Unfortunately we are getting vibs that the OPC program is in jeopardy. I’ll have more to say about this later, but wanted to get it out there as quickly as possible.
If you would like a review of how bad its going get, even if we proceed as currently planed, you might want to take a look at “Rethinking the New Cutter Programs.” (Thanks to Lee for the heads up.)
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
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If the Coast Guard loses the OPC program, this will be the beginning of the end of the Coast Guard’s “blue water” capability – and the service will have no one to blame but the collective leadership going back more than a decade. Of course, no one will accept responsibility for this coming debacle.
Yes, one can argue that no one could have predicted the depth of the current recession, but if the “Deepwater” program hadn’t been so poorly run from the beginning, the NSC fleet would be well on its way to completion, and the first OPC’s would have been under construction by now.
Coast Guard Officers accept responsibility for their own screw ups? LOL! That will never happen; everything is always someone elses fault with them.
There were several who did predict the fiscal crisis. Historian Nial Ferguson for one. However, the rest of the country was not paying attention then no one can expect the Coast Guard to have been.
However, there are historical parallels that past historians of Coast Guard history missed or glossed over. Three major economic downturns in the antebellum period could have been used as models for how to keep, maintain and expand the fleet in times of national pecuniary difficulties. There were a couple more in the post-bellum period and at least three more in the 20th century. So, how come the current one was not anticipated; especially when a major ship building program stumbled along.
I am constantly amazed at the repetition I see in history. The article noted,
“However, given the Coasties’ numerous duties — drug interdiction, rescues, anti-piracy ops, homeland security patrols, oil cleanup etc etc — it seems a strange time to reduce the service’s ability to do long-range patrols with ships that should be more efficient and more effective.”
The wording is not the same but the tenor is mirrored in the public and congressional calls for providing the RCS with its first steam ships. One major difference is there are very few present era Coast Guard (active duty) officers out on the stump, hawking for better vessels as was done at nearly every opportunity in the late 1830s. The tact was to show the public and the Congress what they could do for the public and not what they could do for themselves — although doing for oneself was the name of the game in the 19th century. Captains Strugis, Frazer, Howard, Hunter and etc., were constantly in the press using direct and indirect comments about what the RCS could do for, primarily, the major shippers, insurance companies and ship owners. Don’t forget, it was estimated that a ship was wrecked on the U. S. coast every day and in certain times of the year on various hazardous coasts, every eight hours.
Granted, major ship wrecks are rare. Powered vessels and better navigation have helped, but the Coast Guard gets no credit. The flip side of credit is blame and accountability. Perhaps, credit is seen as a negative today.
Besides, how many cutter crews today have actually handled a twelve-inch towing hawser? Do they still carry one?
When I came into the Coast Guard we were building 36 Hamilton Class 378s. When the Ocean Station Program ended it quickly went down to 12. Even then, in addition to the 12 378s, we still had 16 210s, + several 213s, 205s, 143s, 165s, and 125s.