“AUGMENT NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE BY UPGUNNING THE COAST GUARD”–CIMSEC

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This is a post I wrote for CIMSEC for their “Distributed Lethality Week,” but their editor thought it would fit better in their “Naval Force Structure Week.” Had I known the topic, I might have spent more time on ASW. 

The Navy has been talking a lot about distributed lethality lately, and “if it floats, it fights.” There is even talk of mounting cruise missiles on Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, even though it might compromise their primary mission. But so far there has been little or no discussion of extending this initiative to include the Coast Guard. The Navy should consider investing high-end warfighting capability in the Coast Guard to augment existing force structure and provide a force multiplier in times of conflict. A more capable Coast Guard will also be better able to defend the nation from asymmetrical threats.

Why Include the Coast Guard?

A future conflict may not be limited to a single adversary. We may be fighting another world war, against a coalition, perhaps both China and Russia, with possible side shows in Africa, the Near East, South Asia, and/or Latin America. If so, we are going to need numbers. The Navy has quality, but it does not have numbers. Count all the Navy CGs, DDGs, LCSs, PCs and PBs and other patrol boats and it totals a little over a hundred. The Coast Guard currently has over 40 patrol ships over 1,000 tons and over 110 patrol craft. The current modernization program of record will provide at least 33 large cutters, and 58 patrol craft of 353 tons, in addition to 73 patrol boats of 91 tons currently in the fleet, a total of 164 units. Very few of our allies have a fleet of similar size.

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Coast Guard 82 foot patrol boats interdicted coastal traffic off South Vietnam. (USCG Photo)

Coast Guard vessels routinely operate with U.S. Navy vessels. The ships have common equipment and their crews share common training. The U.S. Navy has no closer ally. Because of their extremely long range, cutters can operate for extended periods in remote theaters where there are few or even no underway replenishment assets. The Coast Guard also operates in places the USN does not. For example, how often do Navy surface ships go into the Arctic? The Coast Guard operates there routinely. Virtually all the U.S. vessels operating with the Fourth Fleet are Coast Guard. There are also no U.S. Navy surface warships home based north of the Chesapeake Bay in the Atlantic, none between San Diego and Puget Sound in the Pacific, and none in the Gulf of Mexico with the exception of mine warfare ships.

In the initial phase of a conflict, there will be need to round-up all the adversaries’ merchant ships and keep them from doing mischief. Otherwise they might lay mines, scout for or resupply submarines, put agents ashore, or even launch cruise missiles from containers. This is not the kind of work we want DDGs doing. It is exactly the type of work appropriate for Coast Guard cutters. Coast Guard ships enjoy a relatively low profile. Unlike a Carrier Strike Group or Navy SAG, they are less likely to be tracked by an adversary.

If we fight China in ten to twenty years, the conflict will likely open with China enjoying  local superiority in the Western Pacific and perhaps in the Pacific in general. If we fight both China and Russia it may be too close to call.

Platforms

The National Security Cutter (NSC)

This class of at least nine and possibly ten, 418 foot long, CODAG powered, 28 knot ships, at 4,500 tons full load, are slightly larger than Perry-class frigates. Additionally they have a 12,000 nautical mile cruising range. As built they are already equipped with:

  • Navy certified helicopter facilities and hangar space to support two H-60 helicopters,
  • A 57 mm Mk110 gun,
  • SPQ-9B Fire Control Radar
  • Phalanx 20mm Close in Weapon System (CIWS)
  • SRBOC/ 2 x NULKA countermeasures chaff/rapid decoy launcher,
  • AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System,
  • EADS 3D TRS-16 AN/SPS-75 Air Search Radar,
  • A combat system that uses Aegis Baseline 9 software,
  • A Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF)

In short, they are already equipped with virtually everything needed for a missile armed combatant except the specific missile related equipment. They are in many respects superior to the Littoral Combat Ships. Adding Cooperative Engagement Capability might even allow a Mk41 equipped cutter to effectively launch Standard missiles targeted by a third party.

USCG National Security Cutter BERTHOLF (USCG Photo)
USCG National Security Cutter BERTHOLF (USCG Photo)

The ships were designed to accept 12 Mk56 VLS which launch only the Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSM). Additionally, the builder, Huntington Ingalls, has shown versions of the class equipped with eight Mk41 VLS (located between the gun and superstructure) plus eight Harpoon, and Mk32 torpedo tubes (located on the stern). Adding missiles to the existing hulls should not be too difficult.

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LRASM topside launcher concept. The size and weight are comparable to launchers for Harpoon. (Lockheed Martin photo)

The Mk41 VLS are more flexible in that they can accommodate cruise missiles, rocket boosted antisubmarine torpedoes (ASROC), Standard missiles, or Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSM). Using the Mk41 VLS would allow a mix of cruise missiles and ESSM with four ESSMs replacing each cruise missile, for example eight cells could contain four cruise missiles and 16 ESSM, since ESSM can be “quad packed” by placing four missiles in each cell. Development of an active homing ESSM is expected to obviate the need for illuminating radars that are required for the semi-active homing missiles. Still, simpler deck mounted launchers might actually offer some advantages, in addition to their lower installation cost, at least in peacetime.

Cutters often visit ports where the population is sensitive to a history of U.S. interference in their internal affairs. In some cases, Coast Guard cutters are welcome, while U.S. Navy ships are not. For this reason, we might want to make it easy for even a casual observer to know that the cutter is not armed with powerful offensive weapons. Deck mounted launchers can provide this assurance, in that it is immediately obvious if missile canisters are, or are not, mounted. The pictures below show potential VLS to be considered.

The relatively small footprint of the Mk56 VLS system (pdf) can be seen here on a Danish Absalon-class command and support ship (beam 64 feet, by comparison the National Security Cutters’ beam is 54 feet). Two sets are visible in the foreground, one set of twelve with missile canisters with red tops in place to the right, on the ship’s centerline, and a second set of twelve without canisters to the left. The Absalon-class has three twelve-missile sets, with the third set off camera to the right. (Royal Danish Navy)
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12 earlier Mk48 mod3 VLS for ESSM seen here mounted on the stern of a 450 ton 177 foot Danish StanFlex300 Flyvefisken-class patrol boat. The Mk56 launchers replace the Mk48s with an approximate 20% weight savings.
The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC)

The OPC  program of record for provides 25 of these ships. A contract has been awarded to Eastern Shipbuilding Group for detail design and construction of the first ship, with options for eight more. The notional design is 360 feet long, with a beam of 54 feet and a draft of 17 feet. The OPCs will have a sustained speed of 22.5 knots, a range of 10,200 nautical miles (at 14 knots), and an endurance of 60-days. It’s hangar will accommodate one MH-60 or an MH-65 and an Unmanned Air System (UAS).

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Notional design characteristics and performance of the OPC. (USCG Image)

It will have a space for a SCIF but it is not expected to be initially installed. As built, it will have a Mk38 stabilized 25 mm gun in lieu of the Phalanx carried by the NSC. Otherwise, the Offshore Patrol Cutter will be equipped similarly to the National Security Cutter. It will likely have the same Lockheed Martin COMBATSS-21 combat management system as the LCS derived frigates. It is likely they could be fitted with cruise missiles and possibly Mk56 VLS for ESSM as well. Additionally these ships will be ice strengthened, allowing the possibility of taking surface launched cruise missiles into the Arctic

The Fast Response Cutter (FRC)

The FRC program of record is to build 58 of these 158 foot, 28 knot, 365 ton vessels. 19 have been delivered and they are being built at a rate of four to six per year. All 58 are now either built, building, contracted, or optioned. They are essentially the same displacement as the Cyclone class PCs albeit a little slower, but with better seakeeping and a longer range. Even these small ships have a range of 2,950 nm. They are armed with Mk 38 mod2 25 mm guns and four .50 caliber M2 machine guns.

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The first Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutter (FRC), USCGC Bernard C. Webber. (USCG photo)

They are already better equipped than the Coast Guard 82 foot patrol boats that were used for interdiction of covert coastal traffic during the Vietnam war. If they were to be used to enforce a blockade against larger vessels, they would need weapons that could forcibly stop medium to large vessels.

The Marine Protector Class

There are 73 of these 87 foot, 91 ton, 26 knot patrol boats. Four were funded by the Navy and provide force protectionservices for Submarines transiting on the surface in and out of King Bay, GA and Bangor, WA.

File:US Navy 090818-N-1325N-003 U. S. Coast Guardsmen man the rails as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Sea Fox (WPB 87374) is brought to life at Naval Base Kitsap.jpg
Photo: KEYPORT, Wash. (Aug. 18, 2009) U. S. Coast Guardsmen man the rails as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Sea Fox (WPB 87374), one of four of this class assigned to Force Protection units. (U.S. Navy photo Ray Narimatsu/Released)

If use of these vessels for force protection were to be expanded to a more hostile environment, they would likely need more than the two .50 caliber M2 machine guns currently carried.  The four currently assigned to force protection units are currently equipped with an additional stabilized remote weapon station.

Weapons

Cruise Missiles

The U.S. Navy currently has or is considering four different surface launched cruise missiles: Harpoon, Naval Strike Missile (NSM), Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Tomahawk. Of these, LRASM appears most promising for Coast Guard use. Tomahawk is the largest of the four and both Harpoon and NSM would be workable, but they do not have the range of LRASM. The intelligence and range claimed for the LRASM not only makes it deadlier in wartime, it also means only a couple of these missiles on each of the Coast Guard’s largest cutters would allow  the Coast Guard’s small, but widely distributed force to rapidly and effectively respond to asymmetric threats over virtually the entire U.S. coast as well as compliment the U.S. Navy’s efforts to complicate the calculus of a near-peer adversary abroad

Small Precision Guided Weapons

It is not unlikely that Fast Response Cutters will replace the six 110 foot patrol boats currently based in Bahrain. If cutters are to be placed in an area where they face a swarming threat they will need the same types of weapons carried or planned for Navy combatants to address this threat. These might include the Sea Griffin used on Navy’s Cyclone-class PCs or Longbow Hellfires planned for the LCS.

Additionally, a small number of these missiles on Coast Guard patrol craft would enhance their ability to deal with small, fast, highly maneuverable threats along the U.S. coast and elsewhere

Light Weight Anti-Surface Torpedoes 

If Coast Guard units, particularly smaller ones, were required to forcibly stop potentially hostile merchant ships for the purposes of a blockade, quarantine, embargo, etc. they would need something more that the guns currently installed.

The U.S. does not currently have a light weight anti-surface torpedo capable of targeting a ship’s propellers, but with Elon Musk building a battery factory that will double the worlds current capacity and cars that out accelerate Farraris, building a modern electric small anti-surface torpedo should be easy and relatively inexpensive.

Assuming they have the same attributes of ASW torpedoes, at about 500 pounds these weapons take up relatively little space. Such a torpedo would also allow small Coast Guard units to remain relevant against a variety of threats.

Conclusion

Adding cruise missile to the Coast Guard National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters would increase the number of cruise missile-equipped U.S .surface ships by about 40 percent.

Coast Guard Patrol craft (WPCs) and patrol boats (WPBs) significantly outnumber their Navy counterparts. They could significantly increase the capability to deal with interdiction of covert coastal traffic, act as a force multiplier in conventional conflict, and allow larger USN ships to focus on high-end threats provided they are properly equipped to deal with the threats. More effective, longer ranged, and particularly more precise weapons could also improve the Coast Guard’s ability to do it Homeland security mission.

Thanks to OS2 Michael A. Milburn for starting the  conversation that lead to this article.

Littoral Operations Center, a Coast Guard Role?

MarineLink is reporting,

“The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)in Monterey has established a new Littoral Operations Center (LOC) to focus on these threats and opportunities and is hosting a series of workshops this week to examine littoral operations…The LOC will conduct and promote the study of U.S. Navy and allied partner nation policy, strategy and technology necessary to deal with conventional, irregular and criminal threats in these crowded and cluttered coastal waters and their adjacent lands,” said LOC Director, NPS Senior Lecturer Dr. Kalev Sepp.”

This looks like something the Coast Guard should be involved in.

Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation: Examining Cutter, Aircraft, and Communications Needs

“The Coast Guard’s FY2014 Five Year (FY2014-FY2018) CIP (Capital Investment Plan–Chuck) includes a total of about $5.1 billion in acquisition funding, which is about $2.5 billion, or about 33%, less than the total of about $7.6 billion that was included in the Coast Guard’s FY2013 Five Year (FY2013-FY2017) CIP. (In the four common years of the two plans—FY2014-FY2017—the reduction in funding from the FY2013 CIP to the FY2014 CIP is about $2.3 billion, or about 37%.) This is one of the largest percentage reductions in funding that I have seen a five-year acquisition account experience from one year to the next in many years.”–Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service

The video above is long (one hour and forty two minutes) but I think it is important, and it might even make you mad. This is a hearing before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. The first hour and ten minutes are fairly routine and I’ll summarize some of it below. It includes the obligatory thank you to the Department Secretary (Secretary Nepolitano has been “particularly supportive”) when in fact the Coast Guard has been cut far more deeply than the rest of DHS. The real meat begins with Ronald O’Rourke’s presentation at 1hr.10min.

(1:10 to 1:15) Mr. O’Rourke’s stance is neutral, as befits a good researcher, preparing a balanced assessment for the law makers, but he succeeds in making some of the best arguments I have heard for increased funding for the Coast. (Unfortunately this seems in marked contrast to the passivity of the Coast Guard leadership. Hopefully this is more apparent than real and there are things going on that we do not see. There is some indication this is true, here and here.) He also takes the Coast Guard to task for not employing multi-year and block buy contracting.

(1:15 to 1:19) Dr. Bucci provides his personnel view, noting that the Coast Guard has not learned to play the Washington bureaucratic game of asking for more than really need. (He also specifically advocates an exemption to the Jones act to allow the Coast Guard to lease foreign built icebreakers.)

(1:19 to 1:24) Dr. Korb advocates a Unified National Security Budget that looks as trade-offs between the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State. He also advocates including the Commandant in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointing a Civilian Service Secretary to act as an advocate. Later, when questioned, he points out that the Coast Guard’s unofficial motto is “We can do more with less” and if that is what you ask for “that is what you will get.” Among his telling points was that the Navy budget is 16 times that of the Coast Guard even though they have only eight times the people.

(1:24 to 1:42) Testimony of these three witnesses continued in response to the Representatives’ questions.

You can take a short cut and read the text of the prepared statements, but the Congressmen’s questions and reactions are also instructive, and generally supportive of the Coast Guard.

(0:00 to 1:10) Discussion with Vice Admiral Currier, Vice Commandant

Vice Admiral Currier’s prepared statement was completed at 14 minutes. Questions, answers and committee member statements continued to 1 hour and 10 minutes.

(Note, I am not taking the points in chronological order as discussed)

C-27J: The Coast Guard is apparently counting on getting at least 14 of these aircraft, perhaps as many as 21. Eighteen C-144s have been funded so far of a total of 36 in the “Program of Record.” Substituting C-27Js (which do have a higher operating cost) for the remaining 18 could represent a savings of up to $800M in acquisition costs. Calling it a strategic pause, the Coast Guard has zeroed additional C-144 purchases as it waits to find out if it will get these surplus Air Force assets.

Zeroing future C-144 purchases accounted for about a third of the reduction of the CIP compared to last years. As much as I have supported this course of action, and as confident as the subcommittee sounded, this is really not a done deal because the Air National Guard wants to keep the planes and they are very well connected politically. Additionally there are others who also want these aircraft.

Webber Class WPCs: Another major change was the decision to fund only two Fast Response Cutters annually instead of the four or six funded previously. Simply spreading out the buy is a really bad decision. Building six per year cost less per ship. Buying only two per year will require a renegotiation of contract. In addition, inflation in the ship building industry is not only higher that inflation in general, its rate is higher than the interest rate on government borrowing, so it would cost less in the long run to borrow money and build as rapidly as we can, even including the interest paid on the bonds. This consideration applies to the Offshore Patrol Cutter as well as the FRC. I don’t think this is the last word on construction of the FRCs, and we may see more money added to the budget.

Bertholf Class WMSLs: It now appears all eight National security Cutters will be completed, but we can waste time and money if we do not fund long lead time items and this is currently the plan. This was also discussed and generally deplored.

Multiple Crewing: Questions were raised about when the Coast Guard would demonstrate the “Crew Rotation Concept” which has been touted as being able to provide 225-230 days per year from each of the larger cutters. The Vice Commandant responded that the plan would not be implemented until 2017, but until that time the NSCs are expected to average 210 days AFHP.

Offshore Patrol Cutters:  VAdm Currier said the CG expects to select to three preliminary designs for further development by the end of this FY, and that the final selection will be made a year later, by the end of FY2014.

Unmanned Air Systems: The uncertain future of the Coast Guard’s Unmanned Air Siystem (UAS) programs, and its dependence on the US Navy’s development, was discussed, with Representative Garamendi pointing out this represented a major hole in the Coast Guard’s plan to maintain Maritime Domain Awarenes (MDA).

Response Boat Medium: A Representative questioned why the Coast Guard had stopped the Response Boat, Medium program at 170 RBMs rather than building the 180 approved by Congress, without submitting a justification report for the smaller program as required by Congress.

Port Security: Representative Janice Hahn, California, expressed discomfort with the current container inspection rate of only 2 to 3%. She also suggested the possibility of diverting from some customs money to port security.

The Arctic: A pleasant surprise was that VAdm Currier expressed confident that the Coast Guard can already demonstrate good Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Arctic. Don Young, Alaska, asked several questions about icebreaker. He opined that the Coast Guard should lease an “American built” icebreaker, never mind the fact that no heavy icebreakers have been built in the US since the Polar Sea. We could of course lease a ship someone would call an icebreaker, but that sort of misses the point. VAdm. Currier did say the Polar Sea could be returned to operation after about three years work at a cost of $100M and have a seven to ten year additional useful life.

Missions: The question, what missions the Coast Guard will not do, given reduced funding. The only answer was that we will have to make some tough choices and the CG and the Department will do a portfolio analysis, date of completion unknown.

Tone: Generally the Committee was supportive. The irony of spending $5B for an East Coast Missile Defense system while shorting the Coast Guard assets that are necessary to prevent a much more probable method of introducing weapons of mass destruction was not lost on the Committee. They also saw the foolishness adding $46B to  beef-up patrols along the Mexican Border and simultaneously undercutting the Coast Guard. They also discussed the double standard by which they could write a $2.6B blank check to purchase unspecified aircraft for Afghanistan, while demanding detailed justification for all Coast Guard purchases. They seemed to recognize that if “National Security” were considered in a holistic fashion, the Coast Guard would do a lot better, but that the committee structure in Congress prevented this kind of evaluation of trade-offs.

Sexual assault: The Vice Commandant addressed this in his prepared remarks and it was also discussed in the subsequent question and answer period.

Things the Coast Guard might do differently:

There was a clear message from the three civilian witnesses that the Coast Guard has not learned to “play the game,” that the Coast Guard has been excessively modest in pointing out its needs, and that because of this reticence important missions are being short changed.

We have repeatedly told our elected representatives about our successes, but that leaves the impression everything is alright. Everything is not alright. We need to keep reminding them what is not getting done and the possible consequences of inaction. Every time a Congressionally mandated task is not done to the fullest extent, it should be reported, and they should be made to understand that the reason it was not done is lack of resources. We need to put the onus on Congress and the Executive.

When asked what mission the CG will not do, Adm Currier “we can adjust.” Given an opportunity to address why the aging fleet’s patrol hours now down 8-12%, Admiral Currier said, Currier, “We are OK for OPC/MEC” (Frankly I don’t think that is true. The Coast Guard’s own studies point out a need not only for newer replacements but also more ships) and “The gap is in the Offshore and the NSC is key.” The construction of the eight NSCs seems assured, it was time to point out how the fleet will continue to age and deteriorate. We can expect even more breakdowns and higher maintenance costs for the legacy fleet. In the nine years 1964 to 1972, 28 new ships entered service with the Coast Guard (3.11 ships per year). Only three have been replaced and we are building at a rate of less than one a year, and we don’t expect to deliver more than one replacement per year until at least 2023 and then never more than two a year. Things are going to get much worse before they get better.

We have done an absolutely terrible job of conveying an sense of urgency in replacing our over-aged patrol ships. I have on my desk the August issues of the Navy League’s magazine “SeaPower” and the US Naval Institute’s Magazine “Proceedings.” Both magazines carry happy glowing reports of the Coast Guard’s successes. There is hardly a word about the growing problems with our major cutters. There is hardly a mention of the OPC and certainly no article designed to explain the urgency of its funding and why the naval and maritime community should be excited about it.

The Coast Guard needs to publish a 30 year ship building plan. When I first saw that the Navy was doing this, I thought it was ridiculous, but think about what it does for you. It lays out intentions far into the future and prepares the decision makers to deal with uneven funding requirements. It also highlights the bow wave effect of deferring acquisitions.

If the Coast Guard can get seven to ten years out of the Polar Sea for $100M then compared to 30 years from a new $800M to $1B icebreaker then the costs are not out of line. Perhaps we should not reject the idea. By the time the new icebreaker is ready, the remaining life in Polar Star will be used up (if it actually lasts that long) and we will still have only one heavy icebreaker. Putting an second heavy icebreaker into the fleet, as soon as possible, is the best way to create a presumption that there will be a second new icebreaker to follow the one currently planned. These ships break, we really need more than one.

Perhaps it is also time to make another examination of the legacy of Deepwater that is still with the Coast Guard. Are there alternatives to the long range aircraft/UAVs and the ship types that have been perpetuated long after the program failed?

The Coast Guard has belittled its role in national defense and in doing so has also minimized the future utility of its assets in this role. Fear is a stronger motivator than altruism. We need to recognize that the nation is motivated more by fear than by the desire to do good or maintain its infrastructure. This is the reason the Defense Department is well funded.  The national defense role of the Coast Guard, both against terrorism in peacetime and as a naval auxiliary that can bring needed additional numbers to the fight in wartime needs much more emphasis. It is obvious, listening to the subcommittee, that the counter-terrorism role was what they had in the forefront of their minds.

The Sub-Committee:

—Republicans

Duncan Hunter, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska
Howard Coble, North Carolina
Frank A. LoBiondo, New Jersey
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania
Steve Southerland, II, Florida, Vice Chair
Tom Rice, South Carolina
Trey Radel, Florida
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania, (ex officio)

—Democrats

John Garamendi, California, Ranking Member
Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland
Corrine Brown, Florida
Rick Larsen, Washington
Timothy H. Bishop, New York
Janice Hahn, California
Lois Frankel, Florida
Nick J. Rahall, II, West Virginia, (ex officio)

Uncertainty in the Arctic

Naval War College Professor James Holmes recently wrote suggesting that a rearmed Coast Guard and the Air Force should be entrusted with the security of the Arctic while the Navy busies itself in the Western Pacific and the waters around SW Asia. We discussed the proposal earlier here: “America Needs a Coast Guard That Can Fight”

He subsequently discussed the topic as a guest on National Public Radio and on a blog radio show.

Today, he adds another chapter to the story, “Five Obstacles to U. S. Arctic Strategy,” that outlines why this will be a hard sell. Earlier he also wrote an article about Coast Guard Wartime missions, “U. S. Coast Guard Meets Corbett”

Rewrite of Seapower 21 Coming–Opportunity for More Clarity?

As noted by Brian McGrath, over at Informationdissemination, the CNO has issued a “Position Report.” (pdf) It’s only three pages and updates his “Navigation Plan.”

This quote caught my eye, “With the other sea services we will revise our maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”, to address the challenges and threats facing us in the near future.”

While there may be commitments in a war plan. Most Coasties don’t seem to have an idea what their war time roles would be. Perhaps this is an opportunity to address the apparent ambiguity. As discussed recently, a more explicit explanation of wartime roles for the Coast Guard could go a long way toward informing choices in the procurement of platforms and equipment, particularly the Offshore Patrol Cutter.

A second line, while addressed specifically at the Navy’s close formal relationship with the Marine Corps, suggest there will be an effort to  minimize duplication of effort, “We will develop concepts to guide future amphibious operations, building on the ongoing “Single Naval Battle” effort with the Marine Corps.”

Where might we eliminated duplication of tasks and platforms between the Navy and Coast Guard?

As a side note one of the items addressed as a “fundamental responsibility” under the principle “Warfighting First.”

”” We deployed (and will keep) in the Arabian Gulf new mine hunting and neutralizing equipment, improved torpedoes; advance electromagnetic sensors, “up-gunned” patrol craft (emphasis applied–Chuck), and USS PONCE as an afloat forward staging base.

The reference to patrol craft may be exclusively to the Navy’s Cyclone Class, but some of the patrol craft in the vicinity are USCG. I haven’t seen anything indicating that their armament has been changed. Also have not seen any indication the Coasties are coming home. Could this become a long term standing commitment? Will the 110s be replaced by Webber class Fast Response Cutters?

New Budget Cancels Plan for Last Two NSCs

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U.S. Coast Guard photo ID: 100228-G-2129M-004, by Petty Officer 3rd Class Kevin Metcalf

Defensedaily.com is reporting that while the FY 2013 budget request would fund the sixth National Security Cutter, additional purchases would be delayed while the Department reevaluates its needs.

Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said yesterday that the reason for proposing a pause in the NSC program is due to budget constraints as well as examining how it fits with the Navy’s plans.

“We will look at [NSC’s] seven and eight in light of what the Navy is doing,” Napolitano told the House Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee during a hearing to examine her department’s budget request. “So we need to look at what the DoD is doing with respect to their own force lay down to see what we need to be putting in the acquisition pipeline.”

Presumably this ties in with the Navy’s review of their own programs.

It has been recognized for a long time that current plans would require a substantial increase in AC&I funding. The GAO has called the program of record “unachievable.”

While I certainly applaud coordination with DOD, this could mean a lot of different things.

Will the Navy try to move the Littoral Combat Ship program to the CG as replacement for the OPC?

Will the Navy try to avoid cutting their building programs further by suggesting that the CG does not need large ships for drug enforcement because they will supply platforms for CG boarding teams? or

This might not be so bad. When Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work  discusses American Sea Power, he almost never fails to mention the contribution of the Coast Guard. Perhaps some additional thought will go into how possible military roles should be reflected in the requirements for Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC), Icebreakers, and other assets.

An OPC that  reflects military requirements would almost certainly be larger and more capable than one designed only to meet peacetime requirements that might otherwise have been forced on the CG in an austere budget climate. Those greater capabilities probably would also make it a more capable CG asset in peacetime.

The differences might include a larger hull, more speed, better aviation facilities, and better communications and sensors, possibly including a towed array that would be useful for detecting drug subs (both true subs and self propelled semi-submersibles).

Its not clear yet, if this is a disaster or an opportunity. Perhaps a new way of justifying CG assets will come out of this, and the government will see that putting money in the CG is a sound investment.

What Might Coast Guard Cutters do in Wartime? Part 1, Navy Shortfalls

Many of the new generation cutters may be around for another 50 years so it is likely they will see some conflict as previous generations have. What might cutters be doing if we go to war? What sort of environments? What possible missions? What capabilities do they have? And what might we want to be added?

We need to start with the question, what limitations does the Navy have that might prompt them to call on the Coast Guard? Why would the US Navy, by far the most powerful in the world, need help from the Coast Guard? Let’s look at their missions and the forces available.

Navy Missions

The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas.

Included in that might be:

Protecting the US and its allies from attack from the sea in any of a number of forms, overt or covert, by air, surface, sub-surface, or missiles (both cruise and ballistic).

Projecting power against hostile forces, by a similar diverse range of options.

Protecting US and friendly nations’ use of the oceans and the air above them for purposes including (but not limited to) both military and economic exploitation.

Denying that use to hostile powers.

Those objectives entail a huge range of subsidiary tasks. New missions, like defending population centers against ballistic missile attacks, have been added, but centuries old historic missions still must also be addressed.

Forces

The Navy currently has approximately 285 vessels, but not all these are combatant ships. The exact composition changes frequently but they have roughly:

  • 2 Fleet command ships
  • 11 aircraft carriers (there is talk that this may go down to 9. In the not to distant past 15 was the norm)
  • 28 Amphipbious assault ships (LHA/LHD/LPD/LSD)
  • 83 Guided missile Cruisers and Destroyers
  • 26 Frigates (soon to be decommissioned)
  • 2 Littoral Combat ships (LCS) (55 ships planned, expected to replace remaining frigates, the 14 mine countermeasures ships, and the 11 Cyclone class patrol craft)
  • 57 SSN and SSGN submarines armed with torpedoes and tactical missiles
  • 14 SSBN Strategic Defense Ballistic Missile submarines
  • 14 Mine Counter Measures Ships (MCM) (soon to be decommissioned)
  • 11 Cyclone Class Patrol Craft
  • 37 Underway replenishment ships

This is the fewest ships in the US Navy in almost a hundred years. Additionally in view of current budget limitations the size of the fleet is likely to shrink further. Nine cruisers and three LSDs are expected to be decommissioned including some as young as 20 years old, and since the “super committee” has failed to act, the entire LCS program may be in jeopardy, and the fleet may be reduce to approximately 230 ships.

Even if its budget is not cut, if it only remains static, the fact that ship prices are going up faster than inflation, and the Navy is choosing to concentrate more and more technology in fewer and fewer ships means the number of ships will likely continue to fall.

Shortfalls

Most of these ships are individually superbly capable, but the US Navy has some known weakness.

  • Inshore
  • Mine Counter Measures (MCM)
  • Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
  • Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS)
  • Sea Control
  • Base Security

INSHORE: The Navy has very few shallow draft patrol craft of a type useful for boarding and  inspecting coastwise traffic. This is why the Coast Guard has been in Iraq, and why 82s were sent to Vietnam. Fortunately recent requirements have been small because the Iraqi coast line is short. Almost anywhere else, controlling coastal traffic will be much more difficult.

MCM: Despite the fact that since WWII, mines have done more damage to US Navy ships than any other weapon, the US Navy’s MCM capability is modest and generally regarded as both more poorly equipped and less professional than their European counterparts. The LCS program has been expected to address this, but the mine countermeasures systems planned for the LCS are still a long way from maturity. Still the concept of add-on, portable, modular systems is appealing.

ASW: Anti-submarine Warfare capabilities were allowed to decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was understandable under the circumstances, but now the ASW problem is reemerging. Historically ASW has been a “numbers” problem as well as a quality problem. Certainly the US Navy has the quality, but they no longer have large numbers. Not only is the number of escort vessels down dramatically including the impending total disappearance of specialized ASW escorts, carriers no longer have fixed wing ASW aircraft, and Maritime patrol aircraft numbers are way down. Reserve fleets have disappeared and additionally, allied fleets have also declined even more precipitously.

NSFS: Since the decommissioning of the Iowa Class battleships, there has been concern that there has not been enough Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) assets. This concern went as far as resulting in a Congressional mandate (Section 1011 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 421)). There have been several attempts to address this need including putting NLOS missiles on the LCS ships and a plan to build 32 “Land Attack” Zumwalt Class Destroyers with advanced gun systems. The NLOS missile has been canceled and the Zumwalt class has been truncated at only three ships. In a benign environment close air support can fill this void, but if there is an active air defense or air superiority is contested, NSFS may be essential.

SEA CONTROL: Julian Corbett was the disciple of Sea Control and as he would say, Battle force ships make sea control possible, but cannot be exercised by “battleships” alone. There is the question of simple numbers.  At the end of WWII the Navy had 6,768 ships, including 1,600 ships of over 1,000 tons, and those ships were complimented by similarly large numbers of allied vessels. The number of ships in the Navy has been steadily declining and it appears they may decline even more. Numerically this is the smallest US Navy since World War I, almost 100 years. Salt water covers approximately 69% of the earth’s surface or about 352,103,700 km²–roughly 100 million square nautical miles (rounding down a bit). That is roughly 352,113  sq. miles/ship. If we look at only cruisers, destroyers, and the projected LCS force (less than 140 ships) then that is about 715,000 square miles per ship. Spread evenly across the ocean they would be more than 800 miles apart, but of course ships are not spread evenly across the ocean and they are not all underway all the time, and they have missions other than sea control. Our attempts to control the flow of Narcotics by sea and attempts to prevent piracy off Africa demonstrate how truly hard Sea Control can be. The US and its close allies no longer control the majority of merchant and fishing fleets. Potential enemies control substantial numbers of ships that could damage the US and its allies in a number of ways including landing agents, smuggling weapons, laying mines, or directly attacking assets. Russian attempts to market the “Club-K” cruise missile as a containerized system that can weaponize any vessel with space for a standard 40 foot container highlights the potential dangers of failure to control enemy shipping.

BASE SECURITY: Once the US Navy was present in virtually every American port and there were a host of small ships that provided security for these bases. Navy resources are increasingly concentrated and the flotillas of small craft are gone. The Chinese vision of how to counter the US includes attacks on vulnerable rear area and logistical support. In Adm. Liu’s vision. “In applying tactics to ‘active defense’ operations, we would act on the guiding principle that we advance if the enemy advances. That is, if the enemy attacked our coastal areas, we would attack the enemy’s rear.”…Liu recounts addressing a June 1984 forum. He was gratified that the navy had embraced “a unified guiding ideology for its combat operations. It had made clear the combat principle of ‘active defense, offshore battles’ and the combat forms of ‘positional warfare for firm coastal defense, mobile sea warfare, and sabotage guerrilla sea warfare.’”

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When you start with only 120 to 140 surface combatants, after assigning ships to escort eleven carriers and ten Amphibious ready groups, assigning ships for Ballistic Missile Defense, and factoring in maintenance requirements, there simply is very little left for other missions.