I will not try to interpret the intent or implications of the President’s Executive Order of 19 June, reproduced below, but I do welcome comments. It mentions the Coast Guard specifically only once, but the CG is clearly the DHS’ primary agent in performing its role.

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By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Purpose.  The ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes waters of the United States are foundational to the economy, security, global competitiveness, and well-being of the United States.  Ocean industries employ millions of Americans and support a strong national economy.  Domestic energy production from Federal waters strengthens the Nation’s security and reduces reliance on imported energy.  Our Armed Forces protect our national interests in the ocean and along the Nation’s coasts.  Goods and materials that support our economy and quality of life flow through maritime commerce.  Our fisheries resources help feed the Nation and present tremendous export opportunities.  Clean, healthy waters support fishing, boating, and other recreational opportunities for all Americans.

This order maintains and enhances these and other benefits to the Nation through improved public access to marine data and information, efficient interagency coordination on ocean-related matters, and engagement with marine industries, the science and technology community, and other ocean stakeholders.  To advance these national interests, this order recognizes and supports Federal participation in regional ocean partnerships, to the extent appropriate and consistent with national security interests and statutory authorities.

Sec. 2.  Policy.  It shall be the policy of the United States to:

(a)  coordinate the activities of executive departments and agencies (agencies) regarding ocean-related matters to ensure effective management of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes waters and to provide economic, security, and environmental benefits for present and future generations of Americans;

(b)  continue to promote the lawful use of the ocean by agencies, including United States Armed Forces;

(c)  exercise rights and jurisdiction and perform duties in accordance with applicable domestic law and — if consistent with applicable domestic law — international law, including customary international law;

(d)  facilitate the economic growth of coastal communities and promote ocean industries, which employ millions of Americans, advance ocean science and technology, feed the American people, transport American goods, expand recreational opportunities, and enhance America’s energy security;

(e)  ensure that Federal regulations and management decisions do not prevent productive and sustainable use of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes waters;

(f)  modernize the acquisition, distribution, and use of the best available ocean-related science and knowledge, in partnership with marine industries; the ocean science and technology community; State, tribal, and local governments; and other ocean stakeholders, to inform decisions and enhance entrepreneurial opportunity; and

(g)  facilitate, as appropriate, coordination, consultation, and collaboration regarding ocean-related matters, consistent with applicable law, among Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, marine industries, the ocean science and technology community, other ocean stakeholders, and foreign governments and international organizations.

Sec. 3.  Definitions.  For the purposes of this order, the following definitions apply:

(a)  “Ocean-related matters” means management, science, and technology matters involving the ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes waters of the United States (including its territories and possessions), and related seabed, subsoil, waters superadjacent to the seabed, and natural resources.

(b)  “Regional ocean partnership” means a regional organization of coastal or Great Lakes States, territories, or possessions voluntarily convened by governors to address cross-jurisdictional ocean matters, or the functional equivalent of such a regional ocean organization designated by the governor or governors of a State or States.

Sec. 4.  Interagency Coordination.  (a)  To ensure appropriate coordination by Federal agencies on ocean-related matters, there is hereby established the interagency Ocean Policy Committee (Committee).

(i)  The Committee shall consist of the following:

(1)  The Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), who shall serve as Co-Chairs;

(2)  The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Homeland Security, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Director of the National Science Foundation, Director of National Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), and Commandant of the Coast Guard;

(3)  The Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Domestic Policy, and Economic Policy;

(4)  A representative from the Office of the Vice President designated by the Vice President; and

(5)  Such other officers or employees of the Federal Government as the Co-Chairs may from time to time designate.

(b)  The Co-Chairs, in coordination with the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Domestic Policy, and Economic Policy, shall regularly convene and preside at meetings of the Committee, determine its agenda, and direct its work, and shall establish and direct subcommittees of the Committee as appropriate.  The Committee shall, as appropriate, establish subcommittees with responsibility for advising the Committee on matters pertaining to ocean science and technology and ocean‑resource management.

(i)    Committee members may designate, to perform their Committee or subcommittee functions, any person who is within their department, agency, or office who is:

(1)  a civilian official appointed by the President;

(2)  a member of the Senior Executive Service or the Senior Intelligence Service;

(3)  a general officer or flag officer; or

(4)  an employee of the Office of the Vice President.

(ii)   Consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations, OSTP or CEQ shall provide the Committee with funding, including through the National Science and Technology Council pursuant to title VII, section 723 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Public Law 115-141), or any successor provision, or through the Office of Environmental Quality pursuant to the Office of Environmental Quality Management Fund, 42 U.S.C. 4375.  OSTP or CEQ shall, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, provide administrative support as needed to implement this order.

(iii)  The Committee shall be administered by an Executive Director and such full-time staff as the Co‑Chairs recommend.

Sec. 5.  Functions.  To implement the policy set forth in section 2 of this order, the Committee shall, to the extent permitted by law:

(a)  provide advice regarding policies concerning ocean-related matters to:

(i)   the President; and

(ii)  the head of any agency who is a member of the Committee;

(b)  engage and collaborate, under existing laws and regulations, with stakeholders, including regional ocean partnerships, to address ocean-related matters that may require interagency or intergovernmental solutions;

(c)  coordinate the timely public release of unclassified data and other information related to the ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes that agencies collect, and support the common information management systems, such as the Marine Cadastre, that organize and disseminate this information;

(d)  coordinate and inform the ocean policy-making process and identify priority ocean research and technology needs, to facilitate:

(i)   the use of science in the establishment of policy; and

(ii)  the collection, development, dissemination, and exchange of information between and among agencies on ocean-related matters;

(e)  coordinate and ensure Federal participation in projects conducted under the National Oceanographic Partnership Program through the Committee’s members, as appropriate, to maximize the effectiveness of agency investments in ocean research; and

(f)  obtain information and advice concerning ocean-related matters from:

(i)   State, tribal, and local governments; and

(ii)  private-sector entities and individuals.

Sec. 6.  Cooperation.  To the extent permitted by law, agencies shall cooperate with the Committee and provide it such information as it, through the Co‑Chairs, may request.  The Committee shall base its decisions on the consensus of its members.  With respect to those matters for which consensus cannot be reached, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall coordinate with the Co-Chairs to present the disputed issue or issues for decision by the President.  Within 90 days of the date of this order, agencies shall review their regulations, guidance, and policies for consistency with this order, and shall consult with CEQ, OSTP, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) regarding any modifications, revisions, or rescissions of any regulations, guidance, or policies necessary to comply with this order.

Sec. 7.  Revocation.  Executive Order 13547 of July 19, 2010 (Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes), is hereby revoked.

Sec. 8.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)    the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof;

(ii)   the functions of the Director of OMB relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals; or

(iii)  functions assigned by the President to the National Security Council or Homeland Security Council (including subordinate bodies) relating to matters affecting foreign affairs, national security, homeland security, or intelligence.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 19, 2018.

Binocular Night Vision Device (BNVD) with Clip-on Thermal Imager (COTI)

The Navy League’s online “Seapower Magazine” has a short post about new equipment being used by Marine Recon and EOD reminded me once again that perhaps the Coast Guard could use more night vision and thermal imaging devices.

Do ships’ look-outs have the use of night vision devices? They could help even normal operations, particularly in rain or fog. Might help find a person in the water in low vis situations or detect a Self Propelled semi-submersible.

We probably don’t need the depth perception provided by the binocular devices. Wonder if there are any of the earlier versions might be available from DOD as excess property?

Admiral Shultz had a short (5m27s) interview, his first TV interview as Commandant last night, June 15. You can see it above. Don’t think it has any surprises.

CBS New had a June 14, report on the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT). Their report includes a video of the exercise. The video of the same exercise, above is a bit different. It shows the exercise as a bit more complex. It included at least three boats and two helicopters. It also looks like both helicopters conducted fast roping.

As a former exercise planner I have a few observations and comments.

The Exercise:

First I would have to acknowledge that we don’t know how far along the teams are in their training or exactly what the training objectives were.

This may have been more PAO effort than training.

Only bad guys died, none of the good guys. Miles gear and a smart, well trained, agressive red cell would have made this much more meaningful.

These had to be the dumbest opposition forces in history. They made no coordinated effort to prevent the boarding.

There were no warning shots or other evidence of an effort stop the vessel and determine if the vessel and crew were in fact hostile. If the crew and vessel were known to be hostile, we probably should have shot it up before the boarding.

It looks like the “fast rope” boarding from the helicopter not only happened before the boarding from boats, it happened before the boats were in position to provide supporting fire to pen down the terrorists and prevent them from engaging the helicopter and the team fast roping from it. Members of the fast roping team were standing around on the stern waiting for the team from the RHIB while bad guys were still on the same deck hanging out forward.

I have to wonder why they used a Navy H-60 instead of a Coast Guard helicopter. I thought all Coast Guard helicopters were now capable of air-borne use of force. While there are certainly plenty of Navy H-60s in San Diego, that is not the case in other West coast ports.

The vessel was unusually easy to board. A different configuration would have been much more challenging.

The Concept:

Unfortunately when you create an “elite team” there is a tendency to say that is their job, the rest of us don’t have to worry about it. Unfortunately the rest of the Coast Guard cannot simply go back to SAR and stop worrying about this terrorist stuff.

We have, I believe, only two Maritime Security Response Teams, while we have at least 30 ports that are potential terrorist targets. For rapidly developing threats the probability that an MSRT will be in the right place at the right time, or that they will be able to get there is slim.

During WWII both the Germans and the Japanese formed elite fighter squadrons that did extremely well but the concept was disastrous. What worked was what the US did. The US used its best fighter pilots to train others. It raised the general level of competence of the entire force.

The MSRTs could certainly be useful in a slow developing scenario like a cruise ship take-over, but perhaps their greatest role might be as OPFOR, training local units in how to respond, a sort of Red Flag/Top Gun role.

Thanks to Daniel for bringing this to my attention. The criticisms are mine not his. 

A surfboat launch at Drakes Bay in Point Reyes, circa 1900 (Point Reyes National Seashore Archives)

KQED, a public television/radio station, gives us a tribute to four men, immigrants, who died, not in a dramatic rescue, but in training or the every day performance of duty.

Tuna Purser ALBATUN DOS – Port Victoria harbor – Seychelles Islands

Baird Maritime has an interesting post that reports a study has found that, “…up to 54 per cent of the high seas fishing industry would be unprofitable without large government subsidies.” and “The research suggests that through targeted subsidy reforms, governments could save taxpayers money, rebuild fish stocks, and eventually lead to higher value, lower volume fisheries.”

In too many places, too many fishing vessels are chasing too few fish, depleting the stocks and leading to a downward spiral in catch. That governments would encourage this is appalling.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) has been trying to do something about this since 2001, and apparently they have decided to decide.

WTO members agreed to continue to engage constructively in the negotiations, with a view to adopting by the Ministerial Conference in 2019, an agreement on comprehensive and effective disciplines that prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, and eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. The decision recognizes that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing country members and least-developed country members should be an integral part of the negotiations.

With this decision, the WTO has made a multilateral commitment to fulfil Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, which calls for the prohibition and elimination, by 2020, of fisheries subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing and to overcapacity and overfishing, with special and differential treatment for developing and least-developed country WTO members to be an integral part of the negotiations.

Frankly I think countries are going at this ass backward. Instead of paying people to fish, commercial fishermen should be paying for a limited number of licenses to take limited numbers of fish. At least fish within the EEZ are a national resource, same as offshore oil deposits. We put the rights to exploit those resources up for bid. It should be no different for fisheries.

FLIR/Raymarine integrated navigation.

MarineLink has a post (by Joseph Keeke) which, while it is obviously something of a commercial sales pitch, contains a lot of information about an ongoing Coast Guard program to provide integrated navigation system for a wide range of maritime platforms.

“In April of 2017, FLIR was awarded a $50 million contract from the U.S. Coast Guard for integrated navigation electronics under the U.S. Coast Guard’s Scalable Integrated Navigation Systems 2 (SINS-2) program. As part of the contract, FLIR will provide electronics systems that will be a standard fit on over 2,000 U.S. Coast Guard vessels, ranging from small-class boats through large cutter-class vessels.

…

“Beyond the need for robust hulls and competent sailors to bring them out to sea, operators first need the ability to transmit data securely. To that end, and leveraging the same VHF frequency band as AIS, Raymarine’s LightHouse OS is the first Commercially-Developed, Military-Qualified navigation system to send and receive data via encrypted SBU Type-III Tactical Data Exchange System (STEDS.) Designed specifically for the needs of the United States Coast Guard and first responders, SBU Type-III encryption-ready LightHouse software also supports secure text communication between agencies, enabling crews to send and receive short messages with tasking and status reports.

…

“The encrypted MFD and the network it participates on also ensures the accuracy and completeness of messages, tasking orders, and other missions. McGowan adds, “Consider a SAR pattern, which in the past would need to be manually plotted on a chart or entered into an electronic system. Not only was it time-consuming, but also the potential for data entry errors was very high. Our integrated, secure system allows a SAR pattern to arrive digitally without the need to manually copy it down or plot it out. It is essentially ready-to-use when it’s ‘beamed’ aboard.”

…

“When interfaced to a compatible eAIS transceiver, encrypted Raymarine multifunction navigation systems can display Blue Force AIS symbology, along with conventional AIS targets. Mariners see the optimal course for intercepting any AIS or Radar (MARPA/ARPA) target of interest with easy-to-understand graphics that automatically update as conditions change or targets attempt evasive maneuvers.

The NTSB has issued their report on the fire aboard the RO-RO ferry Caribbean Fantasy. All aboard were rescued with no serious injuries, but if this had occurred further from rescue facilities, it could have turned out tragically. You can read the abstract here.

While the Coast responded laudably, this incident was also a failure of prevention–a failure to prevent bad practices and ensure adequate training. Some of the findings:

2. The fire on the port main propulsion engine started when fuel spraying from a leaking blank flange at the end of the engine’s fuel supply line came into contact with the hot exhaust manifold and ignited.

3. Use of improper gasket material on the pressurized fuel supply end flange for the port main engine resulted in a breakdown of the gasket material and the eventual fuel spray that led to the fire.

4. The nonstandard blanking plate used on the end flange of the port main engine fuel supply system potentially exacerbated the leak that led to the fire.

5. Bolts inserted by Caribbean Fantasy engineering personnel into the quick-closing valves to prevent their closing were permanently in place for use during routine operations. (Emphasis applied–Chuck)

6. Testing during recent class surveys and port state control examinations did not adequately test the full functionality of the quick-closing valves.

…

9. The carbon dioxide fixed firefighting system did not extinguish the fire due to ventilation dampers that failed to properly close.

…

12. The abandonment process on board the Caribbean Fantasy was disorganized and inefficient.

13. Crewmembers assigned to safety-critical roles on the lifeboats were not proficient with the procedures for opening the lifeboat release hooks, which delayed the abandonment and put lives at risk.

14. The crew assigned to deploy the marine evacuation system and liferafts were not adequately trained, which delayed the abandonment.

15. The crew did not follow the manufacturer’s procedures when launching the starboard marine evacuation system liferafts, which resulted in the premature inflation of the liferafts.

16. The five ankle injuries resulted from using the marine evacuation system deployed at a steeper angle than designed.

On a positive note:

18. The presence of a passenger vessel safety specialist at Coast Guard Sector San Juan, who had trained and worked with local officials, contributed to the success of the Caribbean Fantasy mass rescue operation.

Recommendations included:

To the US Coast Guard:
1. Require operators to perform full function tests of quick-closing valves during inspections and examinations, ensuring that the associated systems shut down as designed and intended.

2. Evaluate the feasibility of creating a passenger vessel safety specialist billet at each sector that has the potential for a search and rescue activity characterized by the need for immediate assistance to a large number of persons in distress, and staff sector-level billets, as appropriate, based on the findings of that evaluation.

Thanks to Bryant’s Maritime Consulting for bringing this to my attention.

Photo:  Adm. Kurt W. Tidd, SOUTHCOM 

Since pretty much all of SOUTHCOM’s ships are Coast Guard, might be good to know what he is thinking. Military Times reports on Admiral Tidd address before the Association of the United States Army’s forum on June 6. He talked about five key concerns:

USCGC Smilax (WLIC-315)

Seapower Magazine has a report on efforts to recapitalize the Inland Fleet of tenders. You can read it on line here. It may be hard to read when it comes up, but there is a “slide” at the bottom of the page that allows you to make the text larger.

It seems the Congress has appropriated more money than we expected, $26M. Its not really a lot, maybe not even enough to buy the first new inland tender. I think they are expected to cost about $25M apiece and the first is always more expensive.

It almost seems we are complaining. “Its five year money, so unless you have a plan to spend it, it is hard. It is also a signal to get moving quicker on this.” I am sure Commander Boda is saying it is hard to optimize and get the most out of it,  but there have been studies of how best to replace these during the previous decade including a joint study with the Army Corps of Engineers, and I believe one at the Academy. There is almost certainly a backlog of maintenance, and we have five years to spend this money on a ship type that is not really that complicated. Come on guys, don’t tell the world you don’t know how you will manage to spend this little bit of money, we will certainly find a good use for it.

A request for information for a solution to our inland cutter needs went out Feb. 14, 2018. If we fund the first new tender by FY2023 presumably we will not see the new ship before 2024 with the Smilax will be 80 years old and the fleet average 61 years old. We are supposed to be flexible. We cannot say, “We did not see this coming.”

This reminds me of when Congress appropriated money for the ninth NSC and the press started quoting a warrant officer that the Coast Guard did not want or need it. We should never give the impression that we can’t use more money.