The Coast Guard has made public the Executive Summary of its Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study. “FierceHomelandSecurity” has published a short summary of the content.
They also provided a direct link to the “Executive Summary” (a 24 page pdf). It is heavy with acronyms, and there is no list of acronyms attached to the Executive Summary, although there is probably one in the full study. I’ve attached a list of those I found, at the end of the post for those who might want a little help going through the summary.
“This initial phase of the FMA (Fleet Mix Analysis-ed.) is intended to address offshore surface and aviation capabilities. Follow-on FMA phases will assess capabilities needed for coastal and inland missions as well as emerging missions, such as Arctic operations and those of the Deployable Operations Group (DOG).
“The FMA explored the projected Fleet mix requirements to meet the CG’s 11 statutory missions in FY2025. Mission requirements were based on nine Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) and an assessment of critical activities, such as training and support, which consume asset mission availability.
“The FMA included all CG aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing), all white-hull cutters (FRC up to NSC), and all applicable C4ISR systems.
“The FMA focused on activities in the offshore and aviation operating environment. Offshore and aviation are defined in the FMA as being generally 50+ nautical miles offshore and/or requiring extended presence. The FMA also considered missions within 50 nautical miles that consume air asset availability.
“The FMA used the 2007 CG Fleet, as defined in the 2007 Modeled CONOPS (Concept of Operations-ed.) and the “Deepwater” POR (Program of Record-ed.) as Baselines for comparative performance and cost analysis.
“Preliminary Operational Requirements Document (P-ORD) thresholds were used for the OPC (Offshore Patrol Cutter-Chuck).
“The OPC and NSC will operate 230 days away from homeport (DAFHP). No specific crewing method is assumed (i.e., crew rotation concept [CRC]).
“The HC-144A will operate at 800 programmed flight hours (PFH) per year. (This is a reduction from previous assumption–Chuck)
“U.S. Navy out-of-hemisphere (OOH) (2.0 OPC/NSC) and Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) (7.0 OPC/NSC) support was consistent with the FY2010 demand.
“Additional acquisition/next generation platforms have the same capabilities and cost as the FMA Baseline Fleet mix cutters and aircraft (e.g., the next-generation short range recovery (SRR) helicopter is an MH-65C).
“The High Latitude regions of the ice shelf and Deployable Operations Group (DOG) mission requirements were not considered.
“No specific MDA performance measures have been established to model.
“87-ft coastal patrol boat (CPB), 225-ft seagoing buoy tender (WLB), Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and foreign asset contributions were considered, but force level requirements for 87-ft CPB, 225-ft WLB, DoD/DHS and foreign assets were not assessed.
“Additional shore facilities (e.g., schools, berthing, simulators/training aids, etc.) beyond those directly associated with platforms (e.g., piers, hangars, etc.) are not included in costs.
“”The need for non-operational/shore billet increases commensurate with the projected increases in operational manning was not assessed and is not included in costs.
“All cost estimates are rough order of magnitude (ROM) and are not budget quality.
“Additional specific assumptions utilized for modeling, simulation, and costing are included in their respective chapters of the final report.
“The Fleet Capacity Analysis (FCA) combined information developed in the mission validation phase, the capability definition phase, and a Warfare Analysis Laboratory Exercise (WALEX) to produce an objective Fleet mix and incremental Fleet mix alternatives. To develop the objective Fleet mix, the FMA used three independent teams with unique force projection tools or methodologies – the Database Enhanced Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) IDS Asset Assessment Tool (CIAAT) Model (DECMv2), the Mission Effectiveness Asset Needs Model (MEAN), and a qualitative analysis by a panel of CG SMEs – to develop a force structure that was aligned with MPP capability and capacity targets. Each team applied their methodology using a common set of asset characteristics and mission demands to develop a zero-based force mix (capable of meeting all mission requirements) projection. The results from these independent projections were considered as three “lines of position” (LOPs) and were consolidated to form a conceptual “fix.””
Seven Alternative Fleets:
The Study looks at seven levels of effort:
- 2004 Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) Mission Needs Statement (MNS) which was used as an approved performance objective, but that was not achievable because of operational realities now recognized.
- 2007 Actual
- The current Program of Record (POR) (closely related to the 2004 IDS/MNS but with adjustments)
- An “Objective Mix Asset Quantities.” This was referred to as FMA-4, and provided a fleet approximately twice as large as the program of record.
- Three additional levels between the Program of Record and the Objective Mix Asset Quantities were identified as FMA-1, 2, and 3. The increments were not proportional across all platform types and appeared to have been tied to addressing specific performance shortfalls. The objectives of these intermediate steps were not explicitly stated in the summary.
Table ES-8 Alternative Fleet Mix Asset Quantities
————–POR FMA-1 FMA-2 FMA-3 FMA-4
NSC 8 9 9 9 9
OPC 25 32 43 50 57
FRC 58 63 75 80 91
HC-130 22 32 35 44 44
HC-144A 36 37 38 40 65
H-60 42 80 86 99 106
H-65 102 140 159 188 223
419 21 21 22
4215 19 19 19
Based on the Figure ES-6, “CG-Wide Measures Compared to the 2004 NMS System,” measures of effectiveness that would primarily benefit from increased assets would be Cocaine interdiction, Living Marine Resources, and PWCS intelligence driven security boarding rate. All the improvements have very little impact on SAR and NDAD (non-deepwater aviation demands).
Graph ES-7 provides another way of looking at this:
“Figure ES-7 shows the relative improvements attributed to each FMA (Fleet Mix Analysis–ed.) increment over the 2007 CG Fleet based on these seven metrics. The POR (Program of Record–ed.) shows significant improvements over the 2007 Fleet, especially in LMR (living marine resources–ed) and CD (cocaine interdiction-ed.). As was expected, FMA-1 shows significant improvements in DefOps and CD; FMA-2 and FMA-3 show significant improvements in LMR, OLE, and PWCS; and FMA-4 shows significant improvements in AMIO. In addition, FMA-1, which targeted CD, showed a significant improvement in AMIO, and FMA-4, which targeted AMIO, show significant improvement in CD. This “by-catch” is due to the common threat vectors and targets shared by the AMIO and CD missions. The SAR mission shows only a slight increase in performance because the 2007 CG Fleet has a robust SAR posture, leaving very little room for improvement.”
In regard to Migrant Interdiction, ES-6 and ES-7 appear to be contradictory. Assuming “Maritime Migrant Success” in ES-6 is the measure for AMIO, results appear relatively flat in ES-6 with little change as assets are added, while ES-7 seems to indicate significant improvement with additional assets, with FMA-4 providing an approximate 135% improvement over levels in 2007. This is very hard to understand considering the Coast Guard already claims to have successfully interdicted 42.1% of marine migrants in 2007 and 46.9% in 2008. Additionally, other agencies are intercepting another 20% of marine migrants (See table ES-2). In other words to achieve a 135% improvement in AMIO the Coast Guard would have to intercept essentially 100% of marine migrants with no assistance from any other agency (The target was 90% and the study did suggest that this target be validated).
There a lot more to the report than we see in the Executive Summary, “A complete operational effectiveness assessment, with results broken down by region, mission, and asset class, is included in the final report.”
The objective mix assumed that five NSCs would be deployed to the Caribbean and four to the “International Pacific Ocean” for Defense Operations. None would be used for ALPAT. OPCs would be used for that mission. I find this decision hard to understand.
I was also surprised that at all levels, land based UAS out numbered ship based systems.
What it did not do:
The study did not consider different proportions of assets within the same spending constraints.
It did not consider alternative platform characteristics. Only those assets that were in the program of record were considered.
At least in the Executive Summary, it did not make a direct connection between platform requirements and missions. That is, it does not show how resource hours or units are allocated among programs.
Did not consider the effects of actual current funding levels.
I believe Congress asked for a “Fleet Mix Study” in 2008. The Coast Guard has been keeping it in house and the results, and apparently the format, have not changed significantly since 2009 when it was considered too unrealistic to present to Congress. We discussed it here in April 2011: “Fleet Mix Where Are the Trade-offs.” Unfortunately I don’t think this document will satisfy anyone. I have to say that I am profoundly disappointed, that so much effort has gone into a document, that has missed an opportunity to make any important point.
- It states the obvious, “We could do more with more assets.”
- It answers questions no one is asking like, “What would you do if we gave the Coast Guard an additional $2B a year?” and
- It has missed the opportunity to tell Congress about the effects of the cuts the Coast Guard is actually experiencing.
Still the process appears to be a good one, if it can be integrated into the decision making process in a timely manner, instead of waiting for years for the result. Having developed the methodology, there should be an immediate effort to show the effects of the current budget. How effective will the Coast Guard be, when all the 210s are gone and the only large cutters we have are six NSCs and 13 270s? That is the Coast Guard we are likely to have in 2020. The Mission Effectiveness Project, which attempts to keep the legacy fleet operational indicates that they are attempting to keep the 210s in service until 2017 (by which time the youngest will have been in service for 48 years and the oldest for 53) and the 270s in service until 2022 by which time the youngest will have been in service for 32 years and the oldest for 39). The first OPC does not come on line until 2020 and it appears, unless there is a significant increase in the AC&I allocations, the Coast Guard may not build more than one a year. If so, the thirteenth OPC will not be delivered until 2032 at which time the youngest 270 will have had 42 years of service. Unless things change, we have to accept that the OPCs are replacements for the 270s not the 210s. The Webber Class are becoming the defacto replacement for 210s as well as 110s.
Acronyms–And one last gripe, executive summaries are not written for people who want to learn all the acronyms. Using too many acronyms leaves the impression the writer is following the advise, “If you can’t dazzle ’em with brilliance, baffle ’em with bull shit,” and consequently the results are suspect. As indicated above, here is a list of 83 acronyms used in the Executive Summary. My favorite is CIAAT, which is an acronym that incorporates two other acronyms– CNA (Center for Naval Analysis) IDS (Integrated Deepwater Systems) Asset Assessment Tool. There are three acronyms I was not able to identify, but have included them anyway in hopes that readers will provide the missing definition (two of the three now identified):
AMIO Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations
APB Acquisition Program Baseline
AOPS Abstract of Operations System
AtoN Aids to Navigation
AUF Airborne Use of Force
CD Removal rate for cocaine from non-commercial vessels in maritime transit zone
CGMOES Coast Guard Maritime Operational Effectiveness Simulation (campaign model)
CIAAT CNA (Center for Naval Analysis) IDS (Integrated Deepwater Systems) Asset Assessment Tool
CNA Center for Naval Analysis
COP Common Operating Picture
CPB Coastal Patrol Boat
CRC Crew Rotation Concept (multiple crewing for cutters)
DAFHP days away from homeport
DCI Detect, Classify, Identify
DCO Deputy Commandant for Operations
DCMS Deputy Commandant for Mission Support
DECMv2 Database Enhanced Center for Naval Analysis Integrated Deepwater Systems Asset Assessment Tool CIAAT (One of three sources for determining number of asset required.)
DefOps Defense Operations
ESC Executive Steering Committee
FCA Fleet Capacity Analysis
FMA Fleet mix analysis
FVI Foreign Vessel Inspection
GT Guidance Team
IDE International Data Exchange
IDS Integrated Deepwater System
IIP International Ice Patrol
IMO International Maritime Organization
IOC Initial Operational Capability
IPT Integrated Product Teams
JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force South JIATF-S
LMR Living Marine Resources
LMS Local Monitoring System
LRC Long Range Cutter
LRIT Long Range (vessel) Identification and Tracking System
LRS Long Range Surveillance (C-130)
LSI Lead System Integrator
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MEP Marine Environmental Protection
MER Marine Environmental Response
MEAN Mission Effectiveness Asset Needs (Model)
MISLE Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (a data base)
MNS 2004 Integrated Deepwater System Mission Needs Statement
MOE Measures of Effectiveness
MRC Medium Range Cutter
MPP Mission Performance Plan
MRR Medium Range Recovery (H-60)
MRS Medium Range Surveillance (C-144)
MSMP Modeling and Simulation Master Plan
NAIS Nationwide Automated Identification System
NDAD Non-Deepwater Aviation Demands
NDC National Data Center
NMSRA National Maritime Security Risk Assessment (methodology)
OLE/GLE Other/General Law Enforcement
OPAR Operational Performance Accountability Reports
PFH Programmed Flight Hours
PGA Performance Gap Analysis
POA&M Plan of Action and Milestones
POR Current Program of Record
P-ORD Preliminary Operational Requirements Document
PWCS CG Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security
ROM Rough order of Magnitude
RWAI Rotary Wing Airborne Interdiction
SAR Search and Rescue
SDCIP Surveil, Detect, Classify, Identify, and Prosecute
SESS Shipboard Signals Exploitation Space
SSEE Ship’s Signal Exploitation Equipment
SI System Integrator
SLEP Service Life Extension Program
SME Subject Matter Expert
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea
SOPP Standard Operational Planning Process
SPD Strategic Planning Direction
SRC Short Range Cutter
SRR Short Range Recovery (H-65)
TOC Total Cost of Ownerships
SUAV Strategic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
TUAV Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UAS-CB Unmanned Aerial System–Cutter Based
UAS-LB Unmanned Aerial System–Land Based
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
WALEX Warfare Analysis Laboratory Exercise