“North American Arctic defense could shape outcome of Indo-Pacific conflict” –Indo-Pacific Defense Forum

A U.S. Army Green Beret observes an incoming CH-47 Chinook helicopter during Operation Polar Dagger in Wales, Alaska, in August 2024. IMAGE CREDIT: SPC. BRYON DAVIDSON/U.S. ARMY

The Indo-Pacific Defense Forum reported on a Special Operations Command North (SOCNORTH) exercise,

“To address growing concerns in the Arctic, SOCNORTH recently executed two phases of Operation Polar Dagger, an operational series that demonstrates rapidly deployable, joint SOF capabilities throughout the North American Arctic. It forms the basis of options to deter, disrupt and deny adversary activity in support of U.S. Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) layered defense of the U.S. homeland…

“In 2023 and 2024, SOCNORTH and the U.S. Navy partnered to deploy the amphibious transport dock ship USS John P. Murtha and the USS John L. Canley, an expeditionary sea base vessel that supports SOF operations and other maritime missions, to the Bering Sea and the Arctic Circle to support Operation Polar Dagger. USSOF is enhancing its navigation expertise in Arctic terrain and has demonstrated the ability to thrive in the region by executing long-range movements, maritime interdiction operations, rapid infiltration/exfiltration, air-to-ground integration, critical infrastructure defense, domain awareness, and medical evacuation validation, among other engagements.”

(I suspect what this means is that USS John P. Murtha participated in 2023 and USS John L. Canley participated in 2024. Both could not have participated both years.)

A lot of the post is an attempt to explain to an Indo-Pacific audience why a NORTHCOM exercise should be important to them.

Observations: 

It appears that Polar Daggar is a part of the larger NORTHCOM NOBLE DEFENDER exercise. This is apparently a regular annual exercise. NORTHCOM’s on-line magazine reported on the 2023 exercise.

“U.S. Army and Navy assets conduct an interdiction operation in the Bering Sea in July 2024.” Note how flat the seas are. That’s not normal. They did do this in July. You can’t count on seas like this. IMAGE CREDIT: SENIOR AIRMAN JOHNNY DIAZ/U.S. AIR FORCE

There is a serious problem here because there was apparently no Coast Guard participation in these exercises. The Navy’s Pacific Fleet almost never has surface ships anywhere near the Arctic. If you have an urgent need for a ship to do something in the Bering Sea, the Coast Guard is really the only option most of the time. SOCNORTH should be learning how they can exploit Coast Guard resources including ships, boats and aircraft. If you want maritime interdiction in the Bering Sea, if you want maritime domain awareness, who should NORTHCOM call? –the Coast Guard.

Want to fly a “Night Stalker” helicopter off of a ship? Want to launch ATACMS from the Chukchi Sea or maybe Tomahawk or SM-6 from a Mk70 launcher? You could put it on the flight deck of a cutter. 

Need follow-up logistics for paratroopers dropped into an isolated coastal location? Coast Guard.

A satellite image of Shemya Island. What is now called Eareckson Air Station, with its lengthy runway, is seen along the southern edge. Google Earth

Not enough Air Force transports available when you need to move troops to reinforce Shemya? Kodiak C-130Js can help with that.

Cutter might even put a landing party ashore to provide quick protection for a critical facility and stand offshore to provide some AAW protection with its 57mm.

East-Coast-based U.S. Naval Special Warfare Operators (SEALs) conduct an over the beach infiltration on Shemya Island, Alaska, Sept. 6, 2023, as part of Operation Polar Dagger. During the operation, special operations forces projected the ability of U.S. forces to defend critical infrastructure, enhanced all-domain awareness, demonstrated operational reach, and strengthened our understanding of activity in the Arctic. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Matthew Dickinson)

In 2023, Special Forces operating from USS John P. Murtha (LPD-26) did an infiltration exercise. A cutter could have done the same thing, and it probably would have been more realistic since an LPD is unlikely to be available.

Any surface or land action at the start of a conventional conflict against Russian and/or China that involves the Arctic is likely to be a surprise involving small units, probably involving covert actions from unconventional platforms, paratroopers, and small unit insertions. At least initially, it will be a “run what you brung” war. We will have to fight with what we have and effectively the Coast Guard is the surface navy for Alaska.

The “Center of Gravity” for the theater is likely to be the Bering Strait. As long as the US controls the strait, the Northern Sea Route will be useless for traffic between the Russian North coast and China or the Russian Pacific Coast.

The photo that leads off this post was taken at Wales, Alaska, population 145, 111 miles (179 km) northwest of Nome. The location is significant in that it is on the Eastern edge of the Bering Strait. It appears someone has recognized the significance of the location.

New Format–USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker: July 11, 2022

The latest “USNI News Fleet and Marine Tracker” includes additional summary information that is more informative.

Ships Underway

Total Battle Force Deployed Underway
298
(USS 241, USNS 57)
110
(USS 73, USNS 37)
 60
(44 Deployed, 16 Local )

Ships Deployed by Fleet

2nd Fleet 3rd Fleet 4th Fleet 5th Fleet 6th Fleet 7th Fleet Total
0 11 2 13 26 58 110

For the last several weeks, information about how many ships were deployed and how many underway was missing entirely.

I had been following how many ships were deployed to 4th Fleet because in most cases those ships were assisting in drug interdiction, but recently that information was not listed. That is back. Two ships are deployed to 4th Fleet which was typical of earlier information.

From prior information, I had concluded that US Navy ships were deployed about a third of the time and underway about a quarter of the time. That is far less underway time than I believe is typical for Coast Guard cutters. We frequently hear that US Navy ships are overworked. I would not dispute that, but it does seem that underway time is not the reason they are overworked. New information included in this latest “Fleet and Marine Tracker” gives even clearer insight into how much time US Navy’s commissioned ships spend deployed and underway. For the first time there is a breakdown of ship type as either USS or USNS.

USNS ships are only 19.1% of the “Battle Force.” but they are 33.6% of the ships deployed. 64.9% of USNS ships are deployed.

Commissioned ships (USS) are 80.9% of the “Battle Force,” but only 66.4% of those deployed. Less than a third, 30.3% of commissioned ships, are deployed.

Only 20.1% of the “Battle Force” was underway. We don’t have a USS/USNS breakdown for ships underway. If we assume the 44 ships deployed and underway was in the same proportion as those simply deployed, then there were probably 29 USS ships deployed and underway. While unlikely, the 16 ships underway locally might all be USS ships, so at most 45 USS ships, 18.7% of commissioned ships might have been underway.

If the Navy wants to reduce the workload on their sailors, they probably cannot do it by reducing deployments and underway time. My own experience was that we got a lot more done while underway than while inport.

There is a second observation that is particularly important for war planning. The USNS fleet is strained to support current deployment levels. If we have a near peer conflict in the Western Pacific, we would probably want to approximately double the number of commissioned ships deployed to about 60% with about 50% of commissioned ships actually continuously underway, almost three times what we are seeing now.

Those ships will need underway replenishment.

That means that both, we need to substantially increase the number of support ships, just to fully use the combatants we already have, and that the support ships we do have are precious and need to be protected. The Coast Guard may have a role in providing at least some of that protection.