Here is an interesting development with possible Coast Guard implications:
“The company (Northrop Grumman) has received a $517 million Army contract to build up to three of the huge military airships, called the Long Endurance Multi-Intelligence Vehicles (LEMV). Such airships would serve as surveillance stations at 20,000 feet (6,096 meters) above sea level and could stay on watch for as long as three weeks at a time.”
When I first saw the video of the Bertholf’s trial of the Phalanx Close In Weapon System (CIWS) against a small fast surface target, I was a bit disappointed to see the wide dispersion of projectiles, knowing how small a cruise missile, seen end on, would be, but it didn’t think a lot about it. This blog post (post is not longer available, Chuck) has caused me to look at the trials in a different light, and I find it a bit disturbing.
Paired with the video of the Bertholf’s trial is one of a new Navy Guided Missile Destroyer engaging unmanned fast surface drone targets. His conclusion is that apparently we still have a problem with reliably stopping small boats.
I imagine both exercises were considered successful, and undoubtedly the targets in both videos were hit several times. Being on one of these boats would have been very dangerous, but the fact remained that the boats seemed to loose none of their speed or maneuverability.
I would like to be able to say that the failure to stop the boats was due to exercise artificialities, that there was an intentional offset in bearing or range so that we avoided hitting the target, but that does not seem to be the case. Or perhaps we were using practice ammunition that could not penetrate the target which service ammunition would have?
Several years ago the Navy had a landmark exercise in which a Carrier Battle Group was set upon by a swarm of small boats that got a mission kill on the Carrier. Ever since that exercise and the attack on the Cole, they have started paying attention to this type of attack. Countering swarms of small boats was a primary mission driving the creation of the of the new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). The Iranian Revolutionary Guards expect to use swarm tactics.
I pulled the videos out separately if you would like to get a better look at them. Here is the Bertholf’s trial, which, judging by the delay from the gun firing until the fall of shot, appeared to be at ranges beginning at about 3000 yards and ending at about 1,000 yards.
Here is the video of the USS Howard (DDG 83)’s layered defense exercise of 25 September 2005 using 5″, 25 mm, and .50 cal in addition to the CIWS, which began at a bit over 7,200 yards.
Realistic testing and training, along with a realistic assessment of your probabilities of success are essential to good tactical decision making. Why weren’t we able to stop these boats?
Yes, it is a gun but it is also a day/night electro-optic sensor system that can help with SAR, law enforcement, navigation, man-overboard. When the Webber Class Cutters are delivered they will have a new gun system, but it is really much more.
The new system includes the familiar 25 mm chain gun that currently arms 378s, 210s, and 110s but it is mounted on a stabilized system with an on board electro-optic system that appears to have many uses beyond directing the gun.
The Mod2 is a product of BAE Systems Minneapolis, MN, but it is designed by Rafael, Haifa, Israel and it incorporates Rafael’s Toplite electro-optic system that includes 4-axis gimbal stabilization, forward looking infra-red radar with three fields-of-view, a low contrast, low light level color television camera and an eye-safe laser range finder.
Navigating at night, you can pick out a point that would be invisible to the naked eye and get a bearing and range. Looking for a man in the water, the IR will help you find him. See what is happening on suspected smuggler as you approach at night, or document illegal fishing activities. The electro-optic sensors can be slewed separately from the weapon, so we don’t have to point the weapon to use the sensors.
Israel calls the mount the Typhoon and uses the mount on boats as small as the Super Dvora and Shaldag class patrol boats which are slightly smaller than our own 87 ft WPBs. The Israelis also mount small missiles like the Spike-ER on the Typhoon in addition to the gun which extends the range of the system from 2,000 meters for the gun out to 8,000 for the missile. Here is a video of the system in operation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T2kLdFW8EMc ( You’ll have to copy and paste, I could not get it to link properly.)
The Israeli navy moved to stop a convoy of 6 ships attempting to break their naval blockade of Gaza. Looks like there are at least 10 dead. Someday, the Coast Guard might be doing the same sort of thing. Put yourself in the Israeli Navy’s position. Was there a better way this might have been handled?
A bit more information here.
Now this is what we really need, a death ray for our cutters.
“The LaWS is essentially a laser upgrade to the MK 15 Close In Weapon System (CIWS), a.k.a. the Phalanx gun, a radar-guided autocannon that is already installed on Navy surface combatants. According to NAVSEA, the system tested fired a laser through a beam director installed on a tracking mount, which in turn was controlled by a Mk 15 CIWS. That’s the basically same system that controls the Phalanx.”
Read the whole story at the link here. We do already have the CIWS on our WHECs and National Security Cutters and expect to have them on the Offshore Patrol Cutters.
It’s not April First is it?
A short video of one of several UAVs the Navy is looking at operating from the Stelleto. There is a short commercial before it starts.
Screen shot from the video:
Another significant document has been issued, the “National Security Strategy.” This is not just a military strategy. In many respects it seems to reflect the values of “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century.” There are sections that can be used to justify international cooperation and training, but the most immediately applicable sections are on pages 18-19
“Strengthen Security and Resilience at Home
“At home, the United States is pursuing a strategy capable of meeting the full range of threats and hazards to our communities. These threats and hazards include terrorism, natural disasters, large-scale cyber attacks, and pandemics. As we do everything within our power to prevent these dangers, we also recognize that we will not be able to deter or prevent every single threat. That is why we must also enhance our resilience—the ability to adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly recover from disruption. To keep Americans safe and secure at home, we are working to:
“Enhance Security at Home: Security at home relies on our shared efforts to prevent and deter attacks by identifying and interdicting threats, denying hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders, protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, and securing cyberspace. That is why we are pursuing initiatives to protect and reduce vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, at our borders, ports, and airports, and to enhance overall air, maritime, transportation, and space and cyber security. Building on this foundation, we recognize that the global systems that carry people, goods, and data around the globe also facilitate the movement of dangerous people, goods, and data. Within these systems of transportation and transaction, there are key nodes—for example, points of origin and transfer, or border crossings—that represent opportunities for exploitation and interdiction. Thus, we are working with partners abroad to confront threats that often begin beyond our borders. And we are developing lines of coordination at home across Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners, as well as individuals and communities.
“Effectively Manage Emergencies: We are building our capability to prepare for disasters to reduce or eliminate long-term effects to people and their property from hazards and to respond to and recover from major incidents. To improve our preparedness, we are integrating domestic all hazards planning at all levels of government and building key capabilities to respond to emergencies. We continue to collaborate with communities to ensure preparedness efforts are integrated at all levels of government with the private and nonprofit sectors. We are investing in operational capabilities and equipment, and improving the reliability and interoperability of communications systems for first responders. We are encouraging domestic regional planning and integrated preparedness programs and will encourage government at all levels to engage in long-term recovery planning. It is critical that we continually test and improve plans using exercises that are realistic in scenario and consequences.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently released its latest report: AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, by Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich and Jim Thomas.
It explores the possible progression of a major armed conflict between China and the US and its allies as a worst case scenario (short of nuclear weapons) of how to deal with the developing threat of Anti-Access and Area Denial weapons like conventionally armed Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) along with air and surface launched cruise missiles, mines, and submarines.
At almost 150 pages it is a bit of a slog, but interesting. It is a bit like WWII in the Pacific with modern weapons. The Chinese make a devastating surprise attack, then establishes a bastion in hopes of convincing the US and their allies that it is just too hard to reverse their aggression. The allies then have to begin disassembling and rolling back the bastion’s defences. This begins as each side makes a concerted attempt to blind the other’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems including space based systems.
The Coast Guard is not specifically mentioned, but if you look at the section on enforcing a distant blockade on China, page 76-78, it is a classic Maritime interdiction Operation (MIO) not unlike drug interdiction. They note, “However, many of the platforms most suited for this kind of operation, such as Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), patrol craft and small frigates, do not carry ordnance sufficiently heavy to stop larger ships determined not to halt and be boarded. Those Navy ships that do would be likely to have higher priority taskings, and thus would not generally be available to support MIO operations. However, Air Force bombers with their large payloads and long endurance could provide “on-call” maritime strike. These bombers could be assigned to support MIO operations and conduct strikes on PLA vessels or cargo ships as needed.”
This looks like make work for bombers that couldn’t survive China’s integrated air defense system to me. As we discussed in the post on the Korean sinking, There are cheaper and simpler ways of stopping recalcitrant merchant ships, but of course support of Maritime Patrol Aircraft for this type mission is almost always useful.
The Naval Operations Concept 2010 has finally been released. This document is intended to implement the Maritime Strategy, 2007. After only a quick skim, it is apparent that the Coast Guard was well represented in writing the document. If anything the number of references to the Coast Guard are surprisingly high, considering the relative size of the service. The document calls out a number of requirements for Coast Guard forces, both currently filled and anticipated.
In view of the frequent question of whether the Coast Guard is a “Naval Service,” it was gratifying to see this straight forward statement on page 7, “The Naval Service is comprised of the active and reserve components and the civilian personnel of the United States Navy, the United States Marine Corps and the United States Coast Guard.”
We have all probably read that five Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) are to be dissolved. There is good background in a recent article in The Navy League’s magazine, “Sea Power”.
For those that would like a little more background on the potential threats, here are some links to historical employment of irregular naval warfare:
There were many more attacks in Vietnam. So called “sapper” attacks were fairly common.
GPS and development of technology for underwater work and recreation have made these capabilities much easier to achieve.
I’ve heard statements to the effect that others can do the mission better, but I don’t see anyone else stepping up to do the job, at least not in US ports other than Navy bases.
I have very mixed feelings about the underwater port security mission. It is really almost an impossible job to do with a high probability of success. There are too many potential targets, not unlike trying to protect subways or buses from suicide bombers. It’s a job the needs to be done, but it is most likely to be recognized only when there is a failure.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 