The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Winslow Griesser, homeported in San Juan, Puerto Rico, transits toward the pier in Bridgetown, Barbados, June 7, 2017. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Melissa Leake)
Military.com reports the results of an investigation into a Aug. 8, 2022 collision between USCGC Winslow Griesser and a 22-foot center console recreational boat that resulted in a fatality.
I was surprised by this,
As the Winslow Griesser left San Juan, it revved up to 29 knots — a normal practice at Coast Guard Sector San Juan to save time, limit crew fatigue and relieve other cutters on duty — even as the operational plan called for 16 knots, according to the Coast Guard.
Transiting at 29 knots does seem a bit excessive, if only because of fuel costs.
Going 29 instead of 25 gets you there 16% faster but burns about 70% more fuel, fuel that could keep you on patrol longer.
Going 29 instead of 21 knots gets you there 38 percent faster but burns almost three times the fuel.
Going 29 knots instead of 16 gets you there 81% faster but uses more than four times the fuel.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
As far as I know, 29 knots is maximum speed for the FRC.
A Coast Guard cutter (the police of the US territorial waters) zooming 29 knots through a fishing area to a routine assignment is like a police car driving at 120 mph down public streets on its way to a routine assignment without using its lights or siren. Either way, It’s a fatal accident waiting to happen, and in this case, it did happen.
Whether it’s a police car or a CG cutter, it’s not the fuel consumption that worries me as much as the fatal results from going at that speed without lights or siren on.
Going maximum speed in a fishing area, just because you can, is a recipe for disaster.
(Yes, I realize that coastal waters aren’t exactly the same as a crowded public street, and there are no speed limits in the ocean, but going maximum speed in a fishing area just because you can is still a recipe for disaster, and I’m glad the lead-foot Lieutenant Commander was relieved of command).
I’m surprised that the report was so lenient on the speed issue. From the article at Military.com,
“Lunday also said that the cutter’s speed was a factor in failing to prevent the accident, even as he did not rule that the cutter was traveling at an unsafe speed.
‘While the sea state played a factor in restricting the visibility for small vessels when they dip below swell height, I do not believe it necessitated either vessel to reduce speed for the prevailing conditions,’ Lunday wrote.”
That’s like saying that it’s perfectly okay for a police car to drive 120 mph to a routine assignment, without its lights or siren, as long as it’s not raining or snowing.
Nope, just because a police car or cutter CAN go that fast doesn’t mean it SHOULD go that fast to routine assignments.
I doubt there was much other traffic in the vicinity. No mention of darkness so probably had good visibility if they had been keeping a proper lookout. As you say, they really had no reason to go that fast. My point is that they had good reason to go slower. These little ships have substantially more horsepower than either 210 or 270s so when they are going full speed they suck down fuel at a horrendous and uneconomical rate. There is a reason the oporder said 16 knot transit. That going 29 knots had apparently become routine was irresponsible. This kind of hot dogging may have contributed to a command climate where they were less careful than they should have been.
When I was on Midgett with a crew of 150, we transited to Alaska on one engine and one shaft at 11 knots, using 3500 HP because it was economical, while in this case, with a crew of 24, they were transiting at 29 knots using 11,600 HP.
Maximum speed is there for when you absolutely need all the speed you need right now and for no other business. Life is a game of inches stuff only, not BAU.
Drives up the frequency and cost of maintenance too.
No one on the cutter was a designated lookout at the time. https://gcaptain.com/ntsb-inadequate-lookouts-led-to-collision-between-us-coast-guard-cutter-and-small-boat-off-puerto-rico/
“During the investigation, several crewmembers of the Winslow Griesser declined to speak with NTSB investigators. If the Winslow Griesser had been equipped with a voyage data recorder, or VDR, the additional data and audio could help identify safety issues, resulting in safety improvements.”
Shouldn’t the Coast Guard be required to cooperate with NTSB investigators? As a military service, all it would take is one four-word order from on-high, “Cooperate with NTSB investigators.” The lack of such an order, and the lack of cooperation, smells like a coverup. Perhaps the captain ordered the crew not to cooperate, but again, all it would take is for a higher command to give that four-word order, “Cooperate with NTSB investigators.” An NTSB investigation isn’t a criminal case, so should be no 5th Amendment “right to remain silent,” and there should be a standing order to cooperate with investigators. Of all people, of all institutions, you’d think that the United States Coast Guard would be the one organization concerned enough with boating safety to cooperate with an investigation into a fatal boating accident, so this smells like a coverup to me!
But I was only Coast Guard Auxiliary and a US Army officer, not active-duty Coast Guard, so what do I know? I’d always thought that boating safety would be something the Coast Guard is concerned about, concerned enough to at least cooperate with an accident investigation into a fatal boating accident, but I guess I’m wrong and the Coast Guard doesn’t think fatal boating accidents are worthy of investigation. When I was in the Coast Guard Auxiliary, our most important mission was boating safety, but I guess the active duty Coast Guard isn’t even concerned enough to cooperate with accident investigations. Pardon my sarcasm, but “declining to speak with investigators” about a fatal accident does not sound like good military discipline, at all levels of command from the Commandant on down!