According to the BBC the British Government has blocked American backed UN sanctions against two kingpins of the Somali piracy organizations. The article goes on to describe how the EU forces on scene released pirates caught in the act, because it was simply to hard to prosecute.
I don’t know about you, but I’m finding this attitude troubling.
It has been quite a while since the Coast Guard tried using hovercraft. It may be time to have another look. Here is an interesting video (sales pitch) about how other services are using hovercraft. Many of the users in the video are in areas where ice and snow covered surfaces are common. With the Arctic opening up, there might be a place for these craft there.
The Indian Coast Guard has had some experience with these craft and have decided to triple their fleet to 18 craft.
Not that we would want them everywhere, but perhaps for some environments, they would be just what we need.
As noted earlier, there doesn’t seem to be universal agreement on what the “Law of the Sea” (UNCLOS) means. The Washington Post is reporting that Senior Col. Geng Yansheng, a Ministry of Defense spokesman, has claimed that China has “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea but would continue to allow others to freely navigate the 1.3 million-square-mile waterway.
On July 23 Secretary Clinton crossed the Chinese by suggesting an multilateral approach to resolution of competing claims. Competing claims involve Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines. Claims to the Spratley Islands group seem to be particularly contentious. There is an outline of competing claims here. China has used force in the past, seizing the Paracel Islands from Vietnam in 1976. Dai Bingguo, China’s state councilor in charge of foreign policy, had told Secretary Clinton in May during a tense exchange on the region that China viewed its claims to the sea as a “core national interest.” In addition they seem to have thrown down the gauntlet to the US over exercises in the Yellow Sea.
To complicate matters, the Chinese have a new weapon system, and anti-ship ballistic missile, to enforce their claims, that makes the Navy’s traditional response to Chinese aggressiveness appear much more dangerous.
Navy Times’ “Scoop Deck” asks what the Navy will do “After the frigates are gone” and suggest that variants of the National Security Cutter (NSC) might be a better solution than the Littoral Combat Ship (LSC).
Back in March, Defense News also suggested that the NSC might be the Navy’s best option.
This has been an on going discussion for a long time, fueled no doubt by Northop Grumman’s desire to sell more ships. But the suggestion has been taken seriously. In July 2009, the Congressional Budget Office Study did a study that included an upgraded 20 NSCs as an option to 25 of the LCS.
That study suggested that these 20 NSCs be upgraded as follows:
“For approximately $260 million, the Navy could replace the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) currently used on the national security cutter with the SeaRAM Mk-15 CIWS. Unlike the former system, which consists of a rapid-firing gun designed to engage subsonic antiship missiles at close ranges, the SeaRAM CIWS would incorporate a rolling airframe missile on the same physical space but provide the ship with the ability to engage supersonic antiship cruise missiles out to 5 nautical miles. The SeaRAM system includes its own sensor suite—a Ku band radar and forward-looking infrared imaging system— to detect, track, and destroy incoming missiles.
“An additional layer of antiship missile defense could be provided by installing the Mk-56 vertical launch system with Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSMs) along with an Mk-9 Tracker/Illuminator system to detect, track, and engage antiship missiles. The ESSM can engage supersonic antiship missiles at a range of nearly 30 nautical miles. Installing 20 sets of a 12-cell launching system (which would carry 24ESSMs), buying the missiles, and integrating the weapons with the ships would cost about $1.1billion.”
So these upgrades would cost $1.360B/20 ships or $68M/ship
With many more critics than supporters, there is a lot speculation that the Navy will not build anywhere near the 55 LCSs currently planned. The black-eye lean manning is getting in the Navy lately, and the fact that the LCSs are designed for lean manning with no apparent option for growing the crew, is adding to criticism of its limited weapons and poor endurance. The Coast Guard is looking smart for providing the NSCs and OPCs with both realistic crews and room for growth.
If the government wanted to open an option for the future, it might be smart to increase the CG buy of NSCs to 12, to make up some of the shortage of ship days that is certainly in our future and direct that the last 6 be made as a “B” class with a weapons fit including the systems sited above, a towed array sonar, and all necessary space and equipment for support of two MH-60Fs, with the marginal cost paid out of the Navy budget. The nation would have an additional capability and the Navy would have have a ready option in a mature design, that could take on the functions of the FFGs.
CNN is reporting that the attack on the Very Large Crude Carrier M. Star, discussed earlier, is now being claimed by a group with links to al Qaeda. Reportedly web sites have a picture of the man who reportedly carried out the attack.
Quoting from the CNN report:
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The group said the attack was intended to “strike an economic blow to the infidels.”
CNN was not immediately able to authenticate the claim.
The group, said to be inspired by al Qaeda, is believed to be behind several attacks in the Middle East, including the October 2004 attack on a hotel and nearby camp sites in Egypt that killed more than three dozen people.
The statement from the Abdullah Azzam Brigades said the attack on the tanker was the “conquest of Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman” — a reference to the imprisoned blind cleric who inspired the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York.
“In a blessed episode of our Jihad in the name of God and in order to weaken the global infidel network, a battalion from our Jihadi brethrens managed to carry out an operation in order to strike an economic blow to the infidels,” the statement said.
“After midnight on last Wednesday, the hero, the martyrdom seeker Ayoub Tayshan, blew himself up in the Japanese tanker M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz between the United Arab Emirates and Oman causing damages, that were reported all over the international media outlets. This heroic operation will have a major effect on the global economy and the oil prices.”
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I’m tempted to yawn, but if they keep practicing, they may get better at this. Still it’s hard to keep experienced crews.
The August edition of US Naval Institute Proceedings has a short article by retired Captain Lawson Brigham under in the “Nobody Asked Me But…” section that list of ten suggested steps “to ensure that our many polar maritime interests are given proper attention.”
He touches on the need for Arctic Patrol ships but this is not really about hardware justification. These proposals impact virtually every mission area. I think it’s worth a read.
The Japanese owned oil tanker M Star was damaged by what was reported as an explosion in the Straits of Hormuz. The cause of the damage is unknown. There has been speculation that included a rouge wave caused by a small earth quake, a mine left over from the war between Iran and Iraq in the 80s, a terrorist attack, a collision with a submarine, or even a meteor strike. More here.
The things that appear to be clues to me are:
–We can’t see below the waterline, but the depression in the hull seems to start at the waterline and go up. This indicates to me it was not a mine or the deepest impression would be at the waterline or below. For the same reason, I don’t think it could have been collision with a submarine.
–There also seems to be a contact scrape and additional depression on the aft side of the main depression. This might be from a fragment of shrapnel blown onto the side of the ship by an explosion, or it might have been an collision.
If there was an explosion, it appears that it was above water and relatively close to the ship because of the limited radius of the impression on the hull. If it had been a terrorist attack, I would have thought that we would have had a claim by now.
Other thoughts?
Looks like the Coast guard may be involved in a situation where a ship loaded with people claiming to be refugees of an oppressive regime sail about from port to port and they are repeatedly refused entry.
This recalls an incident in 1939 that damaged the Coast Guard’s image in the eyes of many, the voyage of the motor vessel St Louis carrying 937 mostly Jewish refugees seeking asylum from the Nazis. The story was made into a movie, “Voyage of the Damned,” in 1976.
The Coast Guard historian’s take on the incident, which seems to show our bad press was not justified is here.
Some random thoughts on “Maritime Domain Awareness,” prompted by a Congressional mandate, Canada’s recent action regarding the North West Passage, and China’s “enforcement” of their EEZ.
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“Maritime Domain Awareness.” It is a nice catch phrase, but where are we going with this? What is the objective? What level of detail is enough?
We want ships bound for US ports to report their intentions, what if they don’t? What’s the punishment? What about those that pass just outside our territorial sea, and might suddenly veer into a US port, but aren’t required to check in? Are we being effective, or is this yet another attempt to be seen to be doing something, that is actually nothing more than an inconvenience to the law abiding mariners while making us no safer?
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Having read Ryan’s article about the Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, this amendment caught my eye:
H.AMDT.472 to H.R.3619 Section 1332 -“Directs the Secretary to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat the illicit flow of narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband through the use of submersible and semi-submersible vessels.”
My first reaction–I foolishly assumed that what was being mandated was a system that would have a high probability of detecting any submersible or semi-submersible approaching the US.
–I would love to see us have this capability.
–All our other “Maritime Domain Awareness” problems are likely to be solved by any system that could do this.
–Let’s see, we would need a field of acoustic sensors wrapped around the US coast line, and then we would need some visual way to identify the contacts picked up–we could probably use UAVs for that…
But then–Do they have any idea how incredibly hard this is? This may be harder than tracking Ballistic Missile submarines. The Navy with all their resources can’t do this. We can’t even monitor our land border. It could easily require the entire CG budget.
Maybe the Secretary’s plan ought to be to “let the Navy do it.”
My next thought–Even having read it, I don’t really know what it means. Looking at it again, are we talking about these craft coming into US waters? Or are we expected to stop this illegal traffic wherever it exists, if the fruits of the trade might end up in the US? It’s not specific. As I understand it, most of these semisubmersibles go to Mexico, not directly to the US.
And finally, what is the point, if we are not also monitoring every sail and motor boat who might also bring in “narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband?”
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Then the Canadian government put the world on notice that ships entering that country’s Arctic waters will be subject to new mandatory vessel-tracking rules aimed at preventing terrorist activity and pollution while improving search-and-rescue capabilities in the Far North. The Canadian plan requires mandatory registration for ships of 300 tonnes or more, for tugs with a two-ship weight of 500 tonnes or more and for any vessel carrying dangerous goods or potential pollutants. Read more here and here. For an overview of the Canadian position, link here.
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Then there are the Chinese, whose interpretation of the Law of the Sea, seems very different from our own. They seem to view the EEZ as little different from their territorial sea–a bit of history. Very recently they objected to our exercising with South Korea in the Yellow Sea even though presumably the exercises would not have even entered their EEZ. The Chinese have also been harassing the Japanese Coast Guard in their own EEZ (more here and here). The US Naval Institute blog is discussing the latest flap between the US and China in an article entitled “Poking China in the Chest.” The Chinese have been making a lot of friends lately and they are a member of the security council, so don’t be surprised to see something like their view of the rights of coastal states being raised in the UN.
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I think we are going to see more changes to the EEZ. I can see points like this being made:
–How can you argue with the desire to limit pollution and quickly respond to maritime disasters as the Canadians state they want to do?
–How can a state monitor the economic exploitation of their EEZ if they don’t know who is there? Is a requirement to report entry into the EEZ any different from requiring name, flag, and homeport be displayed? How could anyone engaged in legitimate activity object?
–Isn’t preventing terrorism an element of managing economic resources within the EEZ? Can’t we say the same about preventing a Naval attack?
While the Navy will probably want none of this, as the Coast Guard, there might be elements worth considering here.
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It would be nice to have a system that showed us everything within the EEZ, but it is unlikely we will see that anytime soon.
In addition to getting projected ETA at our ports, if we were prepared to accept, catalog, store, and redistribute the information to those who could use the information, it might be helpful to ask all vessels entering our EEZ to identify themselves, to help us classify the contacts we do detect, but under the present regime I don’t think we have any recourse, if those who claim to be in innocent passage refuse.
Short of a robust detection capability to find those not reporting, additional reporting may be only a paper exercise of little utility. If the detection capability were truly robust, we would not need reporting.
The weapons of mass destruction we worry about, as well as “narcotics, weapons, bulk cash, and other contraband,” are not limited to large ships or semisubmersibles. They can come in on boats that appear no different from the thousands of recreational boats that enter and leave our harbors every day.
Doesn’t look like the Coast Guard is providing a featured speaker for this event. Trust we will have some high level representation, but it would not hurt to have some worker bees too.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 