India Builds an OPV (OPC)

Posted on April 17, 2013 by Chuck Hill

India recently commissioned INS Saryu, the first of a new class of Offshore Patrol Vessels (five photos), that are in many respects similar to the planned Offshore Patrol Cutters. I don’t think anyone is considering these as contenders for the OPC contract, but with similar mission profiles, they do show what the OPC might look like. From the Wikipedia Description:

Displacement:	2300tons
Length:	105 metres (344 ft)
Beam:	12.9 metres (42 ft)
Draught:	3.6 metres (12 ft)
Propulsion:	2 x 7790 kW engines
Speed:	25 knots (46 km/h)
Range:	6,000 nautical miles (11,000 km) at 16 knots (30 km/h)
Complement:	8 Officers and 102 Sailors
Armament:	1 x 76 mm Oto melara gun with FCS 2 x 30 mm CIWS
Aircraft carried:	1x medium helicopter

The 2,300 ton displacement is probably the light displacement. Full load is probably more. The beam is essentially the same as the 378s, so the helicopter facilities look reasonable, although I hate to see them all the way aft, where they are most effected my pitching.

I’m hoping for a more sophisticated hybrid or integrated diesel electric powerplant on the OPC, but the two diesels on Saryu providing almost 21,000 SHP are certainly adequate, meeting the OPC’s objective speed of 25 knots.

Crew size is very similar, with a total of 110 compared with the OPCs’ projected Manpower Estimate of 104 total (15 officers, 9 E-7 and above, and 80 E-6 and below) plus up to 12 attached personnel. (Another source indicates Saryu will have a crew of 16 officers and 102 enlisted.)

Range is a little less at 6,000 nmi compared with 7,500 minimum for the OPC, but it is measured at a higher speed–16 vice 14 for the OPC. It is likely the Saryu would also have a longer range at lower speeds.

The armament is also similar, only a bit heavy on the Indian vessel compared to the 57mm Mk 110, single 25mm Mk38mod2 and two remotely controlled .50 cal projected for the OPC.

A little surprising, that these ships are being built for the Indian Navy, instead of the Coast Guard, which in India is part of the Navy, but there is also, reportedly, an outstanding contract for six similar ships for the Indian Coast Guard.

Rewrite of Seapower 21 Coming–Opportunity for More Clarity?

Posted on October 31, 2012 by Chuck Hill

As noted by Brian McGrath, over at Informationdissemination, the CNO has issued a “Position Report.” (pdf) It’s only three pages and updates his “Navigation Plan.”

This quote caught my eye, “With the other sea services we will revise our maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, to address the challenges and threats facing us in the near future.”

While there may be commitments in a war plan. Most Coasties don’t seem to have an idea what their war time roles would be. Perhaps this is an opportunity to address the apparent ambiguity. As discussed recently, a more explicit explanation of wartime roles for the Coast Guard could go a long way toward informing choices in the procurement of platforms and equipment, particularly the Offshore Patrol Cutter.

A second line, while addressed specifically at the Navy’s close formal relationship with the Marine Corps, suggest there will be an effort to minimize duplication of effort, “We will develop concepts to guide future amphibious operations, building on the ongoing “Single Naval Battle” effort with the Marine Corps.”

Where might we eliminated duplication of tasks and platforms between the Navy and Coast Guard?

As a side note one of the items addressed as a “fundamental responsibility” under the principle “Warfighting First.”

We deployed (and will keep) in the Arabian Gulf new mine hunting and neutralizing equipment, improved torpedoes; advance electromagnetic sensors, “up-gunned” patrol craft (emphasis applied–Chuck), and USS PONCE as an afloat forward staging base.

The reference to patrol craft may be exclusively to the Navy’s Cyclone Class, but some of the patrol craft in the vicinity are USCG. I haven’t seen anything indicating that their armament has been changed. Also have not seen any indication the Coasties are coming home. Could this become a long term standing commitment? Will the 110s be replaced by Webber class Fast Response Cutters?

How the Coast Guard Presents its Shipbuilding Programs to Congress

Posted on October 21, 2012 by Chuck Hill

I would like to talk about an observation found here : “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress” (pdf) Congressional Research Service, Ronald O’Rourke, July 20, 2012

“Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the adequacy of information available to Congress to support review and oversight of Coast Guard procurement programs, including cutter procurement programs. The Coast Guard has entered a period where, like the Navy, it is requesting significant funding each year from Congress to execute multiple ship procurement and modernization programs. Congress, however, lacks ready access to basic information exhibits on Coast Guard shipbuilding programs that are equivalent to those that support congressional review and oversight of Navy ship procurement programs.” (from p.32)

Could this be at least part of the reason, why we have such a problem selling our shipbuilding programs?

Quoting from p.34,

• “Although the Coast Guard’s annual budget submission includes a budget justification book, the entries in that book for the Coast Guard’s ship procurement programs do not present information as detailed and structured as that presented in the P-40, P-5, and P-27 exhibits. (note–the reference provides samples of these, see Appendix A–Chuck)
• “Reports on Coast Guard programs equivalent to DOD’s SAR reports are not readily available to Congress. (SAR=”Selected Aquisition Reports”–no sample of this–Chuck)
• “The Coast Guard’s POR (Program of Record–Chuck) is a statement of desired procurement quantities for certain procurement programs, but not a concise statement of the Coast Guard’s overall ship force structure objective, which would take into account continued service of existing ships that are not in need of immediate replacement. (Navy sample provided as Appendix C–Chuck)
• “The Coast Guard’s five-year capital investment plan shows annual funding amounts for individual programs, but not annual procurement quantities, and annual procurement quantities are not always easy to discern from annual funding amounts. (Sample in Appendix D–Chuck)
• “The Coast Guard’s budget submission does not include an equivalent of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.” (Sample in Appendix D–Chuck)

This report is addressed to Congress, but there is no reason we should not consider its findings.

Why don’t we have a statement of what our force structure objective is?

How can we have a Five Year Procurement Plan and not include procurement quantities?

And lastly why don’t we have a 30 year shipbuilding program if that is what Congress expects?

When I first heard that the Navy had a 30 year shipbuilding program, I thought it was a little ridiculous, because It is a long way out, but maybe it is a way of building consensus on where we are going. It will provide a warning when increases will be required. Patrol ships, Patrol boats, Polar Icebreakers, Buoy tenders, Icebreaking tugs, Inland construction tenders, and major renovations all have to fit into the same budget. A long term road map is needed because experience has shown that the budget is not elastic.

Among the advantages claimed for the Navy’s way of doing this (from p.33) are:

“identifying and evaluating cost growth and schedule delays in the execution of shipbuilding programs;

“understanding the relationship between annual procurement rates and unit procurement cost;

“evaluating whether programs are achieving satisfactory production learning curves over time;

“evaluating whether proposed sequences of annual procurement quantities for programs would be efficient to execute from an industrial standpoint;

“evaluating stability in Navy shipbuilding planning by tracking year-to-year changes in the five-year shipbuilding plan;

“identifying potential financial and industrial-base linkages between shipbuilding programs that are being funded in overlapping years;

“identifying and evaluating Navy assumptions concerning service lives and retirement dates for existing ships;

“evaluating whether ship procurement needs are being pushed into the future, potentially creating an expensive ship procurement “bow wave” in coming years; and

“understanding when the Navy will achieve its ship force level goals, and whether the Navy will experience ship inventory shortfalls relative to those goals that could affect the Navy’s ability to perform its missions in coming years.”

This all sounds like it should also apply to the Coast Guard.

The service is attempting to improve presentation of its programs, but even the planned improvements don’t address all these concerns. From a recent GAO report “COAST GUARD, Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes” (download the report, GAO-12-918 (.pdf)).

“Coast Guard acquisition officials told us that one way it is trying to address portfolio affordability is through an update to its Major Systems Acquisition Manual. According to draft language, the acquisition directorate’s Office of Resource Management will be required to maintain a chart to visually depict all competing acquisition program priorities within the capital investment plan at various points in time. Officials told us that each acquisition program will be required to include this chart in its required materials for future acquisition decision events. This update to the Coast Guard’s acquisition manual follows best practices outlined in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide with the exception that the guide notes the affordability assessment should, preferably, be conducted several years beyond the programming period. (emphasis applied) However, deferring costs could lead to what is commonly characterized as a bow-wave—or an impending spike in the requirement for additional funds—unless the Coast Guard proactively chooses to make some tradeoff decisions by re-examining requirements.

The Coast Guard has certainly encountered the “bow wave.” We need a way to address it now and avoid it in the future.

At the very least we need a “Force Structure Objective” and a 30 year shipbuilding (and disposal) Plan to identify how we intend to get there. ———————————————————————————————————-

While on the topic of selling a program the Naval Aviation has a fine example:

To view “Naval Aviation Vision, January 2012,” visit http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/nae/Vision%20Book/Naval_Aviation_Vision.pdf.)

The DHS Cutter Study, Trade-offs, and the Case for “Cutter X”

Posted on October 12, 2012 by Chuck Hill

I have had an opportunity to look a bit more closely at the Department of Homeland Security Cutter Fleet Study, “Options for the Future USCG Cutter Fleet Performance Trade-Offs with Fixed Acquisition Cost,” by Alarik Fritz • Raymond Gelhaus • Kent Nordstromr (.pdf).

The Study

I highly recommend at least the synopsis, which is the first thirteen pages. I think the study is an honest attempt to determine the best mix for the Coast Guard fleet; it is quite well done. Basically it holds cost constant and looks at possible alternatives to build the most effective fleet possible. It builds on work done for the earlier Coast Guard Fleet mix studies, but unlike the CG studies, it looks at alternatives to the program of record. It looks at where the missions are being performed and considers the effects of weather on mission performance in four regions, the Northeast, Southeast, West, and Alaska.

The study considers:

trading National Security Cutters (NSC) for more Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) (Approx. two OPCs per NSC)
trading OPC as currently described for OPCs that have reduced capabilities but retain the seakeeping and endurance of the OPCs (This was postulated but not explored in depth. It did not appear to make much difference.)
trading OPCs for a modernized version of the 270 (approx. four mod-270s for three OPCs)
trading OPCs for an equal number of LCS (This was seen as a non viable choice because of the higher cost and lower seakeeping and endurance of the LCS)

The problems (and these were recognized by the study) are:

Further delays in beginning building ships severely impacts near term capability
A major Cutter fleet of only NSCs and mod-270s does not meet the needs for heavy weather capability where it does exist.
Because the Mod-270s have as large a crew as the OPCs, a larger number of ships would add to the operating cost of the fleet.

What comes through loud and clear, from this study is that

We need ships with the capability to do boat and helicopter ops in State Five Seas particularly in the Northeast and Alaska.
In the Southeast and West, where the primary missions are Drug Enforcement and Migrant Interdiction, we are a long way from a point of diminishing returns, that is, mission performance is most directly linked to the number of cutters, increasing in in almost direct proportion to the number available.
The cutters ability to launch boats and helicopters in State Five conditions are much less important in the West and Southeast where most of the cutters are normally deployed.

An Alternative

In simplistic terms, while we need some highly capable hulls, we also need even more hulls on patrol, but the additional hulls don’t need to be particularly sophisticated. This leads me to the conclusion to the we really need another option, another class of ship, I’ll call it “Cutter X.” Think of this new class as taking the crew and equipment of a Webber class Fast Response Cutter (FRC) and putting them in a larger hull with more endurance and seakeeping, while accepting lower top speed than the FRC. We can take advantage of the training and corporate experience with the FRCs, if we add similarly equipped larger cutters.

I am going to talk about one possible fleet mix including this additional class. It is not necessarily the optimum mix, I’ll leave that for further analysis, but I think it may illustrate the advantage of including this additional class. For this proposed new mix I believe we can hold acquisition and operating costs constant, ie the same as the program of record. The proposal would trade 24 units in the program of record (2 NSCs, 4 OPCs, and 18 FRCs) for 22 units of this additional class (depending on cost we might get more) and could allow us to:

avoid the worst of the disastrous drop in the number of major cutters that appears likely in the 2020s,
field more major (cruising) cutters (49 vs 33),
while proceeding with the OPC program as currently planned.

I’ll compare this possible fleet mix to the Coast Guard Fleet as it existed in 2000/2001 and the fleet in the Program of Record (POR). on the basis of cutter days available and crewing requirements using both conventional and augmented crewing.

Before we do that, what would “Cutter X” look like? The design that I think comes closest to what I have in mind is the French built L’Adroit (also here and here). It is four times as large as the FRC at 1,450 tons but even with far less horsepower than the FRC (7,500 vs 11,600) it still does 21 knots. With the FRCs engines it would likely do about 24. It might be thought of as a modernized 210, in that unlike the 270 it has no medium caliber gun, fire control system, or ESM.

L’Adroit began sea trials in July 2011. DCNS photo

L’Adroit 285’x36’x11′, 7,500 HP 21 knots, crew 30 + additional accommodations for 29, endurance 30 days, 8,000 nmi @ 12, 1x20mm, helo deck for up to 10 ton Helo, hangar for 5 ton helo, UAV, ESM, missile and torpedo decoys

I find L’Adroit particularly appealing because, not only is it simple and run by a small crew (30), it even has a hanger (cleverly sited under the bridge) designed to house and carry out the maintenance on both a 5-ton helicopter (like the H-65) and UAVs at the same time. The flight deck can accommodate helicopters up to 10-tons (H-60?). It is actually a bit more sophisticated than we need in the also has ESM and missile and torpedo decoy systems. Range is very good at 8,000 nautical miles at 12 knots. Seakeeping, thanks to modern design and stabilizer technology, is probably at least as good at 270s and probably better.

(There are other similar ships that could be used as examples, see the addendum at the end of the post.)

As we have noted earlier, increased size doesn’t necessarily add much to the cost of a ships. Adding only volume, storage, and larger fuel and ballast tanks, I think these ships can be produced for no more than three times the price of the FRCs, perhaps less than twice as much. I don’t have prices for other examples, but for one, BAEs “Port of Spain” class, the original price for was only $80M each, less than twice the cost of a FRC and that figure included continued maintenance and training for the crew.

Basically my assumption is that the tradeoffs would work something like this:

1 NSC = 2 OPCs = 4 Cutter Xs = 12 FRCs

This equates to approx. prices of: $700M/NSC, $350/OPC, $175M/Cutter X, and $60M/FRC.

Lets compare the Fleets

As a baseline, take a look at the CG fleet as reported in the 2000/2001 Combat Fleets of the World (I happen to have a copy). It included:

12 Hamilton class 378s
13 Bear class 270s
16 Reliance class 210s
Alex Haley
Acushnet
Storis
49 Island class 110s

or 93 vessels including 44 “cruising cutters” to use the old generic term.

The Program of Record if completed will include:

8 NSC
25 OPC
58 FRC

or 91 vessels including 33 cruising cutters.

The proposed alternative mix would include:

6 NSC
21 OPC
22 Cutter X
40 FRC

or 89 vessels including 49 cruising cutters.

Cutter Days AFHP and Crew Requirements:

For the analysis below I have used the following as the personnel allowances for the new classes:

NSC 113
OPC 90 (still to be firmed up)
FRC 24 (includes two extra junior officers assigned to gain experience)

The personnel allowance for new class could be as little as 30 but is likely going to be more, if only as an opportunity to provide more at sea experience. Using the assumed personnel allowances and the trade-off identified earlier, the proposed mix would require no more personnel than the program of record unless the personnel allowance for “Cutter X” is more than 46. At most the personnel allowance should not be more than that of the 210s. My figures may be out of date, but at least at one point that was a crew of 62. I’ll use this as the upper limit.

The 2000/2001 fleet theoretically could have provided 8,140 cruising cutter days away from homeport (AFHP) (44 cruising cutters x 185 days) and would have required a total personnel allowance of 5,509.

Without augmentation, the program of record would theoretically provide 6,105 cruising cutter days AFHP (33 cruising cutters x 185 days) and require a total personnel allowance of 4,526.

With Augmentation (increasing their personnel allowance by a third and running the cruising cutters 230 days/year) the program of record would theoretically provide 7,590 cruising cutter days and require a total personnel allowance of 5259.

Without augmentation, the proposed mix would theoretically provide 9,065 cruising cutter days AFHP (49 cruising cutters x 185 days) and require a total personnel allowance of between 4,188 (assuming a crew of only 30 for Cutter X) and 4,892 (assuming a crew of 62 for Cutter X).

With Augmentation (increasing their personnel allowance by a third and running the cruising cutters 230 days/year) the proposed mix would theoretically provide 11270 cruising cutter days AFHP (49 cruising cutters x 230 days) and require a total personnel allowance of between 5264 (assuming a crew of only 30 for Cutter X) and 6203 (assuming a crew of 62 for Cutter X).

What about the loss of FRCs? The proposal would trim 18 FRC from the POR. They are projected to operate up to 2500 hours per day. If we assumed that all 2500 hours were devoted to offshore cruising for the 18 additional units, that would add 1875 days AFHP to the POR for a total of 7,980 days AFHP for the un-augmented fleet and 9,465 days AFHP for the augmented POR. (disregarding the 40 additional FRC that are included in both proposals).

In summary Cutter Days Available:

————————————————–Un-Augmented———Augmented by 1/3
2000/20001 (cruising cutters only) 8,140 N/A
POR (cruising cutters only) 6,105 7,590
POR (w/1,875 additional FRC day AFHP) 7,980 9,465
Proposed Mix w/Cutter X (cruising cutters only) 9,065 11,270

It looks like this alternative provides an improvement of at least 13% over the program of record, possibly as much as 48.5% depending on how you view the FRCs as a patrol asset. It appears that the un-augmented version may be superior to the augmented version of the program of record while using far fewer people.

Is it doable? What is the timing? How would it mess with other programs?

Cutter X production could ramp up as FRC construction trails off. If we are unable to increase the FY2013 from the current two units, that will put the program at 20 units funded. With no NSCs planned for FY 2014 and 2015, hopefully there will be funding for six in FY2014. Out-years, beginning in FY2015 will require a new contract to complete the additional 14 units proposed. Assuming six units a year, in FY 2015 and 2016, the last two would be funded in FY2017.

If the CG starts soon they could fund the prototype unit of Cutter X in FY2017. L’ Adroit was completed in approximately 13 months, so it is at least theoretically possible the first unit could be delivered well before the first OPC (expected FY2020). Replacing the FRC in the budget, two units a year could be funded in parallel with OPC construction.

Addendum: Other Patrol Vessels similar in concept:

HMS Clyde, 267x45x12, 8,250 HP 21 knots, crew 42 + accommodations for 20 more, endurance 7,800 nmi @ 12 knots, 1x30mm, Flight deck for up to Merlin (16 ton helicopter)

British River class OPV (UK) (and here), 261x45x12, 1,677 fl, 5,532 HP 20 knots, crew 30 + accommodations for 20 more, 1x20mm, no flight deck or hangar

BAE’s Port of Spain class (Brazil and Thailand) (more here), 264x44x12, 1700 tons, 9,700 HP 25 knots, crew 34+5 trainees, endurance , 1x30mm, 2x25mm, Helo deck, but no hangar (Thai version HTMS Krabi has a 76mm Oto Melara and 2x30mm)

Italian Ship Vega, Cassiopia Class, Nov. 2001, by Antoio Munoz Criado

Cassiopea class (Italy), 262x39x12, 1,475 tons fl, 8,800 HP 21 knots, crew 60, endurance 35 days, 3300 nmi @ 17 knots (probably 5,000 at 12 or 13 knots) 76mm gun and FCS helo deck and hangar.

Shipbuilding Trends

Posted on August 31, 2012 by Chuck Hill

For those that might like some illustrations to clarify the the acronyms that are being used to describe various ways ships are being powered now, I found a pdf “Naval Shipbuilding, Current Developmental Trends with Combatants and Combat Support Ships,” that shows layouts for six of them:

• CODAD (Combined Diesel and Diesel)
• CODOG (Combined Diesel or Gas Turbine)
• CODAG (Combined Diesel and Gas Turbine)
• CODAG-WARP (Combined Diesel and Gas
Turbine — Waterjet and Refined Propeller)
• CODELAG (Combined Diesel Electric and
Gas Turbine)
• AE (All Electric).

It goes on to talk about hull forms, alternatives to conventional propellers, construction materials and modularity.

Beginning on the about fourth page (of nine, marked as page 29) it becomes a sales pitch for two concepts that were being promoted by Blohm and Voss. One of them, the MEKO CSL (combat ship, littoral). might be of some interest in that it is not too far from the specs for the Offshore Patrol Cutter, except that it appears too compromised toward higher speed and does not look like it has either the endurance or the seakeeping that would make a good cutter.

Innovative Features in Britain’s New Frigate

Posted on August 26, 2012 by Chuck Hill

The Brits are planning a new class of frigate, the Type 26, that has some interesting features.

The ship is going to be a close contemporary of the Offshore Patrol Cutter with both the new frigate and the OPC programs scheduled to deliver their first ship in 2020. The Type 26 is expected to displace 5,400 tons full load, so it is about 20% larger than the National Security Cutters and perhaps twice the size of the OPC. Still some of the thinking might be applicable.

Propulsion:

“For propulsion, BAE has opted for a conventional but upgraded hybrid system combining gas turbines for top speeds and diesel generators for a fuel-efficient quiet mode, and these generators will provide significantly higher speeds than those of the Type 23.”

The 4,300 ton Type 23 cruises 7,800 miles at 17 knots so presumably they are talking about 20 knots or more on diesel-electric alone, for this relatively large ship. Like the now 22 year old type 23s, they will replace, the Type 26s’ generators will supply power for both propulsion and hotel services.

Boats, Mission Modules, and Aircraft:

“For greater flexibility of the combat systems, the ship will have an integrated mission bay and hangar, allowing the Navy to more easily deploy varying numbers of helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and boats according to the situation.”

The frigate, like many new designs, incorporates provision for reconfigurable space. What they have done differently is make this space adaptable for trade-offs among helicopters, unmanned vehicles (air, surface, and sub-surface), and boats.

Computer Systems:

“This basically means having a single computer system that can support the multiple pieces of software used throughout the ship, rather than installing separate hardware systems and local area networks from each supplier.

“Using blade server technology originally developed for the banking industry to provide reliable, high-power processing, the computing environment will be able to run different “virtual” operating systems to cope with the variety of programmes the ship will use, from navigation to combat management.”

Common hardware sounds like a great idea, but some are already questioning the choice of a Windows operating system.

More:

There are lots of conceptual drawings, a couple of videos, and additional links along with exhaustive comment (over 500) here.

Ship Design Efficiencies

Posted on January 4, 2012 by Chuck Hill

GCaptain has published a nice two part presentation by Wartsila discussing ways to make ship propulsion more efficient. The target audience is merchant ships, but much of it is applicable to Cutters.

Makes me more convinced than ever that, considering life-cycle costs, an integrated propulsion and ship service electrical system, like that already being used successfully on the Lewis and Clark class T-AKEs (and planned for the DDG-1000), combined with Azipod propulsion should be seriously considered for the Offshore Patrol Cutter.

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