“Captain’s Errors Led to Collision Between Offshore Supply Vessel and Coast Guard Cutter: NTSB Report” –gCaptain

Oct. 11, 2020, collision between the offshore supply vessel Cheramie Bo-Truc No. 33 and the Coast Guard cutter Harry Claiborne. NTSB Photo

gCaptain reports the results of an NTSB investigation into collisions (yes two) between an offshore supply vessel and USCGC Harry Claiborne (WLM-561) that resulted in injuries to three Coast Guardsmen and provides a link to the 15 page report.

Spoiler alert, primary fault lies primarily with the OSV skipper, but the cutter was not totally blameless.

New Orleans, LA (Jan. 26, 2013)–A photo of the CGC Harry Claiborne (WLM 561). The Claiborne was in New Orleans for a port call while on its way to its new homeport of Galveston, Texas. USCG photo by PA2 Mark Mackowiak

“4 Safety Recommendations Issued Based on Investigation of USS Fitzgerald Collision” –NTSB

Note the classic “Constant Bearing, Decreasing Range.” You may have to enlarge the plot, but there are six parallel bearing lines in the illustration above. 

The NTSB has issued four safety recommendations as a result of the investigation of the collision between collision between US Navy destroyer Fitzgerald and Philippine-flag container ship ACX Crystal in Sagami Nada Bay off Izu Peninsula, Honshu Island,
Japan July 17, 2017

Always important to learn from others, and, the Coast Guard participated in the investigation.

As a result of its investigation the NTSB issued three safety recommendations to the Navy and one to Sea Quest Management Inc., the operator of the ACX Crystal. Two safety recommendations issued to the Navy call for review and revision of fleetwide training and qualification requirements for officers of the deck related to the collision regulations, as well as review and revision of bridge resource management training. The third recommendation to the Navy seeks the broadcast of automatic identification system information when in the vicinity of commercial vessel traffic, at all times, unless such broadcast could compromise tactical operations. The safety recommendation issued to Sea Quest Management Inc., seeks additional training for navigation officers on collision avoidance regulations, radar and automatic radar plotting aids.

You can see the entire NTSB report here. If this proves anything, it is that 13 tired people who sorta know what they are doing, are no substitute for one well rested person who really does know what he or she is doing.

It was a beautiful night, good visibility, sea state 1–2, north winds 11–16 knots, air
temperature 68°F (20°C), and sea temperature 62.6°F (17°C.).

On board the Fitzgerald, the OOD had believed during the approach that the destroyer would clear both crossing vessels (the ACX Crystal and the Maersk Evora, or possibly the Wan Hai 266 and the ACX Crystal). The OOD told investigators that she saw the ACX Crystal’s superstructure about a minute before the collision and she realized the Fitzgerald was not going to clear the containership. According to the OOD, she initially ordered the conning officer to come hard right, however, she cancelled that order before the conning officer could relay the order to the helmsman. The OOD said she then ordered hard left rudder and ahead flank speed. The BMOW, who was standing near the helmsman, stated that the OOD “gave the order all ahead full for 25 knots, and right after that, all ahead flank.” He went on to say that when the OOD gave the order for “hard left rudder” he “just grabbed the wheel” (from the helmsman) and “put it over.”

A review of Fitzgerald engine parametric data indicated that both the port and starboard engine throttle settings were simultaneously advanced by increments at 0130:06, 0130:14, and 0130:22. Engine monitoring data indicated that both engines responded to the requested commands.

At 0130:32, with the Fitzgerald traveling at 22.1 knots and the ACX Crystal at 18.4 knots, the vessels collided. Neither the Fitzgerald nor the ACX Crystal bridge teams sounded any alarms or made any announcements to warn their crews of the impending collision.

What I remembered, from many years ago, was when “in-extremis” both ships should turn right, but apparently that is not viewed as definitive now. Still, it looks like it would have been the best choice here, if you had failed to act early enough to avoid the in-extremis situation in the first place. If you want to review the rules, you can find them here. Rules 7, 8, and 17 apply.

The XO did not trust the OOD, but did not say anything to the CO, when the watch bill for this high traffic transit was planned. Nor did he remain on the bridge during that OOD’s watch.

Fatigue was also a killer, and the constantly rotating watch bill did not help.

“…watchstanding period for each watch team would shift with each cycle of the watch rotation. For example, the watch team that had the 0200–0700 watch would next have the watch from 2200–0200 that evening, and then have the watch from 1700–2200 on the following day. Following this accident and the McCain/Alnic MC collision, which occurred about 2 months later in August 2017, the Navy mandated “circadian watch bill” schedules that followed set watch times each day.”

There was also an inexperienced “conning officer” who relayed orders from the OOD to the helm. This does not seem to have caused the collision, but it could not have helped.

Norweigen Frigate Collides with Tanker, Runs Aground to Avoid Sinking in Deeper Water, Again No AIS

Wrecked Norwegian navy frigate “KNM Helge Ingstad” is seen in this Norwegian Coastal Administration handout picture in Oygarden, Norway, November 13, 2018. Jakob Ostheim/Norwegian Coastal Administration/Handout vis REUTERS

As you probably know by now, a Norwegian frigate was involved in a collision with a much bigger tanker. The Captain chose to run the frigate aground in hopes of preventing it from sinking. Fortunately only eight people were injured and remarkably there were not deaths.
The frigate Helge Ingstad was inbound at 17 knots and  the tanker Solas had gotten underway shortly before and was outbound at 7 knots.
The frigate is a bit smaller than the US Navy destroyers Fitzgerald and John S. McCain, damaged in collisions in 2017, but there was a similarity to these earlier collisions. None of the three ships had its Automatic Identification System (AIS) activated.
As reported by Defense News, in this case, failure to energize the AIS “…seems to have delayed recognition by central control (Vessel Traffic System–Chuck) and the other ships in the area that Ingstad was inbound and heading into danger…”
OK, I can understand turning off your AIS when in open sea, in an attempt to provide a degree of operational security, but if you are in congested waters there is no point. In fact you could use a bogus AIS or some kind of generic AIS, but if you are going to moor within hours in a city or if you have just gotten underway, it buys you nothing.
Turning on the AIS ought to be on every Special Sea Detail checklist. 
Photo: Royal Norwegian Navy

More here, here, here. and here.

Below: Photos of the damage to the KNM Helge Ingstad after its collision with a tanker in a Norwegian fjord. Credit: @Forsvaret_no


Collision–Thetis Rammed by Barge/Tug

USCGC Thetis damage sustained in a collision in the Panama Canal 0111 local, 2 June 2016

The Cutter Thetis (WMEC-910) was hit in the stern by a barge being pushed by a tug, while transiting the Panama Canal, 2 June 2016. The channel was about 270 yards wide at the site of the collision. Thetis was ahead slow at about 4-4.5 knots. The tug and barge combination was full ahead doing 10.5-11 knots. Its radar was off because “he had clear forward visibility.” The captain of the tug never saw the Thetis until after the collision.

The tug was clearly at fault, but the NTSB also found that “Thetis did not maintain a sufficient and proper lookout.”

Mostly Thetis was doing everything right, but they only had one lookout and he was unable to see traffic over a wide sector astern and to port. A longer sound powered telephone cord that would have allowed the lookout to move to the port side might have made a difference.

Thetis had watches on AIS and on radar on the bridge and CIC, but attempts to mitigate or prevent the collision came to late. There was also no mention of sounding the danger signal.

Some times it is missing the basics that come back to bite you.

USCG Actions Post-accident

Since the accident, the Coast Guard cutter Thetis has implemented the following changes:

  • The shipping officer’s responsibilities, as outlined in the onboard guidance, were amended to require that an individual be qualified as deck watch officer, preferably as an underway deck watch officer, before assuming the role of shipping officer.
  • An additional dedicated lookout position was added to the aft area of the Thetis for long transits in restricted waters.
  • A radar-tuning policy was established that prohibits both the SeaWatch and the radar systems from being offset from the automatic tuning mode when transiting in restricted waters, in order to ensure the optimal traffic image.

I might add you don’t have to be in “long transits in restricted waters” for someone to come up your ass. Check your GQ watch bill as well.

Thanks to Bryant’s Maritime Blog for bringing this to my attention.