This Day in Coast Guard History, March 23

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Based on the Coast Guard Historian’s timeline, https://www.history.uscg.mil/research/chronology/
With inspiration from Mike Kelso

March 23

95 foot Cape Class WPB

1974  The 40-foot sailing vessel Lorisel II reported she was aground one mile southeast of North Rock, Bahamas, off the eastern shore of Bimini.  An HU-16 aircraft and CGC Cape Shoalwater were dispatched to assist.  The aircraft located the vessel and a local island boat was diverted to remove two women and a child from Lorisel II.  Cape Shoalwater re-floated the vessel, returned the passengers, and the Lorisel II got underway with no apparent damage.

2001  Two Coast Guardsmen, BM2 Scott Chism and SN Christopher Ferreby, gave their lives in the line of duty when their small boat CG-214341 capsized on Lake Ontario.  Their loss led to important changes in the small boat community’s training, equipment, and operations.

From: U.S. COAST GUARD Newsfeed unofficial, Facebook page, March 23, 2015 

Date: February 8, 2002
Coast Guard releases Station Niagara report
GREAT LAKES — The final action report on the Station Niagara rescue boat accident of March 23, 2001 that resulted in the death of two crewmembers has been released by the Commandant of the Coast Guard and has been posted to the Ninth District web page.
“This report is a reminder to everyone in the Coast Guard of the dangers we face every day,” said Rear Admiral James D. Hull, Ninth Coast Guard District Commander. “We have suffered through this tragic loss, and we will never forget their sacrifice. Our thoughts and prayers continue to be with the families and friends of Petty Office Scott Chism and Seaman Chris Ferreby.”
“We have learned from the circumstances of this accident and are implementing changes to make our jobs safer,” said Hull. “But, we cannot avoid the fact that what we do is inherently dangerous. “
FINAL ACTION MESSAGE ON STATION NIAGARA CG-214341 CAPSIZING, R 081306Z FEB 02 COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-WKS//
R 081306Z FEB 02
FM COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC//G-WKS//
TO AIG 4934
COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA//AO/AOF/AOFT//
COMPACAREA COGARD ALAMEDA CA//PO/POF/POFT//
COMCOGARD MLC PAC ALAMEDA CA//K//
COMCOGARD MLC LANT NORFOLK VA//K//
BT
UNCLAS //N05100//
SUBJ: FINAL ACTION MESSAGE ON STATION NIAGARA CG-214341 CAPSIZING AND SUBSEQUENT FATALITIES ON 23 MARCH 2001
1. SYNOPSIS. ON 23 MARCH 2001 AT 1941 CG-214341, A NONSTANDARD FOAM COLLAR BOAT (FCB) WAS UNDERWAY FROM COAST GUARD STATION NIAGARA TO CONDUCT A LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSION IN THE NIAGARA RIVER FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERDICTING ILLEGAL MIGRANTS. A THREE-PERSON BOAT CREW/ARMED LAW ENFORCEMENT TEAM AND ONE BREAK-IN CREW MEMBER WERE ON BOARD THE VESSEL. IMMEDIATELY UPON DEPARTURE, THE COXSWAIN OF THE BOAT DEVIATED FROM THE PATROL PLAN AND TOOK THE VESSEL NORTH INTO LAKE ONTARIO TO FAMILIARIZE THE BREAK-IN CREW MEMBER WITH THIS PORTION OF THE STATIONS AREA OF OPERATION. THE BOAT EXPERIENCED STEEP, FOUR-FOOT WAVES FROM THE NORTH SHORTLY AFTER ENTERING LAKE ONTARIO. ON SCENE WINDS WERE REPORTED FROM THE NORTHWEST AT 10 KNOTS, THE AIR TEMPERATURE WAS 37 DEGREES AND THE WATER TEMPERATURE WAS 36 DEGREES. THE COXSWAIN SUCCESSFULLY NAVIGATED THE BOAT APPROXIMATELY 1,000 TO 1,500 YARDS NORTH OF BUOY NO. 3 (ABOUT 3,000 TO 3,500 YARDS NORTH OF THE MOUTH OF THE NIAGARA RIVER) IN LAKE ONTARIO, TURNED THE VESSEL AROUND AND PROCEEDED BACK SOUTH IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NIAGARA RIVER. AT SOME TIME SHORTLY BEFORE 2000 AND ON THE RETURN TRIP SOUTH, APPROXIMATELY 50 YARDS NORTH OF BUOY NO. 3, THE COXSWAIN OVERTOOK A WAVE, SURFED DOWN THE FRONT OF THAT WAVE AND BURIED THE BOW OF CG-214341 IN THE BACKSIDE OF ANOTHER WAVE. THE VESSEL THEN SLOWLY ROLLED OVER TO STARBOARD AND ALL FOUR CREW MEMBERS SAFELY ABANDONED THE VESSEL WITHOUT INJURY. THE VESSEL MISSED ITS FIRST COMMUNICATIONS CHECK AT 2001. RESCUE EFFORTS WERE INITIALLY HAMPERED BY THE COXSWAINS DECISION TO PROCEED NORTH INTO LAKE ONTARIO WITHOUT ADVISING CG STATION NIAGARA OF HIS DEVIATION FROM HIS PREVIOUS FLOAT PLAN. THE WILSON, NY FIRE DEPARTMENTS BOAT CREW RECOVERED ALL FOUR CREWMEN AT 0027 SATURDAY, 24 MARCH 2001. TWO OF THE CREWMEN WERE IN CARDIAC ARREST WHEN RECOVERED AND SUBSEQUENTLY DIED DESPITE THE HEROIC AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORTS OF LOCAL EMS PERSONNEL TO RE-WARM AND RESUSCITATE THEM. THE OTHER TWO CREWMEN RECOVERED AND HAVE RETURNED TO DUTY.
2. CAUSAL FACTORS. THE MISHAP ANALYSIS BOARD AND TESTIMONY AT THE COMMANDANTS BOAT SAFETY BOARD REVEALED VARIOUS PRIMARY CAUSES AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS MISHAP.
A. PRIMARY CAUSES:
(1) THE COXSWAINS INABILITY TO SAFELY MANEUVER THE BOAT IN THE EXISTING SEA CONDITIONS;
(2) THE COXSWAIN DEVIATING FROM THE INTENDED AREA OF OPERATION WITHOUT NOTIFYING THE STATION OF THE CHANGE, THUS HINDERING THE SAR RESPONSE AND DELAYING RESCUE; AND
(3) THE CREWS EXTENDED EXPOSURE TO THE COLD WATER. THIS WAS A RESULT OF THEIR DECISION TO ATTEMPT TO REACH A NEARBY BUOY AND CLIMB OUT OF THE WATER ON IT, INSTEAD OF USING THE OVERTURNED HULL OF THE BOAT, WHICH WAS MOVING ERRATICALLY IN THE CHOPPY SEAS. THE BUOY WAS UP-CURRENT. VIGOROUS SWIMMING ATTEMPTING TO REACH IT CAUSED WATER INTRUSION INTO SOME OF THE DRY SUITS, AS DID THE COXSWAINS USE OF A NECK RING DEVICE. TOGETHER, THESE FACTORS ACCELERATED THE ONSET OF HYPOTHERMIA.
B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. WHILE NOT THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE MISHAP AND FATALITIES, THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WERE IMPORTANT LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF ERRORS THAT RESULTED IN THIS MISHAP.
(1) EQUIPMENT FAILURE/SHORTFALL:
(A) LACK OF AN EMERGENCY POSITION INDICATING RADIO BEACON (EPIRB) FOR EITHER THE PERSONNEL OR THE BOAT, OR SOME OTHER METHOD TO AUTOMATICALLY SIGNAL DISTRESS AND POSITION.
(B) INSUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PERSONAL ISSUE COLD WEATHER UNDERGARMENTS (BOTH LAYER ONE (POLYPROPYLENE) AND LAYER TWO (POLYESTER FLEECE)) FOR ALL BOAT CREW MEMBERS.
(C) LACK OF A COAST GUARD STANDARD OR PROCESS FOR DETERMINING SUITABILITY OF NON-STANDARD BOATS FOR OPERATION IN VARIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS.
(D) FAILURE OF THE SOLE MK 79 SIGNALING KIT TO BE MAINTAINED IN AN OPERABLE CONDITION.
(2) TRAINING FAILURE/SHORTFALL:
(A) LACK OF AN ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE FORMAL TRAINING PROGRAM FOR NON-STANDARD BOAT OPERATIONS.
(B) LACK OF KNOWLEDGE, SKILL AND/OR MOTIVATION TO PROPERLY DON AND VENT ANTI-EXPOSURE SUITS AND TO PROPERLY LAYER UNDERGARMENTS.
(3) PERSONNEL ERROR/SHORTFALL:
(A) FAILURE TO REPLACE THE BATTERY IN THE CG-1 STROBE DURING THE REGULAR INSPECTION IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTED DISCREPANCY.
(B) A GENERAL TENDENCY TO ACCEPT KNOWN NATIONAL DISTRESS SYSTEM COVERAGE GAPS AS THE COST OF DOING BUSINESS.
(C) FAILURE TO ENSURE THAT SUFFICIENT SAR/PYRO VESTS WERE ON BOARD PRIOR TO GETTING UNDERWAY.
(4) LEADERSHIP:
(A) FAILURE OF THREE OF THE FOUR CREWMEN TO WEAR SAR/PYRO VESTS.
(B) CHAIN OF COMMANDS FAILURE TO ACHIEVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEVEL OF RISK FOR VARIOUS MISSIONS (ROUTINE MISSIONS WERE ASSUMED TO BE LOW RISK MISSIONS), AND OF REPORTING/AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS.
(C) COAST GUARD GROUP BUFFALOS LACK OF AWARENESS OF ON- GOING STATION OPERATIONS.
(D) DEVELOPMENT OF AN QUOTE UNOFFICIAL STANDARD UNQUOTE WITHIN THE BOAT COMMUNITY TO NOT WEAR SAR/PYRO VESTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION MISSIONS.
(E) FAILURE TO PROPERLY MANAGE THE MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF A LARGE NON-STANDARD BOAT FLEET (CONFIGURATION, MODIFICATION, TRAINING, ASSESSMENT, ETC.).
3. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS/LESSONS LEARNED.
A. ROUTINE DOES NOT EQUAL LOW RISK; OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT (ORM) MUST CONSIDER THE WHOLE SYSTEM. DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION, STATION NIAGARAS MISSION ON THE NIGHT OF 23 MARCH 2001 WAS CHARACTERIZED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES AS ROUTINE. THE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS A ROUTINE MISSION WAS STATED AGAIN IN RESPONSE TO THE MISHAP BOARDS DESCRIPTION OF THE MISSION AS HIGH RISK. IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT ROUTINE AND HIGH RISK ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT TOUR LENGTHS (ACTUAL TOURS ARE OFTEN SHORTER THAN NOMINAL TOURS), RAPID PROMOTIONS, JUNIOR WORK FORCE AND NEW BOAT DESIGNS, IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT MANY OF OUR ROUTINE EVOLUTIONS THAT PRESENTED LOW RISK FIVE YEARS AGO NOW POSE MODERATE TO HIGH RISK. HAD THE ENTIRE CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM DISTRICT COMMANDER TO COXSWAIN STARTED WITH A BLANK PAGE AND APPLIED ORM TO THIS PARTICULAR MISSIONS CHALLENGES (NIGHTTIME, LAW ENFORCEMENT, COLD AIR AND WATER TEMPERATURES, SHARED PPE) AND CONSIDERED THE EXISTING BOAT FORCE SYSTEM (CAPSIZING STATISTICS, JUNIORITY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTERS RISK ANALYSIS), THE RIVER LAW ENFORCEMENT PATROL MAY HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, DEFERRED UNTIL DAYLIGHT, OR AT LEAST UNDERTAKEN WITH ADDITIONAL CARE. ORM MANDATES THAT THE WHOLE SYSTEM, NOT JUST THE INDIVIDUAL MISSION PROFILE, BE CONSIDERED.
B. TURNOVER AND JUNIORITY THWART TEAM COORDINATION TRAINING(TCT)/ORM SKILL RETENTION; COMMANDERS MUST CONSTANTLY ASSESS CREWS. ORM/TCT MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED ON A CONTINUOUS BASIS. THOUGH IT IS REQUIRED BI-ANNUAL TRAINING, A WAY TO MEASURE THIS TRAININGS SUCCESS, OTHER THAN THE END OF THE YEAR MISHAP REPORTS, WILL BE ESTABLISHED. A WEB-BASED MEASUREMENT TOOL FOR TCT/ORM, RECENTLY DEVELOPED AND PROTOTYPED, WILL BE IMPLEMENTED SOON. UNITS SHOULD USE THIS TOOL TO HELP ASSESS PROFICIENCY IN THE ABILITY TO APPLY TCT/ORM ON THE JOB. ORM AND TCT ADVOCATE THE GAR/SPE MODELS AS TWO OPTIONS FOR RISK ASSESSMENT. WHICHEVER TOOLS ARE CHOSEN, THEY SHOULD BE USED AS DICTATED BY GROUP/STATION COMMANDING OFFICERS OR OINC. STAN TEAMS SHOULD CONTINUE TO EVALUATE THIS REQUIREMENT, AND A SIMILAR EVALUATION SHOULD BE PART OF READY FOR OPERATIONS INSPECTIONS.
4. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. THE ANALYSIS OF THIS MISHAP IDENTIFIED SELECT ACTIONS THAT ARE DIRECTLY LINKED TO PRIMARY CAUSAL FACTORS IN THIS MISHAP AND COULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE LOSS.
A. COMMANDANT (G-OCS) SHALL:
(1) ADVANCE FUNDING EFFORTS THROUGH THE NORMAL BUDGET PROCESS TO PROVIDE PERSONAL ISSUE ANTI-EXPOSURE SUITS AND UNDERGARMENTS TO EACH BOAT CREW MEMBER AT APPROPRIATE UNITS.
(2) ENSURE THAT THE CREW BRIEF SECTION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS AND WATCHSTANDER GUIDE IS UPDATED TO REFLECT THAT A FLOAT PLAN SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE WATCHSTANDER BY BOAT CREWS, AND THAT IT INCLUDES PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IF THERE WILL BE A DEVIATION.
(3) MODIFY BOAT CREW QUALIFICATION GUIDE VOL. 1 CREW MEMBER, COMDTINST M16114.10A TO REQUIRE CREWMAN TO ACTUALLY DON AND MANIPULATE EVERY PIECE OF SURVIVAL GEAR THE UNIT IS REQUIRED TO CARRY, IN THE CONDITIONS FOR WHICH THEY WERE DESIGNED.
(4) MODIFY BOAT CREW TRAINING MANUAL, COMDTINST M16114.9 TO REQUIRE ALL BOAT CREW POSITIONS TO SHOW PROFICIENCY, ON AN ANNUAL BASIS, IN SURVIVAL TECHNIQUES IF LOST OVERBOARD OR INVOLVED WITH A CAPSIZING (I.E. ANNUAL WET DRILLS).
B. COMMANDANT (G-OPL) AND (G-OPN) SHALL WORK WITH G-OCS TO IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING SIGNALING EQUIPMENT, FOR CREW MEMBERS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION MISSIONS, AND ENSURE THAT MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT AND AIDS TO NAVIGATION SCHOOLS RE-ENFORCE THE REQUIREMENTS TO WEAR THE EQUIPMENT.
C. COMMANDANT (G-OCU) SHALL REVIEW THE ORDNANCE MANUAL FOR APPROPRIATENESS AND AVAILABILITY OF THE MK-79 AS SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT, AND SHALL APPRAISE THE USE OF COMMERCIAL PYRO THAT MEETS FEDERAL STANDARDS. AS THIS REVIEW PROCEEDS, G-OCU SHALL IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT CHANGES TO THE MK 79 PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE SYSTEM TO INCLUDE A METHOD TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE MK 79 TUBE CAN ACCEPT A FLARE CARTRIDGE.
D. THE COAST GUARD MUST CONTINUE EFFORTS TO SYSTEMATICALLY STANDARDIZE AND IMPROVE NON-STANDARD BOAT OPERATIONS. LISTED BELOW ARE ADDITIONAL ACTION ITEMS IDENTIFIED DURING THE MISHAP ANALYSIS THAT COULD REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR SIMILAR MISHAPS FROM OCCURRING. THE CHIEF OF STAFF HAS DIRECTED THAT DESIGNATED OFFICES TAKE THESE FOR ACTION.
(1) COAST GUARD ATLANTIC AREA (AO) AND PACIFIC AREA (PO) SHALL RE-EMPHASIZE THE DISTRICT COMMANDERS ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MANAGING AND SUPPORTING ALL FACETS OF NON- STANDARD BOAT OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE.
(2) COMMANDANT (G-O) SHALL ENSURE THAT MEMBERS PERFORMING SMALL BOAT OPERATIONS ARE EITHER OUTFITTED WITH PERSONAL LOCATION DEVICES (I.E. PERSONAL RADIO BEACONS, EPIRBS, OR SIGNAL BEACONS TO AID IN THEIR LOCATION), OR THAT THEIR BOATS ARE EQUIPPED WITH A FLOAT-FREE EPIRB SYSTEM.
(3) COMMANDANT (G-OCS) SHALL:
(A) DEVELOP A STAND-ALONE SURVIVAL AND SAFETY ANNEX FOR THE RESCUE AND SURVIVAL SYSTEMS MANUAL.
(B) WORK WITH STAN TEAMS TO DEVELOP A STANDARD COLD WEATHER SURVIVAL ASSESSMENT MODULE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SAR SYSTEMS PORTION OF THE ASSESSMENT.
(C) WORK WITH COMMANDANT (G-SCT) TO REVISE STANDARD LOST COMMUNICATIONS DOCTRINE TO RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR MORE CONSERVATIVE DOCTRINE FOR HIGH-RISK OPERATIONS. REQUIREMENTS FOR NIGHT AND INCLEMENT WEATHER SHOULD BE TIGHTENED.
(D) COORDINATE WITH COMMANDANT (G-OCA) AND COMMANDANT (G- W) COUNTERPARTS TO DETERMINE A REALISTIC REPLACEMENT CYCLE FOR PPE. NOTE: THE EXCEPTIONALLY HIGH TURN OVER RATES AT STATIONS, THE CONSUMABLE NATURE AND HIGH COST OF GEAR WILL COMPOUND THE FISCAL IMPACT OF THIS ISSUE.
(E) IMPLEMENT AN ADDITION TO THE RESCUE AND SURVIVAL SYSTEMS MANUAL, COMDTINST M10470.10D THAT REQUIRES THE SPECIFIC VISUAL AND PHYSICAL CHECKING OF THE MK-79 FLARE KITS ASSEMBLY AND THREADS, CONTINGENT UPON COMMANDANT (G-OCU) REVIEW OF ORDNANCE MANUAL FOR APPROPRIATENESS AND AVAILABILITY OF MK-79 AS COLD WEATHER SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT.
(F) INVESTIGATE DEVELOPING STANDARD TETHER LINES WITH D- RING CONFIGURATION FOR CARRYING IN EACH SUIT.
(G) REVIEW AND ADOPT THE NON-STANDARD BOAT OPERATORS HANDBOOK, D13INST M16114, FOR INCLUSION INTO THE COMDTINST M16114 SERIES.
(H) REVIEW CURRENT COAST GUARD PUBLICATIONS AND DIRECTIVES FOR ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY WITH RESPECT TO COLD-WATER SURVIVAL INFORMATION.
(I) INVESTIGATE THE FEASIBILITY OF EQUIPPING CREW SURVIVAL VESTS WITH CHEMICAL LIGHT STICKS.
(J) ENSURE THAT EVALUATION AND MEASUREMENT OF TCT/ORM IS A STANDARD PART OF STAN TEAM ASSESSMENTS AND READY-FOR-OPERATIONS INSPECTIONS.
(4) COMMANDANT (G-OPR) SHALL WORK WITH THE NATIONAL SEARCH AND RESCUE SCHOOL TO CONSIDER INCLUDING A CASE STUDY OF THE NIAGARA MISHAP IN THE SENIOR SAR SUPERVISORS COURSE AND OTHER APPROPRIATE COURSES AT TRACEN YORKTOWN.
(5) COMMANDANT (G-AND) SHALL IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL DISTRESS RESPONSE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION PROJECT (NDRSMP) TECHNOLOGIES AS QUICKLY AS FEASIBLE, PARTICULARLY ASSET TRACKING COMPONENTS.
(6) COMMANDANT (G-WKS) HUMAN FACTORS DIVISION SHALL WORK WITH COMMANDANT (G-WKH) TO MODIFY/SIMPLIFY THE DATA REPORTS FORMS A-E FOR THE FLIGHT SURGEONS MISHAP ANALYSIS IN THE SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH MANUAL.
(7) COMMANDANT (G-WKW) SHALL MODIFY STANDARD CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS RESPONSE PROTOCOLS TO IDENTIFY INDIVIDUALS WHO NEED COUNSELING. THE INITIAL RESPONSE SHOULD QUERY FLAG OFFICERS TO HELP DETERMINE WHICH MEMBERS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP SHOULD BE OFFERED COUNSELING.
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F/V ALASKA RANGER

2008  Two Coast Guard helicopters worked with the F/V Alaska Warrior to save 42 of 47 crewmen from the sinking F/V Alaska Ranger in an Easter Sunday blizzard amidst 20-foot waves.  There was flooding in aft steerage of Ranger and the doors would not close.  The ship’s shell was rusty and flat-bottomed, built for Gulf of Mexico.  It was located 120 miles west of Dutch Harbor in the Bering Sea.  CGC Munro’s HH-65 Dolphin pulled five fishermen from the water, three of whom had to be cut free from the netting and ropes.  The HH-60 Jayhawk from St. Paul Station in the Pribiloff Islands lifted 15 sailors out of the sea and onto the sister ship, F/V Alaska Warrior.  Warrior also saved 22 lives on its own.  The crew of Munro received the Coast Guard Unit Commendation and aviators LT Brian J. McLaughlin, LT Timothy L. Schmitz, LT Steven M. Bonn, LT Greg S. Gedemer, Petty Officer 2nd Class O’Brien Hollow, Petty Officer 2nd Class Robert R. DeBolt, and Petty Officer 2nd Class Alfred V. Musgrave received Air Medals.

2012  The 9th Coast Guard District concluded Operation Taconite, its annual ice-breaking operation in the western Great Lakes, thereby officially bringing the 2011-2012 icebreaking season to a close.  Under control of Coast Guard Sector Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, Operation Taconite was carried out in Lake Superior, the St. Mary’s River, the Straits of Mackinac, and northern Lake Huron.  Operation Taconite began December 21, 2011.  Working together during this year’s ice-breaking season were crews aboard U.S. Coast Guard Cutters Mackinaw, Alder, Hollyhock, Mobile Bay, Neah Bay, Katmai Bay, Biscayne Bay, and Thunder Bay, the latter being temporarily assigned to the Great Lakes from its homeport of Rockland, Maine.  Together these eight cutters spent 1,668 hours breaking ice and assisted more than 60 vessels.

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