Reflections on the CNO’s Navigation Plan

https://i0.wp.com/upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/86/Admiral_Jonathan_W._Greenert_%28CNO%29.jpg/819px-Admiral_Jonathan_W._Greenert_%28CNO%29.jpgThe CNO has issued a “navigation plan” for for Fiscal Years 2013-2017 that can be accessed here. (It’s only four pages.)

“The Nav Plan provides details on how we will execute this guidance, highlighting our investments through the lens of my three tenets: Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready.”

Most of it is, of course, not Coast Guard related, but there are some that might ultimately impact the Coast Guard.

Under “Warfighting First”:

“Improve near-term capability to counter fast attack craft by fielding enhanced gun and surface-to-surface missile systems for Patrol Coastal (PC) ships and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and laser-guided rockets for helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).”

Some of this might ultimately be applicable to CG platforms.

Under “Operate Forward”:

“Sustain the “places” our forward operating forces depend on to rest, repair, refuel, and resupply in Spain, Italy, Greece, Djibouti, Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Japan, Singapore, and Republic of Korea – as well as our forward base on Guam”

“Field improved Firescout UAVs…”

“Forward station additional ships – LCS at Singapore and PCs at Bahrain – to improve our ability to cooperate with regional partners in maritime security operations.”

“Improve our ability to remain forward by studying options for rotational crewing of other classes of ships.”

We already have Patrol Boats at Bahrain. We may see an additional push to put more assets, including perhaps more than one FRC, in Guam, (maybe not a bad thing for SAR and Fisheries enforcement). The increased Navy presence in Guam may also provide opportunities to exploit their units for SAR and LE as well.

Hopefully the CG will benefit from improvements in Firescout, but the Navy is talking about increasing the size of the airframe substantially which may be problematic for CG ships.

Certainly there will the opportunity to share experience in rotational crewing, and perhaps make it work.

Under “Be Ready”:

“Improve the “wholeness” of the Aegis Weapons System through data link and software upgrades while adding the Shipboard Self Defense System to more non-Aegis ships, such as amphibious assault ships.”

“Improve operational energy efficiency by investing in new technologies such as hybrid-electric drive.”

The weapon systems on the NSCs, and presumably the OPCs, are derived from the Aegis system and, I believe, closely related to the Shipboard Self Defense System for non-Aegis ships mentioned above. As the system evolves, ultimately we might see the Rolling Airframe Missile system replace the Phalanx on the NSCs. It is essentially the same weight and is used by the very similar system on the Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship.

The Navy is already using hybrid-electric drive on the USS Makin Island (LPD-8) and a fully integrated system on the USNS Louis and Clark class T-AKEs. There may be opportunities to ride the coat tales of their experience. Fuel economy is probably even more important to the Coast Guard than to the Navy.

What was not there:

I notice there was no mention of either African Partnership station or Drug Enforcement.

Multi-crewing, Coming to a Neighborhood Near You

Now that there are three National Security Cutters commissioned and  homeported in Alameda, we will soon see the first attempts at using multiple crews to man them, the “Crew Rotation Concept.” Four crews will man three ships. Additional facilities for the fourth crew are being built on Coast Guard Island.

There is a discussion of the Navy’s current plans for doing something similar here, along with comments on their previous experience with the concept.

https://i0.wp.com/upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/USCGC_Waesche_by_Yerba_Buena_Island.jpg

Photo Credit: U.S. Coast Guard photo ID: 100228-G-2129M-004, Petty Officer 3rd Class Kevin Metcalf

We have had previous posts on the concept and they always prompted a lively discussion:

The Navy’s reason for wanting to “swap” crews centers on a desire to avoid the dead time inherent in the long transit to their operating areas. In the Coast Guard case it is more a desire to reduce AC&I costs. Providing more op-days per hull even if the day to day operating cost per op-day are almost certain to be higher.

Continue reading

Unmanned Air Systems, Small Enough for WPB?

Flightglobal.com is reporting the Israelis are seeking an Unmanned Air System (UAS) for their Dvora class patrol boats (here, here, and here) that range in length from 71 to 86 feet and 45 to 54 tons (smaller than a CG 87 foot Marine Protector Class WPBs). Steadicopter showed its Black Eagle 50, as a possible contender.

Perhaps it would not be unreasonable for the Coast Guard to start considering unmanned systems to complement the Webber Class that are six times as large.

https://i0.wp.com/upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/2/27/S_Dvora_Mk_III_2.jpg

Photo credit: http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/naval/super_dvora3/SuperDvora3.html, via Wikipedia

Philippines and China in Standoff–former USCGC Center Stage

https://i0.wp.com/upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/03/Scarborough_Shoal_Landsat.jpg

Photo credit, NASA Landsat 7 image of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea

The former USCGC Hamilton, now BRP Gregorio del Pilar, is at the center of a standoff with the Chinese over a remote atoll shaped group of rocks and shallows called variously Scarborough (or Panatag) Reef or Shoal.

Both the Chinese and the Philippines claim sovereignty.

A Philippine patrol plane located eight Chinese fishing vessels inside the atoll. With the Gregorio del Pilar now on scene, two Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessels are blocking Philippine fisheries enforcement action against the fishing vessels and the Chinese are demanding the Philippine Navy depart their waters; while the Philippines is asserting it will enforce its sovereignty. Diplomacy is given lip service, but the standoff is ongoing. The US has a treaty obligation to the Philippines (subject to interpretation of course) and there are calls for US assistance.

A long discussion from the Philippine point of view here.

Photo: Philippine flag planted on Scarborough Shoal, Photographed by Adel Rosario, 05:11, 2 May 2010 (UTC)

File:Panatag Shoal.jpg

Black Eye for NATO and European SAR Organizations

NATO and European SAR organizations are being blamed for the death of 63 refugees from the fighting in Libya. The voyage started with 72 refugees, 50 men, 20 women, and two babies. Fifteen days later, when the craft drifted back to Libya, only ten remained alive and one of those subsequently died.

The media (CNN story here, MailOnline (UK) here) seems to have concentrated on this case as emblematic of failure, but it does not begin to tell the story. According to Aljazeera, “The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that roughly 50,000 people attempted to cross the Mediterranean by boat in 2011 and close to 2,000 drowned.”

To the outside observer there seem to have been many opportunities to rescue the refugees. Not having done so is seen as racist. NATO and European Coast Guards are being blamed, but might simply have been overwhelmed.

Clearly rescue organizations are being held to a very high standards. It is not enough that they rescue the vast majority of those in distress, they must rescue everyone without fail. It is not unlikely that once, perhaps several times, these organizations responded to reports of the boat adrift, located a boat in the area and assumed the mission was accomplished.

Its not unlikely our Coast Guard will find itself in a similar situation again.

 

 

What Does It Take to Sink a Ship, Illustrated

A little over a year ago, I published a post entitled “What Does It Take to Sink a Ship.” It has proven perhaps my most widely read post. The recent sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel Ryou-Un Maru beautifully illustrates the point that ships can be very hard to sink by gun fire.

120405-G-ZZ999-The sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel Ryou-un Maru

  • Title: GULF OF ALASKA – The Japanese fishing vessel, Ryou-Un Maru
  • Summary: GULF OF ALASKA – The Japanese fishing vessel, Ryou-Un Maru, shows significant signs of damage after the Coast Guard Cutter Anancapa fired explosive ammunition into it 180 miles west of the Southeast Alaskan coast April 5, 2012.

Reportedly the USCGC Anacapa began the operation at 13:00 and the Ryou-Un Maru sank at 18:15. It appears that the F/V may have been hit 100 times by explosive 25mm projectiles. With no crew aboard to do damage control and probably with no real measures taken to ensure water tight doors were closed, it stayed afloat for over five hours and ultimately the Anacapa resorted to pumping water into the vessel to sink it.

120405-G-RS249-005-USCG responds to Japanese vessel in Gulf of Alaska

  • Title: 120405-G-RS249-005-USCG responds to Japanese vessel in Gulf of Alaska
  • Summary: GULF OF ALASKA – The Coast Guard Cutter Anacapa crew douses the adrift Japanese vessel with water after a gunnery exercise 180 miles west of the Southeast Alaskan coast April 5, 2012. The crew was successful and sank the vessel at 6:15 p.m. in 6,000 feet

This was a very small ship, probably less than 500 tons, the implications for our ability to stop a medium to large vessel with a determined crew on board, bent on using the vessel for a terrorist act in an American port should be obvious. With even crude and unsophisticated measures to protect vital machinery and control functions, a ship can resist a great deal of gunfire and continue to its objective.

Late Addition–Video of the sinking added 25 Dec. 2012

Another New icebreaker, No Not Coast Guard

gCaptain reports, Shell oil recently took delivery of a 360 foot icebreaker anchor handling vessel. This is the fourth icebreaker built by Edison Chouest Offshore in the last two decades. Two of them (Laurence M. Gould and Nathaniel B. Palmer) were chartered by the National Science Foundation to support their high latitude work.

Reportedly this is part of a continuing trend toward larger vessels to support oil drilling as it moves further off shore.

While it is certainly no Polar Class, it appears to be larger than either the Wind Class or the Glacier. Its good to know that if we wanted to quickly build an arctic patrol vessel that would not break the bank (reported cost $200M), there is at least one American shipyard up to the task.