From the German Navy blog “Marine Forum,” 28 August, “VIETNAM, Full-rigged sail training vessel LE QUY DON, built by Polish shipyard Marine Projects for the Vietnamese Navy, is on its transfer voyage from Poland around the Cape of Good Hope to Vietnam … mixed Polish-Vietnamese crew for final trials and crew training enroute.”
Photo: Yilan (CG 128). (Taiwan Coast Guard Administration)
I mentioned this earlier in a comment on an earlier post, but Jane’s has more detail and much better pictures. Back on June 8, Janes 360 reported that Taiwan’s Coast Guard administration has commissioned two new 3,000 ton, 119 meter (390 foot) helo capable cutters, Yilan (CG 128) and Kaohsiung (CG 129), with a speed of 24 knots and a range of up to 10,000 miles.
Taiwan, along with Mainland China, supports the concept of the Nine Dash Line, but they have a particular beef with Japan. regarding the Senkakus Islands as they are known in Japan or the Diaoyutais as they are known in China and Taiwan, about 120 nautical miles (220km) northeast of Taiwan.
The other area where these might be assigned is protection of the area around Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (at least before the Chinese began reclamation) which the Taiwanese have garrisoned.
Photo: Kaohsiung (CG 129). (Taiwan Coast Guard Administration)
“Since 2008, Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration has been engaged in a 37-ship building program totaling 17,000 tons at a cost of approximately NT$ 24 billion ($782 million).”
The US Naval Institute News Service has made available the U.S. Department of Defense’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy.
I have only scanned it, but it does mention the Coast Guard in the context of freedom of navigation exercises and capacity building for our allies.
Navy recognition is reporting that all four type 053H2G frigates (NATO designation Jiangwei I) have been transferred to the Chinese Coast Guard, contributing to the already feverish build up of this service. These 115 meter (376 foot), 2,200 ton, 27 knot, helo deck and hangar equipped, diesel powered ships entered service with the Chinese Navy (PLAN) between 1991 and 1994, so while far from new, by USCC standards, they should have considerable life remaining. The design seems quite appropriate for a cutter.
The fact that the PLAN is willing to give up these ships suggest both the pace of modernization of the PLAN and the priority given to bulking up their Coast Guard.
The conversion apparently results in the removal of all the primary weapons including a twin 100mm gun, anti-air and anti-surface missiles, and anti-submarine weapons.
But the ships will not be unarmed, and how they are armed may suggest how Chinese Coast Guard vessels, which were essentially unarmed in the past, may be armed in the future.
The guns that remain are four twin 37mm type 76A mounts. Positioned as they are, this will allow at least two twin mounts to be pointed at any direction, and in perhaps most cases three twin mounts. The projectile weight is about 1.6 pounds; rate of fire is 375 rounds/minute/barrel. They have a range of 9,400 meters and an effective range of 3,500 meters, with a 1600 round ready service capacity at each twin mount.
While these weapons are obviously limited in range, at close quarters they would be extremely dangerous.
In an earlier post I used the weight of projectiles a ship could shoot per minute as one measure of the possible effectiveness of a weapon system. By that measure four 37mm firing 375 one-point-six pound projectiles per minute would mean the capability of firing 2400 pounds of projectiles per minute. This is more than a single 57mm Mk110 (1160 pounds), a 76mm Mk75 (1120 pounds), or even a 5″/62 Mk45 mod4 (1400 pounds).
Why did they retain all four mounts? It would not have been hard to remove two of the four mounts and still retain, what many would see as more than adequate law enforcement firepower, but we probably should not read too much into the retention of all four mounts; it was the easier option, and they may be seen as nothing more than on board spares. They certainly have retained a fierce capability to engage at anything less than 4,000 yards. I would not mind seeing similar redundancy on USCG cutters for our peacetime missions..
The deletion of the ASW equipment certainly suggest the new, more militarized, Chinese Coast Guard does not see itself as ASW capable, and the removal of the 100mm guns suggest they don’t expect to be used as a Naval Gun Fire Support asset.
A photo published in a report on Chinese mine warfare by the U.S. Naval War College shows Chinese civilian fishing vessels practicing deploying sea mines at a naval base in Sanya in 2004. —Courtesy of U.S. government
The Wall Street Journal has an interesting story about China’s Naval Militia. It employs not only the crews of their fishing industry, but also their vessels, to support China’s Navy and Coast Guard. It certainly blurs the line between government and non-government vessels.
Presumably this organization also extends to include their ocean going vessels and their crews as well. This is all the more interesting because of China’s recent announcement that they would require the incorporation of military characteristics in newly constructed container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk civilian vessels.
“The Metal Shark 75 Defiant Patrol boat, capable of achieving 40+ knots. For the ideal balance of performance, economy, and reliability, twin Caterpillar C32 diesels mated to Hamilton HM-651 waterjets will propel the vessel to speeds in the 30-knot range.” Photo via DBA METAL SHARK
gCaptain is reporting that the US has pledged $18M to help Vietnam buy US made patrol boats. gCaptain does not specifically state which boats will be bought or how many, but the choice of illustration above certainly suggests that they will be Metal Shark 75 Defiants. There is more information on this boat here.
China Coast Guard Crest
The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) has issued incredibly detailed information on China’s Navy and para-military naval organizations in an unclassified form.
Perhaps most impressive is the PLA Navy Identification Guide which includes their coast guards. The sheer number of vessels in their coast guard type organizations is staggering.
The Diplomat offers their take on these new intelligence products. The author, “Andrew S. Erickson is an Associate Professor in the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College and a core founding member of the department’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI). He serves on the Naval War College Review’s Editorial Board.”
You can access all of these products here.
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