The Chinese research vessel Xue Long transits the United States’ exclusive economic zone and over the U.S.’s extended continental shelf in the Bering Sea in July 2026. U.S. COAST GUARD

(Note: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) was officially renamed back to the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) on June 16–17, 2026.)

The Pacific Area’s Indo-Pacific Defense Forum reports,

The United States Coast Guard tracked four Chinese Communist Party (CCP) research vessels in international waters off Alaska in September 2026 amid indications that Beijing is increasing its Arctic presence. In 2025, five CCP ships conducted work in the region, according to U.S. Coast Guard Rear Adm. Bob Little, who commands the service’s Arctic District.

“Where I have responsibility, interest and concern is when they are operating in and around U.S. sovereign space,” Little told the Reuters news agency during a visit to Oslo, Norway, to speak at an Arctic security conference. “So inside of our exclusive economic zones or over our extended continental shelf, we certainly have a security concern.”

These vessels may be doing mapping and research for the Chinese Navy but as long as they stay out of the 12 mile territorial sea while they are doing it, it is all quite legal, even if it is in the US EEZ or over the extended continental shelf. That is not likely to change since we want to do similar research just outside China and Russia’s territorial sea.

A concern might be if we have sensors or other infrastructure on the sea floor and they attempt to damage or tap into it. 

Over the long term, China argues that the Arctic Ocean and its high seas constitute a “global commons” and the common heritage of all mankind, rather than the exclusive domain of the eight Arctic Council nations. I don’t see the US disputing that as long as they recognize Exclusive Economic Zones and extended continental shelves, but as you can see below, that leaves relatively little unclaimed area and what there is can be difficult to access. (Claims to extended continental shelf, which would further restrict exploitation, are still largely unsettled.)

Arctic Exclusive Economic Zones (This does not include claims to extended continental shelf.)

Rajah Sulayman-class OPV BRP Rajah Sulayman (PS-20) 19 January 2026, Philippine Navy photo

Army Recognition reports the launch of the third of six new Korean built Offshore Patrol Vessels for the Philippine Navy.

These may be important ships in the Philippine’s ongoing disagreement with China. Since these look an awful lot like Coast Guard cutters, thought I would provide some description. Wikipedia has more complete information.

Note that the first of class was laid down 5 February 2025 and commissioned 24 February 2026. The ship was built in less than a year. The second of class was commissioned 9 June, 2026.

• Length: 94.5 m (310 ft 0 in)
• Beam: 14.3 m (46 ft 11 in)
• Draft: 3.6 m (11 ft 10 in)
• Speed: 22 knots
• Range: 5500 nautical miles at 15 knots
• Complement: 72
• 1 × 76mm Oto Melara Super Rapidmain gun
• 2 × 30mm Aselsan SMASH 200/30RCWS secondary guns
• 2 × 12.7mm heavy machine guns

Wikipedia notes,

GeoSpectrum Technologies Inc. of Canada was selected by Hyundai Heavy Industries to supply three (3) units of its TRAPS (“Towed Reelable Active Passive Sonar”) towed-array sonar system as part of the weapons and sensor systems acquisition project of the Philippine Navy for the Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessels.

Her length reminds me of my first ship, USCGC McCullough (WHEC-386), a “311” about the same size. When I was on her, she a 5″/38, two M32 triple torpedo tubes, Hedgehogs, and a hull mounted sonar. And of course we had a much larger crew.

Defense News reports, “What is the US Army doing in Panama? A bit of everything.”

If Army can be there, maybe Coast Guard could be too. Latin America finds Coast Guard white hulls less offensive than USN gray hulls. It looks like the Coast Guard already has good relations with their Panamanian counterparts.

If we could put a PATFORSWA like squadron of six Webber class WPCs based at the Pacific end of the Panama Canal it would make drug interdiction in the Eastern Pacific a lot easier, and they would be in position to help defend the canal from unconventional attacks.

They might be the first place we should put counter-UxS systems on WPCs. (I think we may have already done that on the cutters that were assigned to PATFORSWA, but we can do better.)

(We might sweeten the deal by making it a joint US/Panamanian squadron by gifting three of the six ships to Panama.)

(Costa Rica might be an alternative. Good relations between the USCG and Costa  Rican CG for decades.)

Xue Long 2 on sea trials. Photo by PRIC.

CIMSEC has an article that might serve as a brief overview of some of the innovative Gray Zone activities being done by the Chinese (and the Russians). Among these are anchor drags and use of UUV.

These activities are not limited to areas inside the first island chain and include Arctic and US waters.

Textron Systems’ TSUNAMI 25 uncrewed surface vessel will support U.S. Navy Fourth Fleet and SOUTHCOM trials in Key West, combining high-speed maritime surveillance, autonomous interdiction support, and potential precision armament for counter-drug and littoral security missions (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

If you are regular reader here you know I am a fan of APKWS, the (Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System). Thousands are being made. It is light, cheap, accurate, and easy to use, but effective against unmanned air and surface systems and able to actually hurt a ship at a range of more than 5,000 yards (some sources say 10 kM).

I have been hoping the Navy would develop a maritime surface launcher that would become common enough to be added to Coast Guard cutters. We are not there yet, but it looks like they may be getting close.

The photo above is from a “Seapower” article reporting experiments with unmanned surface craft in 4th Fleet. (More here)

The video above is also a Navy program.

The Army is also getting this system. (More here.)

Interestingly the CROWS II remote weapon station used in the EAGLS system was in service with the Coast Guard at least as early as 2009 (Photo below).

Maybe if the Coast Guard specifically asked for this capability on all their WPCs (or all their cutters), it might help to move things along.

KEYPORT, Wash. (Aug. 18, 2009) U. S. Coast Guardsmen man the rails as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Sea Fox (WPB 87374) is brought to life at Naval Base Kitsap. (U.S. Navy photo Ray Narimatsu/Released) On the bow is a CROWS II remote weapon station.

USS Gridley (DDG 101) destroys a drug smuggling go-fast vessel after the suspects were arrested by a US Coast Guard Law Enforcement detachment and the drug shipment was seized. Eastern Pacific Sept 21, 2026 [Album]

USS Gridley (DDG-101) was listed in the release but without any details given. Apparently she had at least one of the interdictions. Thought she should get some credit.

Guess the cartels are still moving drugs by sea.

The USCGC Sycamore (WLB 209) crew participates in a navigation exercise with a HDMS Knud Rasmussen (P570), a Royal Danish Navy Knud Rasmussen-class patrol vessel and the FNS Fulmar (P740), a French Navy patrol vessel, off the coast of Southern Greenland, June 13, 2023. Deployed forces demonstrated U.S. Coast Guard capabilities to build partner capacity and expertise in search and rescue, navigation, and damage control. These efforts solidify key strategic relationships while achieving mutual Danish, Greenlandic, and U.S. goals in the North American Atlantic Arctic and Northwest Atlantic Ocean. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Lt. Cmdr. Katherine Blue)

The US Naval Institute has an interesting article written by an old fiend. I think he identifies a real problem but I can’t agree with his solution. Briefly his position is that,

“Of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions, only five align under the Department of Homeland Security. Three (Marine Safety, Environmental Protection, and Aids to Navigation) should be reassigned to other government departments and agencies.”

If you are a regular reader, you know I think we are not really ready for the “Defense Readiness” or “Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security” missions but I don’t think that is because we have other missions. Historically I don’t believe those missions were taken seriously by DHS. DHS is focused on Migrant interdiction and to a lesser extent Drug interdiction. This means ICE and Customs and border protection are their primary instruments. (Yes, the Coast Guard got an infusion of cash in the 2025 reconciliation (the “Big Beautiful Bill”)  but ICE and CBP got much larger funding and also got another huge funding increase in the 2026 reconciliation.) In years when funding is tight DHS tends to favor those agencies over the Coast Guard knowing that the Coast Guard, unlike the others, has strong bipartisan support and will get everything the administration asks for along with some additions. Since there is a tendency to make as few increases as possible in the budget, increasing the Coast Guard budget might result in cuts elsewhere in the DHS budget.

When congress tells the Commandant “just tell us what you need” it seems those reports never make it to Congress. The last Fleet Mix study, which I am sure said we needed more large cutters, was never declassified.

For whatever reason, the Navy seems to be hesitant to tell the Coast Guard what our role will be in a major war and how they would like to see Coast Guard units equipped. Essentially nothing has changed in this regard since I retired in 1991 except the removal of ASW equipment and Harpoon missiles. Certainly I see no evidence the Coast Guard is training or being equipped for a wartime role.

The Coast Guard should be an independent agency. We really don’t need to have to explain ourselves to a new raft of political appointees in the Department every four years, so they can tell the administration and Congress what we need, when their number one priority is migrant interdiction at the land border.

Coast Guard leadership can justify our needs and explain the benefits of Coast Guard operations.

Looking at the proposal.

Mission breakdown

Considering the proposal, of the three missions proposed to be handed off, Aids to Navigation is by far the most important. Buoy tender sailors go on to sail in other classes of ships and buoy tenders don’t just tend buoys. Many of our big ship crew members learned their trade on buoy tenders. Tenders are multi-mission assets that do Icebreaking, SAR, and LE. They support Webber class in doing fisheries in the Western Pacific and drug interdiction in the Eastern Pacific. They do domestic icebreaking in the Great Lakes, the North East and Alaska. The Coast Guard is a good agency to handle this because most of the people involved are sailors first and that is an essential skill for aids to navigation.

Is there some other agency better prepared to do Marine Inspection? Do marine inspectors do other work for the Captain of the Port? Do we benefit from information exchange between SAR and Marine Inspection?

MEP, other than the Strike Teams, seems to be very much a part time job, reflected in the small 2.3 percent credited to that missions. Boats patrolling a harbor may spot pollution and the group responses. Something like the Deep Water Horizon was a big job, but not a full time job. Assets were diverted and reservist were called up. Reserves frequently play a major role in major pollution cases. Is there another agency with reserves they can call on?

Will divesting itself of three missions help the Coast Guard do the remaining missions better? Not if they lose the people and funding that go with the missions. In fact we would probably lose some degree of the flexibility that the service is famous for.

Does the Navy suffer because they have ships doing law enforcement as suggested? I really do have a lot of sympathy for those away from home for many months, but actually being at sea is the best training and Navy ships are generally underway less than Coast Guard ships. A short cruise with a LE Detachment on board some time between a yard period and deployment is a good time to do training and qualifications. I can understand the feeling that a DDG is overqualified, but LCSs, particularly the Freedom class based in Mayport, certainly are not.

It should be obvious it is time to start adding an ASW capability to large patrol cutters. Just about all our cutters need a hard kill system against unmanned air and surface systems.

We also need to start developing a new class of more warlike cutters that would be considered a corvette or light frigate.

Oct 6, 2023 STRAIT OF HORMUZ – STRAIT OF HORMUZ (Oct. 6, 2023) An undated still image released on Oct. 6 from video taken by an Arabian Fox MAST-13 unmanned surface vessel of an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle in the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. 5th Fleet forces recently conducted an operation integrating unmanned platforms with traditionally crewed ships and aircraft to conduct enhanced maritime security operations in the waters surrounding the Arabian Peninsula. Seven task forces falling under U.S. 5th Fleet integrated 12 different unmanned platforms with manned ships for “manned-unmanned teaming” operations tracking Iranian Navy and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) ships and small boats over several days during routine patrols in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

This dates back to March 11, but thought you might have missed it as I did. ABC news reported a warning from the FBI.

“We recently acquired unverified information that as of early February 2026, Iran allegedly aspired to conduct a surprise attack using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) from an unidentified vessel off the coast of the United States homeland, specifically against unspecified targets in California, in the event the U.S. conducted strikes against Iran,” according to the alert distributed at the end of February. “We have no additional information on the timing, method, target, or perpetrators of this alleged attack.”

Since the attack would have been launched from sea, this would have been of interest to the Coast Guard. If such a plan existed, it is likely still considered an option, highlighting the need for Maritime Domain Awareness.

California offers almost an infinite number of potential targets, but an aircraft carrier in San Diego would certainly be high on the list of possibilities. Maritime Domain Awareness should extend to cover adjacent Mexican waters as well as off the US coast.

Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) “Little Bird” helicopter operates with USCGC DILIGENCE

Army Recognition’s Navy news reports, “U.S. Navy Explores Littoral Combat Ships as Forward Bases for Marine AH-1Z Viper Attack Helicopters.”

Maybe this capability should have been obvious, but it does require thinking outside the box. Any ship that normally operates helicopters should be able to provide at least basic logistics support for an attack helicopter, and with a little foresight, planning, and experience do better than that.

Coast Guard cutters could do this too. The Navy is doing this with Marine Helicopters, but I bet the Army might be interested in doing something like this, particularly in Alaska where Navy surface ships seldom venture.

Of course there are lots of other Army weapon systems that could be temporarily parked on Coast Guard flight decks. 

U.S. Army and Navy assets conduct an interdiction operation in the Bering Sea in July 2024.
IMAGE CREDIT: SENIOR AIRMAN JOHNNY DIAZ/U.S. AIR FORCE

Screen Grab from CENTCOM video

Below is a news release from CENTCOM.

Go to the linked report and watch the video. This looks like another Hellfire/JAGM type attack. Note they hit at the extreme end of the stern rather than immediately below the stack in the likely location of the engine room.

As noted previously if the Coast Guard needs to disable a larger ship being used in a terrorist attack, this may be the weapon we need.