The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently released its latest report: AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, by Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas.
It explores the possible progression of a major armed conflict between China and the US and its allies as a worst case scenario (short of nuclear weapons) of how to deal with the developing threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial weapons like conventionally armed Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) along with air and surface launched cruise missiles, mines, and submarines.
At almost 150 pages it is a bit of a slog, but interesting. It is a bit like WWII in the Pacific with modern weapons. The Chinese make a devastating surprise attack, then establishes a bastion in hopes of convincing the US and their allies that it is just too hard to reverse their aggression. The allies then have to begin disassembling and rolling back the bastion’s defences. This begins as each side makes a concerted attempt to blind the other’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems including space based systems.
The Coast Guard is not specifically mentioned, but if you look at the section on enforcing a distant blockade on China, page 76-78, it is a classic Maritime interdiction Operation (MIO) not unlike drug interdiction. They note, “However, many of the platforms most suited for this kind of operation, such as Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), patrol craft and small frigates, do not carry ordnance sufficiently heavy to stop larger ships determined not to halt and be boarded. Those Navy ships that do would be likely to have higher priority taskings, and thus would not generally be available to support MIO operations. However, Air Force bombers with their large payloads and long endurance could provide “on-call” maritime strike. These bombers could be assigned to support MIO operations and conduct strikes on PLA vessels or cargo ships as needed.”
This looks like make work for bombers that couldn’t survive China’s integrated air defense system to me. As we discussed in the post on the Korean sinking, There are cheaper and simpler ways of stopping recalcitrant merchant ships, but of course support of Maritime Patrol Aircraft for this type mission is almost always useful.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
Good point Chuck. As we know from our FTG and FCTC days, attrition warfare is never a way to win. 😉
Beside the ridiculous expense of keeping a bomber orbiting overhead with cruise missiles at the ready, there is the real possibility they will hit the wrong target.
The Red Chinese also have gotten to the point of having a pretty sophisticated IADS along their coast. Any major operation could not be undertaken without softening up those first…which would be a costly endeavor in both men and equipment.
True, and they talk about what would be necessary to deal with that. The presentation makes a strong case for more subs, cruise missile, stealth aircraft, and a new Navy capability for conventionally armed ballistic missiles–largely to degrade the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS).
Chuck,
It was a B-47 that first hit the Point Welcome. Two F-4s later on. Good thing the F-4s did not have gun pods. The fast movers have a difficult time hitting a moving target — then anyway.
I think it was a Martin B-57 (American version of the British Canberra), smaller than a B-47, which was a SAC asset.
Planes have gotten better at hitting what they aim at. I am just a bit concerned with the Air Force’s ability to distinguish targets. I’m sure their is an app for that.
Chuck,
You are correct. I mistyped the type. You are also correct. Target designation was the key culprit in this incident. The controller was in a C-130 some 4,000 feet above and at night. He was afraid to get lower and check out the target–which wasn’t a target.
The primary problem was that no one knew what the other was doing. The WPBs did not have TACAIR communications. After the 1966 incident there was the promise that the WPBs would get it but it never came and it could have cost lives on the ground. The air observers had to use drop messages to get us their frequencies. The funny thing was that we could speak with commercial airliners over the VHF radios that were original to the WPBs.
The Point Welcome incident was one of those lessons not learned.
Bill,
Yes almost everything I know about the incident, I got from your article, http://www.aug.edu/~libwrw/ptwelcome/PointWelcome2.html, although I did know Ross Bell. It is a good read, an essential piece of CG history, really. As you point out this was not the only friendly fire incident. There was an attack on a swift boat too that was even more deadly.
Of course, the Coast Guard would probably also have a role in the Domain Awareness system that would help distinguish between blockade runners and those in innocent passage.
MDA, hey I think that’s mentioned in the NOC. 😉
Yes, I am planning on doing a series on the NOC (Naval Operations Concept) and what I think it means for the CG. It is just too much to cover in one post.
Chuck,
I have a healthy skepticism of broad reaching plans when it comes to the promise of Navy help and support. There is just too long a history of the Navy saying one thing one day and reversing itself when it no longer advantageous to itself.
There are numerous documents about joint planning and mission sharing. However, most revolve about the same premises. For example, in 1992, then, LDCR Ty Waterman wrote his thesis for the Naval War College (NWC), “WANTED: A DOCTRINE FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY .”
Sound familiar. He described the problem as, “The United States Coast Guard needs a governing doctrine to provide a common perspective and a way of thinking about its integral relationship with national security.” Of course, the wrote this in the middle of a RIF, the implementation of TQM, and the rise of the “M” crowd.
He called for “a unity of effort” that would resolve the “ambiguity and misperception” of the “Coast
Guard’s role in national security.” He strongly suggested a standard “Service doctrine” a “common philosophy” with a common language and purpose to remove those ambiguities and misperceptions.
The NOC may do this for 2010 and Admiral Allen but what of 2011 and Admiral Papp? I am sure they collaborated but the differences between the two are readily apparent.
Waterman wrote that the diversity of Coast Guard missions was one of the most harmful to creating a standard, purposeful doctrine. He also noted, “This diversity hinders a common understanding of the Service.” With the result of an “endless debate over Coast Guard roles and equipage.”
He defined more of the problem, “The perception of the Coast Guard as an organization with ambiguous purpose admits all nature of unfounded argument, constrained only by the assumptions of the advocate. For example, because published speculation over the service’s warfighting role lacks deference to a commonly understood purpose and operating philosophy for the Service, authors freely arrive at conclusions like: “the Coast Guard is not equipped to
fight”‘ and its operating units are unarmed and untrained; the Coast Guard should own minesweepers and diesel submarines.”
It will being interesting to see the NOC emerge with a common Coast Guard philosophy.
Bill I can understand your skepticism. Our diversity of mission and vision is a great strength, but sometimes we can also be our own worse enemy. If we appear confused about our missions, how can we ever expect an outsider to understand.
Frankly I don’t think the Navy has promised us much in the NOC they are not already doing. On the other hand they are telling the world they need our services. I think that is a useful lever. Every other military service got a budget increase this year. We were the only service to take a cut. Obviously we need to sell our utility a bit better. The tasking proposed in the NOC ought to be part of that.
One thing I find interesting is the apparent “Coast Guardization of the the Navy.” They no longer see their own mission as simply defending the country by militarily defeating the enemy. They see themselves doing law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, developing working relationships with other nations and Coast Guards. It’s a kinder gentler navy. We may have to be careful that the Coast Guard is not someday simply reduced to LEDETs that allow the Navy to get around Posse Comitatus.
Our own people also need to understand our utility as a military service better. The NOC can help with that too. To some extent it appears to me, the attitude I see toward the military side is better now, than it was when we had 36 WHECs equipped for ASW and you and thousands of other coast guardsmen fighting the war in Vietnam, because at least some Coast Guard people now see they have a unique military mission that no other services address, that we aren’t just playing Navy Lite. 9/11 was sobering and it is inevitable that that shock resulted in programs that are now being rethought for reasons both valid and questionable, as memories fade. I don’t see anything we can do but continue to work the problem.
Chuck, nice post. Only thing I would comment on/clarify is that Posse Commitas only applies to the Navy and Marine Corps by their own policy, not by law itself. The Navy really has no desire to “get around” it or they definately would have changed it for domestic (as so far as Homeland Security vice Homeland Defense missions are concerned). FWIW, for Phase I /TSC ops overseas, generally any authority they need they get from the host nation anyway
SF, Acronyms. Que es TSC ops?
The Navy has been struggling for relevance in the wars in the middle and south Asia. Apart from carrier operations, special warfare and some itty bitty boat work done on the rivers in Iraq and they got that from the Marine Corps that did not want it in the first place. Why the Coast Guard was not charged to do the job is evident by the comments of Rumsfeld and then SECNAV England. And here I thought Nelson’s signal at Trafalgar would have been appropriate to use the Coast Guard.
They have been more or less left behind the Army and in some cases the Air Force. It is an exercise in relevance that the Coast Guard should be heeding. I’ll take another pass through the NOC and see if it is there.
The Navy rushed to help when the “drug war” began but then pulled the majority of their ships out to do real DOD work. Anyone who has been around and active for the last half century understands the necessity of relevance–even if it only situational relevance. A good study to look at on this topic is John Hattendorf’s “U. S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s.” It is online at the Naval War College.
From page 126, then CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward, “talked before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Services Committee on 15 February 1979 on the questions of “Why do we need a navy?” and “What kind of navy should it be, anyway?”
Interesting questions that seem pertinent for the Coast Guard today.
Bill, my apologies.
TSC is the acronym for Theater Security Cooperation…what they call “shaping” the Area of Operations.
Best,
Surface F orce