The choice of the NSC as the basis for the FF(X) has prompted a lot of discussion about their survivability. Ten years ago, I did a post, “Small Warship Survivability,” I think it is still relevant. Basically I found that while it is certainly true that a major hit is more likely to sink a small ship than a large ship, the probability of actually being sunk is, based on US WWII experience, less likely for smaller ships. Looking at the video above, it seems that is the British experience as well.
In addition, it is far more likely that large ships will be taken out of service for a period due to damage that does not sink the ship. The current lack of tenders, repair ships, and floating dry docks makes these periods likely to be relatively long.
Considering the possibility of a war with China, it seems little thought has gone into how the effort will be supplied. In 2018 the Navy frankly told Military Sealift Command that they would probably not be able to escort the logistics ships that supply the US military. Additionally we have so few merchant mariners, we cannot afford to loose any of them.
The head of the Chinese Navy is a submariner. The Chinese have studied the naval war in the Pacific during WWII and they found the Japanese’s primary mistake was not attacking US logistics. We can be pretty sure, if we go to war, Chinese nuclear submarines, supported by their constellation of satellites, will be positioned to ambush our logistics when hostilities start. (I think there may be a possibility of armed merchant ships as well early in the conflict. MSC ships are essentially unarmed making them easy prey.)
Our situation is not unlike that of the Royal Navy in WWII. We do not have enough ships to escort the logistics ships. If we try to make each new ship capable of dealing with every threat, we will be unable to build enough. We need to build enough that are just good enough to handle escorting in areas where the threats are limited to submarines and their limited number of weapons. In areas where the threats more diverse, they will have to be teamed with more capable ships.
We will also need to be able to take out their satellites, but that is a job for Space Force.
It might be possible to escort some ships with Maritime Patrol Aircraft like the P-8. To make that possible we probably need to reopen NAS Adak, but if the vessels are sunk, the aircraft cannot rescue the crew.
An aspect of the Battle of the Atlantic that is frequently overlooked, is how many merchant mariners were rescued by escorts and specialist rescue vessels. If the crews know that there will be no rescue if their ships are sunk, they might not even choose to start.
Check out the video. The success of the corvettes was remarkable.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
Merry Christmas Chuck,
There has been much caterwauling and complaining about the NSC based frigate. What folks should be complaining about is the length of time it has taken for Big Navy to get off its collective duff and order some. HII had the design ready to go back in, what, 2012?
We don’t need another Burke or mini-Burke, just a good Knox replacement. There has been too little emphasis on ASW lately. An NSC based frigate is perfect for this role. The first flight should be just a slightly modified NSC. The next flight should have a good sonar, torpedo tubes, a VLS for ASROC and some noise attenuation for the machinery. Build about two dozen of them. Split them up among the ship builders to get them in the water faster.
The first flight should be USNR ships. Use them for training, drug interdiction, “showing the flag”, etc. The later flights will be front line units. None of these ships need Aegis or any other gold plating. Just a simple ASW ship with some limited ASuW and AAW capabilities. The KISS method needs to be strictly adhered to for this program to succeed.
The best way to fight a submarine is with . . . another submarine. I am wondering out loud if a new AIP SSK Escort Submarine could be of use. Multiple would be assigned to each convoy, and they would use Sprint-and-Drift techniques to provide ASW protection.
Generally SSKs are too slow to escort a convoy. The Convoy would be going 15 to 18 knots now. (5 to 7 knots in WWII). The search for the enemy subs would be by helicopters, sonobuoys, and towed array.
There is a lot of benefit in having a team approach with several units that can communicate.
An SSN would be a great escort, but I expect they will be doing other things. US of course has no SSKs. I expect the Chinese conventionally powered subs to be lying in wait, inside the second island chain.
The submersible ship is the future perhaps? Look at the French submarine Sercouf. 18.5 knots top speed surfaced and not that big. What would a modern boat built along these lines look like?
I was waiting for this argument. As I said it would take more than one (ideally three). Surfaced diesel-electric subs go faster. I should not have to explain the Sprint-Drift. You go ahead of the formation to a fixed point and maintain a quiet sonar watch as the convoy goes by. Higher sea states could be brutal on surfaced subs moving rapidly.
I like the idea of an SSN escort, but we cannot even build two boats/year just to maintain what we have. Sad state of affairs.
The US has 12 territories in the Pacific. All of which could be ‘fortified’ and be used as bases for SSK’s.
I would love to see the US build some air independent conventionally propelled subs but the submerged speed of such submarines is not high over long distances.
I think I have already said that. Sprint-drift is required.
AMEN . . . my brain has already been there.
Great documentary video. While it is absolutely true that we need hulls, there is no way to out-produce the world’s highest producing shipbuilding nation, China. They can build them small, large and in-between. We can’t compete based on numbers, just as we couldn’t compete with the numbers of Soviet tanks during the Cold War. Instead, we changed the game with technology, particularly centered around our attack helicopters.
What we need here is not just hulls, but the ability to detect and sink multiple ships, preferably before they even leave port, and then take care of those that escape.
Our space based ISR has to be top notch, and we need to consider taking out their bases and ports before they even deploy. We can’t fight a conventional war of attrition with a shipbuilding giant. Instead, we need to let them know we will nuke their bases and ports, and then take care of the leakers.
I don’t think anyone wants to go nuclear.
China’s fleet is still not nearly as large as the US fleet in displacement. https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2024/01/06/top-ten-navies-by-aggregate-displacement-1-january-2024-analysis-and-diagram-by-phoenix_jz/
Our navy is large enough, but it is scattered all over the world and based 1000s of miles from what will be the primary center of action.
Getting our fleet into position and keeping it there, supplied and combat ready is the challenge.
I don’t think we can look to the Battle of the Atlantic or the Pacific as our templates for war with China. Any conflict, should it arise, will be swift and brutal. There won’t be much time to have convoys getting to anywhere, as we’ll be licking our wounds and trying to figure out whether we repair our ships or scrap them due to limited yard capacity. It will be hard to keep them in theater unscathed, and casualties must be expected.
All naval ships, from combatant to auxiliary should have decent defensive armament. 2-25mm or 30mm Mk38s isn’t enough. If we value our sailors and the ships they sail on, we should immediately implement a program to install at least 1 but preferably 2 or more Phalanx and/or SeaRAM systems on all our ships and consider the 57mm where possible also. With the amount of money we’re spending aimlessly sailing around the Caribbean, we could have done some of this by now.
Everyone always assumes the next war will be over quickly and somehow it never is. It takes an awful lot of destruction before any nation will say uncle and admit defeat. Look at Ukraine. Russia thought it would all be over very quickly. Now over a million casualties. Unless it goes nuclear, any modern war is likely to go much longer than anyone would assume.
I have read recently that the Chinese have realized any attempt to take Taiwan would be long and difficult.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/analysis-china-adapts-russia-ukraine-war-lessons-to-shape-taiwan-conflict-planning
I am a bit surprised that they would be that realistic.
In considering survivability, don’t forget to consider that these ships are unlikely to operate alone. Other ships that are probably higher on the enemy’s target list are no better protected, for instance the MSC logistics ships have no missiles and no guns larger than .50 caliber. The LPDs have the same RAM missiles and 30mm guns, but no 57mm.
Accompanying DDGs can provide Area AAW protection when you are in an area where there is that kind of threat.
For transits of most of the Pacific the air threat is limited while the submarine threat limited only by the Chinese aggressiveness.
I think a lot of our recent problems have been a result of a desire to make ships “survivable” and those standards essentially required something approaching a DDG in size.
Nice video – thanks
@ Chucky
The submarines would ‘defend’ their island ‘bastion’.
What I think warship classification here in the West is a rating system for capabilities.
1st Rate: An area capability and ship features directed towards the mission.
2nd Rate: A local or defence capability.
So a ship that has 1st Rate ASW capability would be ultra quiet, have a TDS/VDS as well as HMS, 2 or more large ASW helicopters, STWS, and a larger number of VL ASROC’s in their silo. A ship that 1st Rate AAW capability would still need to be quiet but not ultra quiet as it will need speed, (multiple) radar lofted high large, VLS silo fore and aft packed with ESSM up to SM-6, cannon covering every arc, and perhaps just one helicopter so the hangar and flight deck don’t impinge on VLS silos or gun arcs.
2nd Rate ASW: hull mounted sonar, quiet, one ASW helicopter, and very few ASROC.
2nd Rate AAW: VLS with ESSM and SM-2, CIWS, basic air-search and targeting. Basic Aegis. Aegis is no longer clever it is a standard.
Other factors come in obviously. Surface warfare. EW. Etc.
I don’t have a lot of faith in hull mounted sonars. Their signal tends to be captured by the surface duct. There is really no reason ships of virtually any sized cannot have a VDS.
My impression is that while every ship needs some self-defense AAW capability, we need more ships with ASW capability than ships with area AAW capability both because the ASW maximum detection range is shorter than the AAW maximum detection range and because submarine threat can exist anywhere in the Pacific while the Air threat is extremely variable with distance from China.
In other words, not every escort needs to be a DDG.
I think the FF(X) will ultimately be equipped with the Mk 56 GMLS. Why? The Mk 41 tactical length VLS requires a 22 ft depth. The existing NSC VLS void is 7.5 ft, similar to the LCS SSMM. The foc’sle “shelf” looks to be 8.5 ft above the main deck. This is the height of the Mk 110 turret and both shelf and turret look to be about the same height if the render is accurate. So you have 16 ft to work with. That just so happens to be the height of the Mk 56. I think you could fit 32 cells in that shelf for ESSM Blk II. You could fit Mk 41 by cutting below decks, but that’s time and money; I think they want to leave NSC as intact as possible. If I’m right, FF(X) combat suite looks more or less identical to the Mexican Navy Sigma 10514: Mk 56, Mk 110, Mk 38, Mk 49 RAM. The Sigma also has the CAPTAS-2 VDS which would work well for FF(X). Streamed away from the NSC machinery noise. Detection possible out to the 1st Atlantic CZ, or about 32 miles. Prosecute with onboard MH-60R or on station P-8.
POLA didn’t end up installing ESSM and the other ships got cancelled. That said, I wouldn’t mind building some.
This article points out about the FF(X), “When it comes to installed armament, America’s next frigate is set to be just as lightly armed as the LCS that came before it,” with no VLS in the Flight I version:
“Navy’s New Frigate Will Not Have A Vertical Launch System For Missiles
FF(X) will initially have the same armament installed as the Littoral Combat Ships, relying on uncrewed platforms and modular payloads for expanded capability.”
https://www.twz.com/sea/navys-new-frigate-will-not-have-vertical-launch-systems-for-missiles
You have just argued about not building expensive all purpose ships. And then say any ship could have a VDS/TAS?
Like most kit there are different scales. A MANPAD is a SAM so is a Patriot. There is huge a difference between the effectiveness of a heliborne dipping sonar and say 2087.
Yes HMS performance is degraded the quicker you go. But you can’t use towed bodies as speed and they take time to deploy. And their performance degrades if not used as slow speeds; if a body is to be towed you are not going to do it at much above 10kts. Plus limits on general ship handling. The hull mounted sonar is the SSN’s primary sensor do you worry about their effectiveness? What about SSK sonar performance in the littoral? The key defence to submarines is movement.
A hull mounted sonar is already deployed. If something needs investigating send up the helicopter. You can’t steam around with TAS deployed. When do you decide to deploy the TAS?
The air threat also includes missiles launched from submarines……..
And ships don’t spend all their time in the deep ocean. Sometimes they have to operate close to shore too.
I explained how I thought systems need to be allotted. I don’t think you quite grasp how dangerous it is out there. Even frigates need a limited area air warfare capability. The archer has to be pushed back.
Sorry Chucky. You are talking tosh……..
Like I said, all ships need a self defense AAW capability, and here I am talking about carriers, amphibs, icebreakers, everything.
Aegis systems are not self defense, they are area defense. Would really like to see at least 8 Mk41 VLS so it could have four ASROC and 16 ESSM, but that would mean it would actually better protected than a USS San Antonio class LPD.
Our oilers have no defense at all except the ships in company. That’s not right, but we do have to realize these ships are not going to be operating alone in a high threat environment.
The difficulties you describe in using a towed array, are precisely why we need more tail ships. DDGs or near DDG frigates are too expensive to provide all the tail ships we need.
What we need is not the best possible ship but the best possible combination of ships we can provide.
I am not saying TAS are not worth it. Most Burkes have one fitted no? Here this side of the Pond I keep saying we need some SWATH ocean surveillance ships as force multipliers.
I am saying you don’t understand the importance of HMS. You can’t operate with TAS alone. You need an ear in the water at all times. Would you only switch on the air search radar periodically in peace? No. China is building and improving Type 039 all the time. Russia’s main naval competence is submarine warfare. I don’t see many signs that you guys across the Pond understand ASW warfare now.
FWIW for me the NSC should have ASW kit from the get go and STWS and ASROC in tubes………
I have decided perhaps I should summarise using ‘grown up’ words because you don’t seem to grasp any of this………..
Persistent awareness: HMS provides an always-available, non-deployable acoustic sensor with no impact on ship maneuverability or speed restrictions, unlike towed arrays (TAS/VDS) that impose speed caps (~15–18 kt max for most systems to avoid array damage or excessive tow noise) and require time-consuming streaming/retrieval.
Layered ASW defence: While not optimised for long-range low-frequency passive detection below convergence zones or thermoclines (where TAS excels), HMS delivers useful medium-frequency passive and active performance for initial cueing, short-to-medium range contacts, and rapid classification. Active mode provides unambiguous range/bearing data when passive TMA convergence is slow or uncertain.
Task-group synergy: In multi-unit formations (CVSG/ESG), multiple HMS platforms enable distributed sensor fusion via data links (Link 16/CEC equivalents), allowing cross-bearing localisation, baffle clearing, and collaborative contact prosecution without every unit slowing or deploying TAS.
Cueing role: HMS serves as the primary trigger for escalating to higher-fidelity sensors: cueing helicopter dipping sonar (e.g., FLASH/Low Frequency Sonar), sonobuoy fields, or TAS deployment, recognising that neither organic helo nor TAS can be maintained continuously (helo endurance/weather constraints; TAS speed/maneuver limitations).
Littoral and defensive advantage: In shallow water or high-speed inner-screen operations, HMS avoids the bottoming risk and reverberation issues that complicate towed systems, making it the default persistent sensor for defensive ASW during routine escort/transit.
Analogy to submarine sensors: SSNs, which routinely operate at high speed (25–35+ kt), still rely on their large bow spherical/conformal arrays (primary HMS equivalent) for initial detection, active search, and navigation/obstacle avoidance — accepting self-noise trade-offs for mobility, exactly paralleling surface escort requirements.
I am certainly not the US’s foremost expert on ASW. I’m pretty sure the US Navy has a few experts. I went through Tactical Action Officer school in the 80s and retired in ’91 so I am probably a little out of date.
I don’t mind having hull mounted sonar in addition to a towed array, but I would object to an ASW escort with a hull mounted sonar but no towed array.