A map showing the location of the Black Sea and some of the large or prominent ports around it. The Sea of Azov and Sea of Marmara are also labelled. Created by User:NormanEinstein, Wikipedia
Russia has dispersed its naval forces in the Black Sea between the southeastern coast of Crimea and Novorossiysk in fear of Ukrainian surface drone strikes, Southern Command spokesperson Natalia Humeniuk said on Aug. 18.
Well, the US Navy is all a twitter about “Distributed Maritime Operations” (DMO) so is this a good idea for the Russian Black Sea Fleet? Like most such questions, it depends.
It depends on how good Ukrainian intelligence is. The supposed advantage for the Russian Fleet would be that their ships are harder to find, but is this case? Not only does Ukraine have access to some Western intelligence sources, but they seem to have good independent intelligence. All their successful USV attacks seem to have been against valid targets though there are many more potential targets that were not directly supporting the Russian military. When Russian ships are in port, the Ukrainians are going to know it.
Convoying has been a feature of Naval Warfare for over a thousand years because it is a defensive tactic that takes the choice of where and when to concentrate out of the hands of the offense. Spreading out the potential targets requires diluting the defense. That leaves the choice of where and when to concentrate effort in the hands of the Ukrainians.
To be successful, the defense has to detect all of the incoming USVs at a distance from their target and have sufficient numbers of countermeasures systems, in the right place, to engage all incoming USVs as they are detected.
The Ukrainian USVs don’t seem to be too hard to defeat once they are detected. Most of the successful countermeasures seem to have used machineguns, but you need one or more within effective range to engage every attacking USV.
On August 4, Ukraine’s maritime authorities issued a “war risk area warning” to all international mariners headed for six Russian Black Sea ports, including Novorossiysk and the smaller oil-exporting terminals of Tuapse and Taman. The warning is scheduled to go into effect on August 23 and continue “until further notice” (Interfax-Ukraine, August 5). And on August 8, Zelenskyy’s economic adviser Oleh Ustenko told US media that “everything the Russians are moving back and forth on the Black Sea are our valid military targets,” including oil tankers or terminals.
When you multiply the number of points you have to defend, you divide your defensive force. USVs are cheap and readily produced. Ukraine will not have trouble finding targets. Ukraine will attempt to overwhelm the defenses by creating situations where even if the defense is taking out say four out of five or six out of seven attacking drones, the Russians still loose, even if it is only one ship at a time.
GULF OF AQABA (Feb. 13, 2022) The U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class cutter USCGC Glen Harris (WPC 1144) sails near a U.S sail drone explorer during the International Maritime Exercise/Cutlass Express (IMX) 2022, Feb. 13, 2022. IMX/CE 2022 is the largest multinational training event in the Middle East, involving more than 60 nations and international organizations committed to enhancing partnerships and interoperability to strengthen maritime security and stability. (U.S. Army photo by Cpl. DeAndre Dawkins)
“Drones are heading to the southern waters of 4th Fleet, which will follow 5th Fleet’s pioneering experiments with unmanned craft in the Middle East, Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro announced Tuesday at the Navy League’s 2023 Sea-Air-Space Conference.”
This is great, and not unexpected, but I noted two things that concern me. First there was not mention of making this an international effort, as has been the case in 5th Fleet, and second, that they want to start in the Caribbean where we already have excellent maritime domain awareness, instead of the eastern Pacific drug transit zone where these are really needed.
Del Toro added, “it’s fair to say however, you want to start small and build upon it, obviously. And so you know, focus perhaps on the Caribbean Basin first, and then expand beyond that in the future.”
I can see that they would be more comfortable operating UxVs in the Caribbean, because it is closer to home, but in the Eastern Pacific we could look at Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USV) using acoustic sensors to help detect semisubmersibles. This is something that is not being done in 5th Fleet so it would provide a different sensor and target set and perhaps an opportunity to cross over some of the learning to ASW.
Of course, most of the 4th Fleet’s surface ships are Coast Guard Cutters.
The first Air Force Research Lab video above talks about a new weapon, but it is also recognition of a new threat.
Let’s talk about what is wrong with the scenario in the video, how the Coast Guard could use this new weapon, along with the “Rapid Dragon” delivery system, and why the Coast Guard not only could, but should be the agency to use this weapon against this particular threat.
“Conventional cruise missiles or hypersonic cruise missiles, low-radar cross-section cruise missiles, cruise missiles from Russia, cruise missiles from China, potentially other countries. Cruise missiles that can be launched from undersea, from 100 miles-plus off the coast. Cruise missiles from on the sea. … Cruise missiles from the air. Cruise missiles from commercial vehicles launched out of a container that can be masked as part of the commercial ship. (emphasis applied–Chuck)
The video shows a ballistic missile being preped for launch from a container. That is possible, but cruise missiles are more likely. In any case, potential actions to stop the launch would be the same.
In the video we see a Navy P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft monitoring the activities of a suspicious container ship. Presumably the war has not started since they don’t call for an Air Force fighter to bring in the weapon until the P-8 sees a launcher being elevated for missile launch. This is really too late to call the Air Force. Before the Air Force can get a fighter on scene, the missiles will have been launched. The aircraft monitoring the ship’s activity should be able to immediately initiate countermeasure. The P-8 Poseidon is capable of carrying Anti-Ship Cruise missiles of 725 kg (1,598 lb). It might be able to deploy the QUICKSINK weapon seen in the video which is based on a 2,000 pound bomb. It could certainly deploy a similar weapon based on the 1000 pound bomb. The problem is that, at this stage in the run-up to war, P-8s should be looking for submarines that might also launch cruise missiles, and fighter aircraft don’t have the endurance to loiter on scene waiting for something to happen. They would also be needed to intercept any cruise missiles that are launched.
In the actual sinking, this was a big bomb used against a small ship, but the key to its effectiveness what where it exploded.
The weapon is discussed here, “Air Force destroys target vessel with ship-killing JDAM.” It clearly is intended to exploit the non-compressibility of water to allow a weapon that would not normally immediately sink a ship, if it hit above the waterline, to break the ship in half.
“In a September 2021 interview with Military.com, Meeks said one of the bomb’s modifications was a redesigned nose plug. This is intended to keep the bomb from veering off in an unintended direction if it hits the water before the target, which Meeks likened to skipping a stone across the surface of a pond.”
There is additional information about the seeker here, including how it works (GPS to get to the general area, then radar, and imaging IR), expected cost (substantially less than $1M for the all up rounds bought in quantity), and range (15 miles, potentially more with range extending wing kits).
As I have pointed out numerous times, no other non-nuclear weapon equals a modern torpedo’s ability to sink a ship. Apparently the Air Force agreed and decided to develop a weapon that would kill a ship in the same way a modern torpedo does, by detonating under water, preferably below the keel, rather than by directly hitting the target above the waterline. Looking at the videos, it appears the bomb enters the water, almost vertically, close to the port side. We see the familiar lift of the center section as we have seen many times when a Mk48 torpedo is used against a surface target, after which the ship breaks in half. For comparison, here is a destroyer hit by a Mk48, and a Mk48 torpedo’s warhead contains far less explosive than a 2000 pound bomb.
The Launch Platforms:
The weapon can be used on a wide variety combat aircraft. The video shows and F-35 and the actual test was done with an F-15, but there is no reason this could not In fact be dropped from a Coast Guard fixed wing using the “Rapid Dragon” concept.
It is not that the Coast Guard will necessarily be the only ones doing this mission, but the Coast Guard does seem to be particularly well suited for the purpose.
If we are to keep watch on vessels off the US coast in the run up to war, you want aircraft with long endurance. You want excellent communications. You want good electro optics so that you can watch what is happening on a ship from outside the range of shoulder launched air defense systems (MANPAD). You get all that with Coast Guard fixed wing aircraft equipped with the Minotaur system. Using Air Force’s QUICKSINK modified JDAM from the Rapid Dragon launcher means we can have a single unit that can remain on station for an extended period, observe the actions of target of interest, communicate effectively, and if necessary promptly eliminate a threat while freeing other assets like the P-8 and fighters to do jobs only they can do.
It would not be necessary for the Coast Guard to store the weapons or arm the aircraft if a agreement could be reached allowing DOD facilities to load the Rapid Dragon and weapons. Actually targeting would be done by DOD assets anyway. It appears this mission could be performed, even to our smallest fixed wing, the HC-144.
Is it doable?:
A recent report suggests that it is. Lt. Gen. James Slife, who leads Air Force Special Operations Command said, “It doesn’t require any aircraft modifications, it doesn’t require any special aircrew training.”
Might be of interest to compare the amount of ordanance used in this SINKEX. It should be recognized that this retired USN frigate was probably a larger, more resilient target than the one used in the “QUICKSINK” demonstration, but I suspect, if QUICKSINK had been used agains the frigate, the results would have been the same, though it probably would have taken the two halves of the ship longer to sink.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 