Below is my input to a discussion among my classmates. It is mostly history, but hopefully useful. As I was preparing this, I was struck by the realization that when the Crew Rotation Concept was thrown out, it should have resulted in a complete revision of our program of record.
When the program of record began, it was to replace 12 WHECs, 32 WMECs, and 49 WPBs, a total of 93 vessels with 8 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 58 FRCs, a total of 91 vessels.
This plan also assumed the NSCs and OPC would use the Crew Rotation Concept that would have theoretically provided about a third more underway days than conventionally crewed cutters.
The Crew Rotation Concept was ultimately discarded, taking with it about 1980 underway ship days or eleven ship years.
This was partially offset by adding NSCs #9 and #10, but we are still getting the equivalent of nine large patrol cutters less than originally planned.
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Coast Guard missions seem to be expanding. This has been partially addressed by building more FRCs than originally planned. The FRCs have exceeded our expectations and we are planning to have 77 of them, but we are still looking at only 35 large patrol cutters, 10 NSCs and 25 OPCs. I don’t think that is enough.
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The Coast Guard has been describing the OPCs this way, “The OPC will provide a capability bridge between the national security cutter, which patrols the open ocean in the most demanding maritime environments, and the fast response cutter, which serves closer to shore.”
That is not really true. The OPC and the NSC are virtually the same size. The OPC may be intended to replace the MECs, but in fact it is 1250 tons larger than the Hamilton class WHECs and 2.5 times the size of a WMEC270. The OPC will also have a crew almost the size of that of the NSC. With a range of over 10,000 nautical miles they are high endurance cutters.
In 2012 the OPCs were expected to cost about half of what an NSC cost, now the costs to build and operate are approaching that of an NSC.
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Since 2012 I have been suggesting that we could meet the need for more large cutters by building a true medium endurance cutter by basically putting the crew and equipment of a FRC in a large hull (at least 80 meters/262 feet) and trading off some OPCs and FRCs for these medium size ships. https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2012/10/12/the-dhs-cutter-study-trade-offs-and-the-case-for-cutter-x/
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Two years later I did a revised look. https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2014/09/28/cutter-x-revisited/ and along the way, I pointed out several ships that could fill the Cutter X role. Actually they just seem to be the typical Offshore Patrol Vessel.
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The Japanese are building a class that reflects the Cutter X ideas, a relatively large ship, 312 feet in length, about half the displacement of the OPCs, with a crew of only 30. https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2025/11/14/offshore-patrol-vessels-for-the-japanese-maritime-self-defense-force-launched/
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Since the geopolitical situation has changed and war with China looks more likely I have begun to think we should start building cutters that are more immediately useful in the event of war.
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Congress has been telling the Navy they need to look at building Corvettes to bulk up their numbers and the next Navy league magazine is supposed to have a story about the proposal. Assuming these are ASW capable corvettes, this might be a class that could be built as a dual service ship, serving in both the Navy and Coast Guard.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
l couldn’t agree with you more, but what really impresses me is the fact that you know what’s coming in a pending Navy League issue!
@DaSaint, that is because I read the last one.
Hey Chuck
Can you imagine if this Hybrid OPV/Corvette became the design the USCG was looking for. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/11/bulgarias-first-mmpv-90-corvette-begins-sea-trials/
Nice ship. I wish it had a non-rotating version of the Sea Giraffe 4A FF . . . otherwise it is perfect for an OPC/NSC augment/replacement.
The Bulgarian Navy design is what the USCG is looking for. Something that is proven design, in service that we can readily see. Modular that we can bolt on gear if we are called into by the US Navy. Heck, it would be perfect to pair with the NSC.
Never happen, CG would rather build something that can barely defend itself or protect other shipping.
Never happen, CG would rather build something that can barely defend itself or protect other shipping.
There is an FRC with a non-rotating RPS-42 radar on it for testing. Have not read a report on that!
Congress would step in and compel the United States Coast Guard to act. Lawmakers hold the power to pass bills that demand changes in agency operations. They control funding and set rules for how the Coast Guard works.
In the past, Congress has pushed federal agencies hard. Take the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Lawmakers grilled the Coast Guard on response failures and boosted oversight rules right after. They cut budgets or added new tasks to enforce compliance. This time, expect similar pressure. Congress might tie funds to quick results or launch probes into delays. That threat of tight watch and lost resources would loom large over Coast Guard leaders. It would push them to move fast on the issue at hand. Such steps ensure agencies align with national goals without room to stall.
With current USCG assigned mission sets, limited funding and not enough personnel . . . I am amazed that they accomplish as much as they do.
The Coast Guard Budget simply must grow along with a larger force size and more platforms.
Commerce in the U.S. is about to TAKE OFF and the inland waterways will require more attention than ever before. The Waterways Commerce Cutters cannot come online fast enough, and more may be required. Bridges, locks, and dredging all require attention.
This is why the US Coast Guard and US Coast Guard Auxiliary should grow and expand.
Petition congress to fund it. So many things are changing at present maybe this could be one of those things.
“Congress would step in and compel the United States Coast Guard to act.” . . . you know Nicky . . . you of all people know how the USCG mission set has grown over the years with MORE MANDATED MISSION SETS without budget and force growth to perform the task. Why would you support and put forth FLOGGING THE USCG more?
Here’s a concise, actionable strategic brief I’d present to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard on growing both the active-duty Coast Guard and the Coast Guard Auxiliary—while positioning the Coast Guard as the service with the broadest, most inclusive spectrum of service options in the entire U.S. military. 1. Overarching Vision: “From 18 to 80—Everyone Can Serve the Coast Guard Mission”
Make the Coast Guard the only U.S. military branch where literally anyone who loves the water and wants to serve their country can find a meaningful role—active duty, reserve, Auxiliary, civilian, or even episodic volunteer—regardless of age, prior service, medical limitations, or full-time availability. 2. Growing the Active-Duty & Reserve Force (Target: +15–20% end-strength in 8–10 years)
3. Supercharging the Coast Guard Auxiliary (Target: Double membership from ~20k to 40–50k in 5–7 years)
Make the Auxiliary the “on-ramp” for everyone who can’t or doesn’t want to wear the active-duty uniform.
Key reforms:
4. Making the Auxiliary the Home for Those Ineligible for Active/Reserve
Explicitly market the Coast Guard Volunteer Force as the place for:
Tag line: “If you love the water and love this country, the Coast Guard has a job for you—full-time, part-time, or volunteer.” 5. Selling the Message: “Only the Coast Guard Has This Many Ways to Serve”
National advertising & recruiting campaign built around a simple comparison table (run on TV, YouTube, TikTok, recruiting stations): Way to Serve Army Navy Air Force Marines Space Force Coast Guard Full-time Active Duty ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Traditional Reserve ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ State-controlled Guard ✓ ✓ Robust Volunteer Force (no age/max commitment) ✓ (40k+ strong) Paid episodic short tours for volunteers ✓ (coming) Service with direct life-saving mission every day limited ✓
Closing tagline in every ad:
“Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Space Force—great ways to serve. Coast Guard? The ONLY service with this many ways to serve. From 18 to 80, full-time or one weekend a month, on the water or behind a computer—if you want in, we’ll find a way.” 6. Legislative & Budget Asks (to make it stick)
Bottom line for the Commandant: In one decade the Coast Guard can be the fastest-growing uniformed service and the only one that literally never has to turn a willing American away. That’s a recruiting and retention superpower no other branch can match.
“I have begun to think we should start building cutters that are more immediately useful in the event of war.” . . . I wonder where that idea came from?
The U.S. Navy needs a new US Navy Aegis Destroyer Escort . . . in numbers.
The US Navy seriously needs a proven Frigate that can be built in numbers and in the fleet protecting the ARG, MSC, Show the flag, ASW/ASUW and even Anti Maritime terrorism.
Yes, and the US Navy needs to buy a frigate off the shelf, having failed miserably at building the Constellation Class frigate that was supposed to be based on the European FREMM design. The US Navy has proven once again, with the Constellation Class debacle, that it simply can’t be trusted to design ships or even modify a foreign design without adding so many additional gold-plated changes (or maybe I should say lead-plated) that the ship becomes grossly overweight, many years behind schedule, and vastly overpriced. And the U.S. shipbuilding industry has also proven, time and again, that it can’t be trusted to build ships that aren’t many years behind schedule, full of defects, and vastly overpriced.
That’s why if the Voters found out how messed up the US Shipbuilding industry is along with the Constellation class frigate and Heritage class OPC fiasco. How much do you want to make a bet the voters would have everyone in congress primaried in the next election. It would be a bloodbath at the polls, if the Voters found out.
agreed
Word is the Coast Guard will get 15,000 additional personnel by the end of 2028. I don’t know how we are going to do that, and I don’t know where they will go, but there was the RFI for a new training center.
We could benefit from multiple cutter programs. Continue the current contract with Austal, build a couple of cutter X per year, and get in on the new Corvette program. We currently have only the ten NSCs as new generation large patrol cutters. I believe we need another 35 or so. That could be 13 OPCs, 10 of the new corvettes, and 12 Cutter X.
Gibbs and Cox is marketing a corvette design now.
Seems to be a relatively simple ship, designed to US Navy standards with a lot of configurable deck-space.
With the maturation of containterized weapons and sensors, this approach makes sense.
The U.S. Coast Guard’s (USCG) Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program, centered on the Heritage-class, has faced persistent delays, cost overruns, and now a critical halt in construction by Eastern Shipbuilding Group due to financial strain as of November 18, 2025. With the first vessel (Argus) still undergoing trials and no clear timeline for the full 25-ship fleet, the aging fleet of medium-endurance cutters (WMECs) risks critical gaps in maritime domain awareness, search-and-rescue, and counter-drug operations. Replacing the Heritage-class with a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) design is a pragmatic move to restore momentum, leveraging proven platforms already in production and service elsewhere. This avoids redesign risks, accelerates delivery (potentially within 3-4 years per vessel via U.S. licensing/building), and cuts lifecycle costs through smaller crews and modular upgrades.
After evaluating options like the Finnish Pohjanmaa-class (ice-capable but corvette-focused and not fully proven in service yet), the NVL Group’s MMPV 90 (modular but only entering trials in late 2025), and stripped-down variants of existing U.S. designs, I recommend the Damen OPV 2600 as the optimal immediate choice. This Dutch-designed vessel is a battle-tested offshore patrol vessel (OPV) in full production, with four units operational in the Pakistan Navy’s Yarmook-class (deliveries completed through 2025). It’s derived from Damen’s commercial maritime tech, ensuring rapid scalability via U.S. shipyards like Bollinger or Austal (which already builds for the USCG). Pakistan’s examples demonstrate reliability in high-threat environments, including anti-surface warfare (ASuW) roles with modular weapon fits—directly transferable to USCG needs in contested waters.
Key Comparison: Damen OPV 2600 vs. Heritage-Class OPC
The OPV 2600 matches ~95% of the Heritage’s core capabilities (endurance, speed, aviation) at roughly half the displacement and crew size, enabling 50-60% more hulls for the same budget while maintaining blue-water patrol efficacy. It trades some heavy-lift volume for modularity, allowing quick swaps for USCG-specific modules (e.g., pollution response or unmanned systems bays).
Why the Damen OPV 2600 Now?
Proven and In Service: Four Yarmook-class vessels (PNS Hamza, 2023; PNS Tabuk, 2024; PNS Yanama, 2025; fourth imminent) have logged thousands of operational hours in the Arabian Sea, handling piracy, smuggling, and escort duties without major issues. This real-world validation trumps the Heritage’s unproven status—Pakistan’s fleet even integrates U.S.-compatible systems like the 76mm gun (upgradable to Mk 110).
In Production and Scalable: Damen’s Dutch and Indonesian yards are active on similar hulls (e.g., recent UAE follow-ons to the Arialah-class, a stretched 67/6911 variant). Licensing to U.S. builders (as with Sentinel-class FRCs) allows parallel construction at 2-3 yards, hitting 4-6 deliveries/year by 2030. No R&D needed—issue an RFP by Q2 2026 for FY2027 funding.
Mission Fit and Cost Efficiency: Aligns with USCG’s “capability bridge” between National Security Cutters (NSCs) and FRCs, emphasizing endurance over high-end warfighting. Modular bays support USCG priorities (e.g., oil spill response kits or migrant processing), while wartime scalability (e.g., NSM integration as in Pakistan) aids DoD surge needs. At ~$200M/hull, it frees $5-7B for 25+ vessels vs. the OPC’s $12B+ for 25, plus 20% lower annual ops costs from reduced crew/fuel.
Risk Mitigation: Avoids the Heritage’s pitfalls—Eastern’s inexperience led to 3+ year delays and now a full stop. Damen’s COTS approach has 90% commercial components, slashing integration risks and enabling foreign military sales offsets if needed.
Implementation Path
Immediate Actions (Q4 2025): Terminate non-critical Eastern options; redirect Phase 3 funds ($3B+ potential) to a Cutter X-style bridge program focused on OPV 2600.
Procurement: Sole-source Damen for design license; competitive build to U.S. yards (e.g., Austal for steel expertise). Target 12-15 initial hulls, with options for 10 more.
Upgrades: Baseline U.S. C4ISR integration; add Mk 110 gun and MH-60 compatibility at delivery.
Fallback: If larger hull needed, pivot to Damen’s stretched 6911 variant (110m, as in UAE Arialah follow-ons) for closer Heritage parity.
This shift prioritizes readiness over perfection, delivering capable cutters now to plug fleet gaps. The OPV 2600 isn’t a silver bullet, but it’s the fastest path to a sustainable, modern USCG presence in an era of great-power competition.
Lots of great suggestions above! I like Nicky’s idea to purchase the Damen OPV 2600.
I saw a disturbing statistic recently that said 50% of all new ships are built in China, while only 1% of all new ships are built in the United States! Since it will obviously take years, if not decades, to rebuild the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and then decades to build the ships in the U.S.,I think the U.S. needs to swallow its pride and immediately start buying ships from other nations to rebuild the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy as rapidly as we can. Otherwise, the U.S. Navy’s fleet will continue shrinking, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s fleet is starting to shrink too, as elderly cutters (there’s no better word to describe them than elderly) are retired. China isn’t going to sit around and wait decades for the U.S. shipbuilding industry to be reborn–they have their eyes set on taking Taiwan in this decade, in the 2020s, probably 2027, so any U.S. Navy or Coast Guard ships that won’t enter service until the 2030s or 2040s will arrive far too late.