MaritimeProfessional has an interesting short post about the Cutter Ingham with emphasis on its operations during the run-up to the Texas War of Independence. Its a story I was not aware of.
Cutter Ingham–1835
2
India Builds a Buoy Tender
India’s new buoy tender looks very different from those the USCG uses, looking more like an Offshore Support Vessel. Take a look at this report from Bairdmaritime. Maybe they are on to something.
The ship is 71.5 meters (235 feet) long.
Coast Guard Impact of “USA FREEDOM Act of 2015”
The “USA FREEDOM Act of 2015” is intended to impose limits on the NSA’s collection of data on US citizens. But like many laws it goes beyond its apparent purpose. There is an “Easter Egg” in Title VIII, “Safety of Maritime Navigation and Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation.”
Frankly, I have a hard time interpreting what this new law really means. But because it appears that it will extend enforcement authority over many ships that are not US flag, I presume this will bring the Coast Guard, as the primary Federal maritime law enforcement agency, additional authority and responsibilities. Here is a short review. I am unfamiliar with the source, so I can’t really vouch for it, but sounds like this may be important.
If any of the readers is knowledgeable on this topic, I would appreciate your perspective.
Authorization Bill Has Some Surprises
Federal Times is reporting the contents of the Coast Guards latest authorization bill, and there are some surprises.
The item I was particularly pleased to see, was a apparent interest in something I feel should be more closely watched, cutter days available.
Part of that requirement would be to implement a standard for tracking the number of days Coast Guard cutters are in operation at sea, and include days in which cutters are undergoing maintenance or repair.
That should be revealing. In considering what should be expected, I would suggest we look back a few years, say take a five year average from 1998 to 2002 as a baseline.
There are lots of other proposed changes, not the least is that it is to cover two years. I suggest you check it out.
Coast Guard Annual Personnel Strength, 1947-2012
Click to enlarge or see the pdf directly.
An interesting chart showing the strength of various components of the Coast Guard’s personnel strength from the bottom of the post-WWII demobilization through FY2012.
In interpreting the chart, note that there are two different vertical axis scales.
A few things seem to stand out.
1. The Coast Guard has not been shrinking. There have been ups and downs but the size of the service is at or near an all time high. It is a little more than twice as large as it was in 1947, but to put that into perspective, the US population has also a bit more than doubled, so the number of Coasties as a percentage of the population is about the same, but not as high as it has been.
2. There was a dip in the number of auxiliarists about ten years ago, but this may be recovering.
3. Recently there has been a notable rise in the number of permanent civilian staff. Could these be (CG-9) Acquisitions staff?
4. The ratio of officers (O-1 and above) to enlisted has shown a steady rise. Where previously there were about one officer for seven or eight enlisted, there are now about one for six. Frankly this is not as much of a change as I thought it might have been.
We should stop saying the Coast Guard is smaller than the New York City Police Department. It is no longer true.
What we can say is, that the Coast Guard is, in terms of personnel, larger than the French Navy or Britain’s Royal Navy or any NATO navy, other than that of the US or Turkey.
I think it would also be true to say, that we have the oldest fleet, and not by just a little bit.
CG making progress in reducing acquisition risks for OPCs–DHS IG
Photo: Eastern’s proposed Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) concept. One of three shipyards contending for the contract
FierceHomelandSecurity is reporting,
“An internal audit says that the Coast Guard is making progress in reducing acquisition risks of more than two dozen offshore patrol cutters, but it’s still too early to tell whether the service has fully implemented two risk mitigation recommendations that were previously made by the inspector general.
“One recommendation directs the Coast Guard to make sure it’s achieved a level of “design maturity” in its engineering plans, meaning that the designs are fully developed prior to construction.
“The other instructs the service to ensure that “low-rate initial production” – that is producing enough quantities of cutters to test, evaluate and approve before full production – are supported by an operational assessment. This assessment evaluates proposed cutter designs against operational requirements and identifies risks.
The Commandant has said they have looked so closely at the designs that they questioned the number of water fountains (scuttlebutts for the sailors). That sounds like design maturity, but then the purpose was to save money, not to ensure operational competence. I would hope we have done that as well. We are certainly taking long enough to make sure the designs are mature.
I would take issue with the statement, “Under a two-phase strategy, the service plans to acquire 25 OPCs to replace an equal number of medium endurance cutters.” These 25 ships are intended to replace 32 WMECs, four of which have already been decommissioned, 13 270s, 16 210s, the Alex Haley, Acushnet, and Storis. In 2000 we had 44 large cruising cutters; if the program of record is fully implemented we will have only 33. The misguided “Crew Rotation Concept” which, even if it works, will not give us the same number of ship days away from home port as 44 ships, even if we have to pay for 44 crews, is biting us. (Note, it appears to me this statement was made by FierceHomelandSecurity rather than as part of the IG report.)
The DHS IG report referred to, regarding the OPCs, is this document, “Verification Review of U. S. Coast Guard’s Acquisition of the Sentinel Class Fast Response Cutter (OIG-12-68),” that can be accessed through the FierceHomelandSecurity post.
The alarming aspect of this, is the insistence on “low rate production” until the design is tested. It seems we have been planning low rate production all along, with only one ship per year to be funded for the first three years, and no more than two per year after that, meaning with production of 25 ships, we will not see the last ship delivered until 2035. That sounds pretty low rate to me.
If we fund as expected (one per year for three years, then two per year), there will be a shift to funding two ships per year before the first ship has completed testing. Is two ships per year a high rate which the IG might oppose? Is there any possibility that after testing we might be able to build OPCs at a rate higher than two per year (as we really should)?
I have still heard no suggestion that the Coast Guard will take advantage of the multi-year/block buy procurement that Congress has authorized for the OPC, nor have they requested authority for Multi-Year procurement of the Webber class WPCs which certainly qualify as a mature and tested program.
There was a time when the Coast Guard took delivery of 28 ships in nine years. It really looks like the we are going to need similar surge in the future to prevent a collapse of our capabilities.
GAO makes astounding discovery
With an amazing grasp for the obvious, the GAO has once again reported (pdf) that the Coast Guard is not getting, or expected to get, the money it needs to fund its program of record in a timely manner.
“…the Coast Guard’s acquisition needs are not affordable based on past and expected future funding levels.”
Basically they are repeating their findings for the past several years, and as always their solution to not making the goal, is to move the goal post.
“GAO found in June 2014 that budget officials have acknowledged that the Coast Guard’s current plan for developing new, more capable assets is not affordable given current and expected funding levels. For the past 5 years, GAO has found that the Coast Guard’s acquisition funding has fallen short of what it estimates it needs to fully recapitalize its assets. The Coast Guard has responded by annually delaying or reducing its capability. The Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have taken some steps to address these affordability issues, but as yet these efforts have not led to the types of significant trade-off decisions among resources and needs that would improve the long-term outlook of the Coast Guard’s acquisition portfolio.”
Frankly the Congressional Research Service, reports written by Ronald O’Rourke, are far more informative, and despite his position mandated neutrality, more supportive of the Coast Guard, but still this document does have some interesting observations.
Fixed Wing Aircraft
The Coast Guard has a Program of Record goal of 52,400 flight hours for its fixed wing assets. Currently the fleet performance is 38 percent short of this flight hour goal, but even if all currently planned assets are procured, we will still be 18 percent short of the flight hour goal. How come? First, instead of getting 36 C-144s we will be getting only 32 aircraft, 18 C-144s and 14 C-27J. The award winning C-144 acquisition program has been suspended even though the Coast Guard knew they were going to be at least four planes short. Second, instead of the 1,200 hours per year per Medium Range Search (MRS) Aircraft, the Coast Guard has decided it can expect only 1,000 hours per year.
The GAO reports the Coast Guard plans to complete a fixed-wing fleet mix analysis by 2019, which will revisit the current flight hour goal.
“The Coast Guard has begun to rewrite its mission needs statement and concept of operations and plans to complete this effort by 2016. The Coast Guard plans to complete its full fixed-wing fleet mix analysis, which includes the assets it estimates will best meet these needs, by 2019, but has not set forth specific timeframes for completing key milestones. We recommended in our March 2015 report that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the Coast Guard inform Congress of the time frames and key milestones for completing the fleet mix study, including the specific date when the Coast Guard will publish its revised annual flight hour needs and when it plans to inform Congress of the corresponding changes to the composition of its fixed-wing fleet to meet these needs. DHS concurred with our recommendation but did not provide specific time lines for meeting this recommendation. The bill for the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015, introduced in April 2015, requires a revised Coast Guard fixed-wing aircraft fleet mix analysis to be submitted to congressional transportation committees by the end of fiscal year 2015.”
OPCs/WMECs:
The report raises for the first time I have seen in official documentation, the possibility that some WMECs will have to be retired well before replacement. They report that currently there is no plan to extend the service life of these legacy assets and no money programmed in the five year capital investment plan. As a result the CG “faces a potentially significant capability gap.”
NSCs:
All though the National Security Cutters have all been funded, they may yet adversely effect future AC&I budgets.
As we also reported in June 2014, further changes may be needed due to issues discovered through operating the NSC, which could result in the Coast Guard having to spend even more money in the future to ensure the NSC fleet meets requirements and is logistically supportable.
“For example, the cutter is experiencing problems operating in warm climates, including cooling system failures, excessive condensation forming puddles on the deck of the ship, and limited redundancy in its air conditioning system affecting use of information technology systems. According to operational reports from a 2013 deployment, the Commanding Officer of an NSC had to impose speed restrictions on the vessel because of engine overheating when the seawater temperature was greater than 68 degrees. In addition, cold climate issues on the cutter include a lack of heaters to keep oil and other fluids warm during operations in cold climates, such as the arctic. Further, Coast Guard operators state that operating near ice must be done with extreme caution since the ice can move quickly and the NSC could sustain significant damage if it comes in contact with the ice. In June 2014 we reported that while senior Coast Guard officials acknowledged that there were issues to address, they stated that the Coast Guard has not yet determined what, if any, fixes are necessary and that it depends on where the cutter ultimately operates.”
Webber Class WPCs:
In April 2015, the Coast Guard accepted delivery of the 13th of 58 FRCs and now has 32 of the cutters on contract. As we reported in April 2015, the Coast Guard is introducing additional competition into this purchase by recompeting the construction contract for the remaining 26 vessels; this contract is planned to be awarded in fiscal year 2016. According to the Coast Guard, the FRC has already been used to rescue over 400 undocumented immigrants, seize nearly $20 million in contraband, and apprehend several suspected drug smugglers. The fiscal year 2016 Capital Investment Plan includes $1.47 billion over the next 5 years to continue purchasing these assets by which time the Coast Guard plans to have fielded 42 FRCs.
The Future:
As I noted earlier, we have to look beyond these programs and the GAO addresses this concern.
“…senior Coast Guard officials have stated a need for over $2 billion per year, but the Coast Guard has received $1.5 billion or less over the past 5 years. The President’s budget requests $1 billion for fiscal year 2016. In an effort to address the funding constraints it has faced annually, the Coast Guard has been in a reactive mode, delaying and reducing its capability through the annual budget process but without a plan to realistically set forth affordable priorities. The Coast Guard, DHS, and Office of Management and Budget officials have acknowledged that the Coast Guard cannot afford to recapitalize and modernize its assets in accordance with the current plan at current funding levels. Efforts are underway to address this issue, but so far, these efforts have not led to the difficult trade-off decisions needed to improve the affordability of the Coast Guard’s portfolio. We recommended in 2014 that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service—aviation and surface— and the fiscal resources needed to buy the identified assets. We recommended that the plan should consider trade-offs if the fiscal resources needed to execute the plan are not consistent with annual budgets. The Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation, but its response did not fully address our concerns or set forth an estimated date for completion.
“In June 2014, we also reported that the Coast Guard faces a potentially expensive recapitalization of other surface assets, such as the polar icebreakers and its fleet of river buoy tenders, as these assets continue to age beyond their expected service lives and, in some cases, have been removed from service without a replacement. These issues pose additional potential challenges to the affordability of the Coast Guard’s overall acquisition portfolio.”
Icebreakers—According to program officials, due to funding constraints, the Coast Guard chose not to invest in either of its heavy icebreakers as they approached the end of their service lives. Thus, both heavy icebreakers were out of service from 2010 to 2013 and the Coast Guard could not complete missions, such as resupplying a science laboratory in Antarctica. The Coast Guard has recently returned one of these heavy icebreakers back to service, but still has one fewer heavy icebreaker than it has historically operated and several fewer than it needs, according to the Coast Guard’s June 2013 heavy icebreaker mission need statement. The fiscal year 2016 President’s Budget asks for $4 million for continued preparatory studies to develop a cost estimate, among other things. The associated fiscal year 2016 Capital Investment Plan contains $166 million for polar icebreakers over the next five years but does not identify what this money is for, though it is far short of the estimated $831 million needed to build the vessel. The Coast Guard is currently working with several U.S. government agencies to develop requirements and establish a plan to build a heavy icebreaker that could be jointly funded by the U.S. government agencies that need the asset to accomplish its missions.
River Buoy Tenders—”The Coast Guard is facing a gap in its river buoy tender fleet and has yet to formalize an acquisition project to replace this fleet—a project estimated to cost over $1.5 billion.”
HH-60 and HH-65 Helicopter Fleets—”The HH-60 and HH-65 helicopter fleets will approach the end of their lifespans between 2022 and 2026 and will need to either be replaced or have a service life extension performed to keep them operational. Regardless of the future path, significant acquisition dollars will be required to maintain annual flight hours for the next 20 years, according to Coast Guard program officials.”
Observations:
When the GAO says, “We recommended in 2014 that the Coast Guard develop a 20-year fleet modernization plan that identifies all acquisitions needed to maintain the current level of service (emphasis applied, Chuck)—aviation and surface— and the fiscal resources needed to buy the identified assets” it gives the impression they are not looking at the benefit side of the cost/benefit equation. It also looks like they may be ignoring the changes in the world since the legacy fleet was built. After all, when the 210s and 378s were built there, was no Exclusive Economic Zone and the territorial sea was 3 miles. 9/11 was still decades in the future. Our Navy was many times larger and it had units based all along the coast in almost every major port.
On the other hand they may be giving us a criteria for defining how fast existing resources should be provided. If we say resource hours should never drop below those provided by the legacy fleet, then really it looks like we need to build faster.
The units that the Coast Guard is currently building are obviously more capable than the units they are replacing and with the possible exception of the National Security Cutter (NSC), they are also going to be more expensive to man and operate.
The Bertholf class NSCs are about 50% larger than the 378s, but at least they have a smaller crew.
The OPC appear to be likely at least 50% larger than the 270 and possibly as much as three times the size of the 210s. They will likely have crews at least as large as the 270s, and significantly larger than the 210s.
The Webber class are more than twice as large as the Island class and have a crew almost half again as large.
I do believe there are reasons for this apparent growth, but it means the Coast Guard does need more money than it has in the past. Coast Guard leadership may have felt that they had been assured that funding for these more expensive assets would be available, given approval of the original Deepwater program and the revised post 9/11 upgraded Deepwater program, but while the money may come, the most expensive part of the program, the offshore patrol cutter, is only being funded in dribs and drabs.
Too often it seems we emphasize the good things the service has done for the country and left unsaid the failures, lost opportunities, and the very real risks we take when the service is not properly funded.
It appears that for several years, perhaps more than a decade, the resource hours from Coast Guard assets, may fall below those of the legacy fleet, either because assets must be decommissioned without replacement, or because of unplanned maintenance requirements. If we could establish a consensus that at least resources hours available should not be allowed to fall below those that were provided by the legacy fleet, we would have a convincing argument for more reasonable funding levels.
Navy’s New Patrol Boat, PB-X
The Navy has initiated a “request for information” (not a request for proposal yet) for a new maritime security/force protection patrol boats about 40 foot (12 meters) in length to replace about 100 existing 25 and 34 foot boats. You can read the solicitation here.
Can’t help but think there would be some benefit if they selected a hull in common with the Coast Guard.
To some extent this sounds a bit like the Coast Guard’s Response Boat Medium (RB-M), but in has some specific requirements for transportability that might rule out a version of the RB-M.
The other CG boat that might provide a basis is the Long Range Interceptor.
The solicitation does include some requirement I don’t think were part of the CG specifications that would require some modification. Here are the specifics:
Mobility & Operational Responsiveness –
Note: The Navy desires to meet boat speed and endurance requirements as specified below and will allow for flexibility in payload requirements. Payload may be varied in order to meet boat speed and endurance requirements.
• Cruise Speed of 25 knots
• Sprint Speed of 40 knots
• 12 hours endurance at patrol to cruise speed
• Range: 250 nautical miles
• Capable of carrying mission payload of at least 4,000 pounds and up to 8,000 pounds (desirable); mission payload includes weapons, ammunition, crew, passengers, and any portable/removable mission systems
• Length: 40 feet (nominal)
• Capable of operating in seas with a 3 feet significant wave height; shall have reduced operating capability in up to 5 feet significant wave heights
• Crew: 2-Operators and 3-Gunners/System Operators; Additional seats and space are desired for up to four additional mission personnel; Shock mitigating seats required for all crew and mission personnelPropulsion –
• Boat must be powered by diesel fuel and be capable of operating on JP-5 and JP-8
• Propulsion equipment should be suitable for operating in shallow water with vegetation, debris and obstaclesSurvivability (Ballistic Protection) –
• At a minimum the craft requires protection against 7.62 mm ball rounds for personnel and critical equipment (e.g., propulsion system and controls)
Lethality (Armament) –
• Space and weight needed for three weapons mounts suitable up to .50 caliber guns
• Space and weight needed for a single station Stabilized Small Arms Mount (SSAM), suitable for up to a .50 caliber gun or MK 49 or MK 50 Gun Weapon SystemsSustainability (Reliability) –
• The craft will allow for affordable Total Ownership Costs by leveraging hull, mechanical and electrical systems that are already in use by the Navy; Leveraging systems that will allow for increased PB-X buying power commonality with other NECC boats is desired
• Innovative hull, mechanical and electrical systems are of interest provided that they can be fielded and supported within the next 2 to 4 years, employ non-developmental technologies, and have proven reliabilityTransportability –
• Sea
– Capable of being transported as deck cargo on Naval Amphibious and Military Sealift Command ships; Specifically, the craft will be launched and recovered; floated-on and off well-deck Amphibious type ships; or transported on a Roll-On/Roll-Off cargo ship with own trailer
• Land
– Must be road transportable on U.S. and NATO roads/highways and comply with applicable oversize load restrictions without escort
– Road transportable also includes off-road (dirt, gravel without significant obstacles) with rough terrain capable trailer
– Capable of launch and recovery from a road transport trailer on a boat ramp
– Capable of being towed by existing NECC prime movers such as a Freightliner FL80 tow truck (40,000 pounds tow) or Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement MK36 Wrecker truck (22,000 pounds tow)
– In preparation for land, air, or sea transport the craft must allow for removal and stowage of fendering, masts, arches and platforms and weapons; transportation preparation should take less than 4 hours
– The craft shall have hoist fittings that allow for crane launching and external airlift• Air
– Internal air transportable in a C-5 or C-17 (see Department of the Army Field Manual Number 55-9, Chapter 2. Air Mobility Command Aircraft for space and weight restrictions)
– External air transportable by the CH-53 (34,700 pound weight limit)Other Desired Characteristics:
• Minimum operating depth of no greater than 5 feet with a target vessel draft of 3 feet or less
• The hull draft structural design shall be compliant with ABS High Speed Craft (HSC) or Det Norske Veritas (DNV) that are appropriate for the construction material, hull form and speed of the PB-X
• The following stability standards are desired: US Navy Standards for single compartment flooding; and, US Navy Small Craft Beam winds and rolling; passenger crowding standards
• The following electronics/systems will be provided by the boat builder: Commercial AIS,
GPS Chart plotter, Radar, Marine VHF, Emergency Positioning Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB), Law Enforcement lights/siren
• The craft should be capable of launching, operating and recovering unmanned systems such as a MK18 Mine Countermeasures Underwater Vehicle System Mod MK 18 Mod 2 (approximate dimensions: 10 feet x 12 inches; weight 500 pounds)
• Construction standards should allow for a service life of 15 to 20 years
• The craft should be outfitted with heavy duty commercial grade fendering/rubrails or strakes, or foam filled sponsons preferred.
(Thanks to Lee for bringing this to my attention.)
The Coast Guard’s Missing Links–the Commandant
The Coast Guard Compass has published a post by the Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Paul Zukunft arguing for Offshore Patrol Cutter. This is obviously a topic close to my heart, and I don’t think anyone will mind if I quote it here whole cloth.
“Twenty miles east of the Dominican Republic, the Coast Guard Cutter Charles Sexton rescued 117 people from a dangerously overcrowded 30-foot makeshift craft. Hours later, the Coast Guard Cutter Stratton interdicted $14 million worth of cocaine and apprehended three suspected smugglers. In two days, on two coasts, two assets proved the multi-mission might of the U.S. Coast Guard as crews saved lives, secured our border and severed cash flows to a transnational criminal enterprise.
“The Charles Sexton, a 154-foot fast response cutter, and the Stratton, a 418-foot national security cutter, are part of the Coast Guard’s persistent presence, patrolling and protecting more than 95,000 miles of coastline and 4.5 million square miles of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone – home to our Nation’s precious resources, including our oil, natural gas, fish and mineral reserves. The vastness of this area, paired with our array of missions, requires a network of Coast Guard surface and air assets on shore and at sea to preserve America’s security and prosperity.
“Missing from this network – the necessary link between the national security cutter’s open ocean endurance and the fast response cutter’s littoral presence – is the offshore patrol cutter. The offshore patrol cutter will promote governance and provide capability on our oceans – the gateway for U.S. economic growth, opportunity and prosperity. It is here, beyond 50 nautical miles from U.S. shores, where national interests in the U.S. maritime domain require the Coast Guard’s unique blend of authorities. And, it is the offshore patrol cutter that will protect our sovereign interests, enforce laws, save lives, protect fisheries, secure offshore energy resources and provide command and control for major response and contingency operations.
“Currently, the 1960s-era 210-foot and the 1980s-era 270-foot medium endurance cutters are the link between the Coast Guard’s national security cutters and fast response cutters. However, this link is under untenable strain, characterized by decreasing readiness and skyrocketing maintenance costs. In the last two years, four of these aging ships had to be pulled out of service for emergency repairs, straining our ability to support and maintain other ships and aircraft, impacting crew safety and quality of life and diminishing the Coast Guard’s ability to project U.S. authorities and respond to crisis in the maritime domain. This past weekend, I went aboard our newest medium endurance cutter, Coast Guard Cutter Mohawk in Key West, Florida. Mohawk was commissioned in 1991 and will continue to serve our Nation until it is replaced with the next generation of offshore patrol cutters close to five decades after she began her service.
“I carried these thoughts with me as I set foot aboard the Coast Guard Cutter Robert Yered, one of our newest fast response cutters. Leaping forward nearly half a century from our oldest ships, the Robert Yered’s modern, high-tech systems are fully interoperable with our partners in the interagency and international community as it executes missions across our littorals. This nimble fast response cutter is not, however, without its limitations. It cannot launch and recover aircraft – a necessary capability in the Coast Guard’s operational network of assets – and has limited range and endurance relative to our major cutters. The Coast Guard must have flight deck capable ships with robust command and control capabilities exactly where we need them, from the farthest reaches of the transit zone off of Central America to our northernmost borders off of Alaska. The offshore patrol cutter is designed to fill this need.
“Our aging platforms do not suffer from neglect. Coast Guard men and women consistently demonstrate exceptional commitment and innovation to sustain a medium endurance cutter fleet that has served admirably for more than five decades. In fact, our first medium endurance cutter went to sea the very same year the first Mustang rolled off Ford’s assembly lines. Unlike antique cars, however, which are often restored at great expense and used for the occasional fair weather Sunday drive, the increasingly expensive ships of America’s Coast Guard are painstakingly maintained and regularly put to work in the harshest maritime conditions.
“Indeed, not having reliable use of these aged medium endurance cutters, the linchpin of our operational network, puts us at a disadvantage at a time when we are needed most. Given the complex threats facing the Nation today, we simply do not have the luxury of storing them in the garage.
“The U.S. Coast Guard has a proud history spanning nearly 225 years. We have won federal acquisition awards, maintained clean financial audits and earned a reputation for responsible stewardship. We cannot afford to dull our operational edge and jeopardize our Service to Nation any longer. The Nation deserves better, and the offshore patrol cutter is the answer.”
USNI Support for the Coast Guard
The US Naval Institute has an opinion piece strongly supporting the US Coast Guard, written, perhaps surprisingly, by a retired US Navy Rear Admiral, Terence E. McKnight.
Being of a cynical nature, I suspected RAdm. McKnight might be employed by Huntington Ingalls (HII), since he was advocating more Bertholf class National Security Cutters, and he has advocated for other HII products in the past, but there is apparently no direct connection.
Since the first Offshore Patrol Cutter is not due to be commissioned until 2022 now (having slipped again), it certainly would not hurt to get a ninth NSC.
Chuck Hill's CG Blog 