“Iran Fires Ballistic Missile From A Shipping Container At Sea” –The War Zone

The country’s IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency reports that two “Fateh class” ballistic missiles were recently launched from Shahid Mahdavi, which the Iranian Navy took delivery of in March 2023 after it was converted from a state-owned and operated container ship known as the Sarvin. Iranian State Media

The War Zone reports,

Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has fired two ballistic missiles from launchers disguised as standard shipping containers that were hosted aboard one of its sea base-like vessels. This particular combination, which has not been seen to date, greatly expands the reach with which those weapons could be used to strike potential targets by surprise, especially given that shipping containers can be embarked on any vessel that has the space to accommodate them.

Iran’s liberal transfer of technology to proxies and the inherent deniability of containerized missile systems aboard nondescript vessels opens a number of unpleasant possibilities.

Launching from the sea complicates defenses because it means new potential threat axes.

This potentially threatens the US as well as our allies. Defenses designed to intercept ICBMs don’t necessarily work against shorter ranged ballistic missiles or cruise missiles. Those destroyers intercepting ballistic missiles over the Red Sea are not patrolling off the US coast ready to intercept missiles aimed at US cities.

“USCG Leans In Towards First Polar Security Cutter” –Naval News

Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

Naval News reports on Coast Guard remarks about the Polar Security Cutter program at the Surface Navy Association annual symposium.

There is some good news. The Commandant says she is, “100% confident in the design…” The keel has not been laid, but “Welding work is commencing on three build units purchased for the first ship.” (That phraseology does sound a little strange to me.)

She goes on to say,

“I’m focused on fielding the Polar Security Cutters …. [and] getting that first one well into construction, with some predictability around when that ship will come to full operating capacity. We’re working hard with the yard, with the navy, and with the program office to bring some better certainty and clarity around that,” said Adm Fagan.

Which clearly means we do not yet have the predictability, certainty, and clarity the Commandant wants.

Explaining why this is not just an Icebreaker, Rear Admiral Chad Jacoby – USCG Assistant Commandant for Acquisition/Chief Acquisition Officer – told the symposium,

“The distinction there is the Polar Security Cutter is going to do way more than break ice. It will have National Security Cutter-level capabilities, sensors, and equipment on a hull that can go anywhere in the world in any season,” Rear Adm Jacoby continued. “So, we’re not just breaking ice, we’re not just having presence: we’re going to be able to execute almost all USCG missions up in the Arctic, down in the Antarctic, anywhere in the world.”

I look forward to learning what that actually means. It certainly isn’t in terms of installed armament. I don’t see an air-search radar on either the model presented (pictured above) or the illustrations I have seen.

Photo of a model of Halter Marine’s Polar Security Cutter seen at Navy League’s Sea-Air-Space Exhibition have surfaced. Photo credit Chris Cavas.

There do appear to be AN/SLQ-32 antennas on top of the bridge on the model (in gray). Could there also be a SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility) like there is on the National Security Cutter? There are also areas where containerized systems could be installed.

To me the most encouraging thing that has happened with regard to this class is that Bollinger took over the project when they purchased the shipyard that is building them. I wish them every success.

“US Navy LCS Successfully Fires SM-6 From MK 70 Payload Delivery System” –Naval News

“USS Savannah (LCS 28) conducts a live-fire demonstration in the Eastern Pacific Ocean utilizing a containerized launching system that fired an SM-6 missile from the ship at a designated target. The exercise demonstrated the modularity and lethality of Littoral Combat Ships and the ability to successfully integrate a containerized weapons system to engage a surface target. The exercise will inform continued testing, evaluation and integration of containerized weapons systems on afloat platforms.” (I note this LCS, unlike Coast Guard cutters, has ballistic protection for the crews of its .50 caliber machine guns)

Naval News reports,

US Navy Littoral Combat Ship USS Savannah (LCS 28) successfully launched an SM-6 missile from a MK 70 Mod 1 Payload Delivery System placed on the ship’s helicopter deck.

This is significant for the Coast Guard, in that this could just as easily been a cutter. In fact, in some respects the cutters are better equipped than the LCS. It could give Coast Guard cutters a wartime role that would not require a lengthy refit in the yard, assuming the Navy could provide the expertise to augment the cutter’s crew with the necessary expertise.

There are other considerations that might be limiting, but the flight decks on the National Security Cutters are 50 by 80 feet and those of the Offshore Patrol Cutters will be a similar size, so there is sufficient deck space to host several 40x8x8 foot Mk70 containers, each with four cells each of which can contain up to four missiles (ESSM and possibly others).

In this particular exercise, an SM-6 was used against a surface target. The SM-6 was originally intended to be used for long range anti-air warfare (AAW) including terminal phase ballistic missile defense. but it also has a proven capability against surface targets, including an anti-ship capability.

The Mk70 can launch any of the weapons that can be launched from Mk41 vertical launch systems, meaning they can be used against ships, aircraft, submerged submarines, or targets on land.

The system could certainly be used on cutters acting alone to attack fixed facilities ashore. Already installed sensors might permit short range use against ships and aircraft.

But perhaps more importantly, there is concern for the depth of magazines on Aegis combatants and the difficulty of underway rearming. Cooperative Engagement Capability would allow missiles mounted in Mk70 launchers on cutters and/or other vessels to be launched by Aegis capable combatants against any threat they can target. This would allow relatively unsophisticated ships armed with the Mk70 systems to serve as offboard magazines for the Aegis combatants. 

The Australians might also be looking at this for the Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) as well. In fact, it could be applied to virtually any allied OPV or ship with a flight deck more than 40 feet in length.

When is a Flight Deck Not a Flight Deck?

Containerized minelaying system on a River Batch 2 Offshore Patrol Vessel

It has been said that aircraft carriers are the ultimate modular warships because their primary weapons (aircraft) are interchangeable.

A flight deck on an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) certainly offers a degree of aviation options. General purpose, cargo, ASW, and ASuW helicopters and a range of Unmanned Air Systems, but it appears our allies, the UK and particularly Australia may be looking at other ways to use this large open space.

Royal Navy:

Navy Lookout had a post that talked about restoring a naval mining capability in the Royal Navy. There was no specific reference to using flight decks or to Offshore Patrol Vessels.

The RN does not need dedicated minelaying vessels. The SSNs have a theoretical minelaying capability but XLUUVs are a much lower risk and stealthier solution for covert and sensitive missions. Where stealth is less important, containerised minelaying solutions are being developed that can be secured to the deck and dispense mines over the stern. (emphasis applied–Chuck)

But the photo, above, definitely got my attention. There we see an SH Defence “CUBE” containerized mine laying system developed by RWM Italia S.p,A. (Rheinmetall). on the flight deck of a River Batch 2 Offshore Patrol Vessel (HMS TAMAR).

Australian Navy:

Australia is planning to produce up to 14 flight deck equipped Arafura class OPVs including two intended specifically for Mine Counter Measures (MCM). These ships were always intended to accept containerized mission loads. It appears they are now planning what these ships will do in wartime.

Missile Launcher:

We already saw “Australia Considering Modular C-Dome For Arafura OPVs” –Naval News

Australia Considering Modular C-Dome For Arafura OPVs
Illustration of Arafura-class OPV fitted with C-DOME

Mine Layer:

As noted in the Navy Lookout, Australia is planning to buy and produce large numbers of mines. Naval News reports,

“Australia is set to accelerate the procurement of sea mines as part of Project SEA 2000…The decision to rapidly procure the capability, reportedly from a European supplier, will deliver a ‘significant’ deterrent effect according to Defence…it’s understood that the government has budgeted approximately $500 million to 1 billion Australian dollars for the acquisition…the weapons being brought are smart mines, able to disseminate between civilian vessels and a variety of military targets, allowing a strategic anchorage to be denied to hostile forces, all the while preserving access for aligned vessels(emphasis applied–Chuck)

This all points to large numbers of mines being used in defensive fields. Such minefields will almost certainly be laid by surface vessels. Australia does have some civilian crewed support ships that might be used for mine laying, but as the Arafura class comes online, they will be the most likely surface minelayers.

SURTASS-E:

SURTASS-E. (U.S Department of Defense)

Then there is these reports from Naval News and The Drive that Australia is getting SURTASS-E systems.

SURTASS-E is expected to provide long range detection and cuing for tactical weapons, against both diesel- and nuclear-powered submarines. Again, the Arafura class seems a likely host, because the system is intended for military crew manning and, unlike the civilian manned National Support Squadron ships, these ships are armed and have communication systems that include tactical data link.

Now About the Coast Guard:

Using a flight deck for non-aviation purposes is not a foreign idea to the Coast Guard. They do it all the time to provide a holding area for migrants. 

USCGC Mohawk’s (WMEC 913) crew patrols the South Florida Straits during Operation Vigilant Sentry, Jan. 5, 2023. Mohawk’s crew patrolled the Florida Straits and Caribbean Sea in support of Homeland Security Task Force—Southeast and Operation Vigilant Sentry in the Coast Guard Seventh District’s area of operations for a 46-day patrol. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by USCGC Legare (WMEC 912)

“SEA To Provide KRAITSENSE ASW System For A South-Asian Navy’s OPV Program” –Naval News

KRAITSENSE ASW System. Photo credit: SEA

Naval News reports,

“UK-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) solutions provider SEA has been awarded a contract to supply two of its innovative ASW systems, KraitSense, to a South-East Asian Navy for a new offshore patrol vessel (OPV) programme.”

I found another photo, below, in an earlier report.

KraitSense low profile passive sonar system. SEA picture.

It these systems perform reasonably well; they would be an attractive mobilization option for giving OPVs an ASW role. Even if not equipped with ASW weapons, adding sensors that can be coordinated with other surface and air weapons carriers would be helpful.

The SE Asian Customer?

Artist impression of the future Philippine Navy OPV to be constructed by HHI. HHI image.

Who is the SE Asian country with, “With a vast coastline and high number of islands within their jurisdiction…” Think the Philippines may be most likely.

Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) is building six offshore patrol vessels (OPV) for the Philippine Navy (not their Coast Guard). At about 2400 tons, 94.4 meters (309 ft 9 in) in length, with a speed of 22 knots, they are pretty typical medium sized OPVs, except for one thing, Wikipedia reports that their armament, in addition to 76 and 30 mm guns, includes two sets of triple lightweight anti-submarine torpedo tubes. There is no indication of an ASW sensors. It is reported to have spaces for Multi-Mission Containerized Modules. The flight deck and hangar are sufficient for support of an ASW helicopter and/or UAS.

Chinese Navy Submarine and Major Surface Ship Order of Battle

Image: Creative Commons.

Below are some info-graphics provided by Sarah Kirchberger on the CIMSEC Internal Discussions Facebook page. I wanted to share them with you. (Not included in the listings are Chinese aircraft carriers, amphibs, and numerous frigates, corvettes, and other small combatants.) I have also provided her notes included with the three Facebook posts, but first some observations.

Geographic Boundaries of the First and Second Island Chains. Image:China Report 2006.pdf. DOD.

What does this have to do with the Coast Guard?

My expectation is that, if there is a major prolonged conflict with the Chinese, that the primary theater of operations will be inside and around the “First Island Chain” with Taiwan the critical center (Think Malta in the Mediterranean during WWII). The Chinese surface fleet is not likely to make significant operations outside this area. Chinese conventional submarines will also concentrate in this area but will also operate in the Straits that access the South and East China Seas.

The Chinese will make air and missile attack out to at least the “Second Island Chain,” including Guam.

The Chinese will want to attack US logistics and underway replenishment ships outside the Second Island Chain, both for the direct effect of reducing logistics available and for the secondary effect of drawing off units from the primary theater of action.

In the initial phase, the Chinese merchant and fishing fleets might be used to lay mines or even directly attack unarmed logistics and underway replenishment ships using containerized weapon systems supported by satellite targeting. (They might also launch cruise missiles into US ports as an opening salvo.) The Coast Guard Maritime Domain Awareness systems and cargo tracking programs will have a role in neutralizing the Chinese Merchant and distant fishing fleets.

The Chinese will operate at least some of their nuclear submarines (SSNs) (which would have difficulty dealing with USN SSNs) outside the Second Island Chain, perhaps as far East as the US West Coast. While MSC has been told not to expect escorts, the benefits of cutters with embarked Navy (probably Navy Reserve) ASW helicopters (and ultimately towed array systems) within effective helicopter range of a dispersed group of logistics ships to provide at least minimal ASW protection and rescue for the crews of the ships that are inevitably sunk, will quickly become evident. The cutters would hopefully be aided by Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft and any combatants making the transit trans-Pacific.

(None of the above reflects anything official, it is just the logic of the geography and the capability of the participants.)

Incidentally the format use below would be a good way for the Coast Guard to present its plans for major cutters.

Now to the Kirchberger posts:


After a long pause in making these info graphics, here is an overview of the *approximate* type and age structure of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines. I am decidedly less confident than with the surface fleet graphs about the accuracy of the information, which is why it took so long. Basically, I have decided to just visualize the data given in Manfred Meyer’s book ‘Modern Chinese Maritime Forces’ (March 2023 update) with some minor adjustments based on cross-checking with own research in Chinese newspaper reports. Despite the caveat, the graph might be useful to some, therefore posting it. I will periodically update as more information becomes available.

Blue arrow means boat is (most likely) in service as of April 2023, white means not yet or not any more in service, but may already be launched. Striped means: status unknown.

Feel free to use and republish (unaltered) with attribution. In case you find mistakes, I’d appreciate a note so I can make corrections during the next round!

Here is now also a visual overview of the PLA Navy’s conventionally powered submarine fleet. Blue arrow means boat is most likely in service as of April 2023, white arrow means not yet, or not any more, but may already be launched. The teal color indicates boats equipped with a (Stirling) AIP. Does not include test submarines (such as the Type 032), the unknown type sailless submarine, nor midget submarines.

Feel free to use and republish (unaltered) with attribution. In case you find mistakes, I’d appreciate a note so I can make corrections during the next round!

The speed of naval shipbuilding in China is such that it is easy to overlook that China has earlier this year commissioned the eighth and last of Flight 1 of its new cruiser, the Type 055 (never mind that the PLAN refers to it as a destroyer – at >12,000t full load, 180m length, and given its armament, it looks like a cruiser more than a destroyer).

Since the lead ship entered service in early 2020, China has commissioned altogether 8 of these Type 055 cruisers within a timespan of just 3 years! Further, 8 more are apparently already in the works, for a class of at least 16.
Here is an updated graphic overview of the type and age structure of China’s large surface combatants. Arrows indicate maximum time in service from commissioning until decommissioning – program start and build start is therefore not shown. 40 years per hull may be a bit long (30 years is common practice in most advanced navies), but in practice some navies have operated their surface combatants that long, so I choose to give the maximum conceivable length.
It is interesting to see how the arms embargo since 1989 initially disrupted naval shipbuilding, leading to multiple classes of just one or two hulls being built next to a Russian import, and how mass production finally took off from the Type 052D onward.
The Chinese official newspaper Global Times commented on the completion of the Type 055 class here: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202304/1289571.shtml
Feel free to use and reproduce this graph for non-commercial purposes (with attribution) and please let me know in case of mistakes so I can make corrections during the next iteration!

Royal Navy OPV Does Mine Countermeasures With USN Team

HMS TAMAR

The Royal Navy reports that HMS Tamar participated in an exercise off S. Korea, providing a platform for a US Navy diving/explosive ordnance disposal team equipped with Remus 100 uncrewed underwater vehicles to do mine countermeasures.

Virtually any large Coast Guard cutter could do the same thing, maybe even the Webber class FRCs. HMS Tamar would be an MEC if operated by the Coast Guard.

The Remus 100 would also be useful in reopening ports after a natural disaster, looking for changes in the underwater topography or obstructions.

This goes along with the way I think the Coast Guard should plan to do the Defense readiness mission, that is, that the Coast Guard would provide the platform and USN teams would come aboard, bringing the naval capability, whether it be mine hunting equipment, an ASW towed array and helicopter, or special ops team.

What is an Ideal Coast Guard Military Readiness Mission? We Provide the Truck and Driver, Navy Provides the Load

A US Marine Corps Logistics Vehicle System Replacement truck carrying a standard shipping container with a Navy logistics vessel in the background. The Navy is now working on a project to develop a containerized electronic warfare and electronic intelligence system that will work on various naval, air, and ground platforms. USMC / Lance Cpl. Shawn Valosin

The US Coast Guard has had a long history of participation in almost every armed conflict the US Navy has engaged in. But there has always been a tension between peacetime economy and effectiveness and readiness for war.

Some military systems are essential for our peacetime missions, like minimal deck guns or muti-mode radars, we would probably have them, even if we had no wartime missions.

Some military equipment we would be unlikely to have, if we had no military missions, can enhance performance of peacetime missions, like data links and electronic warfare systems. These systems are welcome.

Then there are systems that would enhance our wartime effectiveness that have little or no utility in peacetime. If they require significant training and maintenance time, they can adversely effective peacetime economy and effectiveness. There is an argument to be made that these still offer good return on investment compared with making a similar investment in DOD assets, but diverting DHS assets to support DOD missions can be a hard sell.

Ideally, we would want Coast Guard assets to do their peacetime missions without having to think about wartime missions until mobilization, but when needed, DOD would quickly and easily add capabilities and trained operating personnel.

That is not always possible, but in some cases we might be able to come close to that.

The Danes showed how to make modular naval weapon and sensor systems with their SanFlex system. Now we regularly see announcement of some new modular system. Here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and  here.

TRAPS containerized active/passive towed array from GeoSpectrum Technologies.

Towed sonars can be containerized, here, here, and here.

I even proposed a containerized weapon system.

What I think we need, after determining the most appropriate mission set for Coast Guard units is a determination of what:

  • must be permanently installed and operated by Coast Guard personnel at all times,
  • what can be quickly installed and operated in the event of a crisis, and
  • what can be added in the form of modular equipment maintained by the Navy and to be operated by Navy Reserve personnel upon mobilization.

A primary example of the latter would be an ASW helicopter. Unmanned systems also look like likely candidates for systems that could be quickly added to Coast Guard vessels.

Unmanned mine hunting and destruction equipment might be based on Coast Guard buoy tenders to allow them to look for mines in US waters, including those around Alaska, Hawaii, Guam and Saipan. In fact the Navy is making some extra LCS Mine CounterMeasures (MCM) for ships of opportunity.

If the Navy wanted Coast Guard cutters to augment Navy ASW forces, a likely mission if we have a war with China, they could become useful units by the addition of a modular version of the Navy’s towed array sonar systems and assignment of experienced ASW personnel and an MH-60R aviation detachment. We would need to have identified where we would store torpedoes, sonobuoys, and other support equipment, but those spaces could have other uses in peacetime.

A Modest Proposal for a Containerized Weapon System

Leonardo DRS has been chosen to provide the mission equipment package (rendering pictured) atop a Stryker combat vehicle to serve as the Interim Maneuver-Short-Range Air Defense system for the U.S. Army. (Courtesy of Leonardo DRS)

     After the recent report of Russia containerizing anti-air missile systems I got to thinking about containerized systems the Coast Guard might use. There are many systems that might be containerized–sonars, torpedo countermeasures, cruise missiles, drones, 120mm mortars, medical facilities, but there is one combination I found particularly appealing.
     We could tie into the Army’s attempt to develop a new short range air defense system (SHORAD) by mounting a marinized version of the SHORAD turret on a container.  The systems are meant to fire on the move, so they should be able to deal with ship’s movement. The container might be armored to some extent to protect it from splinters and small arms. The container could be equipped to provide power (external connection, generator, and battery), air conditioning, air filtration, etc as the supporting vehicle would have in the Army system.  It looks like the planned interim SHORAD system will include Stinger, Hellfire, an M230 30mm gun and a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun. If we could mount some additional vertical launch Hellfire in the container, so much the better.
     For the Coast Guard these might be used on icebreakers and buoy tenders when they go into contested areas. They might be mounted on the stern of FRCs in lieu of the over the horizon boat using an adapter over the stern ramp, when additional firepower is required. 
     The Army and Marines might also use these containerized systems as prefab base defense systems. As fixed ground defenses, the containers might be buried leaving only the turret above ground level.
     They could also be used on Military Sealift Command and Merchant ships to provide a degree of self defense.

“Russian navy to receive container air defence system” –Navy Recognition

The Pantsir- M presented at Army 2017

NavyRecognition is reporting that the Russians are planning to package air defense systems in standard containers.

Specifically they refer to possible use on the project 20386 corvettes and project 22160 patrol ships. One of the two systems discussed is a missile and gun “Close In Weapon System” (CIWS) but the other system is a much longer ranged system.

This is a significant departure from the container packaged cruise missile systems we have heard about before.

The Pantsir-M CIWS (photo above) would also be effective against surface targets, at close range. In addition to the two 30mm gatling guns, the missiles may also have an anti-surface capability.

In time of war, we might see these, or something similar, on naval auxiliaries or even merchant ships as well as the naval vessels mentioned above. Encountering them on a terrorist controlled vessel is far less likely, but not impossible.

The other way to look at this is, could we do something similar, to make it easy for our icebreakers or perhaps other ships, to go from armed, to unarmed, and back again relatively easily?