US Coast Guard photo

I don’t normally comment on CO reliefs. You can never know the full story looking in from the outside, and this is certainly the case here, but something is going on in the 13th district.

The Navy Times is reporting, Cdr. John Bitterman, commanding officer of the cutter Steadfast since July, “was fired for loss of confidence on Monday in the midst of an ongoing investigation…”

This seems to be a bit different, in that Cdr. Bitterman is claiming he is being fired not because of his performance, but because he reported the unsatisfactory condition of his ship, “… it was in such a state of disrepair — with moldy mattresses, lead contamination, bad decking —— that he asked his leadership for money to fix things up…His requests were denied…and the mix of the ship’s condition, the high operational tempo and the crew’s already rock-bottom morale led to his temporary relief.”

I have to wonder, is this going to be a trend? Steadfast is a 47 year old ship, and actually one of the newer 210s. Currently planned production of the Offshore Patrol Cutter suggest the last 210 will not be replaced until 2028 at which time it will be at least 59 years old.

Perhaps the Coast Guard will have to acknowledge, at some point, that they will have to retire ships without replacement.

Reuters is reporting, “President Barack Obama on Tuesday said he would nominate Coast Guard Vice Admiral Peter Neffenger to be administrator of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)…”

Fiercehomelandsecurity provided a link to a GAO report on Department of Homeland Securiy major acquisitions. I did not find most of it that interesting, but toward the end, there are summaries of individual programs. For the Coast Guard programs, they begin on page 68 (73rd page of the pdf).

One of our regular contributors, Lee Walher, has brought to my attention a publication I had not been familiar with, the Canadian Naval Review.

It seems to be a publication that addresses many issues that are common among coast guards and medium to small sized navies.

The publication is supported by subscription and sponsors. The full current edition is available only to subscribers, but in fact, it looks like virtually all the content is readily available. In addition, it appears that after a couple of months, full access is available to a pdf edition, via the Achieves and Index page.

This is the table of contents for the current edition.

Editorial: Always the Bridesmaid, Never the Bride, Ann Griffiths

The Case for a More Combat-Capable Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, Rob Huebert

 NOPEC: A Game Worth Playing?, Andrew Bergel

 Interoperability and the Future of the Royal Canadian Navy, Andrew Touesnard

 A Clash of Naval Strategies in the Asia-Pacific Region, Brian Wentzell

 Most Capable Design or Most Qualified Team?, Janet Thorsteinson

 Making Waves AOPS and the NSPS: Wishful Sinking?, Danford W. Middlemiss

 Collaborative Naval Procurement: Lessons from the ANZAC Frigate Build, Jeffrey Collins

 A View From the West: Reefs of Discontent in the South China Sea, Brett Witthoeft

 Dollars and Sense: Can DND Afford New Submarines?, Dave Perry

 Warship Developments: Flexible Examples from Offshore, Doug Thomas

 Human Capital and the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, Commander Ian Wood

Book Reviews

USAF CV-22, DOD photo

The Air Force Times is reporting the Air Force is considering using the V-22 Osprey for SAR, at least Combat SAR. They see these platforms as having an advantage where speed is critical. They also recognize that in other circumstances, agility may be more important, so they are not considering wholesale replacement of helicopters with these relatively large aircraft. The planned purchase of 112 HH-60W next-generation Black Hawk helicopters is still expected to go ahead.

It may be worth noting the Marines are already using their MV-22 for combat SAR.

In the not to distant future, we may have aircraft that combine the agility of the H-60 with the speed of the V-22.

CIMSEC has a post explaining the Coast Guard role in international maritime security capacity building.

I have been thinking about why the Coast Guard seems to be loosing the budget battle within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While funding for the Department has grown, the Coast Guard budget has in fact declined in real terms. I suspect it has a lot to do with perceptions of a miss-match between DHS missions and Coast Guard missions.

Congress attempted to address this perceived mismatch in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by requiring an annual report of resources allocated to DHS missions and non-DHS missions, to ensure non-DHS missions are not ignored. I will refer to this “Annual Review of  the  United States Coast  Guard’s  Mission  Performance” (pdf) as the Performance Report.

It is an interesting report, but it does have significant weaknesses, largely stemming from the use of undifferentiated and undefined “resource hours” as a measure of effort. I reviewed a report back in 2010 and offered my criticism which have not changed here, here, and here.

Unfortunately, I think this report may be part of the problem, in that it defines several Coast Guard missions as “non-DHS,” and it gives the impression, erroneously I believe, that roughly half of the Coast Guard’s budget goes for things outside the DHS charter.

Of the eleven Coast Guard missions, six were regarded as Non-Homeland Security missions: SAR, AtoN, Living Marine Resources, Marine Environmental Protection, Marine Safety, and Ice Operations.

The five Homeland Security missions are Ports, waterways, and coastal security, Drug Interdiction, Undocumented Migrant Interdiction, Defense Readiness, and Other Law Enforcement (primarily Foreign Fisheries Enforcement).

But these distinctions are fallacious.

The Department views its own missions as:

1. Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
2. Securing and managing our borders
3. Enforcing and administering our Immigration laws
4. Safeguarding and securing cyberspace
5. Ensuring resilience to Disaster

NON-DHS MISSIONS: All these mission at least in some respects support DHS missions.

SAR: A robust SAR organization is clearly a necessary foundation for “Ensuring resilience to Disaster.” What were Katrina and Sandy but huge SAR cases? SAR command posts and communications are the skeletal structure upon which Disaster Response is based. After all, every SAR case is really a response to a disaster of some dimension. If the 3,000 plus people the CG saves every year had died in a single incident, it would have been a disaster on the order of 9/11.

AtoN: Most of the population lives near the coast or inland waterways. Most depend heavily on marine transportation and in many cases fishing. When there is a disaster, restoring safe navigation is a high priority both for bringing in assistance and for recovery.

Marine Environmental Protection (MEP):  The Deepwater Horizon was a disaster. MEP regulation attempts head off disasters and mitigate its effects, that is “Ensuring resilience to Disaster” plus offshore and portside energy infrastructure are potential terrorists targets.

Marine Safety: Marine Safety is designed to prevent marine disasters. A sunken cruise ship could be a disaster on the order of 9/11. Marine Safety standards tends to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack on marine targets

Living Marine Resources: Destruction of valuable marine resources can actually be as disaster for the economy of some communities.

Ice Operations: Domestic icebreakers can prevent flooding. We recently had a case where a community in Alaska would have been left without fuel, if an icebreaker had not opened a path for delivery.

THE UNLISTED COAST GUARD MISSION:

Safeguarding and securing cyberspace: It is not one of the Coast Guard’s eleven statutory missions, but this is infact one of the Commandant’s key priorities. Still it is not addressed in the Coast Guard’s annual Performance Report.

THE NON-DHS DHS MISSIONS: Two missions listed as DHS missions in fact are of little interest to the department, and performance goals (which are themselves perhaps inadequate) in these two areas are not being met.

Defense Readiness: Apparently the Coast Guard is doing more for Defense Readiness now than it was before 9/11, but really little has been done in terms of adapting resources for wartime roles. Additionally, a potentially major Coast Guard contribution to defense readiness, the major cutters, are being replaced at such a slow rate, the fleet continues to age, making it less reliable.

Other Law Enforcement (primarily foreign fisheries): DHS probably has little interest in this. This mission also suffers from the aging of the cutter fleet, and additionally the very large US EEZ in the Western Pacific has been largely ignored.

Problems in DHS: I do think the Departments placement of priority on counter-terrorism over more general disaster response is misplaced,  and this is another source of problems.

CONCLUSION:

I will quote my closing paragraph from my 2010 post,

When it comes time to decide the Coast Guard budget, I would suggest Congress take a different approach. Consider return on investment. If you like the return you are getting from the Coast Guard now, invest more.  Don’t say, “Agency ‘X’ isn’t working, we need to put more money into that.” “The Coast Guard, is doing a good job with their current budget so we don’t need to give them any more.” I don’t quote scripture very often. I’m not religious, but there is some wisdom there. Check out the story of the “good and faithful servant” Mathew 25:14-30.

CBC News reports a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaking buoytender, CCGS Ann Harvey, ran aground near Burgeo on the South shore of Newfoundland. She was reported free, but disabled with her motor room flooded.