136 Haitian refugees on the flight deck of the US Coast Guard cutter Harriet Lane

The US Naval Institute has a post that proposes a relatively radical solution to the problems the Coast Guard has had in providing maintenance for our ships.

“The first step to combat rising maintenance costs would involve decommissioning several ships, including the 210-foot Reliance– and 270-foot Famous-class WMECs, the 282-foot USCGC Alex Haley (WMEC-39), 175-foot Keeper-class buoy tenders, and 87-foot Marine Protector-class patrol boats. They should be replaced with significantly more capable ships, such as WMSLs, WPCs, and 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders.”

I don’t think that is going to happen any time soon, for a number of reasons, but in making his case he does a great job in identifying the problem.

“The Coast Guard’s budget for FY24 was $13.4 billion, a figure that severely limits the service’s operational capabilities. Consider that the Coast Guard’s budget in 2014, adjusted for inflation, was $18.5 billion—in real-dollar terms, the budget has fallen by $5.1 billion in a decade.”

If that is the case, there is no way you can maintain a fleet the same size as we had in 2014 whether the ships are new or old. Plus it is going to get worse because with the newer larger ships they will need access to dry docks that are larger and consequently more expensive and fewer in number. Increasingly we will be in competition with the Navy rather than with fishermen.

The author also points to the Coast Guard’s short planning horizon. While the Navy has a 30 year shipbuilding plan, the Coast Guard produces only a 5 year capital investment plan. The author suggests the Coast Guard return to producing a 20 year plan as was prepared for a short period. I have been recommending a 30 year plan for almost as long as I have produced the blog.

While we can’t do it in the short term, the Coast Guard needs a culture change that says we will not operate ships more than 30 years old. As they reach 30 years old, they should be declared excess property and passed to our allies who cannot afford new construction but where labor for repairs is much cheaper than here.

To make this work we have to start the process for planning for replacements when the units are 20 years old because realistically, it is 10 years from “Gee we are going to need a new WXX” to commissioning.

USCGC Bertholf was commissioned in 2008. In three years planning for her replacement should begin. That will require a real change of organizational culture.

I have seen a RFI that indicates planning has begun for the icebreaking 140 and 65 foot tug replacements.

We are probably already behind in planning replacements for the WLBs, WLMs, and WPBs.

Philipine Rajah Sulayman-class offshore patrol vessel

Just to review.

• Fleet the new generation of ships was supposed to replace included 12 WHECs, 32 WMECs, and 49 WPB 110s or 93 ships including 44 large patrol ships.
• The “Program of Record” was to give us 8 NSCs, 25 OPC, and 58 FRCs, a total of 91 ships but only 33 large patrol ships.
• The shortfall in large patrol ship was to be made up by the magic of the “CREW ROTATION CONCEPT,” having four crews for every three ships so we could  keep the ships underway 33% more and 33 ships could do the work of 44.
• The “CREW ROTATION CONCEPT” was killed in the FY2019 budget cycle
• Two addition NSCc and many FRCs have been added, but the current plan is now only 35 large cutters leaving us with far fewer large cutter days. Currently I think we are down to 32 large cutters.
• OPCs are more expensive and require a larger crew than originally projected. They were originally expected to have a crew of about 90 and to cost about half as much as the NSCs.
• Crew size for NSCs has also grown and of course crew size for FRCs are considerably greater than that of the 110 and 87 foot WPCs they are replacing.
• Meanwhile the Coast Guard budget has declined $5.1 billion in a decade in real terms.

Since 2012 I have been advocating for a mid-sized patrol cutter between the 4500 ton OPCs and the 353 ton Webber class that I have called Cutter X. The Philippine Navy is acquiring a new class of six Offshore Patrol Vessels built by South Korean ship builder  Hyundai Heavy Industries. These 2400 ton ships are an example of what can be achieved on that kind of intermediate displacement.

Now I think we have an additional reason for developing a new class. We need a design that is more readily usable as a warship since conflict appears more likely. (In some ways I like the 2600 ton Damen designed Pakistan Navy OPV–faster and better armed.).

These are what I would call prototypical modern OPVs, good examples of the type. They are little more than half the size of NSCs or OPCs, but they are significant improvements over the 210 and 270s. They are large enough to perform typical large patrol cutter peacetime missions, but do it more economically the than an OPC both in terms of initial procurement and operating cost.

One feature I like that sets them apart from most OPVs is the mission bay below the flight deck. This could be used for disaster response equipment, as a holding area for migrants, or for a towed array during war time.

There is a good description of the Philippine OPV and its origin in Wikipedia. Their specs:

As for for characteristic of my more militant Cutter X, I would say:

• Speed at least 24 knots,
• Weapons: 8 cell Mk41 VLS; SeaRAM, two 30mm Mk38 Mod4
• Aviation: H-60 helicopter and spaces to support ASW version including torpedo magazine and sonobuoy stores; additional space for ISR UAS such as V-Bat
• Boats: Peace time normally one Long Range interceptor on stern ramp in the mission bay and two OTH on davits.
• Mission Bay at least large enough for Long Range Interceptor in peacetime and towed array sonar system in wartime.

I am very late on referencing this, but perhaps it might still be of interest. The Coast Guard has published a brief budget fact sheet.

The “Appropriation Summary” compares FY2023 enacted with FY2025 request. The FY2025 request is lower than the FY2023 enacted. Historically the Coast Guard’s enacted budget is larger than the President’s request as bipartisan Congressional supporters tend to add things. It is impossible to compare to FY2024 enacted because no budget was enacted, just continuing resolutions. The Coast Guard also benefitted from the “Big Beautiful Bill” which addressed some costs that had been expected to be addressed in FY2025.

This makes it hard to meaningfully compare the two budgets, but as a retiree I have to ask how the retired pay appropriation could go from $2,044,414 to $1,210,840, a more than 40% drop?

Canadian Coast Guard Multi-Purpose Icebreaker (MPI). Source: Seaspan. This is the ship to be built by the Bollinger/Seaspan/Rauma Marine Constructions (Rauma)/Aker Arctic Team. Two will be built in Finland while four are be built in the US.
Note: The MPI image does not show the right propulsors; it will use Steerprop’s contra-rotating propulsors (CRP). Additionally according to Seaspan, the design could easily be upgraded to PC3. Confirmation from Seaspan and Aker Arctic.

An agreement between President Trump and Finnish President Alexander Stubb seems to have determined the plan for procurement of Coast Guard’s Arctic Security Cutter fleet.

It looks good, but it is not in the budget yet, it includes more ships than studies have shown the Coast Guard needs, and neither design has the propulsion power to be classed as “Medium” icebreaker under the terms the Arctic Security Cutter was previously defined, e.g.. 20,000 to 45,000 shaft HP. Even so I don’t expect any significant push back.

This is the ship to be built by the Davie/Helsinki Shipyard team. Two are to be built in Finland and three in Texas..

The agreement is relatively complex with many parties producing two classes of ships in two countries in four different shipyards. Perhaps the best explanation actually appeared before the official announcement in Peter Rybski’ Sixty Degrees North, “USA-Finland Icebreaker Deal Announcement Expected Today.” There is another very clear report here from Marine Link.

I used information from Sixty Degrees North in the captions of the two illustrations I used.

Last August the US was very active in exercising in the High North. The U.S.S Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group was in the Norwegian Sea. Two of Ford’s escorts broke off and joined two Norwegian frigates in patrolling the Northern Norwegian coast.

Indo-Pacific Command Northern Edge 2025 which included the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group was in the Northern Pacific using the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex.

Most importantly for the Coast Guard, NORTHCOM conducted Arctic Edge 2025 primarily in Alaska and the surrounding seas. In the early days of any conflict involving Alaska (other than just flying over it) Coast Guard ships and aircraft will be a significant part of those forces NORTHCOM can call upon. Coast Guard ships and aircraft can transport personnel, equipment, and supplies including landing small combat units.

A U.S. Coast Guard C-130 participates in forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations during Arctic Expeditionary Capabilities Exercise (AECE) in Adak, Alaska on Sept. 18, 2019. US Marine Corps Photo

When I saw reports of last year’s Operation Noble Defender Exercise run by NORTHCOM in Alaska, I was very disappointed to see no mention of the Coast Guard. So this year I was very pleased to see this.

A joint Marine Corps/Coast Guard team performed a simulated raid on Port MacKenzie, seizing it and reestablishing force flow through the port. The Army’s 3rd Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) opened the unimproved port and led transit operations there.

(I do think they made it too easy on themselves by doing it so close to Anchorage but sometimes it’s necessary. Of course they also made it easy on themselves by having the exercise in August.)

There was no specific mention of Coast Guard units participating in the exercise but the exercise extended the entire month of August. The Canadian frigate HMCS Regina was sighted as participating and we know USCGC Waesche operated with HMCS Regina the last week of August including live fire exercises.

The Navy established a temporary advanced base for MH-60S helicopters at Dutch Harbor, August 17-22.

“During the exercise, the squadron collaborated closely with the Air Force, Coast Guard and Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center personnel recovery experts to coordinate SAR coverage throughout the Aleutian Islands. This ensured smooth integration across commands and enabled HSC-14 to streamline logistics and adapt to Alaska’s unique operational challenges, including extreme weather and limited infrastructure…During the exercise, the squadron collaborated closely with the Air Force, Coast Guard and Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center personnel recovery experts to coordinate SAR coverage throughout the Aleutian Islands. This ensured smooth integration across commands and enabled HSC-14 to streamline logistics and adapt to Alaska’s unique operational challenges, including extreme weather and limited infrastructure.”

It still looks like the surface Navy may never have gotten North of the Aleutians. That may be because of the way the Combatant Commander boundaries are drawn. NORTHCOM has most but not all of the Bering Sea.

Combatant Command AORs, Bering Sea

It should not be this way. That USEUCOM is responsible for Siberia is insane. Siberia, the Aleutians and the Bering Sea should be under INDOPACOM.

Thought you might like to see this.

As you probably know, I believe the Coast Guard should build a more war-like cutter that could be built jointly with the Navy to fill a destroyer escort like role.

Defense News reports,

“President Donald Trump has declared drug cartels to be unlawful combatants and says the United States is now in a “non-international armed conflict,” according to a Trump administration memo obtained Thursday by The Associated Press, after recent U.S. strikes on boats in the Caribbean.”

gCaptain reports there has been a fourth attack.

Many questions have been raised about the legality of these attacks, but I will not address them here. I do question their effectiveness.

Admittedly can’t say that law enforcement efforts, including those of the Coast Guard, despite many successes, has kept drugs out of the country. The financial rewards of a successful shipment have made even very risky voyages too profitable. Probably few if any of the smugglers we catch are high in the cartel organizations so the kingpins are not directly at risk in either of capture or death. The long used capture method does at least provide a potential source of intelligence. The new (take no prisoners) approach may have the advantage of frightening aways potential boat crews for the smugglers but there are reasons to suggest the attacks in the Caribbean will also fail to stop the importation of large quantities of drug and fail to stop the large number of deaths by drug overdose that pointed to as justification for these extreme measures

Most drug overdoses were by the use of synthetic opioids that are not generally transported in the go fast boats we have seen destroyed.

“Overall, drug overdose deaths rose from 2019 to 2022 with 107,941 drug overdose deaths reported in 2022. Overdose deaths declined to 105,007 in 2023. Deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone (primarily illicitly manufactured fentanyl or IMF) decreased from 73,838 overdose deaths reported in 2022, to 72,776 in 2023. Those involving cocaine continued to increase with 29,449 deaths in 2023.”

Because fentanyl is so compact it usually crosses the borders over land at regular ports of entry.

Most Seizures Occur At Ports of Entry Where U.S. Citizens Are The Primary Smugglers...This fact sheet uses two separate datasets to confirm what has long been reported by law enforcement sources and other researchers: that the majority of fentanyl smuggled across the southern border enters not on the backs of migrants crossing the border on foot, but in the vehicles and on the bodies of U.S. citizens and other lawful entrants seeking admission at land ports of entry. Using two separate datasets described below, we confirm roughly four in five people apprehended for smuggling fentanyl into the United States at the southern border between October 2018 and June 2024 were U.S. citizens—the rest were largely individuals with visas, border crossing cards, or other permission to enter the United States lawfully at a port of entry.

Currently the kinetic attacks are limited to the Caribbean while far more drugs are intercepted in the Eastern Pacific. Even if drug shipments are closed off entirely it is likely shipments through other routes will increase to meet demand.

Apparently the attacks are also having unintended consequences.

President Trump “Speaking to military leaders in Quantico, Virginia, he suggested the operations are already proving effective: ‘Now we have a problem. General Caine says, sir, there are no boats out there, not even fishing boats. They don’t want to go fishing.’”

Apparently many local mariners have less confidence in our ability to identify and attack only the smugglers.

Response Boat, Small

The Acquisition Directorate (CG-9) reports they are looking for proposals for new Response Boat, Small (RB-S). You can find the specs and other information here.

Second-generation special-purpose craft – heavy weather (SPC-HWX II) boat. Artistic rendering courtesy of Rozema Boat Works Inc.

Below is a Coast Guard news release.

I think these could replace 87 foot WPBs in some places and do so with lower operating costs.

It is time to replace the older 87 foot WPBs. The oldest are already 28 years old.  In some cases they are being replaced by Webber Class WPCs, but other than the RB-M there is no smaller replacement is in sight. There is certainly no way the Webber class will replace both the 49 Island class and the 70 or so Marine Protector class.

These large surf boats could be very useful in areas around small ports that occasionally experience heavy weather.