Here is an interesting article discussing how the Iranians are using shell corporations and changes of name and ownership to disguise their control of ships being used to circumvent sanctions. This would seem to have important implications for any attempt to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness, and identify potentially hostile ships attempting to enter US ports. As we attempt to do this, let’s make sure it is more effective than the TSA’s “no fly list.”
Category Archives: Policy
Trust But Verify
“Trust But Verify.” It was a phrase from the Cold War, but it is still good advice. The Deepwater Horizon disaster has shown that the federal government may have put too much trust in the oil companies and certainly had little or no ability to verify. The regulators are in a position of having to depend on the organizations they are regulating for the information needed to regulate.
The regulators apparently need a lot more in house information about best practices for deepwater drilling. If the government intends to effectively regulate deep ocean drilling, it needs the ability to go there and see for themselves. They need to be able to test equipment like blowout preventers in the actual environment where they are supposed to work. They need to have responses to equipment failure prepared and tested before there is an actual failure. They need a place where whistle blowers will be heard and their honest concerns addressed.
Whether the capability is invested in Coast Guard, MMS, or some other entity, the government needs the capability to take action, independent of the oil companies. The next question would be, who pays for it? The oil companies of course. They should pay to be policed.
Deepwater Horizon, Transparency and ABC
On June 3, ABC News accused the Coast Guard of acting in collusion with BP to minimize the estimate of oil being discharged from the wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon. I learned about the report from a blog I visit regularly.
While there is much to talk about regarding ABC’s report, including how statements were taken out of context, whether initial estimates of the discharge rate would have any effect on the fines ultimately levied against BP; whether the inaccuracy of those estimates had in any way reduced the urgency of our response, whether this was about a cover up or simply a media outlet sulking because they were not given access to the best available video.
The thing I found truly gratifying was the view of the blogger and of those who commented on the blog. They trusted the Coast Guard because we had been honest in the past, even, and especially when, it wasn’t pretty.
“I am having a seriously hard time believing that the US Coast Guard, which was at the time under the command of Admiral Thad Allen, was the responsible party withholding this information from the public for BP.”…..”US Admirals, Navy or Coast Guard, don’t put companies before citizens during crisis and emergencies – which is what ABC is basically trying to imply with this reporting.”
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National Security Strategy
Another significant document has been issued, the “National Security Strategy.” This is not just a military strategy. In many respects it seems to reflect the values of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century.” There are sections that can be used to justify international cooperation and training, but the most immediately applicable sections are on pages 18-19
“Strengthen Security and Resilience at Home
“At home, the United States is pursuing a strategy capable of meeting the full range of threats and hazards to our communities. These threats and hazards include terrorism, natural disasters, large-scale cyber attacks, and pandemics. As we do everything within our power to prevent these dangers, we also recognize that we will not be able to deter or prevent every single threat. That is why we must also enhance our resilience—the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption. To keep Americans safe and secure at home, we are working to:
“Enhance Security at Home: Security at home relies on our shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks by identifying and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and securing cyberspace. That is why we are pursuing initiatives to protect and reduce vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, at our borders, ports, and airports, and to enhance overall air, maritime, transportation, and space and cyber security. Building on this foundation, we recognize that the global systems that carry people, goods, and data around the globe also facilitate the movement of dangerous people, goods, and data. Within these systems of transportation and transaction, there are key nodes—for example, points of origin and transfer, or border crossings—that represent opportunities for exploitation and interdiction. Thus, we are working with partners abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders. And we are developing lines of coordination at home across Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners, as well as individuals and communities.
“Effectively Manage Emergencies: We are building our capability to prepare for disasters to reduce or eliminate long-term effects to people and their property from hazards and to respond to and recover from major incidents. To improve our preparedness, we are integrating domestic all hazards planning at all levels of government and building key capabilities to respond to emergencies. We continue to collaborate with communities to ensure preparedness efforts are integrated at all levels of government with the private and nonprofit sectors. We are investing in operational capabilities and equipment, and improving the reliability and interoperability of communications systems for first responders. We are encouraging domestic regional planning and integrated preparedness programs and will encourage government at all levels to engage in long-term recovery planning. It is critical that we continually test and improve plans using exercises that are realistic in scenario and consequences.
Sea Services Release Naval Operations Concept 2010–and the CG is a big part of it
The Naval Operations Concept 2010 has finally been released. This document is intended to implement the Maritime Strategy, 2007. After only a quick skim, it is apparent that the Coast Guard was well represented in writing the document. If anything the number of references to the Coast Guard are surprisingly high, considering the relative size of the service. The document calls out a number of requirements for Coast Guard forces, both currently filled and anticipated.
In view of the frequent question of whether the Coast Guard is a “Naval Service,” it was gratifying to see this straight forward statement on page 7, “The Naval Service is comprised of the active and reserve components and the civilian personnel of the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard.”
MSSTs and Irregular Naval Warfare
We have all probably read that five Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) are to be dissolved. There is good background in a recent article in The Navy League’s magazine, “Sea Power”.
For those that would like a little more background on the potential threats, here are some links to historical employment of irregular naval warfare:
- Italian Naval Special Forces
- British X-craft
- The Limpet Mine
- Swimmer delivery vehicles/human torpedoes
- USS Card
- Vietnam-era incidents
There were many more attacks in Vietnam. So called “sapper” attacks were fairly common.
GPS and development of technology for underwater work and recreation have made these capabilities much easier to achieve.
I’ve heard statements to the effect that others can do the mission better, but I don’t see anyone else stepping up to do the job, at least not in US ports other than Navy bases.
I have very mixed feelings about the underwater port security mission. It is really almost an impossible job to do with a high probability of success. There are too many potential targets, not unlike trying to protect subways or buses from suicide bombers. It’s a job the needs to be done, but it is most likely to be recognized only when there is a failure.