The fourth edition of my top ten navy list arrives with 2025! For those unfamiliar, here are links to 2022, 2023, and 2024, with a general explainer for the whole concept in that first 2022 edition.

The long and short of it is that this graph reflects a personal tracker I keep of almost every large and moderately sized navy, and calculates the aggregate displacement of these navies. It’s not a perfect way to display the size of navies – far from it in fact – but it is at least more representative than counting numbers of hulls alone, in my opinion.

To break down what each of these categories mean;

• Surface Warships is an aggregate of all above-water warships and major aviation and amphibious assault platforms. This category includes CVNs, CVs, CVLs, LHDs, LHAs, LPDs, CGs, DDGs, FFGs, corvettes, OPVs, CPVs, lighter patrol craft, and MCM vessels.
• Submarines is what it says on the tin – SSBNs, SSGNs, SSNs, SSKs, and for select nations where applicable (and where information is available), special purpose submarines. Please note dedicated training submarines are counted separately.
• AORs includes all major fleet replenishment vessels (coastal vessels do not count, however).
• Other Auxiliaries is a very wide net that essentially captures everything else. Special mission ships, support vessels, minor amphibious assault vessels (LSDs, LSTs, LCAC’s, LCM’s, LCU’s), training vessels, tugs, coastal support vessels, hydrography ships – all essential parts of navies, but generally often paid less attention to as they’re not as flashy as the warships proper.

Interesting trends in data that I thought I would share for various navies, and thoughts and observations otherwise;

The USN’s position remains unimpeachable, and record a slight increase in both overall tonnage (+11,983t, or 0.16%) and numbers of vessels (net +2), commissioning an LPD, a destroyer, an SSN, and three LCS against the decommissioning of four Ticonderoga-class ‘cruisers.’ It is interesting to note that with these commissioning’s, there are only two more LCS – one of each class – and two remaining Flight IIA Burke’s left to enter service before the torch is entirely passed to the Flight III Burke (ten of which are currently building or fitting out) and other future platforms. Only nine of the venerable Ticonderoga-class remain in service.

The PLAN (China–Chuck), no one will be surprised to hear, increases in displacement again this year, though the on-paper 74,350t (+2.56%) from last-years figure does include some ‘fluff’ – I corrected the displacement of the Type 055 up 1,000t and split off the Type 052D’L’ (12) from the Type 052D’s, which netted +9,800t for the PLAN from thin air. 2024 was a relatively light growth year for the PLAN, with only a two new major warships entering service – the first Batch IV Type 052D and the first Type 054B. That being said, several ships are in advanced stages of trials and likely follow in very early 2025 (the second Type 054B and two other Batch IV Type 052D). There is also an addition of at least one new Type 039C SSK – though for full transparency, while I have three vessels listed presently, there is probably ±2 boat margin of error given the difficulty with tracking individual PLAN boats with open-source data. The rest of the increase comes from the auxiliary category in general, with the most notable of these being a second Type 927 ARS (submarine rescue ship, different from the AGOS formerly dubbed Type 927 but now Type 816). I have also struck a pair of Type 053 variants that have clearly left service.

Despite the modest growth, 2024 has been a big year for PLAN-related shipbuilding, crowned by the launch of the Type 076 LHD – a unique catapult-equipped amphibious assault ship – but one that has also seen the launch of the second Type 055 Batch II (with two more in build) and two more Type 052DL destroyers. Additionally, three Type 054AG frigates have been launched – a new, lengthened variant of the Type 054A, able to handle the Z-20 helicopters (also accommodated by the Type 055 and 052DL destroyers). The production of these additional ships and the absence of additional Type 054B builds has been a curious development that may signal the 054B as more of a transitional design, like the original Type 054 frigates, instead of a design the PLAN intends to produce at large scale (as with the Type 054A).

What is more consequential than any of these, however, is the continued launches of what is generally believed to be Type 093B SSNs from Bohai. 2024 may have seen up to three launches this year, indicating a similar pace of 2-3 boats per year as last year. This would mean that since the spring of 2022, five to seven Type 093B have been launched, compared to four American SSNs in the same period. It remains to be seen if these SSNs will just be built in a limited number, as has been the case in the past, or if the PLAN is adopting a more continuous production model for their SSN fleet (as practiced by the United States).

The VMF  (Russia–Chuck) has also seen a very slight uptick in 2024, of 3,605t (+0.17%). Combat losses in 2024 were less severe for the Russian navy than in the first two years of the Russo-Ukrainian War, but still notable. In 2024, Ukrainian forces sank two corvettes, an OPV, and an LST in the Black Sea. Despite this, arguably the largest blow Russian naval forces suffered this year was the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the naval base it allowed Russia at Tartus. While Russia appears to be sounding out Libyan National Army under Gen. Haftar to use Tobruk as a base (Cyrenaica, Libya), this will not be able to replace the facilities that had been built up at Tartus.

Russia’s most notable additions to its fleet this year include a fifth Yasen-M SSGN, a second Lada-class SSK, and a new Project 21180M icebreaker. Three new corvettes entered service, though this did not offset losses given the retirement of six other corvettes in addition to combat losses. The growth in the submarine force has been offset by retirements of not just aging Project 877 Kilo’s, but also the first of the deeply unsatisfactory Lada-class.

The British Royal Navy sees a reduction for a third year in a row, with 2025 looking to include an even sharper decline given cuts announced late this year. 2024 reductions include two Type 23 frigates (Argyll and Westminster) and all but the last Sandown-class MCM (HMS Bangor). This equals a drop of 11,072t tons (-1.25%).

An additional Type 23 frigate, as well as both Albion-class LPDs and the two Wave-class AORs will be decommissioned in early 2025. This is more a reduction on paper than in practice given the condition of the vessels, which had little to no chance of ever returning into service. It should be noted that while this is a cut in platforms, the up to £500M the British MoD expects to save on maintenance and refit costs for these vessels over the next five years will remain within the MoD for investment in other programs.

Perhaps the most perilous malfeasance facing the Royal Navy at present is the plight of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, which for want of pay raises competitive with commercial shipping continues to hemorrhage mariners.