Public Perception of the Coast Guard

Raymond Pritchett, who writes under the pseudonym, Galrahn, over at “Information dissemination” recently wrote a post contrasting the Navy’s poor Gallup poll numbers with the high numbers recorded for the Marine Corp with respect to two metrics:

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(Note: The Coast Guard was not included in the survey in 2001.)

That the Coast Guard is not considered “most important to national defense” is certainly not surprising, but I thought we might have done better with regard to prestige and status.

Pritchett attributes the disparity between perception of the Navy’s failure to tell it’s story in a compelling way, and to take on tasks the public sees as relevant.

“The story must discuss the positive benefits of the US Navy, and by extension actions must align with words. The mismatch of budget, actions, and words by the US Navy is the single most obvious discrepancy the US Navy must overcome if they wish to be seen as more relevant by the American people.”

The Marines seem to do it better and at least part of that is the fact that NCOs rather than officers are most frequently the face of the Marines.

Marines also take on whatever job they are given and do it well, while,

“…the surface fleet refuses to take on the difficult challenges of this era (stuff like piracy and narcotics submersibles) and is instead focused on meeting some enormous threat that may or may not materialize in the decades ahead. The surface fleet is the most distributed, thus visible force in the Navy, and the refusal by leadership to use the surface fleet today in the actual protection of commerce (see piracy) or in coastline defense (see narcotics smuggling) puts the Navy visibly out of step with what they say when explaining their strategic concept – 21st Century Seapower.”

It is an interesting dicussion, and while I recommend the article, it fails to explain the CG numbers. The CG is constantly taking on and dealing with new missions and frequently the “Coast Guard spokesperson” is the enlisted on the scene doing the job.

One thing the discussion over at Information Dissemination did suggest to me, is that, we need to find a way for the Coast Guard enlisted engineers to tell the story of what the Coast Guard’s aging fleet is doing to them.

I do think a lot of the “status” figure is due to public perception of who sacrifices and places themselves in danger on our behalf.

The public knows Marines and Soldiers are getting shot at on a daily basis, so they deserve our respect. Most people still see the Coast Guard as “safe.” For the most part it is, but you could say the same for the Air Force, the Navy, and for large parts of the Army and Marines.

What could elevate perception of the Coast Guard as a profession? The humanitarian and environmental conservation aspects have to be appreciated by some. The degree of authority and autonomy given our junior people is remarkable compared to the other services. Ultimately, the Coast Guard’s small size may make it impossible to communicate as well as the other services have. We simply don’t have as many veterans returning home and telling their stories.

Coast Guard completes 25,000 “Rescue 21” case.

gCaptain is reporting the Coast guard has completed its 25,000 rescue mission using “Rescue 21.”

The article also talks about the new Sector San Francisco hosted Interagency Operations Center (IOC) on Yerba Buena Island, in San Francisco Bay.

More info here.

Interagency Operations Centers are another way the Coast Guard is making itself indispensable. The question remains, who provides this sort of facility inland?

(Thanks to Ryan for the heads up.)

European Maritime Domain Awareness

This from “Defense Industry Daily”:

“The European Defence Agency (EDA) and 15 European Union (EU) member states demonstrate a Maritime Surveillance network (MARSUR) that could support military operations and homeland security. Aimed at improving the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP), MARSUR’s open design will allow member states to feed in and exchange data at their own discretion. The primary cost to member states will be the ability to plug into an interface costing $1.3 billion.”

Piracy Update, 29 June, 2011

Somalia’s “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) has confiscated $3.6M in ransom intended to free two ships and arrested the security team transporting the money.

They are not targeting pirates, but the US is apparently operating aircraft against targets in Somalia. “For the second time in four days, and for the third time since April, the United States has conducted an airstrike in Somalia….The key point here is that all of these attacks are apparently being conducted by helicopter, all of them are being done at night, and all of them appear to be well planned surgical strikes against Al Shabab targets in southern Somalia.”

The Dutch have released a video of their forces freeing an Iranian Dhow, that had been used as a mother ship, on 2 April 2011. There are several remarkable aspects to this operation. Pirates opened fire on the two RHIBs and the frigate. Snipers on the frigate using .50 cal. rifles and crews on the two RHIBs returned fire killing two pirates and wounding others. Ten pirates attempted to escape in a skiff but were captured. Another vessel under pirate control attempted to intervene, but was driven off by warning shots from the frigate’s 5″ gun. Sixteen pirates were taken into custody and sixteen hostages freed. Earlier report here.

 

The Red Cross Box

The Naval Institute blog has the story of an interesting, little know aspect of the Falkands War (1982), that showed a remarkable level of civility, referred to as the Red Cross Box.

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An area north of the Falklands was identified where hospital ships of both Britain and Argentina would be stationed. While fierce fighting was going on in Falklands Sound and ashore at Goose Green, four British and two Argentinian ships maintained close contact and exchanged wounded and medical supplies. Its a short read, definitely worth the time.

Most of the ships involved could easily have been Coast Guard. The primary British hospital ship was a converted liner, SS Uganda, 14,430 gross registered tons, but the other three HMS Hecla, Herald, and Hydra were Hydrographic survey ships, 259′ over all, and 2,945 tons full load, a little smaller than 378s. The Argentine Hospital ships were an icebreaker, ARA Almirante Irizar, similar in size to the Polar Star/Polar Sea, and the smaller polar transport ARA Bahia Paraiso, 435′ and 9,600 tons full load.

This short history of HMS Hydra’s participation hit home. The story of hasty improvisation and the sacrifices of the crew will sound familiar to many.

Photo: ARA Almirante Irízar wearing hospital ship colors during Falklands War.

OPC Draft Specs

Monday, June 20, was the deadline for industry comments on the draft specs for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). I wasn’t privy to the draft, but did have a limited opportunity to discuss them with someone who was, so I’ll offer my own, admittedly unsolicited, comments. Our last substantial discussion of the ships’ characteristics was here. The general description doesn’t seem to have changed much since the last presentation to industry–go here, and select “Industry Day Presentation” for a pdf of the slides.

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

The selection criteria (section M of the RFP) was not included in the draft. Perhaps the Coast Guard thought it would be premature, or perhaps they were unable to reach a consensus before the draft specs were released, but this was unfortunate, in that the vendors were unable to comment on how the selection criteria will influence the design. Additionally, in the interim they will be unable to proceed in any meaningful way, in formulation of the design.

The draft specs do define a range of characteristics, a minimum threshold and a higher desired level, but without a selection criteria, it is impossible for the vendor to determine if meeting the higher criteria will help him get the contract. Is it a significant selling point or just nice to have? If value is not specified in some way, it may mean that the minimums are the only truly relevant specifications. The selection criteria drives everything and unless you can define your priorities, and how much it is worth to you, it is unlikely you will get what you really want. One way to do this might be to assign a monetary value to higher levels of performance, with perhaps a formula for identifying the value of intermediate levels of performance. How much is going from an 8,500 mile range to a 9,500 mile range worth? To go 25 knots instead of 22? If you can’t decide this before the request for proposal (RFP), it’s going to be very hard to explain why you want to give the contract to a higher bid with more capability when it’s time to make the award. Ambiguity can lead to protracted legal disputes. Continue reading

Studying in the Coast Guard, Bad news for FRC

Navy Times is reporting that the House of Representatives is miffed at the Coast Guard for failing to provide three studies they have requested. Reading between the lines, it appears that the studies have been done, but the Department of Homeland Security or the administration did not like the results and is quibbling.

There is also bad news on the Fast Response Cutter (FRC) program here with an FY 2012 cut from six to four vessels.

“The report also notes that the first fast response cutter, under construction at Bollinger Marine in Lockport, La., is suffering from structural deficiencies that will delay its delivery, originally scheduled for this spring. The committee cut two cutters from the budget request for six and directed the service to hold off on expanding the annual FRC request from four to six until the first ship is delivered and has undergone operational test and evaluation.”

Who is really to blame for delaying the studies is not something we can determine, but the effect of all this is more dithering, ships getting too decrepit to do their jobs, and an inability to conduct SAR and enforce US law in the Arctic and far Pacific EEZ.

Not having a completed study is just an excuse for inaction on the part of the Administration and Congress. I hate to allow them that excuse, but while we may not know what the final fleet size should be, it is pretty obvious, we need to build more ships and faster. We need to start building OPCs yesterday and down the road will be soon enough to decide when we have enough.

Related: Fleet Mix Where Are the Trade-offs and DIY Fleet Mix Study

 

 

327s–Why Were They So Successful?

Of all the larger Coast Guard Cutters, the 327s are generally recognized as the most successful design. It is not just their success as ASW vessels in WWII. They were retained long after their younger siblings, the 255s, were decommissioned.

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Photo: Spencer (WPG-36) on convoy duty.

The 327s were an anomaly, a radical break from the 240 and 250 foot cutters that preceded them, and the 255 foot cutters that followed.

Continue reading

The Coast Guard Shipbuilding Program, 1964

I recently had an occasion to dig out an article, “Developments and Problems in Coast Guard Cutter Design,” that appeared in the 1964 US Naval Institute Naval Review (published at that time as a separate hard bound book, copyright 1963, United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 62-21028) that discussed the then new generation of Coast Guard Cutters.

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Yes, this was a long time ago, even before I entered the service, but this was a great spasm of ship building, the 82 footers may be gone, but the 210s and 378s designed and built at that time still constitute the majority of our large cutters.

The perspective of the time make an interesting contrast to today’s ship building program. 41 of the 82s had been built, 210s were building, the first three entering service in 1964, and the 378s (referred to as 350′ WPGs) were still in the design phase, with the first, Hamilton, being laid down in 1965 and entering service in ’67.

The article was written by officers intimately involved in defining the requirements and design those ships, Cdr. Robert J. Carlson and LCdr. William F. Tighe. They described the Navy’s ships as old and the Coast Guard’s ships as “ancient.” Somethings don’t seem to change, but in fact the standards were different and, while they were facing block obsolescence,  they were in much better shape than the Coast Guard is now. Continue reading