Category Archives: Budget

“Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated March 25, 2024” –CRS

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USCGC David Duren is the first of three FRCs to be homeported in Astoria, OR

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has again updated their “Report to Congress on Coast Guard Cutter Procurement”. (This link will always take you to the most recent edition of the report.) My last post on this evolving document was in reference to the October 19,2023 update. I have reproduced the one-page summary in full below. It gives a good picture of where we are. (The CRS report on icebreakers has also been updated.)

There have been other updates in the interim, but I have been looking forward to this one because it reports the 2024 budget as enacted into law, and (surprise, surprise) it includes two Fast Response Cutters that were not in the 2024 budget request. From page 35,

“Enacted The explanatory statement for Division C of H.R. 2882/P.L. 118-47 of March 23, 2024, provides the funding levels shown in the “Enacted” column of Table 1. The explanatory statement states that the increase of $200.0 million for the FRC program is for “no less than two Fast Response Cutters and the economic price adjustment for Fast Response Cutters funded in prior years”.”

There was a request for four additional FRCs in the Unfunded Priorities List. The House Appropriations Committee had wanted to fund four ($355M) while the Senate Appropriations Committee approved none. Apparently, they compromised. (Nice to see bipartisan support.)

Two Additional FRCs ($216M) are also in the 2025 budget request. (The appropriation amounts include addition funds for FRC program support over and above shipyard construction costs.)

If you do the math, you will see that there has been a departure from the original “Program of Record” (8 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 58 FRCs for 91 total). The current program will provide 11 NSCs, 25 OPCs, and 67 FRCs (one of which severely damaged in a fire) for a total of 102 operations ships, 104 if we get the two additional FRCs in the FY2025 budget.

While this may look like a large gain, the number of large patrol cutters (36 over 1000 tons) is well below historical norms (=>41), while demands on the cutter fleet have grown substantially, no OPCs have been actually delivered, and the entire WMEC fleet is already well overage.

Summary
The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR), which dates to 2004, calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and up to 71 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft.

National Security Cutters are the Coast Guard’s largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are replacing the Coast Guard’s 12 Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Congress has fully funded the procurement of 11 NSCs—three more than the 8 in the Coast Guard’s POR. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requested $17.1 million in procurement funding for the NSC program. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $7.0 in procurement funding for the NSC program, and the Coast Guard’s FY2025 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes an item for an additional $50.0 million in procurement funding for activities relating to the 11th NSC. Nine NSCs have entered service; the Coast Guard accepted delivery of the 10th on October 13, 2023, and plans to commission it into service in 2024. The 11th is under construction.

Offshore Patrol Cutters are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program and the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program (which is covered in another CRS report) as the service’s highest acquisition priorities. The first four OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding Group (ESG) of Panama City, FL. The Coast Guard held a full and open competition for a new contract to build the next 11 OPCs (numbers 5 through 15). On June 30, 2022, the Coast Guard announced that it had awarded a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract to Austal USA of Mobile, AL, to produce up to 11 offshore patrol cutters (OPCs). The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requested $579.0 million in procurement funding for the construction of the sixth OPC and other OPC program costs. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $530.0 million in procurement funding for the construction of (once again) the sixth OPC and other OPC program costs, and states that the requested FY2024 procurement funding would now be for the construction of the fifth OPC rather than the sixth.

A June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the OPC program states “The OPC’s total acquisition cost estimate increased from $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between 2012 and 2022…. In addition, the program incurred a 1.5-year delay in the delivery of the first four OPCs…. GAO also found indicators that the shipbuilder’s significant level of complex, uncompleted work may lead to further delays.”

Fast Response Cutters are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are replacing the Coast Guard’s 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. The Coast Guard’s FY2020 budget submission estimated the total acquisition cost of the 58 cutters intended for domestic use at $3.748 billion, or an average of about $65 million each. A total of 65 FRCs have been procured through FY2023. As of March 25, 2024, 54 FRCs have been commissioned into service. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requested $20.0 million in procurement funding for the FRC program, and the Coast Guard’s FY2024 UPL included an item for $400.0 million in procurement funding for procuring four more FRCs at an average cost of $100 million each, to provide increased Coast Guard presence and engagement with allied and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $216.0 million in procurement funding for the FRC program for the procurement of two more FRCs for operations in the Indo-Pacific region, plus additional FRC program costs.

“New court doc sheds light on Austal’s 2022 Offshore Patrol Cutter win” –Defense News

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Future USCGC Pickering (Image: Austal USA)

Defense News reports,

“The court last month ruled against Eastern Shipbuilding, which had appealed the Coast Guard’s decision. The court unsealed the case documents Dec. 14, though with some redactions.”

There is a link to the 42-page court document, but really there is a lot more here than just the decision.

Eastern’s offer was judged better in several respects, but Austal’s price and indoor assembly facility were deciding factors.

“Ultimately, Austal’s proposal came to $3.22 billion, or about $292 million per hull, according to the unsealed documents.

“Eastern’s price is redacted in the documents but is characterized as a “very large price differential.””

It was noted,

“…only one OPC could be built in the indoor facility at a time, meaning the heel-to-toe production cadence could lend itself to “notable disruptions” to schedule.”

This suggests to me, that Austal might have trouble building more than two OPCs a year if the Coast Guard wanted to accelerate OPC production.

The paragraph below may refer to the same presentation by RAdm Jacoby discussed earlier, where he expressed a sense of urgency regarding the OPC program, but there is also an admission that maintaining the Medium Endurance Cutters has become problematic.

Coast Guard acquisition chief Rear Adm. Chad Jacoby said at a recent conference there’s no current plan to have both yards build concurrently into the future but that he’d be open to it if lawmakers increased annual OPC spending, since it’s “urgent” to get OPCs into the fleet to replace “the medium endurance cutters, which are struggling to maintain operational capability right now.”

 

“Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress” –CRS, Updated Dec. 12, 2023

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Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

The Congressional Research Service has once again updated their look at the Polar Security Cutter (heavy icebreaker) program. (See the latest version here.)

I have reproduced the one page summary below.

For me the most important new information is that somewhere there is a new Coast Guard Fleet Mix Study. It has not been made public, but I would sure like to see the results. The last one goes back to 2009. Ever since it was published. it has been an important part of every Congressional Research Service report on the cutter procurement plan and apparently, it has been expanded to include Icebreakers as well as patrol cutters and aircraft. It is an important planning tool. Let’s hope they don’t take three years to make it public like they did the last time.

Summary

Required number of polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard testified in April, June, and November 2023 that a new Coast Guard fleet mix analysis concluded that the service will require a total of eight to nine polar icebreakers, including four to five heavy polar icebreakers and four to five medium polar icebreakers, to perform its polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in coming years. Prior to this new fleet mix analysis, the Coast Guard had stated that it would need at least six polar icebreakers, including three heavy polar icebreakers.

Current operational polar icebreaker fleet. The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar icebreaker, Healy. In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star until the delivery of at least the second Polar Security Cutter (PSC).

Polar Security Cutter (PSC). The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire at least three new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed at some later point by the acquisition of additional new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The Navy and Coast Guard in 2020 estimated the combined total procurement cost of the first three PSCs in then-year dollars as $2,673 million (i.e., about $2.7 billion). The procurement of the first two PSCs is fully funded. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $170.0 million in continued procurement funding for the PSC program, which would be used for procurement of long leadtime materials (LLTM) and government-furnished equipment
(GFE) for the PSCs, and for other program expenses. (GFE is equipment that the government purchases and then provides to the shipbuilder for incorporation into the ships.)

On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office for the PSC program awarded a fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to Halter Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard that was owned by Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. On December 29, 2021, the Coast Guard exercised a fixed price incentive option to its contract with Halter Marine for the second PSC. In November 2022, ST Engineering sold Halter Marine to Louisiana-based Bollinger Shipyards. The former Halter Marine is now called Bollinger Mississippi Shipbuilding.

Commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI). The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget also requests $125.0 million in procurement funding for the purchase of an existing commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI) that would (be) modified to become a Coast Guard polar icebreaker, so as to help augment the Coast Guard’s current polar icebreaking capacity until the new PSCs enter service, and to continue augmenting the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaking capacity after the PSCs enter service.

Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB). The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget also proposes to initiate a new procurement program for procuring a new Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) that would have capabilities similar to those of Mackinaw, the Coast Guard’s existing heavy Great Lakes icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $55.0 million in initial procurement funding for the ship, whose total acquisition cost, the Coast Guard estimates, might be roughly $350 million, depending in part on the exact design that is developed for the ship. The Coast Guard’s FY2024 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes an unfunded priority for an additional $20.0 million for the ship that would be used for accelerating initial procurement of LLTM for the ship.

“COAST GUARD Asset, Workforce, and Technology Challenges Continue to Affect Law Enforcement Missions” –GAO

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Two small boat crews from Coast Guard Cutter Stratton are underway for operations in the Bering Sea, April 30, 2021. Cutter crews use the small boats to conduct a variety of missions including search and rescue and law enforcement. U.S. Coast Guard photo courtesy Ensign Molly Dolan.

As if we did not know, the GAO is telling us the Coast Guard (unlike the rest of the Government) is having problems–OK I will stop being snide.

I really have not read any more than the highlights of this report, but there is something troubling here that might be turned to an opportunity.

GAO has found that the Coast Guard has not adequately determined its workforce needs. The Coast Guard has reported to Congress that it faces challenges meeting its daily mission demands because of workforce shortfalls. For example, in February 2020, GAO found that the Coast Guard had assessed a small portion of its workforce needs. GAO recommended that Coast Guard update its workforce plan with timeframes and milestones to meet its workforce assessment goals. As of May 2023, Coast Guard officials said they had not yet taken these steps but indicated it could be feasible to develop a rough estimate of how many positions it plans to assess in the next five years.

What I think this means is that not only has the Coast Guard been unable to fill its authorized billets, but the number of billets may be less than it should be. It may also mean the distribution of personnel may put too many people in some places and too few in others.

I think we have all seen this happen, no matter where we work.

But GAO is saying tell us what you really need. No doubt we should have been doing that all along, but it’s hard, and apparently it will take years to get an approximation.

“Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, Updated Oct 19, 2023” –CRS

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US Capital West Side, by Martin Falbisoner

The Congressional Research Service has again updated their “Report to Congress on Coast Guard Cutter Procurement”. (This link will always take you to the most recent edition of the report.) My last post on this evolving document was in reference to a August 30, 2022 update. I have reproduced the one-page summary in full below. It gives a good picture of where we are.

I will try to provide a little more detail after I get a chance to read the full report. Until then, remember that the full price of the ships includes much more than just the shipyard’s building costs. In addition to government furnished equipment, it includes the crew cost before the ship is accepted, their accommodations at the building site, and their training and travel. It may also include supporting shoreside infrastructure.

Summary
The Coast Guard’s program of record (POR), which dates to 2004, calls for procuring 8 National Security Cutters (NSCs), 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs), and 65 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) as replacements for 90 aging Coast Guard high-endurance cutters, medium-endurance cutters, and patrol craft.

National Security Cutters are the Coast Guard’s largest and most capable general-purpose cutters; they are replacing the Coast Guard’s 12 Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters. NSCs have an estimated average procurement cost of about $670 million per ship. Congress has fully funded the procurement of 11 NSCs—three more than the 8 in the Coast Guard’s POR—including the 10th and 11th in FY2018, which (like the 9th NSC) were not requested by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $17.1 million in procurement funding for the NSC program for post-delivery activities for the 10th and 11th NSCs, and for class wide activities. Nine NSCs have entered service; the Coast Guard accepted delivery of the 10th on October 13, 2023, and plans to commission it into service in 2024. The 11th is under construction.

Offshore Patrol Cutters are intended to replace the Coast Guard’s 29 aged medium-endurance cutters. Coast Guard officials describe the OPC program and the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program (which is covered in another CRS report) as the service’s highest acquisition priorities. The first four OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding Group (ESG) of Panama City, FL. The Coast Guard held a full and open competition for a new contract to build the next 11 OPCs (numbers 5 through 15). On June 30, 2022, the Coast Guard announced that it had awarded a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract to Austal USA of Mobile, AL, to produce up to 11 offshore patrol cutters (OPCs). The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $579.0
million in procurement funding for the construction of the sixth OPC, the procurement of Long Lead Time Materials (LLTM) for the seventh OPC, and other program costs.

One oversight issue for Congress concerns substantial cost growth and schedule delays in the OPC program. A June 2023 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the OPC program states “The OPC’s total acquisition cost estimate increased from $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between 2012 and 2022. The program attributes the 40 percent increase to many factors, including restructuring the stage 1 contract [for OPCs 1 through 4] and recompeting the stage 2 requirement [for OPCs 5 through 15] in response to a disruption caused by Hurricane Michael, and increased infrastructure costs for homeports and facilities, among other things. In addition, the program incurred a 1.5-year delay in the delivery of the first four OPCs due to Hurricane Michael and issues related to manufacturing the cutter’s propulsion system. GAO also found indicators that the shipbuilder’s significant level of complex, uncompleted work may lead to further delays.”

Fast Response Cutters are considerably smaller and less expensive than OPCs; they are replacing the Coast Guard’s 49 aging Island-class patrol boats. The Coast Guard’s FY2020 budget submission estimated the total acquisition cost of the 58 cutters intended for domestic use at $3.748 billion, or an average of about $65 million per cutter. A total of 65 FRCs have been procured through FY2023. As of August 10, 2023, 53 FRCs have been commissioned into service. The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2024 budget requests $20.0 million in procurement funding for the FRC program; this request does not include funding for procuring any additional FRCs. The Coast Guard’s FY2024 Unfunded Priorities List (UPL) includes, as one of its items, an unfunded priority for procuring four more FRCs (which would be the 66th through 69th in the program) for a combined procurement cost of $400.0 million, or an average of $100 million per
cutter, to provide increased Coast Guard presence and engagement with allied and partner countries in the Indo-Pacific region

“GAO: Polar Security Cutter Design Won’t Complete Until 2024, Delivery of First Hull Estimated in 2028” –USNI

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Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

The US Naval Institute news service reports,

According to the estimate from GAO, which cites Coast Guard and Navy officials, as well as shipbuilders – the final design for the 23,0000-ton ice breaker won’t be complete until next March. Construction is scheduled to start shortly after the design is approved. Coast Guard commandant Adm. Linda Fagan told Congress last month that the delivery of the first hull is expected in 2028.

This goes back to the fact that while the Polar Security Cutter was supposed to have been based on a proven design of a successful icebreaker, in fact the selected shipyard used a design that never got past the preliminary design stage.

But really, the problem goes back much further than that.

Polar Star was commissioned in 1976. A new class of ships typically takes ten years from concept to commissioning. 30 years is a generally expected lifespan for military ships. That suggests the program to replace the Polar class should have begun in 1996. Not even close. A replacement program was not initiated until 2012. By then the High Latitude Study had identified the need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers in 2010. Launching the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program in 2012 should have given us an icebreaker in 2022. In 2016 a Polar Icebreaker Operational Requirements Document was issued. Arguably the High Latitude Study should have simultaneously launched both a heavy and a medium icebreaker procurement program.

13 years after the High Latitude Study identified the need, we have seen no movement in an effort to procure medium icebreakers.

In the movie “King Richard,” about Richard Dove Williams Jr., father of tennis players Venus Williams and Serena Williams, he is quoted as saying, “If you fail to plan, you plan to fail.”

This was not a problem with Congress.

We have failed to plan.

The only fleet mix plan we have ever done is now 12 years old. In the interim, much has changed.

There is not now, nor has there ever been, a 30 year ship building plan or any kind of comprehensive long range plan comparable to the Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans which the Navy revises every few years.

The first National Security Cutter was ordered in 2001 but was not commissioned until 2008. The first four were commissioned at essentially two year intervals, but even after that, it has taken nine years to complete next six. Looks like the eleventh ship will not be finished until 2025. When the first Hamilton Class WHEC was decommissioned, it was 44 years old. When the last one was decommissioned, it was almost 50 years old.

The Coast Guard currently has 27 WMECs, every single one of them is over 30 years old. 14 of them are over 50 years old. The average age is about 46.4 years. That is the fruit of poor planning.

We did not plan to run ships for 50 to 60 years, but we also have had no plan that defined when they would be decommissioned, that would have informed when replacements had to be completed.

Planning for the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) began with the Deepwater Program. Concepts were revised in light of the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. The acquisition process for the OPC began at least as early as 2010. At that time, we thought all would be delivered by 2027 (and here). The first ship was supposed to have been delivered in calendar year 2019. Now we plan on continuing to build them until 2038 meaning this acquisition program is supposed to run 28 years. 28 years building the same ship without looking at mission and technology changes?

We should decide right now that once we get some experience with the first OPCs, we will start looking at the next class of cutters. It might replace the OPC in future year budgets, or it might be built along with additional OPCs. We might even decide the OPC is exactly what we need to continue building, but we need to reevaluate. Cutter design should evolve. There should be improvements. There should be new capabilities.

The Coast Guard enjoys bipartisan Congressional support. We need to educate the administration, the Congress, and the GAO about our needs, but first we need to decide what they are, because we don’t really know.

We can start by identifying when ships will be decommissioned. The prospect of loss can be a strong incentive for funding their replacements.

We need a new Fleet mix analysis, one that actually looks at our missions, geographic distances and a range of possible solutions.

We also need a long term plan for our major capital resources, particularly the ships and aircraft.

 

 

“Navy’s New 381-Hull Fleet Plan Recommits To Big Amphibious Warfare Ships” –The Drive

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Five white 311-foot cutters of Coast Guard Squadron Three, assigned to support Operation MARKET TIME tied up alongside Navy repair ship USS Jason (AR-8) at Naval Station Subic Bay in the Philippines, 4 August 1967. From inboard to outboard:
USCGC Half Moon (WHEC-378);
USCGC Yakutat (WHEC-380);
USCGC Gresham (WHEC-387);
USCGC Barataria (WHEC-381) and
USCGC Bering Strait (WHEC-382)
U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office. Photo by CDR Richard Morse, USCG, Commanding Officer USCGC Barataria (WHEC-381)

The Drive has one of several posts reporting on the new Navy Fleet Plan and Shipbuilding projections. The US Naval Institute News report is here.

This brings to mind two of my favorite grips:

  • First that he Coast Guard has no similar long-term plans, and second,
  • Coast Guard assets are not considered in as part of the “Battle Force.”

A good part of the reason our ships soldier on long after they should have been replaced may be because we have not been informing the executive branch and congress about our long-term needs.

I can imagine an adverse reaction to my suggestion that cutters should be part of the “Battle Force”, but you need to understand what the Navy includes in that category. These are not all high-powered warships. Currently the US Navy “Battle Force” is 299 ships. Of those, 59 are USNS ships that are almost completely unarmed, have civilian crews, and no electronic countermeasures. They include oilers, logistics ships, expeditionary fast transports, towing salvage and rescue ships, and ocean surveillance ships. In addition, it includes some commissioned ships that are not really warships, like command ships and expeditionary base ships. The relatively small future Landing Ship Medium is expected to be included as well.

If we have a naval conflict with a major power (e.g., China) the Navy is going to need the Coast Guard’s help. Cutters will help enforce blockades, round up hostile merchant shipping and fishing vessels, rescue crews from sunken ships, play host to unmanned systems, provide harbor defense and force protection, and probably ultimately be equipped as second line warships.

Cutters count, so they should be counted.  

Vessels I would include in the count would include at least all the Icebreakers, National Security Cutters, Offshore Patrol Cutters, and Medium Endurance Cutters and possibly ocean-going buoy tenders and Webber class WPCs.

“Editor’s Notes: Why the Coast Guard Lags When It Comes to Unmanned Systems” –National Defense

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Eagle Eye UAS, part of the “Deep Water” Coast Guard recapitalization plan.

National Defense has a post that traces the Coast Guard’s two-decade effort to put unmanned aircraft on cutters.

But here is where I confess that this article is not really about the Eagle Eye. Sorry to say that it was all a bit of misdirection, because this article is really about one of the nation’s greatest but chronically underfunded assets: the United States Coast Guard.

National Defense since the Eagle Eye’s cancellation has written dozens of articles about the service’s effort to deploy UAVs. Over and over again, the only reason cited for the Coast Guard being the “have-not” of the services when it comes to drones was funding.

It is a good article, but I think the conclusion of the article is wrong. To paraphrase Jimmy Buffett (“wasting away in Margaritaville”) it’s our own damn fault.

Too long we seemed to glory in doing more with less. Too many years we went without bothering to submit an unfunded priorities list. We really haven’t changed our program of record since the rethink prompted by 9/11 more than two decades ago. We fired the Deepwater program contractors in 2012, but we are still working on their program. There have been changes around the edges, more NSCs, more FRCs, but those changes were not the result of a Coast Guard masterplan. They were ad hoc and frequently driven by Congressional interests.

Congress keeps telling us our planning is out of date. We have not done a fleet mix study since 2011 and even that one only considered the types of platforms already in the program of record without any consideration of alternative types.

Despite repeated Congressional calls for a new Fleet Mix Study, there is none.

Despite repeated Congressional calls for a 20- or 30-year ship building plan, there is none.

We still have not reached the number of medium range fixed wing search aircraft that were in the Program of Record and apparently have not plan to do so.

The Coast Guard has not been transparent in publicly reporting their measures of effectiveness. We don’t see reports like this one anymore. I have not been able to make reports like these (here, here, and here) since 2010.

We have failed to field any shore based maritime search UAS system, a capability that was included in the Deep Water program, while Japan, Thailand, India, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK have already done so. This in spite of the fact that we have been piddling around with CBP’s MQ-9 program for well over a decade.

Regional Maritime Domain Awareness programs are being implemented all over the world, but if we have such a program with Mexico and Canada no one seems to know about it.

Planning for the medium Icebreakers could have proceeded in parallel with planning for the heavy icebreakers. We know we need them, but I have seen no indication that we have started looking seriously at the possibilities.

We have not talked about the possibly devastating effects the delays in the OPC program are going to have, that would justify increasing the pace of construction to more than two per year.

We still have not adequately addressed the water borne terrorist threat to our ports. Since we never have its easy to continue to ignore.

Despite demands for reports from field units, for whatever reason, the “puzzle palace” is not making public the kind of analytics required to justify significant departures from what we did last year, so we keep stumbling along from one budget to the next.

 

“Icebreakers, Pay Raise, New Cutters: House Adds $430M to Coast Guard Budget” –Military.com

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FOUR WEBBER CLASS PATROL CRAFT. 220822-A-KS490-1182 STRAIT OF HORMUZ (Aug. 22, 2022) From the left, U.S. Coast Guard fast response cutters USCGC Glen Harris (WPC 1144), USCGC John Scheuerman (WPC 1146), USCGC Emlen Tunnell (WPC 1145) and USCGC Clarence Sutphin Jr. (WPC 1147) transit the Strait of Hormuz, Aug. 22. The cutters are forward-deployed to U.S. 5th Fleet to help ensure maritime security and stability across the Middle East. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Noah Martin)

Military.com reports,

The House Appropriations Committee on Wednesday approved an increase to the Coast Guard’s fiscal 2024 budget, forwarding a bill to the full chamber that funds a 5.2% pay raise for members, a commercial icebreaker, four additional fast response cutters, and an extra HC-130J Super Hercules aircraft.

In addition to the projects in the original budget request, the committe has obviously, they have been looking at the Coast Guard’s FY2024 Unfunded Priority List.

The Unfunded Priority List included requests for an additional $1.6B.

The House Appropriations Committee recommendation would fund about $430M, including two big ticket items, four additional Webber class patrol craft and an additional C-130J. The unfunded priority list had listed the total price for the cutters and aircraft as $538.5M, so the markup may not include all the support costs for the cutters and missionization costs for the aircraft included in the Unfunded Priority list.

This still has a way to go before becoming law, but the Coast Guard has been receiving substantial bipartisan support and for the last few years Procurement, Construction, and Improvements budgets have been increased substantially over the requested amounts. There seems to be wide support for additional Webber class cutters to serve in the Western Pacific. As I noted in March,

We shouldn’t expect everything on the list to be approved, but I think we will definitely see the additional C-130 and at least three additional FRCs. Some of the other items will probably be approved as well. Those items not funded in FY2024 will likely be included in the FY2025 budget.

House Appropriations Committee FY2024 Budget Hearings

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Note the video above does not actually start until about minute 17.

Above is a video of the Commandant’s testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations that occurred about two weeks ago. It may be worth noting that those present were not the full committee. The full committee includes 71 members, currently 34 Republican and 27 Democrat.

The Coast Guard enjoys bi-partisan support in Congress, and it was evident in this committee hearing.

Concerns identified included:

  • IUU fishing
  • Border security/drugs/immigrants
  • Recruiting problems
  • Chinese investments/influence in Mexico’s transportation systems
  • The effects of offshore wind farms

There was discussion about the Unfunded Priority list, including:

  • Funding of four additional Fast Response Cutters,
  • Improvements at the Coast Guard Yard that would allow a larger floating dry dock capable of servicing the Offshore Patrol Cutters (1:21:00),
  • and various infrastructure improvements. Charleston, Seattle, and Alaska in particular were mentioned.

There was a lot of concern about the influx of non-prescription fentanyl. This is a problem the Coast Guard has not had much of a role in countering, but there was hope that the Coast Guard might be able to work with the Mexican Navy on ways to track the distribution of precursor chemicals which are imported into Mexico legally.

There was discussion of the lack of progress on the Polar Security Cutters and questions about the waterways commerce cutters.

The Commandant was consistent with her previous statements that the Work Force is her highest priority. Increased recruiting capacity, additional recruiters and recruiting offices, has been funded.

Some comments that surprised me:

  • Indo-Pacific support cutter, Harriet Lane, to arrive in Honolulu before the end of the year, will operate out of there for a couple of years before going on to her final homeport. (49:00)
  • Maritime illegal immigration attempts peaked earlier in the year and are now decreasing.
  • A Maritime Domain Awareness data fusion center has been started. The CG is getting Saildrone USVs to assist in data collection. Scan Eagle was mentioned but there was no specific discussion about land based UAS.
  • Purchase of a commercially available icebreaker was included in the FY2023 budget but was delayed until FY2024. The CG is apparently now ready to proceed with that.

The Commandant also confirmed that the Coast Guard was ready to proceed with procurement of a Great Lakes icebreaker with capabilities similar to Mackinaw (1:10:00).

There is a report on the hearings by “Workboat” here. Thanks to Paul for making me aware of this article, that then led me to find the video above.