This is a post I wrote for CIMSEC for their “Distributed Lethality Week,” but their editor thought it would fit better in their “Naval Force Structure Week.” Had I known the topic, I might have spent more time on ASW.
The Navy has been talking a lot about distributed lethality lately, and “if it floats, it fights.” There is even talk of mounting cruise missiles on Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships, even though it might compromise their primary mission. But so far there has been little or no discussion of extending this initiative to include the Coast Guard. The Navy should consider investing high-end warfighting capability in the Coast Guard to augment existing force structure and provide a force multiplier in times of conflict. A more capable Coast Guard will also be better able to defend the nation from asymmetrical threats.
Why Include the Coast Guard?
A future conflict may not be limited to a single adversary. We may be fighting another world war, against a coalition, perhaps both China and Russia, with possible side shows in Africa, the Near East, South Asia, and/or Latin America. If so, we are going to need numbers. The Navy has quality, but it does not have numbers. Count all the Navy CGs, DDGs, LCSs, PCs and PBs and other patrol boats and it totals a little over a hundred. The Coast Guard currently has over 40 patrol ships over 1,000 tons and over 110 patrol craft. The current modernization program of record will provide at least 33 large cutters, and 58 patrol craft of 353 tons, in addition to 73 patrol boats of 91 tons currently in the fleet, a total of 164 units. Very few of our allies have a fleet of similar size.
Coast Guard vessels routinely operate with U.S. Navy vessels. The ships have common equipment and their crews share common training. The U.S. Navy has no closer ally. Because of their extremely long range, cutters can operate for extended periods in remote theaters where there are few or even no underway replenishment assets. The Coast Guard also operates in places the USN does not. For example, how often do Navy surface ships go into the Arctic? The Coast Guard operates there routinely. Virtually all the U.S. vessels operating with the Fourth Fleet are Coast Guard. There are also no U.S. Navy surface warships home based north of the Chesapeake Bay in the Atlantic, none between San Diego and Puget Sound in the Pacific, and none in the Gulf of Mexico with the exception of mine warfare ships.
In the initial phase of a conflict, there will be need to round-up all the adversaries’ merchant ships and keep them from doing mischief. Otherwise they might lay mines, scout for or resupply submarines, put agents ashore, or even launch cruise missiles from containers. This is not the kind of work we want DDGs doing. It is exactly the type of work appropriate for Coast Guard cutters. Coast Guard ships enjoy a relatively low profile. Unlike a Carrier Strike Group or Navy SAG, they are less likely to be tracked by an adversary.
If we fight China in ten to twenty years, the conflict will likely open with China enjoying local superiority in the Western Pacific and perhaps in the Pacific in general. If we fight both China and Russia it may be too close to call.
This class of at least nine and possibly ten, 418 foot long, CODAG powered, 28 knot ships, at 4,500 tons full load, are slightly larger than Perry-class frigates. Additionally they have a 12,000 nautical mile cruising range. As built they are already equipped with:
- Navy certified helicopter facilities and hangar space to support two H-60 helicopters,
- A 57 mm Mk110 gun,
- SPQ-9B Fire Control Radar
- Phalanx 20mm Close in Weapon System (CIWS)
- 2 SRBOC/ 2 x NULKA countermeasures chaff/rapid decoy launcher,
- AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare System,
- EADS 3D TRS-16 AN/SPS-75 Air Search Radar,
- A combat system that uses Aegis Baseline 9 software,
- A Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence Facility (SCIF)
In short, they are already equipped with virtually everything needed for a missile armed combatant except the specific missile related equipment. They are in many respects superior to the Littoral Combat Ships. Adding Cooperative Engagement Capability might even allow a Mk41 equipped cutter to effectively launch Standard missiles targeted by a third party.
The ships were designed to accept 12 Mk56 VLS which launch only the Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSM). Additionally, the builder, Huntington Ingalls, has shown versions of the class equipped with eight Mk41 VLS (located between the gun and superstructure) plus eight Harpoon, and Mk32 torpedo tubes (located on the stern). Adding missiles to the existing hulls should not be too difficult.
The Mk41 VLS are more flexible in that they can accommodate cruise missiles, rocket boosted antisubmarine torpedoes (ASROC), Standard missiles, or Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSM). Using the Mk41 VLS would allow a mix of cruise missiles and ESSM with four ESSMs replacing each cruise missile, for example eight cells could contain four cruise missiles and 16 ESSM, since ESSM can be “quad packed” by placing four missiles in each cell. Development of an active homing ESSM is expected to obviate the need for illuminating radars that are required for the semi-active homing missiles. Still, simpler deck mounted launchers might actually offer some advantages, in addition to their lower installation cost, at least in peacetime.
Cutters often visit ports where the population is sensitive to a history of U.S. interference in their internal affairs. In some cases, Coast Guard cutters are welcome, while U.S. Navy ships are not. For this reason, we might want to make it easy for even a casual observer to know that the cutter is not armed with powerful offensive weapons. Deck mounted launchers can provide this assurance, in that it is immediately obvious if missile canisters are, or are not, mounted. The pictures below show potential VLS to be considered.
The OPC program of record for provides 25 of these ships. A contract has been awarded to Eastern Shipbuilding Group for detail design and construction of the first ship, with options for eight more. The notional design is 360 feet long, with a beam of 54 feet and a draft of 17 feet. The OPCs will have a sustained speed of 22.5 knots, a range of 10,200 nautical miles (at 14 knots), and an endurance of 60-days. It’s hangar will accommodate one MH-60 or an MH-65 and an Unmanned Air System (UAS).
Notional design characteristics and performance of the OPC. (USCG Image)
It will have a space for a SCIF but it is not expected to be initially installed. As built, it will have a Mk38 stabilized 25 mm gun in lieu of the Phalanx carried by the NSC. Otherwise, the Offshore Patrol Cutter will be equipped similarly to the National Security Cutter. It will likely have the same Lockheed Martin COMBATSS-21 combat management system as the LCS derived frigates. It is likely they could be fitted with cruise missiles and possibly Mk56 VLS for ESSM as well. Additionally these ships will be ice strengthened, allowing the possibility of taking surface launched cruise missiles into the Arctic
The Fast Response Cutter (FRC)
The FRC program of record is to build 58 of these 158 foot, 28 knot, 365 ton vessels. 19 have been delivered and they are being built at a rate of four to six per year. All 58 are now either built, building, contracted, or optioned. They are essentially the same displacement as the Cyclone class PCs albeit a little slower, but with better seakeeping and a longer range. Even these small ships have a range of 2,950 nm. They are armed with Mk 38 mod2 25 mm guns and four .50 caliber M2 machine guns.
The first Sentinel-class Fast Response Cutter (FRC), USCGC Bernard C. Webber. (USCG photo)
They are already better equipped than the Coast Guard 82 foot patrol boats that were used for interdiction of covert coastal traffic during the Vietnam war. If they were to be used to enforce a blockade against larger vessels, they would need weapons that could forcibly stop medium to large vessels.
The Marine Protector Class
There are 73 of these 87 foot, 91 ton, 26 knot patrol boats. Four were funded by the Navy and provide force protectionservices for Submarines transiting on the surface in and out of King Bay, GA and Bangor, WA.
If use of these vessels for force protection were to be expanded to a more hostile environment, they would likely need more than the two .50 caliber M2 machine guns currently carried. The four currently assigned to force protection units are currently equipped with an additional stabilized remote weapon station.
The U.S. Navy currently has or is considering four different surface launched cruise missiles: Harpoon, Naval Strike Missile (NSM), Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Tomahawk. Of these, LRASM appears most promising for Coast Guard use. Tomahawk is the largest of the four and both Harpoon and NSM would be workable, but they do not have the range of LRASM. The intelligence and range claimed for the LRASM not only makes it deadlier in wartime, it also means only a couple of these missiles on each of the Coast Guard’s largest cutters would allow the Coast Guard’s small, but widely distributed force to rapidly and effectively respond to asymmetric threats over virtually the entire U.S. coast as well as compliment the U.S. Navy’s efforts to complicate the calculus of a near-peer adversary abroad
Small Precision Guided Weapons
It is not unlikely that Fast Response Cutters will replace the six 110 foot patrol boats currently based in Bahrain. If cutters are to be placed in an area where they face a swarming threat they will need the same types of weapons carried or planned for Navy combatants to address this threat. These might include the Sea Griffin used on Navy’s Cyclone-class PCs or Longbow Hellfires planned for the LCS.
Additionally, a small number of these missiles on Coast Guard patrol craft would enhance their ability to deal with small, fast, highly maneuverable threats along the U.S. coast and elsewhere
Light Weight Anti-Surface Torpedoes
If Coast Guard units, particularly smaller ones, were required to forcibly stop potentially hostile merchant ships for the purposes of a blockade, quarantine, embargo, etc. they would need something more that the guns currently installed.
The U.S. does not currently have a light weight anti-surface torpedo capable of targeting a ship’s propellers, but with Elon Musk building a battery factory that will double the worlds current capacity and cars that out accelerate Farraris, building a modern electric small anti-surface torpedo should be easy and relatively inexpensive.
Assuming they have the same attributes of ASW torpedoes, at about 500 pounds these weapons take up relatively little space. Such a torpedo would also allow small Coast Guard units to remain relevant against a variety of threats.
Adding cruise missile to the Coast Guard National Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters would increase the number of cruise missile-equipped U.S .surface ships by about 40 percent.
Coast Guard Patrol craft (WPCs) and patrol boats (WPBs) significantly outnumber their Navy counterparts. They could significantly increase the capability to deal with interdiction of covert coastal traffic, act as a force multiplier in conventional conflict, and allow larger USN ships to focus on high-end threats provided they are properly equipped to deal with the threats. More effective, longer ranged, and particularly more precise weapons could also improve the Coast Guard’s ability to do it Homeland security mission.
Thanks to OS2 Michael A. Milburn for starting the conversation that lead to this article.
Looking at just surface warfare type assets, I threw together a quick comparison:
USCG — 165 vessels
9 NSC (418 foot, 28 knot ships, 4500 tons, 12,000 nautical mile)
25 OPC (360 foot, 22.5 knot, 3950 ton, 10,200 nautical miles)
58 FRC (158 foot, 28 knot, 365 ton, 2,950 nautical miles)
73 WPC (87 foot, 26 knot, 91 ton, )
USN — 202 vessels
(16) FFs (410 foot)
24 LCSes (378 foot, 47 knot, 3500 ton, 3500 nautical miles)
(418 foot, 44 knot, ton, 4300 nautical miles)
13 PCs (179 foot, 35 knot, 331 ton, 2400 nautical miles)
48 Mk.VI PBs (85 foot, 35 knot, 72 tons, 750 nautical miles)
What really strikes me is that for such a smaller service (manpower numbers), the Coast Guard has a MUCH higher number (as a percentage of personnel) of people with Command-At-Sea pins. Those opportunities also are weighted at lower ranks too. The Navy has 100 ship CO slots at the O-5/O-6 level, while only 53 at lower ranks. An “upside-down pyramid” vs. the USCG’s 35 at senior ranks & 130 at lower ranks…
As a minor self-edit: I should have put the DDs in parentheses as well as most of the Mk.IV PBs. The one operational DD is not deployment ready, and only a handful of PBs have been built with a final number not exactly determined.
Your figures mostly reflect the future. We of course will not have 25 OPCs until 2034, but in fact we already have more ships than this. The numbers in the CG fleet will not change significantly between now and 2034.
I think you actually over estimated Navy numbers. There is a good chance that by the time the LCS are completed, the 13 Navy Cyclone class PCs will all be decommissioned, their role taken by LCS and MkVI PBs. They want to decommission half the cruisers and put them in a major renovation. Over time, only half the cruisers would be in commission. Most of those LCS and MkVI PBs and all the frigates, still have to be built. Same for a number of the destroyers.
The figures for 9/30/2015 (https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html#2000) give the Navy 22 CGs, 62 DDGs, no frigates, and 5 LCS. In addtion there are the 13 PCs, the few MkVIs, and perhaps four LCS and three destroyers completed since then, so all in all, less than 120 vessels in these class. Right now they do have a few minewarfare ships that are being replaced by LCS, but mighty few ships commanded by O-4 or below considering they have eight times as many people as the CG.
The nature of the command experience differences really highlights why the CG is so esteemed for its seamanship.
And the lack of weapons/lack of emphasis of the national defense mission, combined with the necessary time and division of focus due to the CG’s variety of missions equally harm the leadership corps of tactical military operational expertise.
It’s a shame both services didn’t do better at this. Wasn’t there an officer-exchange program between the CG and Navy at one time? It seems if such a program were expanded to give a lot of cross-over training, CG officers could gain more tactical/military operational experience, and Navy officers could get more seamanship. Seems like a win-win.
Secondarily, the relationships thus developed couldn’t help but improve the mindset of both officer corps toward seeing the CG as an integral (rather than supplemental) part of America’s naval forces and probably make equipping Cutters with the weapons suites we discuss so much, more probable.
There was an Officer exchange progrm.
If there was a determination that the CG will pursue a more militant path, then putting some mid-grade CG officers on Navy ships for a tour so that they can grow into combat capable COs would make sense.
There are a probably a number of Navy Officers that would benefit from time on cutters, but it would dilute CG sea experience.
The best way to grow the capability in the CG is to equip the ships, and do the training and exercises.
It will cost us some underway days that might have gone to other missions, but looking at the overall cost of providing both naval strength and CG peacetime mission capabilities, it is cheaper to combine the functions in CG assets than to provide the form of both a Navy ship and a Coast Guard ship.
Please see also Bob Work’s paper on the National Fleet with includes most of the vessels discussed above
The Navy and Marine Corp are looking at putting Mk41 Vertical Launch Systems on their LPDs.
A good explanation of why the Navy may need help. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e4e68d73-e120-4bd0-8c86-2b7824a6e094/A-Thousand-Splendid-Guns,-Chinese-ASCMs-in-Competi.aspx?platform=hootsuite
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