Future USCGC Argus at launch Eastern Shipyard
No News from Eastern:
I was hoping for some news about Eastern’s progress on the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program, but I could not find any. Eastern has contracts to build four ships,
- Argus (915) and Chase (916) to go to San Pedro, CA
- Ingham (917) and Rush (918) to go to Kodiak, AK
Reported milestones for the four ships are as follows:
- Argus: Steel cut Jan. 7, 2019; Keel laid April 28, 2020; launched Oct. 27, 2023
- Chase: Steel cut April 27, 2020; Keel laid May 27, 2021
- Ingham: Steel cut Sep. 27, 2021; Keel laid July 15, 2022
- Rush: Steel cut Oct. 18, 2022
Nothing since October 2023, not even a report of keel laying for Rush, which should have happened in 2023. Was Rush’s keel laid? Are sea trials being conducted on Argus? WTFO!
The Planned Timeline:
The Congressional Research Service report, “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” noted.
“The posting for the RFP for the Stage 2 industry studies (October 11, 2019–Chuck) included an attached notional timeline for building the 25 OPCs. Under the timeline, OPCs 1 through 7 (i.e., OPCs 1-4, to be built by ESG, plus OPCs 5-7, which are the first three OPCs to be built by the winner of the Stage 2 competition) are to be built at a rate of one per year, with OPC-1 completing construction in FY2022 and OPC-7 completing construction in FY2028. The remaining 18 OPCs (i.e., OPCs 8 through 25) are to be built at a rate of two per year, with OPC-8 completing construction in FY2029 and OPC-25 completing construction in FY2038.
Using these dates—which are generally 10 months to about two years later than they would have been under the Coast Guard’s previous (i.e., pre-October 11, 2019) timeline for the OPC.
The Current Optimistic Timeline:
We are in the middle of FY2025 and still waiting for OPC#1, so we are at least an additional three years late on delivery of USCGC Argus and we are almost certainly an additional two years late getting the first ship from Austal (though I am hoping for a pleasant surprise).
Eastern was expected to deliver one ship every year. I would have expected construction to speed up with experience, but the intervals between steel successive steel cuttings and between successive keel layings never got down to 12 months. But let us presume that Argus OPC #1 will be delivered in 2025 and Eastern will deliver #2- 4 at 12 month intervals.
Austal started cutting steel for OPC #5, Pickering (WMSM-919), on August 29, 2024. I assume they will deliver four years after starting steel cutting and annually thereafter with two per year delivered after #7. It should look like this.
- 2025 #1
- 2026 #2
- 2027 #3
- 2028 #4 & #5
- 2029 #6
- 2030 #7
- 2031 #8 & #9
- 2032 #10 & #11 These will replace the last of WMEC210s
- 2033 #12 & #13. These will begin replacement of Alex Healy and the 13 WMEC270s
- 2034 #14 & #15 These are the last that will be built under existing contracts
- 2035 #16 & #17
- 2036 #18 & #19
- 2037 #20 & #21 These will begin replacement of the six SLEP WMEC270s
- 2038 #22 & #23
- 2039 #24 & #25 These will replace the last of the WMEC 270s
This does assume a smooth continuation of the program, delivering two ships a year without interruption even after exercising all options and completion of existing contracts.
All the WMEC210s will not be replaced until 2032. At that point even the youngest of the 210s would be 63 years old. It is by no means certain any will last that long, but Reliance is already 61 years old.
All WMECs would be replaced by the end of 2039 by which time the youngest WMEC270 will be 48 years old.
Will the program continue uninterrupted after the completion of the currently optioned 15 OPCs? This would be easy only if Austal wins the contract for a Phase 3. Is that a forgone conclusion?
If some other company wins the Phase 3 contract, will they also initially deliver the first three ships at the rate of one ship per year as was done with the first two contracts?
Alternatives:
It can take up to ten years from the beginning of planning to delivery of the first ship. In reality it has taken considerably longer for the first OPC to get this far and we still no finished product. Even if all options are exercised, the last currently contracted OPC will be funded in FY2030 or 2031.
Do we still want to be building a design in 2030 that is 15 years old? Does the Coast Guard now own the design that could be handed over to another contractor to build the last ten ships or would a third yard have to provide a third detailed design, creating a “C” class of OPC?
Now is the appropriate time to consider alternatives.
Assuming we want to continue with the same design, Phase Three might be started with the idea of awarding a contract in FY2027 and delivering one additional OPC each year 2032, 2033, and 2034 by either Austal or a competing shipyard, with the winner producing two per year thereafter, until all 25 are completed. It would allow completion of all 25 a year and a half earlier.
If we want to look at an alternative that could replace the last ten currently planned OPCs and start delivering ships by 2035, we should issue an RFP in 2026.
There are two directions this new design could go.
- A cheaper design that can be made in larger numbers. A primary goal would be a smaller crew as a way to reduce operating costs. It might be smaller and cheaper (we already have contracted for more than enough ships to do Alaska patrols), but should be able to support alternative mission modules and unmanned systems.
- Ships that can be more readily upgraded for a wartime role. We might accelerate the design process by looking at the European Patrol Corvette, Australia’s Tier 2 combatant under the AUKUS umbrella, or if the country needs an ice capable combatant look at Finland’s Pohjanmaa-class corvette.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 
Pohjanmaa is even larger than OPC.
I still like a stretched Arialah OPV based on Damen 6711 (Say 72m like Game Changer, Daloob, or Um Alhoul). Land but not hangar an H-60. Mk 110 on the bow with spots for 2 keep out guns to 30mm and 2 M-2 mounts. Clean up the midships to be modular with 2 davits or containers. In war if might transport 3 Mk 70 launchers or some number of NSM cannisters or even NGELS. The design allows for a stern launch up to 7.5M so you can still have a boat even with the launchers. Can be built many places.
What’s your take on the Swiftships 75 MM Corvette design or Damen’s OPV 2200 or 2600 design. I know the Pakistan Navy is building the OPV 2600 design.
I like the way the Pakistanis equipped their Damen 2600. https://chuckhillscgblog.net/2024/07/30/gun-vs-missiles-pakistans-damen-built-2600-ton-opv/
The ones that Pakistan is building is what the USCG should have gone with. It would give the USCG and USN a capability in case we go to war with China. It would give the USCG an ASUW capability when it comes to escorting the merchant fleet or protecting tenders
Pakistan has real ships. At this point I question if Swiftships is even a real shipbuilder. Their 75 is vapor and they couldn’t build an LCU or an MUSV.
Pakistan has an OPV that makes the USCG jealous. As for swiftship, it’s still on their books but I doubt anyone has ordered one yet
Our history with shipbuilding is so frustrating and exhaustingly slow. You’d think we’d learn our lesson but apparently not. It’s not like we are even building anything exotic or cutting edge either. These are basic ships with basic designs.
On the bright side, at least we’re not the Navy who championed for the LCS and we’ve seen what a mess that was.
The NSC and FRC were reasonably effective.
No it was SecDef Donald Rumsfeld who championed and supported the LCS program…
In the case of the OPCs, Eastern was almost certainly low bidder–clearly underbidding–but we don’t know where the decision was made to go with this relatively inexperienced shipyard. Was it the Coast Guard, the Department, or higher up? We don’t know.
Just going with the low bid is the easy answer.
It might have been easier to rule them unqualified before they made the bid, but again, we don’t know if that was considered or if it was ruled out.
I asked the USCG Public Affairs recently why the OPC costs as much as the NSC. I gave them a week to answer. A POC replied saying that he will answer in a week. He didn’t so I sent the POC a follow-on email days later and he didn’t reply. I didn’t receive any answers to this inquiry.
I find that many times if the news isn’t positive, the DoD won’t reply. Many times the DoD wants positive stories about themselves, not negative stories. DoD is willing to do “Damage control” to dispel public rumors and heresy and tamp down on negativity and Fake News, but when it comes to generating bad news, they won’t reply or generate it for publishing. I think DoD has learned many times not to paint themselves into a corner or dig a hole for themselves with bad publicity, not when peer nations, Asian Pacific Rim nations, and NATO are so successful in their own shipbuilding programs.
GAO tells us that prices for ships of similar type tend to be proportional to the displacement. Since the NSC and the OPC are almost identical displacement, it is not surprising that the prices are similar.
Yeah, their lack of transparency costs us money and lives. How can you get kids to sign up for that with as transparent as the rest of the world is now?
At this point, Elon Musk and DOGE should do a full blown audit of the USCG. I’ll bet they find a way to save the USCG and cut cost in the USCG.
As for the OPC, they either need a 2nd yard to start production or look at another proven off the shelf design that works, is in production and we can see it on operations
A proven supplier of DOGS such as Bath Iron Works would and could turn this debacle around with high quality ships.
The Coast Guard was the first military service to complete a successful audit. Since then the Marines have also satisfactorily completed an audit.
I don’t think you can call what Musk is doing an audit. it is not that detailed.
I believe that OPCs are almost as expensive as NSCs and those are proven designs (although I also believe that the Finish corvettes would have significant advantages).
Chuck, I had emailed Sam at USNI News two months ago about the same subject and responded they depend on public relations departments of US Navy and USCG to issue statements and updates. Apparently Eastern & USCG has decided no news is good news. Frankly as a tax payer this is not acceptable to me with no news for 1 year + on Eastern’s progress.. How difficult will it be for a naval reporter show up at Eastern and demand a status update??
Jamey M
Thank you for this informative post. I appreciate that you did the math on all of these different OPC options.
You laid out three basic courses of action – try to get up to 25 OPCs, build something cheaper and more numerous, build something that is better-suited for a wartime environment.
If we want to build out the OPCs per your first course of action, we might consider a stripped version of the OPC for the last ten. We could replace the mk 110 with a mk-38 mod 4 (with a 30mm cannon), delete the third cutterboat, cut down whatever combat system was included and remove the auxiliary power unit. The advantage of this approach is that it would be a low-risk design that would definitely accomodate an H-60, travel at a reasonable speed and could be built more quickly and at lower cost than the rest of the class. That could help shift the schedule to the left and relieve some pressure on the existing MECs. It would also leverage the same logistics tail as the rest of the OPCs. This is along the lines of what the Navy did with the Flight II LPD. If it were up to me, this would probably be the direction that I would go.
If we want something cheaper, smaller and more numerous per the second course of action that we could put on contract soon and start building in 2035, then things will get a little more interesting. There will be two key factors to consider (in addition to the ones you brought up):
1. How fast does it need to travel?
2. Does it need to embark (not just land) an H-60.
If the ship needs to travel at 18-ish knots (like the WMEC) and embark an H-60, then I suspect we are looking at a clean-sheet design. If we put out an RFP for a ship that is built to ABS Marine Vessel Rules (not Naval Vessel Rules), meets that 18 knot criteria and has a NAVAIR-approved H-60 hangar/flight deck with the minimum associated RADAR, a davit that can accomodate an OTH and a Mk-38 Mod 4 cannon on the bow, then MAYBE we can get that delivered by 2035. It would be tight.
If we don’t need a helicopter and we can sacrifice some speed, then that opens the aperture a lot. Many offshore supply vessels could probably serve as the basis for that design. Even NOAA’s new ship might be a viable (but very slow) option. That first ship is close to delivery, and they are well under $100 mil.https://www.workboat.com/shipbuilding/thoma-sea-marine-holds-keel-laying-ceremony-for-oceanographic-research-ship
I just don’t think that the third course of action – building a ship that can be readily upgraded for war – will be ready by 2035. At least not in the way that you presented it. The three options you laid out would all be great ships as is the Damen 2600 that Nicky suggested, but I am not optimistic that we could get those delivered in ten years based on recent shipbuilding experiences. The Constellation-class tried to use a foreign parent-design approach, and while it might work out in the end, it is taking quite a while. The Landing Ship Medium is another example of a pretty straightforward Navy-compatible ship that is taking a long time to acquire. Going down that mil-spec-ish road just seems to take forever. I would point out that the other two COAs – a stripped OPC or a cheap/small/numerous cutter – could still be valuable to the Navy. If the vessel can embark an H-60R, carry some GARC USVs or provide some fuel to the larger Navy USVs then they can still serve a valuable purpose. Also, as you pointed out many times in your WWII USCG analysis, sometimes starting with a relatively blank slate is easier than removing equipment to make room for new installs. As long as the proposed ship has some extra power, cooling and bouyancy then there should be some opportunities for upgrades later.
There is also the option of continuing with a stripped down NSC. Removing the gun does not save the Coast Guard much during the building process, but it does add to the operating cost because of personnel required to operate and maintain it.
I would be happy to see the 57mm Mk110 replaced by a 30mm Mk38 Mod4 if eight Mk41 VLS were installed. We would not even need a full loadout to meet peacetime requirements.
If the need arose they could then be equipped with a variety of weapons that can be used for ASW, ASuW, AAW, or land attack.
A stripped NSC would also be a good option, but I don’t think that HII would be interested in building that. It seems like they are already planning to use that capacity on DDGs.
https://news.usni.org/2023/08/15/u-s-flight-iii-destroyer-multiyear-deal-grows-to-10-ships-3-hulls-awarded-in-fy-2023
Whether we fill the gap you pointed out with more OPCs, cheaper ships or Navy-ready vessels, I have a hard time justifying the installation of even an 8-cell mk 41 VLS. Those cells take quite a bit of weight and internal space, and they don’t contribute much to the Coast Guard’s mission during peace time. If the USCG finds that it needs to improve its loadout during wartime, then there are numerous deck-mounted options that they could use instead.
ASW – Lightweight torpedos on an H60R or mk 32 tripple torpedo tube.
ASuW – Box launched hellfire missiles, Naval Strike Missile
AAW – RAM (or SeaRAM), ESSM in standalone launcher, various gun-based systems or soft kill
You could also just put a Mk 70 launcher on the deck if it came down to it or modify the ship to accept that 8-cell if you have reserved space and weight.
Outfitting with a 30 mm would be the cheapest way to get through initial production. It does not require a hull penetration and the magazine can be much smaller. Plus if it turns out that you need something different later on then that 30mm would be the easier to remove than the 57mm.
I would be happy if we got any of the ships you laid out, whether they are cheap and numerous or heavily armed. My suggestions are based on what I think would be feasible to acquire in that 10-year timeframe.
Don’t buy foreign built ships, keep building them in the U.S., support American Shipbuilding and American steel manufacturing. Not to mention built by American Labor. Sick of the Coast Guard buying foreign products!