Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2026
(You will need to click on the chart to make it large enough to be readable)
I have been looking forward to this. Once again Phoenix_jz has published his “Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement.” I have duplicated his chart above and his comments below. Even so, it is worth while going to the original post for the very insightful comments.
Observations:
The US Navy is still far larger than the Chinese Navy despite having fewer units, larger in fact than the Chinese and Russian navies combined, and larger in every category other than submarines where the Russian Navy holds a slight edge over the USN. Even so, reportedly, the USN has more nuclear powered submarines than Russia and China combined.
Looking at the changes in displacement between 2022 and 2026, I was surprised to see that the absolute change in displacement of the US Navy was actually greater than the change in displacement of the Chinese Navy, 386,574 tons to 372,122 for China. We can’t take too much comfort in that, the Chinese are likely to enjoy local superiority in any likely conflict, but it does mean in a prolonged conflict, we have a great deal of bench strength.
If there is a surprise here, it is the Indian Navy, having grown 20.5% in four years. The basis of Naval power is of course the economy. If naval power is important to a nation, its naval power should rank at as high as its rank in Gross Domestic Product. We see this in that the two largest economies have the two largest navies. Thing is, there are two common measures of GDP, nominal and purchasing power parity (PPP). Nominal reflects how much you spend while PPP reflects how much you can buy. Russia is the poster child to illustrate the difference. Russia is ninth in nominal GDP just ahead of Canada and slightly behind Italy, but they are fourth in PPP. For India it its a little closer. India is fifth in nominal GDP behind Germany and Japan, but slightly ahead of the UK, but in PPP, they are #3, behind only China and the US, but with a GDP more than twice that of #4, Russia, 17.71 to 7.14 TUS$.
The Indian Navy is already a member of an exclusive club, nations that operate both aircraft carriers and nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines (although their SSBNs don’t seem to be as advanced as the first generation US Polaris missile subs). India has recently begun making an effort to increase shipbuilding and they are likely to follow in the foot steps of Japan, S, Korea, and China. It is going to take some time, but don’t be surprised to see India surpass the UK, Japan, and finally Russia in aggregate tonnage.
You would think the Europeans (UK, France, and Italy) would be doing a little better. Notably missing from the top ten is Germany, the leading economy in Europe.
I’ll add this note from last year because it still applies,
Coast Guards are not included in this analysis. This leads to some distortion since navy operated Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) and patrol craft are counted as combatants, but coast guard operated OPVs and patrol craft are not counted at all. The US, China, Russia, Japan, India and South Korea all have substantial sea-going coast guards, notably the UK and France do not. The Indian Navy in particular has a large number of Navy operated OPVs and patrol craft.
Addendum: In the comments of the original post, the author provided the following list of the next ten navies.
11: Turkey – 335,032t
12: Taiwan – 271,286t
13: Spain – 241,133t
14: Egypt – 229,650t
15: Germany – 228,472t
16: Australia – 218,224t
17: Greece – 182,303t
18: Chile – 171,592t
19: Brazil – 156,048t
20: Canada – 134,297t
Hello all!
The fourth edition of my top ten navy list arrives with 2026! For those unfamiliar, here are links to 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 with a general explainer for the whole concept in that first 2022 edition.
The long and short of it is that this graph reflects a personal tracker I keep of almost every large and moderately sized navy, and calculates the aggregate displacement of these navies. It’s not a perfect way to display the size of navies – far from it in fact – but it is at least more representative than counting numbers of hulls alone, in my opinion.
To break down what each of these categories mean;
- Surface Warships is an aggregate of all above-water warships and major aviation and amphibious assault platforms. This category includes CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LHDs, LHAs, LPDs, CGs, DDGs, FFGs, corvettes, OPVs, CPVs, lighter patrol craft, and MCM vessels.
- Submarines is what it says on the tin – SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and for select nations where applicable (and where information is available), special purpose submarines. Please note dedicated training submarines are counted separately.
- AORs includes all major fleet replenishment vessels (coastal vessels do not count, however).
- Other Auxiliaries is a very wide net that essentially captures everything else. Special mission ships, support vessels, minor amphibious assault vessels (LSDs, LSTs, LCAC’s, LCM’s, LCU’s), training vessels, tugs, coastal support vessels, hydrography ships – all essential parts of navies, but generally often paid less attention to as they’re not as flashy as the warships proper.
Interesting trends in data that I thought I would share for various navies, and thoughts and observations otherwise;
The USN maintains its commanding position – though the increase in displacement seen here (+124,303t, or +1.7%) is deceptive, as this is primarily thanks to high-displacement auxiliaries and AORs that were delivered in 2024 – primarily two John Lewis-class AORs that for lack of crew did not become truly operational until 2025. Additionally, through my own error I missed that the fourth Expeditionary Mobile Base, USS John L. Canley, had been not just delivered but also commission in 2024, and that also counts significantly towards the upwards correction this year. Without the latter, the uptick would have only been about 17,639t.
Combatant forces fared poorly this year – 2025 was the first year since 2015 that the USN did not commission a single guided missile destroyer. A single surface combatant – the final Independence-class LCS – was commissioned this year, along with the twenty-fourth Virgina-class SSN. Decommissioned this year were two Ticonderoga-class CGs, a Los Angeles-class SSN, and four Avenger-class MCMV’s. Despite this, the year is less abysmal than it appears, as the USN did actually accept delivery of two DDGs, two SSNs, and two LCS – but most of these will only commission in 2026. For at least one ship (the final Freedom-class LCS), this delay was solely due to the government shutdown late in 2025. Still, the long-term view of U.S. shipbuilding is less than positive, given LCS production has ended and the successor frigate program has been cut down. The new frigate program (FFX) apparently will be no better armed than the LCS. Likewise, the future DDG design (DDG(X)) appears likely to be delayed by the diversion towards the new ‘BBG(X)’ program unveiled this past December.
The PLAN recorded a year of strong growth (+198,473t, or +6.7%), well above average and predictably breaking three million tonnes. In 2025 the PLAN commissioned its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, along with a fourth Type 075 LHD, seven Type 052DL-class destroyers, four Type 054AG-class frigates, and the remaining Type 054B-class frigate (both may have actually commissioned this year, though only one counted towards their tonnage growth as I included the first ship in last year’s count). No tonnage increases were recorded for submarines this year – I do not yet positively assess that any of the Type 093B have yet entered service, and Type 039C production remains something of a mystery. I no longer have any confidence in being able to render even a ±2 boat margin of error on the number in service.
PLAN shipbuilding continues to move ahead at pace. A hull that may be the Type 004 – China’s first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier – is currently under assembly at Dalian. The amphibious assault ship Sichuan (Type 076) is finishing her fitting out and has begun sea trials, though at present no additional hulls of either it or the Type 075 LHD have appeared. The same is true of the Type 071 LPD, which raises questions about what the PLAN intends for the force structure of its amphibious elements going forward. In the realm of destroyers, two Type 055 and two Type 052DL are presently running trials and will likely commission this year. Four and three ships of each respective class were launched in 2025, but no further hulls have been spotted under construction as of yet. There are two further Type 054AG hulls fitting out, but presently no additional hulls – and most notably, still no additional Type 054B hulls – have been identified. Type 054AG’s tend to come together rapidly so it’s possible there are still more in the works, but it may also be indicative of a pause in frigate production while the PLAN assesses what the future of its frigate force should be. It is also interesting to note that many of the remaining Type 053H3 frigates were reduced to training or test ships this year, leaving only three in frontline roles.
The VMF once again sees a slight uptick (+6,313t, or +0.29%), helped in no small part by 2025 being the first time in three years they have not suffered any notable losses to Ukrainian forces. The VMF commissioned an eighth Borei-class SSBN, as well two conventional attack submarines – one Kilo and one Lada – while definitively striking an Oscar II-class SSGN. It appears that the last pair of Sovremenny DDGs have definitively been retired or given up on, further reducing Russian blue water naval power. Two new corvettes, an OPV, an icebreaker, and an MCMV were commissioned this year, against the retirement of three older corvettes and two MCMV’s.
In this year’s first ‘upset’, the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force recorded another solid year of growth (+14,414t, or +1.9%) and now claims the rank of fourth largest navy on this list, due more so to the misfortunes of the navy they leapfrogged. The JMSDF commissioned two Mogami-class frigates, a fourth Taigei-class SSK, and a fourth Awaji-class MCMV. At the same time, one older destroyer (DD), two Oyashio-class SSKs, and four Sugashima-class MCMV’s were decommissioned. Submarine construction in Japan continues at a regular pace, while surface combatant production looks like it will accelerate. All four of the remaining Mogami-class frigates have been launched as of the end of 2025, and will be followed by the two large ASEV ballistic missile defense ships and the twelve 06FFM type frigates, which will include at least additional three vessels built in Japan for the Royal Australian Navy. It is not clear yet whether any of these surface combatants have started construction yet.
The British Royal Navy had a rough 2025, and has fallen to fifth place for two reasons (-208,979t, or -23.9%). The first is organizational – this year I have decided to strike chartered ships from all navies, as previously only some navies (such as the Royal Navy and Marine Nationale) had chartered ships counted towards them, while others that had them (such as the JMSDF) did not. I decided to err on the side of simplification and struck all of them down, which reduced the size of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in this list (by 127,000t). On the other hand, the RN and RFA both hemorrhaged a considerable number of assets. From the Royal Navy, both Albion-class LPDs and two Type 23-class frigates were decommissioned, along with the last Trafalgar-class SSN. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary lost both Wave-class AOR’s. These seven vessels totaled 117,220t. In exchange, the sixth Astute-class SSN, and the MCM mothership Stirling Castle, were both commissioned, somewhat taking the sting off of the losses (+13,240t). Additionally, the RN’s displacement is slightly buoyed as I have corrected the displacement of the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers from 70,000t to 80,500t, which is more reflective of their operational full load displacement and in line with other aircraft carriers. All in all, the real net change is more in the region of -103,980t (-13.5%).
With that said, it appears the Royal Navy is close to reaching the nadir of its fortunes in 2025, provided no additional frigates bow out of service early. The RN is benefitting from a robust albeit significantly delayed frigate construction program, and with the launch of the HMS Venturer, the first Type 31 frigate, there are now three surface combatants fitting out for the Royal Navy with another five under construction, and a further five awarded. Likewise, first steel was cut on the first of three Resurgent-class Fleet Solid Support ships for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary in December 2025. Additionally, SSN availability should improve in the next few years as the major constraint on servicing these vessels – the unavailability of drydocks – has abated significantly this year, with only one remaining out of service (the No.10 Dock at HMNB Devonport) until refurbishment is completed in 2027.
The Indian Navy, on the other hand, had a very good year – the best since 2022 (+44,359t, or +7.2%). In 2025 India commissioned the fourth and final Visakhapatnam-class (P15B) destroyer along with the first three Nilgiri-class (P17A) frigates, an eighth Talwar-class frigate (Russian built, Project 11356) and three ASW-SWC type corvettes. They also commissioned the sixth and final Kalvari-class (a Scorpène class) SSK. 2026 will likely also be a bumper year, with the Indian Navy expecting to commission its third SSBN and at least two more Nilgiri-class frigates, along with a swathe of ASW-SWC. If the final pair of Nilgiri do not commission in 2026, they will likely commission in 2027.
The Marine Nationale had a somewhat deceptive year with a slight contraction (-6,208t, or -1.4%), though most of this was due to removed chartered vessels (5,240t) from this list. The ‘real’ contraction was only 968t, due to turnover in patrol and MCM forces, and the retirement of the third Rubis-class SSN (technically in December 2024, but it seems to have escaped my tally for that year). Despite this, the MN’s immediate future is fairly positive – they accepted delivery of the second Jacques Chevalier-class BRF in 2025, as well as the first Amiral Ronarc’h-class frigate. Both will commission in 2026, and should be joined by the fourth Suffren-class SSN.
The Marina Militare had another robust growth year (+25,874t, or 6.8%), once again propelling it ahead of the ROKN. This was driven by the commissioning of two Carlo Bergamini-class frigates (FREMM) and Atlante, the second Vulcano-class logistical support ship (+40,980t). This was tempered by the withdrawal of the last Cold War major surface combatants, destroyer Francesco Mimbelli and frigate Grecale. Further reductions included the transfer of one of the Cassiopea-class OPVs to the Albanian navy, and the decommissioning of a Lerici-class MCMV along with a coastal research vessel and two floating drydocks. As in 2024, in 2025 the MMI was ‘down’ one PPA, as the sixth vessel ‘should’ have commissioned this year but instead was delivered to the Indonesian Navy. Contrary to expectations, construction on these ships did not start in 2025, but they were contracted in June and should start construction in 2026, along with the second FREMM-EVO. They may also be joined by the first DDX, as the mechanisms to start the contracting process started recently and it seems likely that contract will be signed in the first half of 2026. The seventh PPA, Domenico Millelire, should be delivered to the Marina Militare this coming year, along with the hydrographic ship Quirinale.
The Republic of Korea Navy slightly contracted in 2025 (-2,510t, or -0.6%), as it decommissioned one of the three remaining Pohang-class corvettes and the submarine Jang Bogo – its first domestically produced submarine, a variant of the German Type 209/1200. In contrast to 2024, no new vessels were inducted into the ROKN in 2025. An ongoing program to modernize the surface and submarine fleet is ongoing, with one destroyer, two frigates, and one submarine fitting out and another destroyer and two submarines under construction, but it is not clear if any of these vessels will commission in 2026.
Finally, the Indonesian Navy has staged an upset and reclaimed tenth place from their Turkish counterparts, achieving significant growth this year (+21,889t, or +6.6%) thanks to both domestic production, and the rapid delivery of two Paolo Thaon di Revel-class ‘OPVs’ (or frigates) in the Light+ configuration from Italy, bought as they were fitting out for the Marina Militare. The most significant domestic this year was a second Bung Karno-class corvette, with most other additional craft being smaller patrol craft – some of which were commissioned at the tail end of 2024, and did not make it into my final tally for 2025. Notable for Indonesian shipbuilding, this year they launched the first of the ‘Red-White’ frigates, known know as the Balaputradewa-class – derivatives of the Danish Iver Huitfeldt-class air warfare frigates.
Though they did not make the cut this year, I will include a brief mention of the Turkish Navy given they are still a close eleventh, and the gap between them and the next largest navy (the ROCN) is quite considerable. The Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri, in my tracker, has lost some tonnage, though this is the result of a vessel being previously erroneously double-counted in the data set, which has since been corrected. The TDK overall had a quieter year of deliveries than 2024, commissioning the second Reis-class SSK and the first of a new class of LCT, the Ç-159. However, in construction programs things have been more active, with three Istanbul-class frigates launched in 2025, along with the third Reis-class submarine.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 