CG Admiral to Head DOI Bureau

gCaptain is reporting Rear Admiral James Watson who has been serving as Director of Prevention Policy for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, will assume leadership of the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement. Adm Watson served as Federal On-Scene Coordinator for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response.

The DOI news release is here:

“BSEE was one of the two agencies to succeed the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) on Oct. 1, 2011. Admiral Watson will begin as BSEE Director on December 1, 2011, and will succeed Michael R. Bromwich.”

“BSEE is responsible for enforcing safety and environmental regulations for oil and gas operations on the Outer Continental Shelf. BSEE’s functions include: permitting and research, inspections, offshore regulatory programs, oil spill response, and newly formed training and environmental compliance functions.

 

C-Span Briefings

C-Span recently had an interview with Rear Admiral Karl Schultz, Governmental and Public Affairs Director (Nov. 10, 2011, 41 minutes) . There were no surprises in the interview, but he did an excellent job of providing an overview of the Coast Guard’s organization and missions, including recognizing the contribution of reserves and auxiliary. He did a great job speaking off the cuff in response to telephone questions and comments, very impressive, but if you have followed Coast Guard news closely you may not hear much new.

Actually. following a link on the page, I found an earlier interview with RAdm Paul Zukunft, Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety and Security (March 22, 2011, almost 44 minute) more interesting because it was more detailed.

What I did not hear in either of these interviews was a clear statement that there is an urgent need to replace our ships.

 

 

Got Icebreakers? Show Me the Money!

Apparently there has been some discussion of icebreakers in Congress. The arguments seem to be over the best way to help out, but don’t seem to be doing anything useful. Perhaps the best summary is here. There have been several reports, so to provide a bit more detail.

CNN reports,

“House Republicans, who say they want to force the administration’s hand, are pushing a Coast Guard authorization bill that would decommission the icebreaker Polar Star, which is now being repaired, in just three years, saying that keeping the 35-year-old ship afloat is ‘throwing good money after bad.’

“The Congressional Research Service said one potential concern for Congress is the absence of a plan for replacing the Polar Star upon completion of its seven- to 10-year life after it returns to service in late 2012.

“That is why Rep. Frank LoBiondo, R-New Jersey, included the provision to decommission the Polar Star, said spokesman Jason Galanes. “We absolutely support the Arctic icebreaker mission,” Galanes said. “We’re forcing this decision rather then allowing the administration to kick the can down the road.”

“Regardless of the outcome of the dispute, a gap in icebreaking capabilities is almost certain, according to the CRS report. Following any decision to design and build new icebreakers, the first replacement polar icebreaker might enter service in eight to 10 years, the report says.”

 If Rep. LoBiondo knows that it will take seven to ten years to complete a new Icebreaker, why does he want to decommission Polar Star after only three years?
In the Senate, Maria Cantwell, D-Wash, is attempting to prevent the planned decommissioning of the Polar Sea (WAGB-11) which the Coast Guard had planned to raid for spares to keep her sister ship, Polar Star (WAGB-10), in commission. She also notes that to meet Coast Guard and Navy mission requirements, the Coast Guard needs a minimum of six heavy-duty icebreakers and four medium-duty icebreakers (first time I’ve seen this stated).

DODbuz lays out the administration’s position, but finds the whole discussion disconnected from reality,

“The Administration strongly opposes House passage of H.R. 2838 because it includes a provision that would require the Coast Guard to decommission the icebreaker USCGC POLAR STAR.  The Administration has requested, and Congress has appropriated, funds to reactivate the USCGC POLAR STAR by December 2012 and extend that vessel’s service life for seven to 10 years.  This effort will stabilize the United States’ existing polar fleet until long-term icebreaking capability requirements are finalized.  By directing the Commandant to decommission the USCGC POLAR STAR within three years, the bill would effectively reduce the vessel’s service life to two years and create a significant gap in the Nation’s icebreaking capacity.”

By way of comparison, we have already done a lot of planning for the Offshore Patrol Cutter including getting industry comment on the draft specifications. Money for the design is in the FY2012 budget, but we are still not expecting to see the first one until at least 2019, and I suspect it will be later than that. So designing, contracting for, and building an new design icebreaker for the Coast Guard in less than eight years is probably impossible assuming normal procedures.

Even if we started the procurement process for WAGB-21 in FY2013, the refurbished Polar Star will probably need to last a full ten years before it can be replaced by a second new construction icebreaker (WAGB-22) that would finally give the Coast Guard the three large icebreakers they say we need, and that includes the less capable Healy (WAGB-20). (Incidentally, where are WAGB-12 through 19?)
There are other ways we might get a capability quicker if the Coast Guard and Congress are really interested. When the National Science Foundation needed an icebreaker they chartered one. Presumably the Coast Guard could do the same.  It provides the capability without the big up front cost and 30+ year commitment to a particular design. Actually there has been some support for this,

“The lone Alaska congressmen, Republican Don Young, opposes decommissioning icebreakers and wants to increase the number of vessels in any way possible, spokesman Luke Miller said. Young has introduced a bill that would authorize the Coast Guard to enter into long-term lease agreements for two new icebreakers.”

The Brits, in need of quick fix when their Arctic patrol ship was damaged by fire, did something even more radical, they took a three year lease on an existing Norwegian vessel that has been used to support the oil industry and added boats and weapons.

Thinking in more conventional terms, there are plenty of existing designs that can be modified and relatively quickly converted to provide icebreaking or ice-strengthened patrol vessels that could be built in the US. We have talked about Arctic Patrol Cutters before, but here is another ship only a little smaller than Glacier (WAGB-4), being built by Finland and Russia that looks adaptable.

NB506507-Supply-vessel

Reportedly they are 99.2 m (325′) in length and 21.7 m (71′) in breadth. Their four engines have the total power of 18,000 kW and the propulsion power of 13,000 kW (17,426 HP). They reportedly are designed to operate independently in ice 1.7 m (5.6′) thick. With parts built in both Finland and Russia the price is about $100M each.

“As multipurpose vessels, these vessels are capable of carrying various type of cargo and they are equipped for oil spill response, fire fighting, and rescue operations. The rescue capacity is for 195 persons.”

Looks like it would not be too hard to add a hanger and flight deck.

No Stern Ramp for Boats on the OPC–Mistake?

The National Security Cutter (NSC) incorporates a stern launch for two of it’s boats. It is one of its most celebrated features. But the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) specifications, surprisingly, explicitly excluded any consideration of this feature. Is this a mistake?

I’ve had reservations about using stern launch on large ships, because I could imagine that as the ship pitches, the boat and the stern of the ship could move up or down at very different rates, even in different directions, perhaps dangerously so. Still training and good technique can mitigate dangers, so I hope to hear form someone with first hand experience with the system, particularly coxswains who have done both stern ramp and conventional recoveries.

Are there circumstances that preclude using the stern ramp recovery? What is the best heading relative to the sea? Comments, please.

Drilling in the Arctic–Ready or Not

gCaptain points out that the administration is planning to expand offshore drilling and in this particular case the expansion will include drilling off the North Slope.

“U.S. officials acknowledged they lack a full understanding of the Arctic’s environment and ecosystem. For that reason, the U.S. decided to delay lease auctions in the Arctic until 2015 and 2016 “to use the intervening years to better address the science gaps,” Interior Deputy Secretary David Hayes said.”

This puts a rush on the Coast Guard to develop infrastructure in this area. Considering the pace of Congressional action and the hesitance to add to appropriations, it will be very difficult for the Coast Guard to be fully ready when the initial capability is required.

Piracy Update, 6 November, 2011

The most dramatic news is that Kenya is attempting to seize Kismayo, a port in Southeastern Somalia, frequently used by pirates. They are after the rebel faction El Shabaab, but they have blockaded the port, and hopefully they will also shut down some of the criminal enterprise.

Over the last two weeks, two tankers have been hijacked, one of the Atlantic coast of Africa in the Gulf of Guinea and one in the Gulf of Aden. Petroleum tanker (HALIFAX), with a crew of 25, was hijacked 29 October approximately 62 nm southwest of Bonny, Nigeria. Vessel had been waiting for berthing instructions. Reportedly it has already been released. Tanker (LIQUID VELVET) with a crew of 22 was hijacked by six pirates on 31 October approximately 55 nm southeast of Aden, Yemen. The crew locked themselves in the citadel, but the pirates were able to breach it.

A small fishing vessel with a crew of two and two tourist on board been reported seized near the Seychelles.

Apparently for the first time in the history of the modern Somali piracy, fishermen have retaken their vessel, after it had been seized 260 nm SW of the Seychelles. Fate of the six pirates is unknown after they “fell into the sea.” Thirteen of the 28 crewmen of the Taiwanese F/V Chin Yi Wen were injured, three seriously.

At least four attacks off the coast of Somalia were thwarted by armed security teams.

The US State Department has directed their personnel to encourage the hiring of private armed security guards for ships transiting areas of known pirate activity.

In an area that used to be a piracy hot spot, a barge underway in Indonesian waters was hijacked 26 Oct., but it was recovered before pirates could tow it away, and a tanker (NAUTICA JOHOR BAHRU) was hijacked 27 Oct. while underway in the Singapore Straits, but pirates fled when Malaysian Navy and Indonesian vessels intercepted.

gCaptain has an analysis of the relationships between risk and the cost of insurance, noting that while risks appear to be declining, the cost of insurance is still going up.

gCaptain also provides a look at what has happened to some of the most unfortunate of the ships’ crewmembers, who have apparently been abandoned by the ship owners, and their flag state.

Not truly piracy since it is happening on internal waters, but attacks on two Chinese ships that resulted in the brutal murder of 13 sailors, as the latest and most outrageous example of lawlessness on the Mekong River, are getting a lot of attention in that part of the world and appear to be prompting cooperation between the four countries involved–China, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Laos.

 

Offshore Patrol Cutters–Are They Affordable?

Earlier the GAO advised that the “Deepwater” program was unachievable, now we have this from the Coast Guard leadership. Nationaldefensemagazine.org reports:

“The Coast Guard does not have a firm date for when it will release a request for proposals for the final piece of its ship modernization program, the Offshore Patrol Cutter. But it does know that building an affordable ship is of great importance….”

“‘We are dedicated to meeting those minimum requirements. We think we can get within an affordable range using commercial practices’ rather than methods used to build combatant ships, Korn (RAdm. John Korn, Chief of Acquisitions) said. Among the initial industry proposals submitted were ideas to reduce costs, he added.”

(I hope that statement does not mean we are totally abandoning the intention to generally comply with American Bureau of Shipping, Naval Vessel Rules–the ABS NVR.)

There are two things this report seem to suggest.

  • There will be further delays in the delivery of these ships, and
  • The Offshore Patrol Cutters are likely to be less capable and robust than previously envisioned.

Conceptual Rendering of the OPCDisclaimer: The conceptual renderings posted on this website are for artistic display purposes only and do not convey any particular design, Coast Guard design preferences, or other requirements for the OPC.

The procurement is already well behind previously published milestones, which would have seen the first ship funded in 2015 and delivered in 2019. These milestones included releasing a draft “Request for Proposal” in April-June 2011 and a “Pre-Solicitation Conference” thirty days later. In reality this does not necessarily mean substantial delays. The timeline for planning is still relatively generous.

Some limits on the design are already planned to keep the price of these ships down. Quoting further:

“The Coast Guard has already made some decisions as far as what the ship will not feature. Gas turbine engines and a system to launch small boats from the stern are two ideas that have already been scrapped, he said. Other Coast Guard ships may have these capabilities, but they would be too costly for the OPC, Korn said.”

I’m not sure if there is a need to further reduce the cost of the OPC or if they are just selling the idea that it already incorporates reduced cost, but it does sound like they need to go further. Earlier I commented on the draft specification. The two engineroom requirement with a 50/50 split in power available seemed particularly arbitrary and unnecessary, although some form of redundancy would seem wise. A diesel electric or hybrid system would appear to offer the possibility of long range, better fuel economy (particularly at low speed), low noise, reduced manning and training requirement, and lower maintenance costs, as well as improved survivability.

An Integrated propulsion and ship service electrical system similar to the one on the Lewis and Clark class T-AKEs (and most cruise ships) could permit a design with only four diesel engines (one forward, one aft, and two in the main machinery space). With azipods providing propulsion, including a drop-down unit in the bow, and the ability to use generators forward and aft, as well as those in the main engineering space for propulsion, the ship would have three compartment redundancy for both propulsion and ship service power while minimizing manning and watch standing requirements. Looking to the future, integrated power makes large amounts of power available throughout the life of the ship. This power can be reallocated to sensors or to accommodate future combat systems.

The Coast Guard has had a long history of using diesel-electric propulsion including the 180 WLBs and has already used azipods in the Mackinaw.

In seeking to make these ships affordable, there are some things that should not be compromised.

  • Boats–We need at least two and they should include at least one 11 meter. This not only makes the ship a more capable law enforcement vessel. 11 meters seems to be the emerging size for unmanned and optionally manned surface vessels that are likely to fill a variety of roles in the future including surveillance, force protection and security, mine countermeasures and ASW.
  • Aviation–We need the ability to support an MH-65 and two UAVs, and the same facilities should also be able to hanger a Navy MH-60s for contingencies. Space that can serve other purposes in peacetime should be identified to support embarked Navy helo including magazine space.
  • Speed–To be credible both for law enforcement and as a potential warship, we need a speed advantage over the average merchant ship and we need to be able to maneuver with underway replenishment ships and amphibious warfare ships. To me this means a minimum of 24 knots.
  • I don’t think this is in the current plan, but these ships should have provision for accepting mission modules, like those being developed for the LCS. In addition to Navy systems, this will give the Coast Guard the flexibility to develop their own modules–e.g., class rooms, holding cells, research facilities, command posts, disaster recovery, or hospital rooms.
  • The ship needs volume to meet the heavy weather operational requirements, but it also means there will be room to accommodate changing mission requirements. In the long run, this will save us money. Reading between the lines, it appears that the seakeeping, which also drives the size, is one thing the Coast Guard will not compromise on.

The program is at a crossroad, and to some extent, so is the service. Is the Coast Guard a military force or not? If we don’t consider armed conflict in our planning, we might as well be civilians. We can dumb down these ships to little more than 270s, maybe less in some respects, or we can make a pitch a better, more capable ship that can contribute to the national defense, at the same time they better fulfill genuine needs in peacetime.

At a time when the Navy is likely to be cut, while naval challenges are growing; spending a tiny fraction of what additional Navy ships would cost, to make sure these are credible low end combatants,  makes an awful lot of sense, particularly when, mostly, all we are only really talking about is providing a little extra space, that also enhances their peacetime utility. The nexus of a desire to strengthen naval forces while cutting costs is a perfect rationale for funding units that can do double duty.

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