U.S. Coast Guard Petty Officer 2nd Class Wesley Armstrong, a boarding team member assigned to the USCGC Stone (WMSL 758), fires flashbang warning rounds during vessel on vessel use of force training in the Atlantic Ocean, Jan. 18, 2023. Stone is the ninth Legend-class national security cutter in the Coast Guard fleet and currently homeports in Charleston, South Carolina. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Riley Perkofski)

A US Naval Institute Proceedings essay in the September 2024 edition, by Captain Craig Allen Jr., U.S. Coast Guard contends that, “The Coast Guard would lead in countering China’s efforts to degrade the United States’ ability to sustain the war at home.”

A mass conflag should be front of mind when considering the challenges posed in the American Sea Power Project 2026 U.S.-China contingency scenario.¹ In the scenario, there is an absence of detail on how such a conflict could affect the U.S. homeland, and it could be seen as a Department of Defense problem in which the Coast Guard plays only a niche role. Indeed, the warfighting challenges inside and near the first island chain with which many excellent authors have grappled are not, for the most part, Coast Guard mission areas. However, believing the conflict would be contained to a fight “over there” underestimates the havoc China could and almost certainly would unleash to prevail in a protracted war.

As a U.S. homeland-centric corollary to the American Sea Power Project scenario, consider one in which China might directly or indirectly degrade the United States’ ability to sustain the war effort logistically and economically, foment chaos and erode social cohesion, and overwhelm domestic-response capacity. Like the original scenario, this one is neither predictive nor comprehensive. Rather, it highlights another important dimension to consider when evaluating U.S. seapower readiness for a major conflict with China.