One of the criticisms of the Navy and Coast Guard’s ship building programs has been that they were not coordinated; that they should have been able to come up with a common hull. I think there may still be an excellent opportunity to do that and get the benefit of large scale series production, by combining the 25 ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) with the last 31 ships of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.
This is the second in a series comparing two incidents from World War II in which ships tried to force entry into a hostile harbor. Part one looked at the bloody, but ultimately successful British assault on the fortified port of St Nazaire. This part will look a German attempt to force their way into Oslo, Battle of Drøbak Sound. Part three considers what these incidents can tell us about what it takes to stop a terrorist attack on an American port using a ship as a weapon.
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Early in World War II, After the invasion of Poland, but before the invasion of France, the Germans invaded Norway to secure their access to Swedish steel and Iron ore and deny it to the British. (Denmark was also invaded on the same day, to secure airfields to support the Norway invasion.) Unlike their other invasions, there was no direct land route into Norway, so the invasion had to came by sea. With the Royal Navy and their French ally dominate at sea, the transit would be risky, but resistance from the Norwegians was expected to be light. Norway was at peace. They had only a small Navy and standing Army. Their defense depended primarily on mobilizing reservists. If they could be defeated before they mobilized, it would be a quick and relatively inexpensive campaign.
Six separate task forces would seize critical facilities all along the Norwegian coast. Rather than a Normandy style assault, the invasion of Norway looked like several simultaneous Special Forces operations. Troops would be landed from warships that could make the transit quickly. It would all be over before the Norwegian military could react–or so they thought.
The Target:
The particular operation we will examine was to seize the seat of power in Norway. It was intended to capture the capital, Oslo, and with it, the King, the Norwegian cabinet, the Storting (Norwegian Parliament) and the national gold reserve.
This is the start of a three part series, the story of two harbor defense organizations, how one, already at war, well trained and well armed, failed to stop a small force, while another, ostensibly at peace, facing a vastly stronger force, and in many ways poorly prepared, managed to stop their enemy.
I’ll put both stories in context, but what I found most interesting and most relevant to current Coast Guard missions was the means employed and the relative success of each in stopping a hostile ship from reaching its objective inside a port. The third part will talk about implications for the Coast Guard.
What is as long as a football field, seven stories high, and weighs next to nothing? Can hangout for 21 days? Go from contract to field test in 18 months? Continue reading
Three Indian vessels, two Navy and one Coast Guard sank a pirate mothership, killing some of the pirates, taking 15 prisoner, and freeing 20 hostages after a 12 hour “battle” here and here. The Indian Navy vessels were Car Nicobar class fast attack craft, about the size of the Webber class Fast Response Cutter, a bit faster, with much larger crews. Reportedly they have eleven machine guns on board. That may include the 30 mm main armament. The Coast Guard Ship, CGS Sankalp, sounds a lot like an OPC, 2,300 tons, helicopter deck and hanger, 25 knots and a crew of 106. Interestingly all three vessels were relatively new. All were delivered in the last three years. Continue reading
An Indian Navy frigate, the Vindhyagiri, slightly smaller than a 378, (and slightly newer) was involved in a collision off Mumbai, caught fire, and after being brought into port, capsized and sank. There were no causalities. Video of the ship on fire, in port is here.
With the end of the Soviet Union, it looked like there was no longer a significant threat from submarines. The Coast Guard, whose ASW assets were already largely obsolete, took the opportunity to simplify its training and maintenance requirements by eliminating what remained of the Coast Guard’s ASW capability. It made sense at the time, but times have changed.
The Emerging Threat
For the first time, with narcotics traffickers starting to use true submarines, it looks like an ASW capability is essential to do a peacetime mission. (The primary surface ship ASW sensor, the towed array, can also help us find semi-submersibles and possibly other targets as well.)
In addition, the threat of military submarines has reemerged. There are still relatively few nuclear submarines in the hands of possible adversaries (other than possibly Russia) but their numbers are growing, and new air independent submarine technologies are making diesel electric submarines deadlier then ever.
Why the Navy will need Help
The Navy has admitted they made a mistake by attempting to minimize the manning of their ships using a concept called “Optimal Manning.” As unfortunate as the mistake may have been–and it has resulted in a lot of pain and may have weakened the service for years to come–poor morale and broken ships–at least now it has been acknowledged. There has been some soul searching about how the mistake was made. The general consensus seems to be that a new generation of leaders was absolutely positive they have evolved to be smarter than those that went before, and since their solution is so obviously superior, there is no need to test it on a small scale be for applying it service wide.
Has the Coast Guard made a similar mistake in attempting to replace twelfve 378s with only eight National Security Cutters, based on an untried concept called “Crew Rotation Concept (CRC)?” Unlike the Navy’s mistake, if we have made a mistake in adopting this concept, it cannot be quickly reversed by moving billets ashore back afloat.
The Chinese have built a large number of 140 foot long, 225 ton vessels (perhaps 100) using a relatively exotic hull form, and there is a suggestion that they may start offering export derivatives of the hull for maritime policing.
You can see the type in motion here. Click on “Type 022 (Houbei Class).” The video is 2m 11s long. (What is the device at the stern seen at 1:51 in the video? dipping sonar?)
There is more information describing the technology and the origin of the design here.
There is an interesting, but unconventional, view of how these ships may be used here.
There are some still pictures here.
For those of you who may be US Naval Institute members, there is an article on the class here. Unfortunately, it is only accessible to members.
The Taiwan Coast Guard, has just accepted two new major ships, the “Tainan” a 2,462 tons “frigate” and “Patrol Boat No. 7,” 1,845 tons. Both appear similar in configuration and capability to Japanese and Chinese Cutters–they appear to be made to merchant standards, and their armament is modest.
The Taiwanese President, Ma Ying-jeou, presided over the commissioning of the larger vessel. The “feel good” statements are here. A more forthright statement of their purpose is here.
The Taiwan (Republic of China) Coast Guard is a relatively recent addition, having been formed in 2000. They seems to have followed the USCG model in many respects.
The Taiwanese Coast Guard is charged with policing a total area of 540,000 square kilometers, which is 15 times larger than the island of Taiwan.
Taiwan is the third party in the dispute with China and Japan over the islands variously known as Senkaku, Diaoyu, Diaoyutai, or the Pinnacle Islands.
(This photo, found on the first link, shows a Taiwan Coast Guard ship that looks an awful lot like a 270.)
