A U.S. Army Green Beret observes an incoming CH-47 Chinook helicopter during Operation Polar Dagger in Wales, Alaska, in August 2024. IMAGE CREDIT: SPC. BRYON DAVIDSON/U.S. ARMY
The Indo-Pacific Defense Forum reported on a Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) exercise,
“To address growing concerns in the Arctic, SOCNORTH recently executed two phases of Operation Polar Dagger, an operational series that demonstrates rapidly deployable, joint SOF capabilities throughout the North American Arctic. It forms the basis of options to deter, disrupt and deny adversary activity in support of U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) layered defense of the U.S. homeland…
“In 2023 and 2024, SOCNORTH and the U.S. Navy partnered to deploy the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha and the USS John L. Canley, an expeditionary sea base vessel that supports SOF operations and other maritime missions, to the Bering Sea and the Arctic Circle to support Operation Polar Dagger. USSOF is enhancing its navigation expertise in Arctic terrain and has demonstrated the ability to thrive in the region by executing long-range movements, maritime interdiction operations, rapid infiltration/exfiltration, air-to-ground integration, critical infrastructure defense, domain awareness, and medical evacuation validation, among other engagements.”
(I suspect what this means is that USS John P. Murtha participated in 2023 and USS John L. Canley participated in 2024. Both could not have participated both years.)
A lot of the post is an attempt to explain to an Indo-Pacific audience why a NORTHCOM exercise should be important to them.
Observations:
It appears that Polar Daggar is a part of the larger NORTHCOM NOBLE DEFENDER exercise. This is apparently a regular annual exercise. NORTHCOM’s on-line magazine reported on the 2023 exercise.
“U.S. Army and Navy assets conduct an interdiction operation in the Bering Sea in July 2024.” Note how flat the seas are. That’s not normal. They did do this in July. You can’t count on seas like this. IMAGE CREDIT: SENIOR AIRMAN JOHNNY DIAZ/U.S. AIR FORCE
There is a serious problem here because there was apparently no Coast Guard participation in these exercises. The Navy’s Pacific Fleet almost never has surface ships anywhere near the Arctic. If you have an urgent need for a ship to do something in the Bering Sea, the Coast Guard is really the only option most of the time. SOCNORTH should be learning how they can exploit Coast Guard resources including ships, boats and aircraft. If you want maritime interdiction in the Bering Sea, if you want maritime domain awareness, who should NORTHCOM call? –the Coast Guard.
Want to fly a “Night Stalker” helicopter off of a ship? Want to launch ATACMS from the Chukchi Sea or maybe Tomahawk or SM-6 from a Mk70 launcher? You could put it on the flight deck of a cutter.
Need follow-up logistics for paratroopers dropped into an isolated coastal location? Coast Guard.
A satellite image of Shemya Island. What is now called Eareckson Air Station, with its lengthy runway, is seen along the southern edge. Google Earth
Not enough Air Force transports available when you need to move troops to reinforce Shemya? Kodiak C-130Js can help with that.
Cutter might even put a landing party ashore to provide quick protection for a critical facility and stand offshore to provide some AAW protection with its 57mm.
East-Coast-based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operators (SEALs) conduct an over the beach infiltration on Shemya Island, Alaska, Sept. 6, 2023, as part of Operation Polar Dagger. During the operation, special operations forces projected the ability of U.S. forces to defend critical infrastructure, enhanced all-domain awareness, demonstrated operational reach, and strengthened our understanding of activity in the Arctic. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Matthew Dickinson)
In 2023, Special Forces operating from USS John P. Murtha (LPD-26) did an infiltration exercise. A cutter could have done the same thing, and it probably would have been more realistic since an LPD is unlikely to be available.
Any surface or land action at the start of a conventional conflict against Russian and/or China that involves the Arctic is likely to be a surprise involving small units, probably involving covert actions from unconventional platforms, paratroopers, and small unit insertions. At least initially, it will be a “run what you brung” war. We will have to fight with what we have and effectively the Coast Guard is the surface navy for Alaska.
The “Center of Gravity” for the theater is likely to be the Bering Strait. As long as the US controls the strait, the Northern Sea Route will be useless for traffic between the Russian North coast and China or the Russian Pacific Coast.
The photo that leads off this post was taken at Wales, Alaska, population 145, 111 miles (179 km) northwest of Nome. The location is significant in that it is on the Eastern edge of the Bering Strait. It appears someone has recognized the significance of the location.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
I appreciate what the USCG does, but as a force which in terms of their typical activities does SAR, safety support and law enforcement, especially in this theater, are you sure you’re not volunteering them to be an anvil rather than a hammer?
IMO, USCG has to train a lot more (on their own) in terms of being able to rapidly introduce everything from new paint schemes for their vehicles to ECM for those same vehicles or they’d be very vulnerable to air and maritime forces whose operational focus is always on combat readiness. Once they have stair-stepped up to combat readiness, then have them exercise with Navy and other forces.
As an example, is your average USCG vessel ready to take on the kind of drone and electronic warfare we’re seeing in Ukraine and other combat theaters right now?
I’m not a coastal defense or interdiction expert by any means, but PLAN and the Russian Pacific Fleet would seem a more robust threat than Narco-submarines, though I think those organizations could probably learn a thing or two from the cartels in terms of maritime infiltration of SOF.
Without proper prep, sending a CG vessel into combat operations could just end up being an extra SAR mission with no tactical or strategic benefit.
If there is a war the Coast Guard will be in it. That is just the facts of life and since there are never enough resources, to respond to all the diverse and conflicting demands, Coast Guard assets will be used.
Of course, the Coast Guard will not be acting alone. Coast Guard units will be used in conjunction with whatever other assets may be used in the theater. There are air defense assets including F-22s in Alaska. There are Army ground units as well.
Still transportation, particularly ground transportation, in Alaska and the Arctic is always challenging.
To be an effective team all parties need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of all parties. Unfortunately, it looks like because the Coast Guard is not participating in these exercises, it appears NORTHCOM may not have an understanding of Coast Guard capabilities and limitations.
The Arctic is always going to be a secondary theater in any major conflict. NORTHCOM is never going to have all the assets they want. Coast Guard participation in exercises is how we find our place in the organization.
Bottom line, we need to be included in the exercises. That does not mean we should not also be looking at the way the Coast Guard is trained and equipped.
It is an iterative learning process. Good exercises leave you with a work list of things to fix before the next exercise.