Ukrainian Armed Forces shoot down a Russian missile with APKWS for the first time (photo: building-tech.org) © RBC-Ukraine

If you are a regular reader of this blog, you know I am a fan of APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System). It is particularly appropriate for the Coast Guard, because:

• It is a proven system against unmanned systems. It may have destroyed more drones than any other system.
• It is a relatively simple system to employ.
• It has a minimal weight and foot print.
• Its precision will minimize the danger of collateral damage.
• Its range is greater than the effective range of improvised weapons a terrorist vessel might use. 
• The effective range is also greater than any Coast Guard weapon with the exception of the 76 and 57 mm guns.
• Multiple hits might damage even relatively large ships.
• It is relatively cheap. For comparison, an all-up APKWS round cost about the same as a single 57mm Mk110 round, the probability of hit is higher, the effective range–about 6,000 yards–may be shorter, but each round can be more destructive.
• There are already a huge number of systems. It is being used on jet fighter planes, helicopters, land based installations, Unmanned Surface Vessels, and the backs of pick-up trucks. Basically it can go anywhere a M2 .50 caliber can go.

My primary purpose here is to point out how many of these guidance kits have been produced and how many more are expected to be produced.

Feb. 24th of this year, BAE reported that they had delivered its 100,000th APKWS laser guidance kit.

In October of this year, BAE got a seven year contract to produce up to 35,000 guidance kits annually. The news release is included below.

If the Coast Guard put eight on every NSC, OPC, FRC, WLB, WLM, Polar Security cutter, and Arctic Security Cutter, planned or in existence (157 ships) that would be only 1246 rounds.

BAE Systems has signed a landmark multi-year framework agreement for up to seven years of multi-year procurement with the U.S. Department of War (DoW) to increase production capacity of APKWS® laser‑guidance kits up to 35,000 units per year, providing surge-ready support for evolving operational demands.

Under the agreement, BAE Systems will increase production while negotiating a multi‑year contract within the framework. APKWS kits are a combat‑proven, cost-effective, multi-mission solution for precision strikes against a range of threats, including the counter‑unmanned aircraft systems (C‑UAS) mission. This framework agreement reinforces the nation’s Arsenal of Freedom by accelerating delivery and strengthening the supply of critical munitions for the U.S. and its allies.

“APKWS delivers proven, reliable and affordable precision at scale to counter evolving threats and ensure our warfighters maintain a decisive advantage,” said Tom Arseneault, president and CEO of BAE Systems, Inc. “This agreement highlights the importance of sustained investment in critical munitions to strengthen readiness and equip forces for evolving operational needs.”

BAE Systems’ APKWS laser-guidance kits transform unguided 2.75-inch rockets into precision-guided munitions. The kits are currently fielded by the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps and Navy, and are available to U.S. allies. The kits can be deployed across a wide range of platforms and are effective in air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air engagements.

Aligned with the DoW’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy, BAE Systems has made sustained investments in advanced manufacturing capacity, materials and human expertise, supported by a robust supply chain and a proven APKWS partner ecosystem. BAE Systems continues to develop upgrades, mission specific variants and new technologies to address emerging threats while expanding capacity to meet future demand.

APKWS laser-guidance kits are produced at BAE Systems’ state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities in Hudson, New Hampshire and Austin, Texas.

Good video and an update on this interesting class we have been following. See my earlier post where I suggested that we might want to look at buying/building some of these, in parallel with the OPCs, since they have a hot production line and they are generally equipped with American weapons. We could probably see the first one in 2029.

PACIFIC OCEAN (March 28, 2025) Members of the U.S. Coast Guard conduct small boat operations with the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) and U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCGC Terrell Horne (WPC 1131) while underway in the Pacific Ocean, March 28, 2025. U.S. Navy assets are employed under U.S. Northern Command’s maritime homeland defense authorities with a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment embarked to enable maritime interdiction missions to prevent the flow of illegal drugs and other illegal activity. U.S. Northern Command is working together with the Department of Homeland Security to augment U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the Southern border with additional military forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joey Sitter)

Real Clear Defense has published an article discussing the growing need for coordination between Homeland Defense and Homeland Security organizations. It was written by Austin Doctor, Ph.D., director of strategic initiatives at the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE), the Department of Homeland Security’s Center of Excellence for counterterrorism research.

“…structural changes bring closer together two mission communities that have, historically, been less conversant. The homeland defense mission, in which the military focuses on protecting against external threats and ensuring U.S. sovereignty, now encompasses threats that originate abroad but move across regional networks and extend into American communities. Conversely, the homeland security mission – in which law enforcement oversees border management and domestic threat prevention – now faces a diverse range of violent criminal actors with transnational linkages who enjoy a level of technological access that was not so long ago a unique privilege of state adversaries.

“The formal line between the two missions still demarcates material differences in authorities, equities, and areas of operational specialization. But the adversary gets a vote. And consequential adversaries are operating across that line and along the seams of our mission structures.”

The Coast Guard is mentioned in two paragraphs,

“Third, ongoing investment in securing the U.S. maritime domain is another, less discussed point of mission convergence. The Navy and Department of War are actively engaged in the protection of ports, military bases, and other coastal assets. A component of DHS, the Coast Guard is an armed service branch that carries organic authority to board, seize, and arrest, which makes it a natural hinge between the two missions. Other DHS components, including Homeland Security Investigations, Border Patrol, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) also lead maritime interdiction activities – often with support from military units. Together, many of these units are working in similar or adjacent waters.

“The growing intersection of missions is perhaps most visible in the interdiction of small boats operated by cartel associates into American waters. Earlier this year, the U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security partner agencies, supported by the U.S. Navy, interdicted five suspected maritime smuggling vessels and apprehended 62 aliens during coordinated operations south of San Clemente Island. Maritime smugglers using pangas – small fiberglass vessels common among fishermen in Mexico – has become a persistent and adaptive tactic among Sinaloa Cartel associates along the California coast. Their tactics have evolved to evade detection and deliver goods further up the California coast. This has involved expanding their range into international waters off the U.S. coastline.

Since the disestablishment of Naval Districts and the centralization of Navy surface assets in only five homeports there really is no Navy presence in or near twelve of the 18 Commercial Strategic Seaports. Depending how they are counted the US has over 300 ports, this puts a grave responsibility on the Coast Guard, one the service is not fully capable of fulfilling without access to support from units of the other armed forces.

A solution might be to rejuvenate the Maritime Defense Zone organizations, reorganizing them to be responsive to both terrorist attacks and unconventional attacks during the open phase of hostilities.

I wanted to introduce this company and its Reconfigurable Integrated weapons Platform (RIwP) because I think it is the type of weapon system the Coast Guard needs to meet current and future threats, including countering unmanned systems, as the primary weapon on buoy tenders, ice breakers, and Webber class, and as a secondary mount on NSCs and OPCs.

This is the Reconfigurable Integrated-Weapons Platform (RIwP) mounted on a 39 foot long Unmanned Surface Vessel. This version includes launchers for four Stinger missiles, eight APKWS, and a 30mm M230 that can fire air burst munitions. 

There are actually two versions,

• Standard RIwP: Built with armored steel, weighs approximately 2,500 lbs, hosts a 30mm cannon (with 115 rounds), and integrates with vehicles like the Stryker (used in the U.S. Army’s M-SHORAD Increment 1 / SGT Stout program), M-ATV, and AMPV.

• Lightweight RIwP (LW RIwP) / Mr. Sled: An aluminum-based platform weighing under 950–1,070 lbs that fits lighter vehicles like the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) to meet U.S. Army M-SHORAD Increment 4 requirements for defeating Group 1 through 4 unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

They are both platform and payload agnostic.

Payloads can be changed in minutes with organic maintenance personnel and minimal lift capability.

They are reconfigurable meaning both sensors and weapons can be changed or upgraded. The two arms can each hold either two loitering munitions, two Hellfire/JAGM, four stingers, or eight APKWS. It can also mount 7.62 mm in addition to a 30mm machine gun.

Narcotics seized during the interdiction of a suspected drug-smuggling vessel approximately 100 miles south of the Dominican Republic, Oct. 5, 2026. The crew of USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul and an embarked U.S. Coast Guard tactical law enforcement team interdicted the vessel, seizing approximately 3,622 pounds of cocaine, with an estimated combined value of $27 million. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

Below is a District SE news release.

A Royal Netherlands Navy maritime patrol aircraft detects a go-fast vessel suspected of drug smuggling in the Caribbean Sea, Oct. 5, 2026. The crew of Coast Guard Cutter William Trump (WPC 1111) interdicted the vessel, resulting in the transfer of approximately 857 pounds of cocaine and two suspected drug smugglers to the Dominican Republic Navy for further processing. (U.S. Coast Guard photo courtesy of Joint Interagency Task Force – South)

Note, Tahoma is not make any interdictions this patrol. I think she would have had better luck if she had been sent to the Eastern Pacific.

This report highlights what I see as something less than the best allocation of resources. It seems the Coast Guard continues to allocate more resources to drug interdiction in the Caribbean than to the Eastern Pacific. This despite the fact that,

1. More drugs are trafficked in the Eastern Pacific than in the Caribbean.
2. Allies assist in drug interdiction in the Caribbean including the Dutch, Canadians, and  British, as a Royal Netherlands Maritime Patrol Aircraft did in this case.
3. The Navy seems to be more inclined to assist in the Caribbean than the Eastern Pacific, with Freedom class LCS based in Mayport, like USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul (LCS-21) that made the seizure of the drugs Tahoma was transporting.
4. The CG has at least 20 Webber class WPC assigned to District SE and at least five more in the Heartland District that are effective drug interdiction platforms, quite capable of operating in the Caribbean.

I can see why this happens. Atlantic Area has more large patrol ships (23) than Pacific Area (9) and sees the Caribbean as their responsibility, while the Eastern Pacific is seen as Pacific Areas responsibility, even though Atlantic Area ships are closer to the Eastern Pacific drug transit zones than Pacific Area ships.

This imbalance could be at least partially addressed by aligning Atlantic Area’s AOR with that of the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet including the 4th Fleet/SOUTHCOM AOR. That would still leave Pacific Area with about 84% of the US EEZ.

US navy fleets areas of responsibility. Source Wikipedia.

Southeast Public Affairs – SoutheastPublicAffairs@uscg.mil 

MIAMI — U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma’s crew offloaded approximately 3,622 pounds of cocaine and four detainees, Wednesday, in Port Everglades.

The offload is from two interdictions resulting in the seizure of the illicit narcotics and the apprehension of four detainees in the Caribbean Sea.

Federal agents took custody of the four detainees, pending further investigation.

“This interdiction was due to the coordinated efforts of Joint Interagency Task Force – South, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Coast Guard Southeast District, along with our international partners throughout the Caribbean Sea,” said Lt. John Colucci, commanding officer of William Trump. “I’m incredibly proud of the crew of CGC William Trump in their ability to carry out this high-risk mission in a safe, efficient, and professional manner. Their success directly prevented illicit narcotics from reaching our shores and disrupted the operations of transnational-criminal organizations throughout the western hemisphere.”

The following assets and crews were involved in the interdiction operations:

• Coast Guard Cutter Diligence
• Coast Guard Cutter William Trump
• USS Minneapolis-Saint Paul
• U.S. Coast Guard Tactical Law Enforcement Team – Pacific, LEDET 105
• A Royal Netherlands Navy maritime patrol aircraft
• A U.S. Customs and Border Protection maritime patrol aircraft
• Joint Interagency Task Force – South
• Southeast District watchstanders

The offload highlights the Coast Guard’s continued efforts to interdict illicit narcotics, disrupt transnational criminal organizations and prevent dangerous drugs from reaching American communities.

The U.S. Coast Guard works alongside local, state, federal and international partners to detect, deter and disrupt maritime drug trafficking. Through persistent operations and coordinated law enforcement efforts, Coast Guard crews help protect the nation’s maritime borders and prevent illicit narcotics from entering the United States.

Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma is a U.S. Coast Guard cutter responsible for conducting maritime law enforcement, search and rescue, and other missions in support of the Coast Guard’s national security and maritime safety objectives.

USCGC Alex Haley moored in Nome, AK.

The US has begun to improve the port of Nome.

The initial phase of the project will extend Nome’s causeway by 1,200 feet and add about 600 feet of new dock face. Phase 1B will add an additional 1,870 feet of dock space, followed by Phase 2 which will primarily focus on deepening the harbor. Phase 3 will widen the port’s inner harbor by shifting the east causeway further east. Additional dredging will occur to aid in inner harbor navigation.

This rendering provided by the City of Nome shows how the Port of Nome, Alaska, will appear following an expansion project. Shipping lanes that were once clogged with ice for much of the year along Alaska’s western and northern coasts have relented thanks to global warming. (PND Engineers Inc./City of Nome via AP)

66 North reports on Russian and Chinese views of the strategic effects of Nome Port expansion, with Russians viewing it as a threat.

“A 2015 article republished by the Russian State Commission for Arctic Development already described Nome as a potential naval base that could provide the U.S. with “control” over passage between the Arctic and Pacific oceans. In 2023, an article in the military journal Arsenal Otechestva situated Nome within expanding American naval activity in the Arctic, which it associated with alleged U.S. ambitions to “displace Russia and internationalize the Northern Sea Route.” The underlying concern has remained quite consistent. The U.S. has never recognized Russia’s legislative authority over the entire Northern Sea Route, and Moscow fears that a stronger American presence could allow Washington to gain leverage over the route’s eastern entry point.”

I doubt the US will lead any effort to internationalize the Northern Sea Route, but the Chinese and Europeans may. If so, the US would likely support that position.

Expanding the port at Nome is of course, important for the Coast Guard, because icebreakers, including the smaller Arctic Security Cutters, and National Security Cutters have too deep a draft to use the harbor currently. (Looks like OPC could use it with no change.) Controlling depth is 22 feet (mean lower low water), meaning ships with draft greater than 18 feet have to anchor offshore and lighter their cargo and passengers to the docks.

The article indicates that the Chinese are much less concerned but recognize that a conflict between Russia and the US could jeopardize access.

My view is that US military interest in the Bering Strait in war time, would be primarily to cut the sea lines of communication between Russian Arctic Ocean ports and Russian and/or possibly Chinese Pacific ports. Because we don’t necessarily need access, it is a sea denial problem and contrary to Russian concerns, doesn’t necessarily require expansion of the port of Nome.

Denial of access to the Bering Sea and the Bering Strait could be done by shore based anti-ship missiles, aircraft, or submarines. We don’t need a naval base at Nome.

A more important move would be to reopen NAS Adak, not only to patrol the Bering Sea, but also to protect the middle of the sea lanes between the lower 48 and Asia which pass near the Aleutians.

Great Circle route, Seattle to Japan

Lt. Holly Harrison, commanding officer of the Coast Guard Cutter Aquidneck homeported in Atlantic Beach, N.C., smiles before departing for the crew’s first patrol in the Middle East. (U.S. Coast Guard/Public Affairs Specialist 1st Class Tom Sperduto)

Ran across a good article that describes how the first WPBs ended up in Bahrain, and the early career of an officer who later commanded a National Security Cutter.

Captain Holly Harrison, commanding officer of the Coast Guard Cutter Kimball, speaks during a commissioning ceremony at Base Honolulu, August 24, 2019. (U.S. Coast Guard/Petty Officer 3rd Class Matthew West)

U010 Aliaca unmanned aerial vehicle –Airbus

Naval Today reports,

The French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) has ordered the vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) version of Airbus Helicopters’ U010 Aliaca unmanned aerial vehicle, with initial deployments planned for late 2026.

The French Navy will begin deploying the VTOL version of the U010 Aliaca drone on metropolitan support and assistance vessels (BSAMs) in late 2026, followed by overseas support and assistance vessels (BSAOMs) in 2027, according to Airbus Helicopters.

These are to equip ships that were never designed to operate aircraft but which do coast guard type tasks. Notably these ships have a crew smaller than a Webber class WPC.

Info on the UAS here:

“Aliaca has a maximum take-off weight of 25 kg, a wingspan of 3.6 metres (11.811 feet–Chuck), and a length of 2.2 metres. The electric version offers up to three hours’ endurance and a 50-kilometre data-link range, while the hybrid version offers up to six hours’ endurance and a 100-kilometre radius of operation.”

I think the Coast Guard is probably looking at similar VTOL UAS to provide small vessels an over the horizon search capability. V-BAT VTOL UAVs are already being used on National Security Cutters, but I still don’t think they are being used on MECs. The Coast Guard does have some experience operating VTOL UAS from smaller units.

221207-N-NO146-1001 ARABIAN GULF (Dec. 7, 2022) An Aerovel Flexrotor unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) takes off from U.S. Coast Guard fast response cutter USCGC Emlen Tunnell (WPC 1145) transiting the Arabian Gulf, Dec. 7. U.S. 5th Fleet’s Task Force 59 launched the UAV during Digital Horizon, a three-week event focused on integrating new unmanned and artificial intelligence platforms, including 10 that are in the region for the first time. (U.S. Navy photo)

Above is a YouTube video. The accompanying explanation is immediately below,

“U.S. Coast Guard Petty Officer 2nd Class Gabriel Wisdom explains the intricacies of the Coast Guard’s personal watercraft program, a law enforcement training program conducted on small watercraft commonly called jet skis, at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C., on Aug. 4, 2026. The PWC program was created to counter human-smuggling threats on the Southwest Border near San Diego.”

One of our regular readers sent it to me. Unfortunately I lost track of who it was, but thank you.

Pohjanmaa Ice Strengthened Corvette

Just ran across a short post, “Rauma Shipyard Launches Third Pohjanmaa-Class Corvette for the Finnish Navy.” (Description here)

(Wonder if they are being made by the same yard making the Arctic Security Cutter?)

I found that the yard building these ships is the same yard working with Bollinger to build Arctic Security Cutters.

(We are way behind on building large patrol cutters. Maybe we could do something like the Arctic Security Program, Maybe build two in Finland and the rest in the US.)

The Finns are in the middle of the program now, but they are moving fast. The first contract Was awarded 26 September 2019. First steel was cut 30 Oct 2023. Of the four ships planned, three have already been launched. All are expected to be delivered 2027 to 2029.

(They have a hot production line. Maybe we could take advantage of that.)

The US has no ice strengthened warships even though we are an Arctic Nation. These ships are designed to operate in difficult ice conditions with ice thickness typically greater than 0.5 to 1.0 meter, approximating Ice Class 1A. That is not to say they are icebreakers. They would normally follow an icebreaker.

(This is another example of where we can benefit from the Finns’ experience.)

The US Navy has no minelayers. These ships could also provide that capability. Maybe even the Hammerhead encapsulated torpedo mine.

Of course they should also function as WMECs. They are designed for an MEC size crew (70) but have accommodations for up to 120.

It is a long way from my original Cutter X concept, but the world has become more hostile.