Seized narcotics sit on the deck of Coast Guard Cutter Charles Sexton, Oct. 28, 2026, off Cartagena, Colombia. The crew interdicted two suspected drug vessels carrying approximately 10,900 pounds of cocaine worth an estimated $89.2 million. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

Below is a news release from CG HQ. (Note, not from District SE or LANT AREA. I think this is because of an interest in putting the individual unit efforts in the context of the total national effort reflected in the last two paragraphs of the release.)

Two things to note.

First the use of disabling fire in both cases by a WPC. We are used to seeing disabling fire from helicopters of the highly trained HITRON (Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron, but lately we are seeing it more frequently from Webber class WPCs that are too small to deploy with a helicopter. I am curious what weapon they are using to do disabling fire. The helicopters use a .50 caliber sniper rifle.

Second these interdictions took place deep in the Caribbean, about as far South as drug interdiction units need to go. This essentially shows that Webber class WPC can do drug interdiction anywhere in the Caribbean that we might use a WMEC or NSC.

Formerly operated by the US Coast Guard as USCGC Marlin (WPB-87304) and USCGC Bluefin (WPB-87318), the vessels were turned over to the PCG on August 20 at the Waterfront Operational Training Center in Baltimore, Maryland, following the completion of specialized operational and maintenance training by 24 PCG crew members. Note the hull number includes a two digit length in meters and a two digit unit number. 

An Indo-Pacific Defense Forum report, “Philippine Coast Guard bolsters surveillance with turboprop planes from U.S” includes the following.

“The PCG also has received U.S. Coast Guard 26-meter Marine Protector-class patrol boats and will take possession of larger former U.S. Coast Guard ships, including a 64-meter Reliance-class cutter. The Philippine military acquired four autonomous sea vessels from the U.S. in June 2026 to boost monitoring of maritime threats.”

I got this from Google AI,

“The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) has received and transferred former United States Coast Guard (USCG) vessels, most notably two Marine Protector-class coastal patrol boats formally handed over in August 2026:

• BRP Pag-asa (PATS-2701) — formerly the USCGC Marlin (WPB-87304)
• BRP Patag (PATS-2702) — formerly the USCGC Bluefin (WPB-87318)

Coast Guard members, in collaboration with the FAA, the Seattle Police Department (SPD), and Mercer Island Police Department (MIPD), employ Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) capabilities to enforce the FAA-issued Temporary Flight Restrictions on Lake Washington during the 2023 Seafair Weekend Festival in support of the Airshow August 3, 2023. This was the first year Coast Guard Counter-UAS has been employed at Seafair. (U.S. Coast Guard courtesy photo)

The Coast Guard is already starting to do counter UAS operations. A hard kill capability seems necessary. They should be represented in this effort reported by AirForce Technologies. 

“Five US federal departments have agreed an expanded approach to coordinating counter-uncrewed aircraft system operations, including a process for evaluating technologies before their deployment.

“The memorandum of understanding (MoU), announced on 9 November, establishes a “whole-of-government approach” across the Department of War (DoW), the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Transportation (DoT), the Department of Energy and the Department of Justice.”

USCGC Bollard (WYTL-65614)

Workboat reports,

“The Coast Guard is seeking information from commercial vessel operators capable of supporting domestic icebreaking operations in Northeast waterways this winter.

“A request for information issued Oct. 21 calls for U.S.-flag, coastwise-qualified vessels capable of operating in ice 4″ to 18″ thick. Operators would need to mobilize in the Northeast by Jan. 2, 2027, to support operations aimed at keeping commercial channels open, moving critical cargo and addressing ice-related emergencies.

This reminds me a bit of the way local governments in the NE hire locals with a snow plow on their 4×4 trucks to clear the streets. This did apparently come out of District NE.

“Potential operating areas include Boston Harbor and its tributaries; Cape Cod Canal and Buzzards Bay; Hyannis, Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard, Mass.; Narragansett Bay, R.I., and its tributaries; and waterways serving Bridgeport, Stamford and New Haven, Conn.”

Thanks to Paul for bringing this to my attention.

U.S. Coast Guard Special Purpose Craft–Ice Rescue Transport Second Generation boats, known as SPC-IRT IIs, are designed to support search-and-rescue and all-hazard missions in the challenging winter conditions of the Great Lakes. Coast Guard photo courtesy of 1000 Island Airboats.

Workboat reports,

“The Coast Guard has awarded 1000 Island Airboats, Marion, Wis., a contract worth up to $6.13 million for as many as 10 ice rescue boats for Great Lakes operations.

“The initial $4.9 million order covers eight 25′ Special Purpose Craft–Ice Rescue Transport Second Generation boats (SPC-IRT IIs), specialized transport trailers, operator training and technical data support. The contract has a three-year performance period, with delivery of the first two boats expected in December 2026.”

Thanks to Paul for bringing this to my attention. 

MSC Poesia (Wikimedia Commons / Pjotr Mahhonin)

Below is a District SE news release. Sorry, I am a bit late in posting this, but thought it was worth knowing that the Coast Guard had done this.

More information here.

Below is a CENTCOM news release, yet another example of how to disable ship. Note how precisely the missile hits the stern. I suspect it was at very low altitude and destroyed the rudder. Looks like the filming was done by two drones rather than the missile launch platform.

Ukrainian Armed Forces shoot down a Russian missile with APKWS for the first time (photo: building-tech.org) © RBC-Ukraine

If you are a regular reader of this blog, you know I am a fan of APKWS (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System). It is particularly appropriate for the Coast Guard, because:

• It is a proven system against unmanned systems. It may have destroyed more drones than any other system.
• It is a relatively simple system to employ.
• It has a minimal weight and foot print.
• Its precision will minimize the danger of collateral damage.
• Its range is greater than the effective range of improvised weapons a terrorist vessel might use. 
• The effective range is also greater than any Coast Guard weapon with the exception of the 76 and 57 mm guns.
• Multiple hits might damage even relatively large ships.
• It is relatively cheap. For comparison, an all-up APKWS round cost about the same as a single 57mm Mk110 round, the probability of hit is higher, the effective range–about 6,000 yards–may be shorter, but each round can be more destructive.
• There are already a huge number of systems. It is being used on jet fighter planes, helicopters, land based installations, Unmanned Surface Vessels, and the backs of pick-up trucks. Basically it can go anywhere a M2 .50 caliber can go.

My primary purpose here is to point out how many of these guidance kits have been produced and how many more are expected to be produced.

Feb. 24th of this year, BAE reported that they had delivered its 100,000th APKWS laser guidance kit.

In October of this year, BAE got a seven year contract to produce up to 35,000 guidance kits annually. The news release is included below.

If the Coast Guard put eight on every NSC, OPC, FRC, WLB, WLM, Polar Security cutter, and Arctic Security Cutter, planned or in existence (157 ships) that would be only 1246 rounds.

BAE Systems has signed a landmark multi-year framework agreement for up to seven years of multi-year procurement with the U.S. Department of War (DoW) to increase production capacity of APKWS® laser‑guidance kits up to 35,000 units per year, providing surge-ready support for evolving operational demands.

Under the agreement, BAE Systems will increase production while negotiating a multi‑year contract within the framework. APKWS kits are a combat‑proven, cost-effective, multi-mission solution for precision strikes against a range of threats, including the counter‑unmanned aircraft systems (C‑UAS) mission. This framework agreement reinforces the nation’s Arsenal of Freedom by accelerating delivery and strengthening the supply of critical munitions for the U.S. and its allies.

“APKWS delivers proven, reliable and affordable precision at scale to counter evolving threats and ensure our warfighters maintain a decisive advantage,” said Tom Arseneault, president and CEO of BAE Systems, Inc. “This agreement highlights the importance of sustained investment in critical munitions to strengthen readiness and equip forces for evolving operational needs.”

BAE Systems’ APKWS laser-guidance kits transform unguided 2.75-inch rockets into precision-guided munitions. The kits are currently fielded by the U.S. Air Force, Army, Marine Corps and Navy, and are available to U.S. allies. The kits can be deployed across a wide range of platforms and are effective in air-to-surface, surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-air engagements.

Aligned with the DoW’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy, BAE Systems has made sustained investments in advanced manufacturing capacity, materials and human expertise, supported by a robust supply chain and a proven APKWS partner ecosystem. BAE Systems continues to develop upgrades, mission specific variants and new technologies to address emerging threats while expanding capacity to meet future demand.

APKWS laser-guidance kits are produced at BAE Systems’ state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities in Hudson, New Hampshire and Austin, Texas.

Good video and an update on this interesting class we have been following. See my earlier post where I suggested that we might want to look at buying/building some of these, in parallel with the OPCs, since they have a hot production line and they are generally equipped with American weapons. We could probably see the first one in 2029.

PACIFIC OCEAN (March 28, 2025) Members of the U.S. Coast Guard conduct small boat operations with the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Spruance (DDG 111) and U.S. Coast Guard cutter USCGC Terrell Horne (WPC 1131) while underway in the Pacific Ocean, March 28, 2025. U.S. Navy assets are employed under U.S. Northern Command’s maritime homeland defense authorities with a U.S. Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment embarked to enable maritime interdiction missions to prevent the flow of illegal drugs and other illegal activity. U.S. Northern Command is working together with the Department of Homeland Security to augment U.S. Customs and Border Protection along the Southern border with additional military forces. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Joey Sitter)

Real Clear Defense has published an article discussing the growing need for coordination between Homeland Defense and Homeland Security organizations. It was written by Austin Doctor, Ph.D., director of strategic initiatives at the National Counterterrorism Innovation, Technology, and Education Center (NCITE), the Department of Homeland Security’s Center of Excellence for counterterrorism research.

“…structural changes bring closer together two mission communities that have, historically, been less conversant. The homeland defense mission, in which the military focuses on protecting against external threats and ensuring U.S. sovereignty, now encompasses threats that originate abroad but move across regional networks and extend into American communities. Conversely, the homeland security mission – in which law enforcement oversees border management and domestic threat prevention – now faces a diverse range of violent criminal actors with transnational linkages who enjoy a level of technological access that was not so long ago a unique privilege of state adversaries.

“The formal line between the two missions still demarcates material differences in authorities, equities, and areas of operational specialization. But the adversary gets a vote. And consequential adversaries are operating across that line and along the seams of our mission structures.”

The Coast Guard is mentioned in two paragraphs,

“Third, ongoing investment in securing the U.S. maritime domain is another, less discussed point of mission convergence. The Navy and Department of War are actively engaged in the protection of ports, military bases, and other coastal assets. A component of DHS, the Coast Guard is an armed service branch that carries organic authority to board, seize, and arrest, which makes it a natural hinge between the two missions. Other DHS components, including Homeland Security Investigations, Border Patrol, and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) also lead maritime interdiction activities – often with support from military units. Together, many of these units are working in similar or adjacent waters.

“The growing intersection of missions is perhaps most visible in the interdiction of small boats operated by cartel associates into American waters. Earlier this year, the U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security partner agencies, supported by the U.S. Navy, interdicted five suspected maritime smuggling vessels and apprehended 62 aliens during coordinated operations south of San Clemente Island. Maritime smugglers using pangas – small fiberglass vessels common among fishermen in Mexico – has become a persistent and adaptive tactic among Sinaloa Cartel associates along the California coast. Their tactics have evolved to evade detection and deliver goods further up the California coast. This has involved expanding their range into international waters off the U.S. coastline.

Since the disestablishment of Naval Districts and the centralization of Navy surface assets in only five homeports there really is no Navy presence in or near twelve of the 18 Commercial Strategic Seaports. Depending how they are counted the US has over 300 ports, this puts a grave responsibility on the Coast Guard, one the service is not fully capable of fulfilling without access to support from units of the other armed forces.

A solution might be to rejuvenate the Maritime Defense Zone organizations, reorganizing them to be responsive to both terrorist attacks and unconventional attacks during the open phase of hostilities.