Below is a post from MyCG. On the MyCG website it says,

“What you can do now to help make the new site better”

Obviously, I was interested. I thought maybe I would ask my readers to offer feedback. This is supposed to be a public-facing website, and we are the public, whereas most readers of MyCG are internal to the organization.

But looking down at “What should members do?” the only thing I see in terms of making the site better is, “Participate when asked.  Your feedback will directly influence the final website and contribute to ongoing improvements post-launch.”

Currently there are a lot of public-facing website such as news by region and many that are directed primarily to service members but accessible to the public like the district websites. CG-9 has a web site. Individual ships and other units have websites and Facebook pages.

I have also seen a need to improve Coast Guard websites and keep them up to date. What I see in this notice also seems to be an attempt to restrict what is said. I have not seen a problem with what has been made public, but this is what it says:

• “…making content management…more consistent for all audiences.
• “…fragmentation makes it harder…to keep information…compliant.
• “Every decision in the process is guided by leadership…
• “Present a…more consistent Coast Guard brand to the public
• “All content will use approved templates, standardized tags…
• “Present a…more consistent Coast Guard brand to the public
• “Stronger governance and brand alignment
• CG-OPA will manage the content approval process for adding or changing public web content. This ensures updates are…aligned with Coast Guard priorities. A dedicated Brand Team will also formalize visual identity, tone, and voice standards.

I can see a single site to pass along information on Coast Guard units, their location and characteristics and to provide information on history, budget requests and status, contracting and other questions of national importance to the general public, but I hope the Coast Guard will not limit public access to just this one website. Multiple websites exist because they address different audiences. A top down requirement for approval will delay distribution and limit response to local news agencies.

CG-OPA should also be making sure unofficial outlets have correct and up to date information. This seems to be being done. Wikipedia and the Navy League’s Seapower Almanac frequently seem to be more up to date than Coast Guard websites.

Nevertheless, as a user of public information sites, the Coast Guard does a great job, much better than the Navy. I believe that is because we have done, what the Coast Guard has always done, pushed decision making down to the local level.

That is not to say HQ should not be checking on what they do.

JORN, a network of three over-the-horizon radar facilities, is a strategic and early-warning asset for Australia. Canada is buying a similar system. (Australian Defence Force)

Defense News reports,

“CHRISTCHURCH, New Zealand — The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), operated by Canada and the United States, has gaping holes in its airspace radar coverage. Ottawa went some way to filling those gaps when it signed four related agreements in June for a new radar system sourced from Australia.

“The system is called the Arctic Over-The-Horizon Radar (A-OTHR), and the deal is worth some US$1.75 billion to Australia.

Not mentioned is the fact that these systems can detect surface targets as well air targets. New Over the Horizon radars will be an important element in Arctic Maritime Domain Awareness.

More info here: “Australia, Canada formalize Arctic over-the-horizon radar deal” –The Watch. 

Two very large and exposed LNG fuel tanks aboard the Chinese-built and operated Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) Yuan Rui Yang (IMO: 9843326)

Covert shores points out the potential dangers associated with alternative fuels being used on merchant ships.

“Increasingly we are seeing new fuel types being used by merchant ships. This trend is driven by environmental regulations (regardless of their current status at the IMO – International Maritime Organization), which pushes ship operators toward equipping merchant ships to operate on alternative fuels. The fuels of interest ate liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), liquid ammonia (NH₃), and methanal (MeOH).”

This is obviously a Port Security issue, but really may become an issue in SAR cases or Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security missions.

It is one more reason we need to be able to counter drones, and we need weapons that target with precision and minimum collateral damage.

The article makes much of the fact that frequently these fuel tanks are exposed, but perhaps internal tanks may be equally dangerous and less obvious.

I have long felt that the Coast Guard needs a yard on the West Coast, and that the former Mare Island Naval Shipyard is an opportunity that should not be missed.

The August (Coast Guard issue) of US Naval Institute Proceedings has an article that also suggests that with a special emphasis, “Reclaim Mare Island as an NSC Center of Excellence,” seeing it not only as a Coast Guard repair facility but also a relief for the Navy’s current repair backlog, particularly for the new frigate based on the National Security Cutter

This was the first prize winning entry in the Coast Guard Essay contest.

It seems the need for a Pacific side Coast Guard Yard is being felt. It was also mentioned in two other places in the same issue of Proceedings.

The Yard in Vallejo was the yard that did the rolling Service Life Extension on Polar Star.

Ships built in Vallejo

Vallejo has one of the lowest costs of living of any port on the West Coast, less than San Diego, LA, or Seattle. It has generally good weather with little likelihood of damaging winds. It is near a major labor market, but not close enough to any existing government shipyard to draw talent from an existing facility.

The administration has expressed a desire to increase shipyard capacity, and the Navy is considering opening a fifth shipyard.

Logically I think given that since China is the pacing threat, and most of the Pacific Fleet is in San Diego there is a need for a Government yard in California. Whether it is Coast Guard run or Navy run or some kind of joint venture, reopening a government yard in Vallejo is too good an opportunity to miss.

U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Douglas Denman (WPC-1149), U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kukui (WLB-203), U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Haddock (WPB-87347), U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Barracuda (WPB-87301) and U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Forrest Rednour (WPC-1129) transit in formation during a photo exercise off the coast of San Diego, July 23, 2026. The underway formation highlighted the Coast Guard’s diverse fleet of surface assets operating together in the maritime domain. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Chris Sappey)

Below is a District Arctic news release. Can’t help but think this is a symptom of cutter shortage in Pacific Area.

It also seems to indicate the continued usefulness of WPBs, although there is, as yet, no plan to procure a direct replacement, even though we have begun decommissioning them.  Apparently in some cases they are replaced by Webber class WPC and in others by Response Boat, Mediums. I still think there is a requirement for true Response Boat, Large.

In smaller ports the new larger motor surf boat might serve this purpose, but in more critical ports we need a capable response to any over water terrorist attack.

• 19 meter (62 foot) Motor Surf Boat, Maybe a Small Port WPB Alternative, July 2019
• The 87 foot WPB Replacement, an Addendum, Apr. 2019
• Marine Protector class WPB replacement? Its Time!, Sept. 2017

Douglas Denman’s ship U.S. Navy high-speed transport USS Colhoun (APD-2) underway to Guadalcanal. She carried units of the 1st Marine Raider Battalion in the initial assault landings on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and continued to serve as both transport and antisubmarine vessel in support of the invasion. At 1400 on 30 August, while Colhoun was on patrol off Guadalcanal, she was sunk in a Japanese air raid.

M-SHORAD is short for Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense. Photo by Christopher Kaufmann

Defense Blog reports,

• Leonardo DRS said its SGT STOUT M-SHORAD system defeated Group 1-2 drone threats during a U.S. government test event using only software updates.
• The Army has fielded SGT STOUT battalions to Germany, Fort Sill, Fort Hood and Fort Bragg, with 36 vehicles per battalion.

I am looking at the mount and the high definition, short range radars, much like what we saw on the PATFORSWA cutters.

That tells us this system is effective against all classes of one way “Kamikaze” attack drones, helicopters and low flying aircraft. It should have a capability against glide bombs and cruise missiles too.

If we traded one of the four pack of Stinger missiles for a pair of Hellfire or JAGM we would have a very capable anti-surface weapon with a range out to 8,000 meters–8.5 nautical miles if JAGM-MR is used. Hellfire has a proven capability to forcibly stop even large merchant ships which I see as a capability requirement implicit in the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions and one which would be required to enforce a blockade, a likely wartime mission.

These mounts are small enough to put on any cutter. They could replace .50 calibers and  arm buoy tenders and icebreakers without significant impact on ship’s stability or manning requirements. They could turn all cutters into mobile defensive positions to protect assets in harbors. All large cutters should probably have two mounts to provide 360 degree fields of fire.

There are of course other short range air defense systems and other remote weapons stations, but this one is relatively small, already proven, and in quantity production.

Navy/Coast Guard Cooperation. USCG Cmdr Harold S. Berdine of cutter Spencer talking with US Navy Capt Paul Heineman of the Escort Group A-3 after sinking German submarine U-175, North Atlantic, 500 nautical miles WSW of Ireland, 17 Apr 1943. US Coast Guard photo by Jack January

CIMSEC provides a study of the command structure of Naval/Coast Guard activities in the Western Hemisphere.

“The United States should designate the U.S. Coast Guard as its lead agency for maritime security in the Western Hemisphere. In military command and control terminology, this would make the Coast Guard the “supported” service with all other armed services and federal agencies as “supporting” services. Such a designation would reverse the customary approach for the Navy to lead at sea, but this reversal is long overdue.”

The author has a rather unique background.

“Bruce Stubbs had assignments on the staffs of the secretary of the Navy and the chief of naval operations from 2009 to 2022 as a member of the U.S. Senior Executive Service. He was a former director of Strategy and Strategic Concepts in the N3N5 and N7 directorates. As a career U.S. Coast Guard officer, he had a posting as the assistant commandant for capability in Headquarters, served on the staff of the National Security Council, taught at the Naval War College, commanded a major cutter, and served a combat tour with the U.S. Navy in Vietnam during the 1972 Easter Offensive.”

It is a complex article, some of which I agree with, some not so much, but highly recommended.

Surveillance, Tracking, Intelligence, Network Services, Global Reconnaissance, Analysis, and Interceptions (STINGRAI) in support of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

Below is an HII news release. Certainly something the Coast Guard is interested in. Will this track aircraft as well as surface contacts? Subsurface? Do we want something similar for Maritime Domain Awareness off the US coast? What is the system’s classification level?

This could be very important.

McLean, Va., August 11, 2026 — HII (NYSE: HII) announced today that its Mission Technologies division has been awarded a $2.2 billion task order to deliver advanced Surveillance, Tracking, Intelligence, Network Services, Global Reconnaissance, Analysis, and Interceptions (STINGRAI) in support of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

STINGRAI will enhance SOUTHCOM’s ability to detect, monitor, and disrupt illicit activity across Central America, South America, and the Caribbean, while strengthening integrated intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities essential to defending the U.S. homeland and national interests.

HII will lead an integrated team to provide SOUTHCOM and partner nations with a comprehensive suite of intelligence gathering capabilities, advanced technologies and adaptable innovative all-domain platforms for high-level operational readiness and preparedness.

“This award is an incredible opportunity and goes right to the heart of what SOUTHCOM needs — clearer visibility, faster decision making, and the ability to stay ahead of rapidly changing threats. Our team understands the complexity of this region, and we’re proud to support the command with solutions that help protect U.S. interests and strengthen security across the hemisphere,” said Andy Green, executive vice president of HII and president of HII’s Mission Technologies division.

The program supports SOUTHCOM’s mission to counter transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and drug trafficking organizations, and provides commanders with greater flexibility to respond to emerging threats and shifts in regional security dynamics.

The task order was awarded under the General Services Administration (GSA) ASTRO Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, issued by GSA Assisted Acquisition Services (AAS) Defense and has a period of performance of one base year with six option years.

USCGC Duane conducting Naval Gun Fire Support in South Vietnam.

I got a question on an earlier post about a very heavily armed small offshore patrol vessel. TTECJJ5 asked, “Who determines what armaments come to the Coast Guard?”

I started writing an answer, but as it got longer, I realized this needs to be a separate post so hopefully, more people will see it.

I think there is a really planning void in how Coast Guard vessels (and aircraft) are armed. The Navy does not seem really interested (Don’t want to push things on to the Coast Guard–don’t want to divert money from Navy programs) and the Coast Guard does not seem to be advocating for additional capability (Let’s just do the same thing we have done since we got rid of the ASW capability after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 35 years ago).

The 57mm Mk110 gun is an exception in a way, in that the Bertholf was the first US ship equipped with the weapon, but, in capability, it has basically the same tasks 5″ and 3″ guns had on CG ships since the 1940s. It is not as good at naval gun fire support as the 5″, which cutter did a lot of in Vietnam. The 57mm became a standard USN weapon. Unfortunately while it was probably an improvement over the 80 round per minute 76mm gun on the WMEC270s, it was not as good as the much improved super rapid 120 round per minute 76mm that had been introduced in 1988.

We have missed the opportunity to use recycled 5″/54 Mk45 guns from decommissioned Navy ships on the NSCs and we are now missing the opportunity to recycle more modern 5″/62 guns onto the OPCs. With 5″ guns cutters could have had a role as naval gun fire support specialists.

Basically I think there is not much thought given to what Coast Guard ships will do in a war with Russia and/or China. They really need an ASW capability.

There also does not seem to be much consideration given to our Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission. As I have noted many times, we are not equipped to stop even medium sized merchant ships that might be used in a terrorist attack.

The emergence of the threat of unmanned systems also seems to demand that the Coast Guard should start to do things differently.

Bottom line, to do our peacetime missions,

• we need to be able to defend our units and near by assets from unmanned air and surface threats
• we need to be able to defend our units and near by assets from suicidal attacks by general aviation aircraft.
• we need to be able to destroy small surface craft and forcibly stop any surface vessel up to and including super tanker size to keep it from getting to its target long enough for more capable weapons to arrive.

In addition, to play a useful role in wartime our large ships need

• to be able to cooperate fully in a multiunit formation, we need “Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)”
• the ability to support Navy MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters including provision for storage of sonar buoys and torpedoes
• a towed array active/passive sonar system
• self defense capability against cruise missiles, glide bombs, and low altitude aircraft–like SeaRAM

Less urgent perhaps, but something useful, Mk41 VLS which would allow the ship to provide additional magazine space for ESSM and VL ASROC for the ship’s own use or Standard missiles and Tomahawk, that could be controlled by other units though CEC.