Former Commandant, Adm. Thad Allen was recognized by Time Magazine as a “Person Who Mattered” in their “2010, Person of the Year” issue.
Admiral Allen continues to make us proud.
Thanks to Ryan Erickson for bringing this to my attention.
Former Commandant, Adm. Thad Allen was recognized by Time Magazine as a “Person Who Mattered” in their “2010, Person of the Year” issue.
Admiral Allen continues to make us proud.
Thanks to Ryan Erickson for bringing this to my attention.
Thanks to all our readers and especially those of you who help the discussion along with your comments. You make this site a success. This morning we passed a milestone with more than a quarter million hits this year.
Thanks again,
Chuck
Ryan Erickson is reporting that a continuing resolution has passed the house and will now go to the Senate. (Hopefully the Federal Government won’t have to shutdown.) In addition to authorizing expenditures, included in the bill is language that will allow the Coast Guard to make some changes, that include decommissioning three ships.
“…the Coast Guard may decommission one Medium Endurance Cutter, two High Endurance Cutters, four HU–25 aircraft, the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, and one Maritime Safety and Security Team, and make staffing changes at the Coast Guard Investigative Service…”
There is more detail in Ryan’s article, but a couple of numbers stood our for me.
“…$73,200,000 shall be for vessels, small boats, critical infrastructure and related equipment…” in the AC&I budget, and additionally
… $1,191,502,000 shall be for the Integrated Deepwater Systems program…of the funds made available for the Integrated Deepwater Systems program, $103,000,000 is for aircraft and $933,002,000 is for surface ships.” So there is $155.5M in the Deepwater Budget that is not for aircraft or ships?
Presumably the Deepwater money for surface ships includes exercising the option for the fifth National Security Cutter (about $480M based on the last award) and four more Fast Response Cutters, #9-12 (about $166M based on the last award)
That would still leave about $287M. Could it be that the programs are accelerating? Can someone fill us in?
What is wrong with this picture? Not the artist’s concept, the word picture painted by the description found at the acquisition directorate web site, that may be the first thing, perhaps the only thing, that a person learns about the OPC?
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(Disclaimer: The conceptual renderings posted on this website are for artistic display purposes only and do not convey any particular design, Coast Guard design preferences, or other requirements for the OPC.)
The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) will complement the Coast Guard’s in-service fleet and next-generation cutters to extend operational capabilities across the mission spectrum. Learn more
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These ships are not nice to have. They are not gravy or icing on the cake. They don’t complement or extend the “fleet and next-generation cutters.” They are the next-generation cutters and in a very real sense they will be the fleet. That they are equipped, as ships are equipped in the 21st century, should be taken for granted, that is not the reason we are building these ships.
Where is the urgency? These ships will replace ships now long overage. We are 20 years behind in the procurement process, and without them, we will have almost no offshore capability.
Why aren’t we pleading our case, and not just on the web site? Where are the articles in the US Naval Institute Proceedings and the Navy Leagues’ Seapower?
We know the nations needs these ships. If we don’t make them understand why we need them, and need them yesterday, we are failing in our duties.
Today, I’ll finish giving my answers to the questions I posed earlier.
My answer to the most basic question, “Why do we need them?” or in fact any large cutters, is here.
What missions will not get done if the program is canceled?
These missions are largely accomplished by the ships the OPCs are intended to replace and will be impacted severely if the OPC program is canceled.
“Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security” could also be adversely effected if the current terrorist threat levels take a turn for the worst.
Marine Safety and offshore SAR will also be adversely effected. Large cutters check compliance with commercial fishing vessel safety regulations on board U.S. vessels in isolated areas like the Western/Central Pacific and Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands. Additionally, flight deck equipped cutters with higher sea state capabilities are often essential for offshore SAR.
Are those tasks worth doing?
I have my own doubts about the efficacy of doing maritime drug interdiction, so I am not a fan of sending ships to operate off of Colombia, but that is only a small part of the drug enforcement effort, which is only a part of what these ships do. On patrol in the US EEZ, they are multi-mission resources, and if they are not involved in drug enforcement, they will be doing something else useful.
Frankly, I don’t think we have properly prepared for the possibility of our enemies using a medium to large ship to make an unconventional attack on a US port. Neither the ships we have now, nor the ships that we are building have weapons that can reliably stop a ship from reaching its objective. Nevertheless, adding the weapons that can do that, is easier and quicker than building ships. The ships are needed in any case, to hopefully intercepts inbound threats and make a determination if they are hostile before they get to our ports. (This likely requires attempting to stop and board the vessel.) The larger cutters, as opposed to patrol boats, are likely to make that determination further from the ports, giving us a better chance of successfully stopping an attack.
Offshore fisheries are already among the most dangerous professions in the US, I don’t think we want to make it any more dangerous.
Migrant Interdiction and Fisheries Patrols appear worthwhile, but ultimately the law makers are going to have to decide if the laws they have created are worth enforcing.
What can they do that you can’t do with the 154 ft Hero class fast response cutters (FRC)?
The new Fast Response Cutters are likely to prove unexpectedly useful, even so, they are certainly at a disadvantage compared to the OPC. Much less endurance. Much greater stress on the crew in even moderately bad weather. No helicopter facilities. Only one smaller, less capable ship’s boat. Smaller crews means less depth in the boarding teams, and less experience. OPCs can do boardings in more severe weather. The FRCs will also not have access to some of the intelligence resources that the OPC will have. In some limited circumstances, particularly operating in company with larger cutters, I think the FRCs will prove useful as a patrol asset, but bottom line, they are designed to “respond’ not to patrol.
Why don’t we let the Navy provide the ships, and “You can just put a detachment on board to do law enforcement missions.”
The Navy has been saying that they do not have as many ships as they need. They have about 288 and have repeatedly expressed a need for 313. Using Navy ships to do Coast Guard missions distracts them from their normal operations. Any navy ship used to replace an OPC is likely to cost more both to procure and to operate and will not have the benefit of the more focused and experienced Coast Guard Crew that routinely executes these missions.
Senators and Representatives will ask, “What’s in it for my constituents?”
Why do they need to be so big and complicated?
The current concept is not much more complex than the 270s, and only slightly larger. Most of the additional complexity is to allow the ships to take advantage of intelligence resources which should also make them more efficient and effective. I can even save fuel by pinpointing where the ship should be going instead of more random patrolling. Increasing size has only a small impact on life cycle costs, but it will make the ships much more capable than the smaller ships they replace.
Aren’t the current ships doing the job? Why can’s you build a simpler ship like the 210?
We can build simpler ships, but depending on our choices they could be unable to catch up with a modern merchant ships, unable to use available intelligence information, unable to make a meaningful defense contribution, unable to use modern sensors, unable to function in severe weather, and unsurvivable in more demanding situations.
Do you really need that many?
25 is really is not that many. In fact it may not be enough. Even building 25 ships as planned the total fleet of large cutters is expected to drop from 43 to 33. The waters off the South Pacific islands and the rapidly expanding Arctic waters are already under served. The US has the largest EEZ in the world, but with only 33 ships, assuming 17 ships underway, their average patrol area would be over 200,000 nautical miles square.
Why don’t you buy Littoral Combat Ships and get economies of scale?
The average cost of Offshore Patrol Cutters are expected to be considerably less than the marginal cost of additional LCS. Perhaps more importantly, the LCS don’t have the endurance we expect from the OPC and their maintenance and operating costs is likely to be considerably higher (bigger ships, more complex and exotic propulsion). The LCS-1 FREEDOM class cannot use their diesels for more than cruising, and have to switch to very thirsty Gas Turbines for higher speeds. The LCS-2 INDEPENDENCE class trimarans have better diesel cruise performance, but their extreme beam, 104 feet, may be problematic for basing at existing Coast Guard facilities and will certainly be more expensive to dry dock.
The LCS manning concepts are yet to be proven and require unusually skilled crews that absorb a disproportionately large percentage of outstanding petty officers to man them, while providing little opportunity to “growing” junior enlisted into the highly qualified petty officer they require. That would have a more severe impact on a small service where these ships would constitute a much larger percentage of the total fleet.
Yesterday I outlined some basic questions that have to be answered to justify the OPC program. I’m sure there questions have already been answered in one form or another, but we need to make sure the answers are widely understood and we need to apply whatever influence we may have to help the program along.
We have already gotten some good answers in the comment section, and I’m going to make my own stab at it. I’ll answer each of my questions in detail later, I’m still polishing them, but first, I’d like to provide basic justification for our large cutters.
Why do we need them?
The US EEZ is roughly 3.7 million square nautical miles, about 30% more than the entire land area of the United States. The Coast Guard is the “Department of Emergency Services” for the entire area–fire, flooding, medical, and the only law. Only a small portion of the area can be serviced by patrol boats, so perhaps 3 million square nautical miles must be patrolled by larger cutters. A fleet of approximately 40 cutters can keep no more than about 20 on patrol at any one time, so each cutter is patrols an average of about 150,000 square nautical miles. On average they would be 1,000 miles apart. Because we don’t distribute the ships evenly, in fact, many times they are closer together in areas of interest, but in other areas the separation is even greater.
If we decide not to build these ships, or some sort of large cutter, we will see a rapid decline in our patrol forces beginning in 2020 running down to a force of only the National Security Cutters with typically no more than four cutters on patrol to cover the entire area.
American citizens are on those waters and they deserve and rightfully expect a minimum level of protection.
The nation and the international community take many of the things we do for granted, but like in the movie, “It’s a Wonderful Life,” consider what that area would be like if there were no large cutters. Some of the things that don’t happen because cutters have been there:
(Somehow the conspiracy theorist in me suspects that the movement to end the OPC program is a result of elements profiting from the NSC, wanting to make sure the NSC program is not truncated in favor of more much cheaper OPCs. If successful, we might even see a continuation of the NSC program.)

Yesterday a report surfaced that OMB was recommending eliminating the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program. I don’t know how serious this threat is to the program. It might just be one of hundreds of line items that might be considered as ways to trim the budget. An OMB recommendation doesn’t necessarily reflect the intent of the President or the department. Certainly the Congress will also have something to say about it.
On the other hand, we know there will be serious attempts to reduce the budget shortfalls, so we can expect any high profile program to get looked at seriously. Within the Coast Guard, it doesn’t get any more high a profile than the OPC program. This is potentially the most expensive ship building program in our history.
We should expect a fight over this program. There are going to be many questions. Hopefully we will have the answers ready, because if this program is canceled, the character of the service will be changed radically, and the country will loose a vital capability.
Even if the program is not canceled outright there will be questions about the choices made:
Unfortunately we are getting vibs that the OPC program is in jeopardy. I’ll have more to say about this later, but wanted to get it out there as quickly as possible.
If you would like a review of how bad its going get, even if we proceed as currently planed, you might want to take a look at “Rethinking the New Cutter Programs.” (Thanks to Lee for the heads up.)

If you would like to take a moment and see what the Coast Guard was doing 69 years ago today, in and around Oahu, The Coast Guard Historian has several articles on the subject you can access here.