Vessels, what immediately jumps out for a Coast Guard reader is that this little ship has four missile systems: VL MICA, RIM-116 RAM, MM40 Exocet, and LOGIR. All four can be used against surface targets and three systems have at least some AAW capability in addition to the capability of the 76 and 30 mm guns.

The UAE is in a rough neighborhood. Dubai is only 150 kms (81 nautical miles) from Iran. The UAE has been targeted by Iran in the current conflict. They have a lot of incentive to be prepared to deal with swarming unmanned air and surface craft. (Fear of death focuses the mind wonderfully.)

Musherib-class OPV Qatar

UAE’s neighbor, Qatar, sees a similar environment and came up with a similar ship, the Musherib-class OPVs of the Qatari Emiri Navy. Both are slightly shorter and much lighter  than a WMEC210. The Musherib class is armed with:

• 1 × OTO Melara 76 mm gun
• 8 × VL MICA surface-to-air missiles
• 4 × Exocet MM40 Block 3 anti-ship missiles
• 2 × 2 Marlin remote weapon stations (30mm I believe)

Being hemmed in by its neighbors, UAE’s waters and EEZ are only about one ninetieth of that of the US. This means they don’t need the range or seakeeping of most Offshore Patrol Vessels and in fact this ship has less range than the Webber class WPCs (2000 miles vs 2500. Range of the Musherib class is even less, only 1500 miles).

These are not really large enough to be considered full fledged Offshore Patrol Vessels. You certainly would not want to send one to patrol the Bering Sea. They are tailored for their unique environment, but really I think they may have gotten the anti-air and anti-surface armament right and it would certainly fit on a larger ship.

They have a high probability of success against unmanned aircraft and surface vessels. The two 12-cell Low-cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR) (similar to APKWS) guided rocket launchers combined with the 21 round RAM launcher and the eight VL MICA provide a deep ready magazine against unmanned systems. These ships could probably forcibly stop even a large merchant ships, although it might require throwing every thing they have at it. You might think the four Exocets would be enough, but the Tanker War demonstrated that, tankers particularly, are very hard to stop unless you can target the propulsion.

For the Coast Guard in peacetime, I see a shortfall in the ability to deal with terrorists using UAVs, USV, or merchant ships. 30mm guns capable of firing air burst ammunition and APKWS appear to be relatively simple, economical counters.

APKWS has become the go-to-system for shooting down UAS economically.

25 mm Mk38 mounts could be upgraded with the Mk44 Bushmaster II firing the 30 ×173mm round.

“The Mk44 Bushmaster II is a 30 mm chain gun manufactured by Northrop Grumman. It is a derivative of the 25 mm M242 Bushmaster, and uses 70% of the same parts as the M242 while increasing the firepower by as much as 50% with the 20% increase in caliber size. The barrel is chromium-plated for extended life. The gun uses standard GAU-8 Avenger ammunition that is available in API (Armor-Piercing Incendiary), HEI (High-Explosive Incendiary) and APFSDS-T (Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot-Tracer) variants.

“The gun can be converted to a caliber of 40×180mm, which involves changing the barrel and a few key parts, to use the SuperShot 40 cartridge.”

For units that do not have the Mk38 mount, conventional 7.62mm and .50 caliber mounts could be replaced by the XM914 Remote Weapon Station as used by the Army and in the Marine Corps MADIS which “includes the XM914E1 30mmx113mm DC driven cannon with a co-axial M240 (7.62mm) machine gun, an integration kit for the Stinger Air-To-Air Launcher (ATAL) and provisions for future C-UAS defeat systems.”

We could put two of them on every cutter, WPC and larger, including icebreakers and buoy tenders.

Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace XM914 remote weapon system (RWS) Photo credit: Janes

The US has a shortage of ASW escorts so I think adding sonar and support facilities for ASW helicopters is the most important improvement we could make for a future conflict with Russia and/or China.

I would also love to see the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) on every large patrol cutter. SeaRAM is a direct replacement for Phalanx installed on the Bertholf class. RAM also has a “HAS” mode to target Helicopter, Aircraft, and Surface targets. Range is reported to be ten Nautical Miles. The missile has a 11.3 kg (24 lb 15 oz) warhead.

The gun we have, the 57mm Mk110 is not as capable as the Leonardo 76mm OTO Super Rapid gun equipped with the STRALES guided ammunition system, since we have yet to produce a guided projectile effective against cruise missiles (no ALaMO does not qualify), so I would be happy to trade the 57mm for eight or more VLS that could provide ESSM and VL ASROC and even Standard or Tomahawk. Would even trade it for a SeaRAM system.

I don’t see much likelihood of Cutters exchanging anti-ship missiles with Chinese destroyers but cutters may be assigned to enforce a blockade so, while surface to surface missiles are probably the least urgent addition, they might still have a place on large cutters.

The crew of #USCG Cutter Oliver Henry participated in an integrated exercise alongside
@USNavy. Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron TWO in the Philippine Sea under the direction of U.S.

The US Naval Institute has begun a new weekly series reporting Naval Activity in the Western Pacific. It has been coming out on Fridays.

The July 17 issue sighted four Coast Guard operations:

• USCGC Kimball’s participation in RIMPAC,
• USCGC Robert Goldman (WPC-1142) + USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC-1146) port call at Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines,
• USCGC Charles Moulthrope (WPC-1141) and USCGC Emlen Tunnell (WPC-1145), participate in Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) Thailand 2026, and
• USCGC Midgett’s (WMSL-757) departure from Yokosuka

This suggested that it would also track Coast Guard units, but this proved limited.

The July 24, 2026 edition, continues to mention USCGC Kimball’s participation in RIMPAC, but makes no mention of other Coast Guard units including the six cutters of the former PATFORSWA now in the Western Pacific nor any mention of the activities of the cutters home-ported in Guam. There is likewise no mention of USS Canberra (LCS-30) and USS Tulsa (LCS-16) also formerly assigned to 5th Fleet and home-ported in Bahrain but now in Singapore.

This series of reports, in contrast to the long running “Fleet and Marine Tracker” series, includes the activities of non-US units including allied, neutral, Russian and Chinese units.

The August 7 issue, has no mention of any Coast Guard units.

I like the format in general although I can’t see both the entire animated chart and the buttons that move it chronologically on my computer, but all the included information is also in standard written format below.

For whatever reason, apparently Coast Guard units will be included only if they are working for a Navy command.

China Coast Guard Cutter Meishan with what appears to be VLS

Found the photo above on Facebook. If this looks a lot like a frigate, it is because the China Coast Guard Type 818 cutters are based on the China Navy Type 054A frigate.

I had known they were building cutters based on the frigate design, but this is the first photo I have seen that seems to indicate they included the 32 cell vertical launch system.

China Coast Guard is reported to have at least six cutters of this class.

Reportedly cutters of this class have operated under PLA direction and have provided input into the PLA’s missile targeting systems. 

China CG Type 818 Cutter Baita (2304; 白塔), 5 October 2019. Photo credit: Tyg728 via Wikipedia.

Lasers vs Small Boats–the Low Cost Solution? Will We Have the Power?

The Coast Guard has apparently recognized the need for systems to counter unmanned air and surface systems for the Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission. Like every other services they are hoping to be able to do it with lasers or other systems that offer light weight, mobility, low per kill cost and infinite magazine depth. So they are asking what is available?

“This Request for Information (RFI) is part of an effort by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) to determine the availability and technical readiness of directed energy technologies. The USCG is interested in systems or effectors that use high energy lasers (HEL) or comparable laser technology to incapacitate targets of interest (TOIs) in the maritime environment. The “maritime environment” refers to installation locations that include, but are not limited to, fixed sites such as piers, on the move (OTM) cutters, and OTM small boats. The unique challenges of the maritime environment may require packaging to protect against shock, vibration, sea spray, and airborne particulates, including smoke and fuel exhaust. Primary TOIs for this RFI are, but are not limited to, uncrewed systems, to include uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and uncrewed surface vessels (USV). Information is specifically requested regarding physical dimensions of the effector: its weight, power requirements, cooling requirements, and rough order of magnitude for cost of acquisition and installation. Responses should also include wavelength, output power, area of effect, and range information. Software load to include target profiles and targeting methods should be included as available.”

This is a long way from a fielded system, but it is at least encouraging that they have apparently recognized the need. Question is, if we find, we can’t do it cheaply, will we pursue hard kill systems and how urgent do we see this threat? Responses are due August 20.

Things we could do relatively quickly, put laser designators and APKWS on every Webber class WPB. Convert every 25mm Mk38 to 30mm so that they could fire airburst ammunition.