Category Archives: News

Naming Ships–The Slippery Slope

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This article, which talks about the controversial decision to name LPD-26 for the late Pennsylvania congressman John Murtha, highlights a pet peeve of mine, the breakdown of the Navy’s naming conventions for ships, apparently for political purposes. Naming ships for recent presidents is bad enough. It introduces partisanship where it is not helpful, but the Murtha decision seems a particularly egregious case.

Generally since World War II, the Coast Guard seems to have been doing it right. The last time our ship names reflected politics, seems to have been the 378s named for Secretaries of Treasury. That continued the practice from the pre-war 327s. As politicians, not all of them were people everyone could admire. Apparently someone saw the error in this and the last three 378s were named for Coast Guard heroes.
I was very pleased when the service announced it would name the Fast Response Cutters (FRC) after enlisted hero. 210s have great names, all laudable characteristics to be aspired to, Courageous, Valiant, Resolute, etc. 270’s names come from Famous cutters of the past, good for reminding today’s sailors about those that went before.
We have named vessels for lakes (255s), bays (140 ft WTGB), islands (110 ft WPBs), points (82 ft WPBs), marine life (87 ft WPB),
Always thought the naming of buoy tenders was a bit curious, in that plants aren’t very nautical, but it did continue a tradition. Nothing like being from the Bluebell to make a sailor tough–sort of like a boy named Sue. Naming the 175 WAGLs after light house keepers was a good choice.
Assuming we build the Offshore Patrol Cutters, how might they be named?
  • The Coast Guard could certainly can find another 25+ heroes who could be honored by having a cutter named after them. Can’t see any down side except that it doesn’t immediately distinguish the class members from the FRCs.
  • Naming for famous cutters seems another likely choice.
  • They might also be named after small cities and towns. Perhaps as a thank you to communities with long close Coast Guard association. There is the small possible problem of possible misunderstanding in communications. Names might reprise those of the 75 Coast Guard manned patrol frigates of World war II which were also named after small cities and towns. The Navy is naming the Littoral Combat Ships after small towns too. This could be seen as a conflict or as an expression that the OPCs are also littoral combat ships. Naming would have to be coordinated with the Navy to avoid duplications.

Somewhere this may have already decided but, any thoughts?

Arctic SAR Treaty in the Works

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This report in the Canadian press suggests that a SAR treaty, negotiated by the Arctic Council members in December, could be signed when the foreign ministers next meet, beginning May 12th, in Nuuk, Greenland. It also gives a glimpse into the challenges the Canadians are facing in getting forces in the area.

Members of the Arctic Council include Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the US.

It will be interesting to see where they draw the sector lines since there is still some disagreement between the parties as to where the national boundaries lie.

A Tale of Two Harbor Defense Organizations–Part Two

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This is the second in a series comparing two incidents from World War II in which ships tried to force entry into a hostile harbor. Part one looked at the bloody, but ultimately successful British assault on the fortified port of St Nazaire. This part will look a German attempt to force their way into Oslo, Battle of Drøbak Sound. Part three will consider what these incidents can tell us about what it takes to stop a terrorist attack on an American port using a ship as a weapon.

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Early in World War II, After the invasion of Poland, but before the invasion of France, the Germans invaded Norway to secure their access to Swedish steel and Iron ore and deny it to the British. (Denmark was also invaded on the same day, to secure airfields to support the Norway invasion.) Unlike their other invasions, there was no direct land route into Norway, so the invasion had to came by sea. With the Royal Navy and their French ally dominate at sea, the transit would be risky, but resistance from the Norwegians was expected to be light. Norway was at peace. They had only a small Navy and standing Army. Their defense depended primarily on mobilizing reservists. If they could be defeated before they mobilized, it would be a quick and relatively inexpensive campaign.

Six separate task forces would seize critical facilities all along the Norwegian coast. Rather than a Normandy style assault, the invasion of Norway looked like several simultaneous Special Forces operations. Troops would be landed from warships that could make the transit quickly. It would all be over before the Norwegian military could react–or so they thought. Continue reading →

France & Australia Cooperate on Fisheries Enforcement in the South Pacific

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“Australia and France will step up patrols for illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean under a new agreement signed by the two countries…French patrols will also include Australian fisheries officers, and Australian vessels will carry French officers so that each country is able to apply the laws of the other to offenders.”

France and Australia have the second and third largest EEZs in the world after the US.

Thanks to Mike Colombaro at http://combatfleetoftheworld.blogspot.com/ for the link.

Working with Army Air for Coast and Harbor Defense

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Here is an interesting explanation of how a command in Korea used a little out of the box thinking to address an unconventional threat. In a bit different circumstances, the NCC (Naval Component Commander) might be Coast Guard, and a similar command arrangement might be useful. (Its also possible Coast Guard units might find themselves in Korea again.)

Thanks to Grandlogistics for the link.

Comparing Apples and Oranges–Ships and Cars

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Ran across a statement in gCaptain that the 378s had cost $15M each (haven’t been able to find it again). I went looking for confirmation and found another source that listed the cost as $16-20M. In any case, comparing that range, with the range of costs for the National Security Cutters suggests that the price for these admittedly nicer ships is 30 times that of the ships they are replacing.

I bought my first new car in 1971, about the same time the Coast Guard was buying 378s. It cost me $2004 for a Datsun 510, a then technically advanced, but small economy car. (Upper middle-class performance cars like the GTO were going for about $3,500) Cars in the same economy car market segment now cost seven to ten times what my ’71 cost. In fact if you look hard you can find cars (base models of the Nissan Versa or Hundai Accent) that are better in every way and only cost five times as much.

Using this inflation calculator, inflation based on the CPI from January 1971 to January 2010 was 444.44% meaning, costs are about five and a half times what they were in 1971.

Yes the NSC is better equipped and larger than the 378s, but cars in the same market segments today are also about 25-50% larger, faster, safer, have more gadgets, and even get better gas mileage. My Datsun had bias ply tires, a four speed manual transmission,rubber floor mats instead of carpeting, no power windows, no air conditioning, an AM radio, the glass was not tinted, seat covering material was a sticky vinyl, and not even a rear window defogger.

Cars and ships are not exactly analogous, but it is hard to see how the price has gone up 30 times. The high prices for the NSC are not just a Coast Guard problem. In fact, on a cost per ton basis, the price for the forth NSC, $480M, is lower than that for the Littoral Combat Ships in the recent 20 ship buy that seems to have been viewed as a shewd deal.

Looks like there is plenty of room for efficiency improvements in the shipbuilding industry.

All the fault may not be with the ship builders. The Coast Guard has been working with interested builders in preparation for the Offshore Patrol Cutter project. Hopefully they are talking about how to work the price down to something more reasonable.

Sail Training Ship for Pakistan

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Looks like the US Coast Guard is not the only service that still sees value in sail training. The Pakistanis have recently acquired a new sail training vessel. A bit smaller than the Eagle, but still a good sized ship, it measures 59.35 meters (196 ft) in length, with a draught of 4.8 meters (15.84 ft) and 498 tons. Its 18 sails total 949 square meters (10,335 sq.ft.).

How We Got in This Mess-A Short History of CG Shipbuilding

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Over the last 60 years the Coast Guard has typically fielded about 45 large patrol cutters, 1000 tons or greater (Is the Fleet Shrinking?) with as many as 36 WMECs. Theoretically we could build an average of 1.5 ships a year and maintain a fleet with an average age of about 15  years with progressive improvements introduced based on experience. This may be something to work toward, but it hasn’t been working that way. The Coast Guard’s current fleet is largely the product of two great spasms of ship building, WWII and one beginning in the 60s, a smaller bump in the 80’s, and long periods when no ships were built.

The last Lake class 255ft WPG/WHEC entered service in 1946. In the 64 years since then, this is the record of Patrol Cutter construction.

  • 1947-1963 (17 years) no new construction patrol cutters entered service. The service did acquire ex-Navy destroyer escorts (what would now be called frigates), 311 foot Barnegat Class former seaplane and torpedo boat tenders, 213 foot former submarine rescue vessels, and 205 foot former fleet tugs.
  • 1964-1972 (9 years) The 16 Reliance class 210s, built in four different yards, including five by the Coast Guard Yard, entered service 1964-1969. The 12 Hamilton Class 378s, all built at Avondale, entered  service 1967-1972. (The original plan was for 36 378s.) (28 ships/9 years=3.11 ships/year)
  • 1973-1982 (10 years) no new construction patrol cutters entered service.
  • 1983-1990 (8 years) The 13 Bear class 270s entered service between 1983 and 1990. (13 ships/8 years=1.625 ships/yr)
  • 1991-2007 (17 years) no new construction patrol cutters entered service.
  • 2008 Bertholf entered service
  • 2009 no new construction cutters entered service.
  • 2010 Waesche entered service.

45 of 64 years, no new construction patrol cutters entered service. All 43 new construction ships (210s, 378s, 270s, NSCs) were delivered in only 19 years. The current rate of construction (two ships in three years) is less than the minimum average long term construction rate (1.5 ships/year).

The program begun in the 60s was a timely effort to replace the ships built in WWII and earlier, unfortunately it was stopped short of completing their replacement.

In 1990 when construction of the 270s stopped, we still had 10 WMECs that dated from WWII: Storis, three 213s, three 205s, and three 180 ft former WLBs. Logically we should have continued building two ships a year to replace these. (In 1991 they were all at least 46 years old.) They would have all been replaced by 1995. Continuing two ships a year, the first 210s could have been replaced in 1996. When replaced, they would have all been at least 32 years old. Continuing two ship a year we could have replaced all the 210s and 378s by 2009. The first replacement for the 270s should have been contracted in 2010 to enter service in 2013.

We had an opportunity to have an orderly replacement program, but we blew it, beginning approximately FY87/88, when we failed to continue building ship, and let our engineering expertise atrophy.

Selling (and Saving) the Offshore Patrol Cutter Project

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Since seeing indications the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program may be in jeopardy (here and here), I’ve been thinking about how the program might be “sold.” There are a number of approaches that might be considered.

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

It Is a Money Saver

Get it started as an alternative to the NSC. As discussed in an earlier post (Rethinking the New Cutter Programs), we can get more new cutters on line more quickly if we truncated the NSC program at six and started the OPC program two years earlier. This could also be sold as a money saving step, in that we can probably get two OPCs for little more than the price of one NSC. There is very little the NSC can do that the OPC can’t. (If we include the features suggested below, the OPC will be able to do things the NSC cannot-further justifying the change.) This gets us “over-the-hump” of starting the program. Having built the first ships of the class it will be much harder to kill the project and much easier to revive it, if interrupted. The winning shipyard and their legislative representatives will work to keep the project going.  It will also mean the MECs and one HEC will be retiring at least a year earlier–the 210s will only be 54 to 56 years old.

Make the Consequences of Not Building Them Clear

Publish the decommissioning schedule. This should make the news in all the Congressional districts that will loose assets.

What is the performance difference. Publish an addendum to the latest “United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 20XX Performance Report” showing the decrease in performance if there had been no MECs.

Publish a plan to scale back or delete missions if the the MECs are not replaced.

Pork with a Purpose:

An infrastructure (shipyard) program. It might be more expensive, but Congress can decide they want to spread the work around. They have been doing this, almost since the day the republic was formed. It would certainly be reasonable to say they wanted the construction contracted to more than one yard, perhaps even one West Coast, one East Coast, one Gulf Coast or some other split. As a stimulus program that also delivers a tangible good, building four a year, two each on the West and East Coasts would not be unreasonable. That this spreads the support base for the program wouldn’t hurt either. It might even promote some competition in the long term.

Mobilize our Allies

Mobilize the shipyards that hope to win contracts. They have political clout.

Get the fishing industry on our side. Some times they don’t like us, but we keep the foreign competitors out, and when there is a medical emergency or their boat starts sinking they’re mighty happy we are around.

Mobile the Navy League. Despite the name, this organization is a great ally of the Coast Guard as well, but I’ve yet to see us make the case for the OPC in the pages of their magazine.

Get the Navy to endorse the program. Not sure they will want to, but there are lots of reasons they should (Offshore Patrol Cutters, Why the Navy Should Support the Program), particularly if the design chosen has the potential to be a useful “low-end” warship. These are exactly the types of ships needed for partnership station, and they are the kind of ships many of our allies should include in their Navies and Coast Guards through Foreign Military Sales.

Strengthen the National Defense Angle

Bring back the ASW mission. Adding a passive towed array to the ship could help in our law enforcement mission, improving the chances of  detecting and tracking semi-submersibles, but the additional military capability could also make the ship easier to justify. Beyond the support for a passive sonar usable for law enforcement, the only additions needed for a credible ASW capability would be having magazine and other storage space for torpedoes, sono-buoys, etc. to support Navy MH-60R helicopters that would prosecute contacts. There is more than enough reason for rejuvenating American ASW assets. As illogical as a US/Chinese confrontation would appear, they have been acting increasingly bellicose. The Chinese Navy already has more submarines than the Germans had at the beginning of WWII, the largest submarine force in the Pacific, while we and our allies have far fewer escort ships than any time in at least the last 70 years. There seems to be a particular need for escort ships for the underway replenishment ships, normally unarmed and unescorted, as they move from the ports where they load their supplies, to the areas where they deliver them to forward deployed task forces. OPCs could perform that mission.

Use the LCS Module Concept. This is ideal for the Coast Guard because it makes the ships adaptable for war time roles without requiring the Coast Guard to maintain either the equipment or the people. It also potentially gives the ships greater flexibility to perform peacetime roles. This requires very little more than some open space, foundations, and bringing up connections for utilities.

The Back Story

As an alternative to the LCS. Not that we can take this as an official line, but if the LCS program continues to draw criticism, particularly if the OPCs are designed to accept mission modules, it is something friends of the Coast Guard can suggest. It has been suggested in the past:

On 5 July 2009, Retired U.S. Navy Adm. James Lyons, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, suggested the LCS “program should return to its original target of $220 million per ship and combine with the U.S. Coast Guard to build a dual-purpose ship with a credible integral combat system that can meet limited warfare requirements. This very different ship should be built in large numbers as part of the coming Ocean Patrol Cutter Program…Such a change would achieve huge savings for both the Navy and the Coast Guard tied to large production numbers. The funding saved from canceling the LCS could be used to procure the most capable high-end combatant ship with margins enough to allow future modernization.” –This could ally us with those in the Navy who would like to divert Navy money from the LCS program to other purposes.

Coming Soon-How We Got In this Mess