Maritime Counter-Insurgency/Stabilization

Gun crew on board USCGC Point Comfort (WPB-82317) firing 81mm mortar during bombardment of suspected Viet Cong staging area one mile behind An Thoi.(August 1965)

Good discussion of the maritime dimensions of “small wars” here.

Insurgencies, failed states, piracy, terrorism all look pretty much like law enforcement and require similar resources. It requires maritime “boots on the ground” in the form of patrolling vessels to do VBSS, including those that can operate in shallow water . The Navy has shown little interest in this type of warfare. Certainly their resources for these types of operations are limited.

When Operation Market time began in 1965, the Navy had 880 ships in the fleet including 287 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates, but that did not mean they did not see a need to bring in 26 Coast Guard 82 foot patrol boats and build 193 Swift boats. Currently the US Navy has about 273 deployable ships including about 100 cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and LCS, plus 13 PCs and the first of their 85 foot Mk VI boats plus a few smaller boats.

It is the nature of these conflicts, that the Navy will never be able to divert all its assets to address the threat. They will continue to worry about and employ assets to counter other threats.

This is an area where the DOD might want to consider funding Coast Guard forces to be available for contingencies to supplement the Navy’s resources. After all the Coast Guard is the country’s primary repository for knowledge about these types of missions. A decision might be based on a poll of the six Combatant Commander’s views of their requirements. It would not be necessary to be able to meet all these contingencies simultaneously, although two trouble spots is certainly a possibility, but choosing the most demanding could provide a good baseline.

USCGC_Owasco_(WHEC-39)_conducting_UNREP_Market_Time

A Common Operating Picture?

Navy photo, experimental ship Stilleto

This sounds like it might be something the Coast Guard might be interested in.

PSS CDS receives critical data from multiple sensors and offers two-way sharing of information and commands across both classified and unclassified domains. Intersect™ Sentry is an automation and analysis tool that creates alerts from a variety of intelligence, sensor and reconnaissance data streams according to parameters defined by the user. Both systems have been successfully demonstrated in support of joint and coalition maritime operations.

Whatever that actually means, it sounds good, and it fits on something WPB sized.

“The Pentagon is buying the wrong ship, and it’s costing taxpayers billions”–David Axe

cyclone-crafts-1

Cyclone-class boats before the modernization program in formation. Courtesy of U.S. NAVY

Influential defense columnist David Axe has written a piece picked up by Reuters that advocates that the Navy buy Webber class PCs instead of Littoral Combat Ships as replacements for the Cyclone class patrol craft currently homeported in Bahrain.

“It just so happens that Bollinger Shipyards, the same Louisiana shipyard that built the Cyclones, is building Sentinel-class boats for the Coast Guard that are roughly the same size as the Navy vessels, far more modern and reasonably priced at just $70 million a boat.

“If the Navy bought 10 fewer Littoral ships and acquired 10 new patrol boats for $70 million apiece instead, it would represent a net savings of more than $3 billion in ship construction costs while also boosting national security.

While I can’t totally agree with Mr. Axe, making the Webber class dual service would almost certainly provide some benefit to the Coast Guard in terms of training, future modernization, and long term sustainability.

“Substandard” or Whistleblower

Samsung

US Coast Guard photo

I don’t normally comment on CO reliefs. You can never know the full story looking in from the outside, and this is certainly the case here, but something is going on in the 13th district.

The Navy Times is reporting, Cdr. John Bitterman, commanding officer of the cutter Steadfast since July, “was fired for loss of confidence on Monday in the midst of an ongoing investigation…”

This seems to be a bit different, in that Cdr. Bitterman is claiming he is being fired not because of his performance, but because he reported the unsatisfactory condition of his ship, “… it was in such a state of disrepair — with moldy mattresses, lead contamination, bad decking —— that he asked his leadership for money to fix things up…His requests were denied…and the mix of the ship’s condition, the high operational tempo and the crew’s already rock-bottom morale led to his temporary relief.”

I have to wonder, is this going to be a trend? Steadfast is a 47 year old ship, and actually one of the newer 210s. Currently planned production of the Offshore Patrol Cutter suggest the last 210 will not be replaced until 2028 at which time it will be at least 59 years old.

Perhaps the Coast Guard will have to acknowledge, at some point, that they will have to retire ships without replacement.

Canadian Naval Review

One of our regular contributors, Lee Walher, has brought to my attention a publication I had not been familiar with, the Canadian Naval Review.

It seems to be a publication that addresses many issues that are common among coast guards and medium to small sized navies.

The publication is supported by subscription and sponsors. The full current edition is available only to subscribers, but in fact, it looks like virtually all the content is readily available. In addition, it appears that after a couple of months, full access is available to a pdf edition, via the Achieves and Index page.

This is the table of contents for the current edition.

Editorial: Always the Bridesmaid, Never the Bride, Ann Griffiths

The Case for a More Combat-Capable Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, Rob Huebert

 NOPEC: A Game Worth Playing?, Andrew Bergel

 Interoperability and the Future of the Royal Canadian Navy, Andrew Touesnard

 A Clash of Naval Strategies in the Asia-Pacific Region, Brian Wentzell

 Most Capable Design or Most Qualified Team?, Janet Thorsteinson

 Making Waves AOPS and the NSPS: Wishful Sinking?, Danford W. Middlemiss

 Collaborative Naval Procurement: Lessons from the ANZAC Frigate Build, Jeffrey Collins

 A View From the West: Reefs of Discontent in the South China Sea, Brett Witthoeft

 Dollars and Sense: Can DND Afford New Submarines?, Dave Perry

 Warship Developments: Flexible Examples from Offshore, Doug Thomas

 Human Capital and the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, Commander Ian Wood

Book Reviews