The U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) last week adopted a formal resolution to develop a legally-binding treaty for the conservation of marine biodiversity on the ‘high seas’.
The new ocean regulations are proposed to include: area-based management tools, such as marine planning and marine protected areas; environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements; the transfer of marine technology; and a regime for managing marine genetic resources, including benefit-sharing. These developments have potentially significant implications for ocean economic activities, such as shipping, oil and gas, cruise tourism, fishing, marine mining, biotechnology, submarine cable, as well as for related sectors, such as maritime law, insurance and investment.
Apparently they are seeking comment with a meeting scheduled for November in Singapore.
What are the chances we will see some results from this? Given how long it took to have UNCLOS accepted, I would not expect anything soon, but you have to start somewhere.
Oceans Beyond Piracy has launched the fifth installment of its annual reports detailing the economic and human costs of maritime piracy. “The State of Maritime Piracy 2014” examines both human and economic costs incurred as a result of piracy occuring in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea, with a never before included analysis of the human cost of piracy in Southeast Asian waters.
A couple of things stand out. The number of seaman being held hostage is way down. The ocean areas around SE Asia are again the most significant areas of danger for piracy (or for robbery inside territorial waters, which is also included in the report, but not technically piracy). That is not to say that the probability of any particular vessel being attacked is higher off SE Asia than in the Gulf of Guinea given the volume of traffic through the waters of SE Asia.
Since before recorded history, merchant vessels have been adapted for offensive purposes by navies, pirates, and privateers to destroy enemy commerce or to launch attacks ashore. Frequently they employed disguise and deception. The UK employed Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) during the 1982 Falklands War, the Malaysian Navy has converted two container ships into pirate hunters, and the US Navy has leased ships to support special operations, but I think the last time they were used to attack commerce was WWII. By the end 1943, it appeared that technology, primarily in the form of reliable radios, plus robust challenge-and-reply procedures, a comprehensive naval control of shipping organization, and a seemingly impervious blockade of the German coast, had made this type of warfare very dangerous, but new technology may now be working in favor of using converted merchant ships as clandestine warships.
The German Experience
During World Wars I and II, the German Navy achieved considerable success using armed merchant ships as clandestine merchant raiders. At small cost they sank or captured a large number of allied merchant vessels, tied down a number of warships searching for the raiders, and even managed to sink allied warships.
In World War I, three raiders, Wolf, Moewe, and Seeadler (a full rigged sailing ship), sank or captured 78 ships totaling 323,644 tons. In addition to the merchant ships they captured or sank directly, merchant raiders proved effective mine layers. One victim of a mine laid by the raider Moewe was the pre-dreadnought battleship EdwardVII, sunk on 6 January, 1915.
In World War II nine German Merchant raiders, Atlantis, Komet, Kormoran, Michel, Orion, Pinguin, Stier, Thor, and Widder, sank or captured 129 ships, totaling 800,661 tons. While this pales in comparison to the sinkings by U-boats, they were far more effective than the regular navy surface raiders, including the vaunted pocket battleships, heavy cruisers, and battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, that managed to sink or captured only 59, totaling 232,633 tons. The merchant raider Kormoran even managed to torpedo and sink the light cruiser HMAS Sydney, before the Kormoran herself was also sunk.
Typically, the raiders of WWII were equipped with six obsolescent 5.9″ guns and large numbers of torpedoes to allow ships to be sunk rapidly. Most were also equipped with aircraft and some with torpedo boats. They were also equipped to change their appearance while underway.
Several of their voyages were extraordinarily long. Michel’s first voyage was 346 days. Orion’s was 510 days. Thor was away 329 days and managed to sink HMS Voltaire, an armed merchant cruiser. Pinguin for 357 days. Komet for 512 days. Kormoran for 350 days before her fatal encounter with HMAS Sydney. The ships were refueled and rearmed by supporting vessels that also took their prisoners. Raiders were also used to resupply submarines.
Perhaps surprisingly, none of these WWII raiders were underway when the war began, when they might have been most effective. They were sortied in two waves in 1940 and 1942.
END OF THE MERCHANT RAIDER
Despite their successes, by the time the last German raider at sea was sunk on 7 September, 1943, by a US submarine shortly after it had sortied from Japan, it had become impossible for ships to sortie from Germany and make it to open sea. Komet and a tenth raider were both sunk attempting to do so. Three of the nine, Atlantis, Pinguin, and Kormoran, were sunk in distant seas by British cruisers. One, Stier, was sunk by the Naval Armed Guard on the Liberty ship Stephen Hopkins. One was destroyed by a nearby explosion while moored in Yokohama. Two, Orion and Widder, survived their career as raiders long enough to return to Germany and be repurposed.
REBIRTH–Weapons and Sensors, Old and New
Technological changes in the form of containerized cruise missiles, satellites and UAVs and other Unmanned Vehicles may have made the merchant cruiser once again a viable option.
Cruise missiles mean that the raider no longer needs to come with visible range of the their victim. With sufficient range and use of way points, the shooter can be over 100 miles from its victim and the missile can come from any direction, not necessarily from the direction of the raider. Plus they can now attack land targets as well as ships. The US has begun to think seriously about the threat of a cruise missile attack on the US and innocent looking container ships are a possible source.
UAVs can provide over the horizon targeting and are likely to be undetected by the target.
Satellites may help or hurt potential raiders. If they have the support of satellites, it may help them find their pray. If the defenders are sufficiently sophisticated (and they are looking in the right place) they may be able to recognize a missile launch as the first step in finding, fixing and destroying the raider.
Similarly the Automatic Identification System may help the raider or the defender. It may help the raider find targets, but it may also help the defender react more swiftly to an attack or help him identify the raider from among all the other ships in the area. There is always the possibility the information may be bogus. Unmanned Surface Vessels might be used to create false targets. We might want to plan for a system of encrypted information for contingencies. Limiting use of the systems is an option that may require careful consideration.
Mines are still potentially effective. The large carrying capacity of cargo ships means they could potentially lay large mine fields. A raider could knowing a war will start soon might lay a large field to be activated when hostilities begin. If hostilities have already begun, the raider is unlikely approach a port closely enough to lay the mines itself, but mobile mines already exist, and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles or even simple semi-submersible unmanned vessels that can lay an minefield should be relatively easy technology.
China, Perpetrator or Target
From an American point of view, China with its huge merchant fleet and large inventory of cruise missile may appear a possible user of Merchant Raiders, but their large merchant fleet and need to import may also make them vulnerable to this this type of warfare if employed by weaker nations.
We know China has a Naval Militia. that will allow them to rapidly increase the size of their naval force. China has recently said it would require its ship builders to incorporate features that would make them usable for military purposes in wartime. These requirements are to be applied to five categories of vessels – container, roll-on/roll-off, multipurpose, bulk carrier and break bulk. What these additional features are to be, is not clear. This could mean upgraded communications, either external or internal. It could mean improved survivability, greater speed, or foundations for weapons upgrades. They may only be thinking of using these ships to support amphibious operations, but these improvements may also make a large number of ships potential merchant raiders.
China’s large merchant fleet and need to import raw materials may make her vulnerable to Guerre d’Course. In the kind of low intensity conflict we have seen between China and her neighbors, it has seemed China has had all the advantages, but if they are pushed too far, China’s neighbors might see this form of warfare as a way to push back.
Non-State Actors
There is also the possibility of terrorist organizations attempting something similar, but they are more likely to attack highly visible targets of a symbolic nature, such as port facilities or major warships. Cruise missile could of course be used to attack major landmarks. They may also be less interested in living to fight another day.
Conclusion: I don’t think we have seen the end of offensive use of Merchant vessels.
INS Saryu, the lead ship of her class of offshore patrol vessels of the Indian Navy. Indian Navy Photo
We have a report from Brahmand.com, there is at least a possibility India’s future Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) will be built with Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles ASCMs).
India’s leading defence shipyard, Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) has submitted a proposal to the Indian Navy to construct offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) armed with missiles.
“We have submitted a proposal to the Indian Navy that all the future OPVs should be developed with the missile on board.
That will give more combat muscle to the vessel. If fitted with missile, the pricing of the vessel goes up only by ten per cent,”
Of course, that does not necessarily mean the proposal will be accepted, but it would make sense, if the Indian Navy is, like the US Navy, thinking in terms of “Distributed Lethality.” Or as it is sometimes expressed, “If it floats, it fights.”
I found the 10% additional cost estimate interesting, but I suspect adding an ASCM capability to the projected CG Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs) would probably be closer 5%, given the much higher cost of building the platform in the US. Manning requirement would probably increase at most three enlisted and an officer.
The Navy has initiated a “request for information” (not a request for proposal yet) for a new maritime security/force protection patrol boats about 40 foot (12 meters) in length to replace about 100 existing 25 and 34 foot boats. You can read the solicitation here.
Can’t help but think there would be some benefit if they selected a hull in common with the Coast Guard.
To some extent this sounds a bit like the Coast Guard’s Response Boat Medium (RB-M), but in has some specific requirements for transportability that might rule out a version of the RB-M.
The solicitation does include some requirement I don’t think were part of the CG specifications that would require some modification. Here are the specifics:
Mobility & Operational Responsiveness –
Note: The Navy desires to meet boat speed and endurance requirements as specified below and will allow for flexibility in payload requirements. Payload may be varied in order to meet boat speed and endurance requirements.
• Cruise Speed of 25 knots
• Sprint Speed of 40 knots
• 12 hours endurance at patrol to cruise speed
• Range: 250 nautical miles
• Capable of carrying mission payload of at least 4,000 pounds and up to 8,000 pounds (desirable); mission payload includes weapons, ammunition, crew, passengers, and any portable/removable mission systems
• Length: 40 feet (nominal)
• Capable of operating in seas with a 3 feet significant wave height; shall have reduced operating capability in up to 5 feet significant wave heights
• Crew: 2-Operators and 3-Gunners/System Operators; Additional seats and space are desired for up to four additional mission personnel; Shock mitigating seats required for all crew and mission personnel
Propulsion –
• Boat must be powered by diesel fuel and be capable of operating on JP-5 and JP-8
• Propulsion equipment should be suitable for operating in shallow water with vegetation, debris and obstacles
Survivability (Ballistic Protection) –
• At a minimum the craft requires protection against 7.62 mm ball rounds for personnel and critical equipment (e.g., propulsion system and controls)
Lethality (Armament) –
• Space and weight needed for three weapons mounts suitable up to .50 caliber guns
• Space and weight needed for a single station Stabilized Small Arms Mount (SSAM), suitable for up to a .50 caliber gun or MK 49 or MK 50 Gun Weapon Systems
Sustainability (Reliability) –
• The craft will allow for affordable Total Ownership Costs by leveraging hull, mechanical and electrical systems that are already in use by the Navy; Leveraging systems that will allow for increased PB-X buying power commonality with other NECC boats is desired
• Innovative hull, mechanical and electrical systems are of interest provided that they can be fielded and supported within the next 2 to 4 years, employ non-developmental technologies, and have proven reliability
Transportability –
• Sea
– Capable of being transported as deck cargo on Naval Amphibious and Military Sealift Command ships; Specifically, the craft will be launched and recovered; floated-on and off well-deck Amphibious type ships; or transported on a Roll-On/Roll-Off cargo ship with own trailer
• Land
– Must be road transportable on U.S. and NATO roads/highways and comply with applicable oversize load restrictions without escort
– Road transportable also includes off-road (dirt, gravel without significant obstacles) with rough terrain capable trailer
– Capable of launch and recovery from a road transport trailer on a boat ramp
– Capable of being towed by existing NECC prime movers such as a Freightliner FL80 tow truck (40,000 pounds tow) or Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement MK36 Wrecker truck (22,000 pounds tow)
– In preparation for land, air, or sea transport the craft must allow for removal and stowage of fendering, masts, arches and platforms and weapons; transportation preparation should take less than 4 hours
– The craft shall have hoist fittings that allow for crane launching and external airlift
• Air
– Internal air transportable in a C-5 or C-17 (see Department of the Army Field Manual Number 55-9, Chapter 2. Air Mobility Command Aircraft for space and weight restrictions)
– External air transportable by the CH-53 (34,700 pound weight limit)
Other Desired Characteristics:
• Minimum operating depth of no greater than 5 feet with a target vessel draft of 3 feet or less
• The hull draft structural design shall be compliant with ABS High Speed Craft (HSC) or Det Norske Veritas (DNV) that are appropriate for the construction material, hull form and speed of the PB-X
• The following stability standards are desired: US Navy Standards for single compartment flooding; and, US Navy Small Craft Beam winds and rolling; passenger crowding standards
• The following electronics/systems will be provided by the boat builder: Commercial AIS,
GPS Chart plotter, Radar, Marine VHF, Emergency Positioning Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB), Law Enforcement lights/siren
• The craft should be capable of launching, operating and recovering unmanned systems such as a MK18 Mine Countermeasures Underwater Vehicle System Mod MK 18 Mod 2 (approximate dimensions: 10 feet x 12 inches; weight 500 pounds)
• Construction standards should allow for a service life of 15 to 20 years
• The craft should be outfitted with heavy duty commercial grade fendering/rubrails or strakes, or foam filled sponsons preferred.
(Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.)
Being of a cynical nature, I suspected RAdm. McKnight might be employed by Huntington Ingalls (HII), since he was advocating more Bertholf class National Security Cutters, and he has advocated for other HII products in the past, but there is apparently no direct connection.
Since the first Offshore Patrol Cutter is not due to be commissioned until 2022 now (having slipped again), it certainly would not hurt to get a ninth NSC.
DefenseMediaNetwork has a story about how Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) training is being done at a NATO facility in Souda Bay, Greece, on the Island of Crete. The only reference to the US Coast Guard is identification of an individual in one of the photos as a USCG officer, but I suspect the Coast Guard was involved in developing the course.
Perhaps the most interesting revelation to me was that they have a vessel dedicated to the training.
“…the 2,500-ton ex-HS Aris (A 74), formerly the Hellenic Naval Academy cadet training ship, serves as a realistic platform for live training for a variety of boarding scenarios. The ship is equipped with smoke, flashing strobes, booby traps, noise to create confusion, and role players to be rescued, detained or captured. Trainees use weapons that fire small paint pellet rounds. During the course of training, the difficulty and complexity of the scenarios can be increased. There are numerous cameras to monitor progress of training evolutions, ensure safety, and provide video for debriefing. When the teams leave they take with them a DVD with the video of their training. Aris will soon be joined by a decommissioned mine countermeasures ship, the ex-HS Alkyon (M211), which is at NMIOTC now and being modified for live training.”
This sounds like a good idea that the Coast Guard might want to consider.
(Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.)
Below are some citations for valor for Coasties who participated in the D-Day invasion.
CLARK, George C., LTJG, USCGR, British Distinguished Service Cross, During the landing of Commandos at Quistreham by LCI (S) on 6 June 1944 Lt. Clark’s cutter was detailed to act as escort to LCI (S) HM LCI(S) 524 on clearing the beach after landing troops received a direct hit and blew up in a sheet of flames leaving a mass of blazing Octane petrol on the water. Although his cutter burned Octane petrol, he did not hesitate to street is craft into the flames and rescue the commanding officer and some of his men.
FRITZCHE, Edward H. CAPT, USCG, Legion of Merit, For exceptionally meritorious conduct, both in the preparation and execution of the amphibious assault on the coast of France June 6, 1944. Captain Fritzche was in command of a main group of the Assault Force, composed of a mixed fleet of American and British transports and American landing craft. He brought these ships an craft to their predetermined stations in the transport area, successfully effected their prompt and efficient unloading and expedited the assault troops and equipment to the designated beaches.—Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit, For meritorious conduct as commanding officer of a Coast Guard transport prior to and during the amphibious invasion of Southern France August 15, 1944. He efficiently organized and trained his ship and boat group to execute the assigned mission of loading transporting to the assault area and landing the embarked Army assault units on the invasion beaches. His able conduct contributed materially to the effective establishment of the beachhead and to the over all success of the invasion.
GISLASON, Gene R., LT, USCGR, Silver Star, For outstanding heroism as Commanding Officer of the USS LCI (L) 94, while landing assault troops in Normandy June 6, 1944. He successfully directed his ship through numerous beach obstacles to the proper beach, discharged his troops and retracted while his ship was seriously damaged from heavy enemy fire. Ship’s communications, engine telegraph and electric steering were disabled by direct hits on the pilothouse which killed three crewman and one screw and shaft were rendered inoperative by beach obstacles. By his coolness under fire and excellent seamanship, Lt Gislason overcame these difficulties and brought his ship off the beach on hand steering and one screw. He later supervised repairs and in four hours enable the LCI (L) to remain operative in the assault area for three weeks.
HENLEY, Coit T., LTJG, USCGR, Silver Star, For heroism as Commanding Officer of the USS LCI(L) 85 while landing assault troops in Normandy, France, June 6, 1944. Lt Hendley successfully landed his troops despite the mining of his vessel, fire in three compartment and concentration of enemy fire while unloading. His courage and seamanship in directing repairs and retracting from the beach resulted in saving the lives many wounded aboard.
IMLAY, Miles Hopkins, CAPT, USCG, Silver Star, For conspicuous gallantry as Deputy Commander of an Assault Group participating in the initial invasion on the coast of France , June 6, 1944. Undaunted by heavy enemy fire, Captain Imlay courageously took station close to the shore on the early morning of D-Day and throughout the most bitter period of the fighting, coolly and promptly made spot decision on the reorganization, grouping and dispatching of craft to the beach, subsequently relieving the Task Group Commander of his duties when he withdrew his transport from the assault area, immediately thereafter, he was placed in charge of operations afloat as assistant to the naval Officer in Charge of one of the beaches and discharging the duties of this responsibility with distinctive professional ability, contributed essentially to the rapid clearing of the backlog of ships.
OXLEY, Gene E., Sea. 1c [ Seaman, First Class], USCGR, Silver Star, For gallantry while on the USS LCI(L) 85 during the assault on the coast of France June 6, 1944 and for extraordinary courage in volunteering and twice taking a line ashore, in the face of heavy machine gun and shell fire in order to assist troops unloading from the ship to the bench through chest deep water.
SALMON, Robert M., LT, USCGR, Silver Star, For gallantry as commanding officer of a U.S. LCI (L) while landing assault troops in Normandy, France June 6 1944. He pressed the landing of troops despite the mining of his vessel a serious fire forward and heavy enemy gunfire. He supervised the unloading of troops, directed the fire fighting despite the loss of proper equipment and exhibiting courage of high degree remained with the ship until it was impossible to control the progress of the fire and it was necessary to abandon ship over the stern. After abandoning he directed a party searching for fire fighting equipment and subsequently fought the fire on another LCI (L) and assisted her commanding officer until she was abandoned.
VERNON, Albert, LTJG, USCGR, Bronze Star, For meritorious service as Commanding Officer of a Coast Guard Cutter in rescuing survivors of the invasion off the coast of France June 6, 1944. During D-Day, his cutter rescued 97 men. Each rescue was effected in the face of constant enemy fire from the beach which was in no way allowed to deter the splendid rescue operations.
VYN, Arend, Jr., LTJG, USCGR, Silver Star, For gallantry in action as commanding officer of USS LCI 91 in the assault on the cost of France June 6, 1944. LTJG Vyn beached his ship and discharged the Army elements therein the face of murderous fire and a labyrinth of obstacles and mines. In spite of the fact that his ship was mined and repeatedly struck by artillery fire and small arm fire, he continued to land the army load in the face of certain loss of his ship. his determination to put the Army ashore was in keeping with the highest traditions of the offensive spirit of the U.S. Naval Service.
While this happened a little later, I have to add it as part of the invasion story.
WALSH, Quentin R., CDR, USCG, Navy Cross, For heroism as Commanding Officer of a U.S. Naval party reconnoitering the naval facilities and naval arsenal at Cherbourg June 26 and 27, 1944. While in command of reconnaissance party, Commander Walsh entered the port of Cherbourg and penetrated the eastern half of the city, engaged in street fighting with the enemy. He accepted the surrender and disarmed 400 of the enemy force at the naval arsenal and later received unconditional surrender of 350 enemy troops and at the same time released 52 captured U.S. Army paratroopers.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 