The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports on the establishment of a new Joint Task Force under the Second Marine Expeditionary Force to address the drug problem in the SOUTHCOM AOR.

We discussed formation of this new task force earlier when it was first announced but this report goes into greater depth. There really is no clarification of how this new JTF and JIATF-S will interact, though this report raises that question also.

I would like to point out that the four key objectives of the new JTF were all also activities carried out by JIATF-S:

• Identifying narcotics trafficking patterns to interdict illegal shipments of narcotics before they reach the U.S. and partner-nation territories using intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft.
• Expanding real-time intelligence fusion among U.S. military, federal law enforcement, and partner-nation agencies.
• Conducting joint training to improve interoperability among U.S. military services and increase rapid-response posture.
• Enhancing partner-nation counter narcotics operations capacity through advisory teams and combined operations.

The only real difference seems to be that the new JTF is not offering any opportunity for the boat crews to surrender. Thinking back, I can’t remember a case where smugglers exchanged gun fire with a Coast Guard boarding party, since the end of Prohibition.

The legality of the strikes on boats allegedly carrying drugs is being hotly debated and is thought by many to be the reason for the early resignation of SOUTHCOM commander Navy Admiral Alvin Holsey. Neither Admiral Holsey nor DOD has made any public statement on his reasons for stepping down.

Thanks to David for bringing this to my attention. 

This is the second in a series about some of the weapons I thought would be most appropriate for cutters, particularly the Webber class WPCs, that would allow them to respond to range of threats including:

• Unmanned aircraft, from the smallest to converted light planes
• Small, fast, highly maneuverable surface craft including personal watercraft
• Merchant ships of any size

The first was about APKWS, this one is about Hellfire and its closely related replacement JAGM.

ATLANTIC OCEAN—A Longbow Hellfire Missile is fired from Littoral Combat Ship USS Detroit (LCS 7) on Feb. 28 2017 as part of a structural test firing of the Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM). The test marked the first vertical missile launched from an LCS and the first launch of a missile from the SSMM from an LCS. (Photo by U.S. Navy)

There is precedence for this, in that the Navy has equipped Littoral Combat Ships with Longbow Hellfire.

Like APKWS, Hellfire has demonstrated success against UAS and small watercraft. With a 20 pound warhead, it should be more effective than APKWS against shipping, but its ability to stop larger vessels is still limited, although it might be able to target selected parts of the ship (bridge, steering gear, engine room) using semi-active laser homing.

In some ways Hellfire and APKWS are similar. In their original form both were guided to their target by a reflected laser beam. Both were developed specifically for one type of target but were found useful for a variety of targets. Both have been used to take down UAS and have had some success against lower altitude sub-sonic aircraft in the surface to air mode.

Hellfire is now more than 40 years old and has seen progressive improvements. APKWS adds a recently developed guidance section to previously unguided rockets developed during World War II. Both weapons are now being made in huge numbers.

Costs are around $30K for an APKWS, about $150K for the current Hellfire, and over $300K for a JAGM MR.

Ranges are approximately 5,000 yards for the APKWS; 8,700 yards for the current Hellfire; and 17,500 yards for the JAGM MR.

Weight varies for APKWS, but a typical weight is 32 pounds. Weight for Hellfire and JAGM is 108 pounds.

Hellfire/JAGM are bigger and more expensive so you are probably going to have fewer of them, but with the improvements (dual or triple seeker, new propellant) it will perform better, particularly in conditions of poor visibility, and will have a greater range. The latest JAGM MR has a range of 16km. It would be a significant asset even for the NSCs and OPCs, providing an upgrade in Anti-Air as well as Anti-Surface capability.

Longbow Hellfire test against small targets 12 November 2018

While the original Hellfire would be a major improvement, the JAGM MR would give us both the dual seekers of the Longbow Hellfire and greater range.

JAGM’s multi-mode seeker provides an improved Semi-Active Laser (SAL) sensor for precision-strike and a fire-and-forget Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar for moving targets in all-weather conditions. These new sensors have been integrated into the JAGM guidance section and mated with the AGM-114R missile bus and demonstrated during multiple guided flight tests.

Fire-and-forget engagement modes significantly increase JAGM user survivability against threat defenses in GPS denied and austere communications environments. JAGM can engage multiple stationary and moving targets, in the presence of adverse weather, battlefield obscurants and advanced countermeasures. Laser and radar guided engagement modes allow JAGM users to strike accurately across wide target sets and reduce collateral damage.

While we might see Hellfire/JAGM or APKWS as an either or choice, some remote weapon stations might be able to handle both.

Interim Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD)

This type of launcher would be appropriate for the NSCs and OPCs. The possibility of vertical launch provides flexibility in location while allowing 360 degree targeting.

JAGM/Hellfire quad launcher. The launcher in the video seems to be a variation of these launchers.

USCGC Olivia Hooker is the second of three FRCs to be homeported in St. Petersburg, FL

Below is a news release from Bollinger Shipyards.

United States Exclusive Economic Zone – Pacific centered NOAA map. https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/2011/012711_gcil_maritime_eez_map.pdf

For some time, I have thought that Coast Guard forces are under represented in the Pacific. Pacific Area’s responsibilities have grown. Because of the great distances in the Pacific they have greater need for ships with greater endurance, but rather than gaining long range ships, they now have fewer. Pacific Area has never had even half of our larger patrol cutters, but at one time they did have ten of our 12 WHECs.

When I retired in 1991, Pacific Area had ten WHEC and five WMECs, 15 large patrol ships. Now they have six National Security Cutters and three WMECs, 9 large patrol ships. The plan was that the first four OPCs would go to Pacific Area, presumably replacing at least two of the existing WMECs, but what will happen to the OPCs contracted to Eastern is still not clear, but near term there is no chance we will see more than one, which would presumably replace one WMEC. In short there is no chance we are going to see a significant increase in the PAC AREA large cutter fleet any time soon as a result of construction.

If you look at the distribution of the US EEZ as depicted above.

• Total US EEZ: 11,351,000 km²
• East Coast EEZ: 915,763 km²
• Gulf Coast EEZ: 707,832 km²
• Puerto Rico EEZ: 177,685 km²
• Total LANT Area EEZ: 1,801,280 km² 15.9%
• Total PAC Area EEZ: 9,549,720 km²  84.1%

The US EEZ in the Pacific Area is about 5.3 times as large as the US EEZ in the Atlantic Area, but the Pacific Area has only 28% of the Coast Guard’s large patrol cutters.

PAC AREA could have more cutter time for operations in the Western Pacific and Alaskan waters, without adding cutters, if LANT AREA took full responsibility for the Eastern Pacific drug interdiction effort. There are good reasons, that might be desirable, not the least of which are that LANT has the assets, the Eastern Pacific has the heaviest drug trafficking, and while it is counter intuitive, LANT AREA assets are actually closer to the Eastern Pacific drug transit zones than PAC AREA assets. But there is also an organizational reason.

COMBATANT COMMANDS

The DOD and the Navy do not divide up the world the way the Coast Guard does, so the DOD and Navy commands charged with doing drug enforcement operations in both the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific end up talking to both PAC and LANT Areas.

US Atlantic Fleet includes all the even numbered fleets: 2nd, 4th, and 6th. The Pacific Fleet  includes all the odd numbered fleets: 3rd, 5th, and 7th.

It would simplify coordination if a single Coast Guard Command was responsible for coordinating all drug enforcement operations in 4th Fleet, and that single command should be LANT AREA. This would also ease coordination in wartime.

US Navy Fleet Organization

A screenshot from video showing a U.S. military strike on an alleged drug smuggling vessel in the Eastern Pacific. Video released Oct. 22, 2025

gCaptain reports,

“The Trump administration has extended its controversial military campaign against suspected drug-trafficking vessels into the Eastern Pacific, marking a significant expansion beyond operations previously concentrated near Venezuelan waters.”

The new administration has said they will make the Coast Guard a better “fighting force.” I have some suggestions.

Having watched the 9/11 terrorist attacks and having learned how unprepared the Air Force was to deal with such an attack, I became concerned that the Coast Guard is also unprepared to deal with terrorist attacks.

We also should not assume that China will not open hostilities with unconventional attacks on US port facilities that are essential for support of a distant conflict.

If you are a regular reader of this blog, you know I feel the Coast Guard is not properly armed to perform its “Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security” and “Defense Readiness” missions and that furthermore there is no other force ready step in and address this shortfall in a timely manner.

The Navy no longer has Naval Districts and associated patrol craft. The Navy has surface ships home-ported in only five ports complexes, Norfolk/Little Creek, Mayport, San Diego, Seattle/Puget Sound, and Pearl Harbor. Not a single Navy surface vessel is home-ported on the East Coast North of Virginia, on the Gulf Coast, or in Alaska. Even where Navy ships are home-ported, how long would it take to get them underway and ready to take defensive action?

The Army no longer has any Coast Defense units. Since 9/11 the Air Force has a few units aircraft ready tor air-to-air combat, but I have never seen any indication they have aircraft and crews on alert, much less air borne ready to respond to a maritime attack.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how relatively unsophisticated short range systems can do significant damage and multiple attacks using these systems can be coordinated.

The Coast Guard needs to have weapons that can deal with a range of threats including:

• Unmanned aircraft, from the smallest to converted light planes
• Small, fast, highly maneuverable surface craft including personal watercraft
• Merchant ships of any size

Generally these weapons need to be light, easy to use, and should require minimum maintenance. They should also risk only minimum collateral damage since they may be being used inside an American harbor.

They should be installed on the larger patrol cutters, but they must also be installed on the Webber class cutters, because the Webber class WPCs are both widely distributed and have a large enough crew to provide the necessary security.

I would also like to see them installed on buoy tenders and a replacement class for the 87 foot WPBs that could serve as true fast response cutter for both SAR and defense. Because there are so many assets to protect, the systems must become ubiquitous.

Some thought should be given to how we might arm our Coast Guard aircraft for these missions too. It would not be too difficult to arm H-60s. It has been done.

Over the next few days I am going to talk about some of the weapon systems I think are most appropriate to fill this need: Hellfire/JAGM; APKWS; the Very Light Weight Torpedo; and the 30mm gun with airburst ammunition.

41107-A-BD526-1148 DORAL, Florida (Nov. 7, 2024) Navy Adm. Alvin Holsey, incoming commander of U.S. Southern Command, takes the command guidon from Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III during the SOUTHCOM change-of-command ceremony in Doral, Florida, Nov. 7, 2024. Holsey assumed command from Army Gen. Laura Richardson, who is retiring after 38 years of service. (Photo by Erica Bechard)

Politico, along with several other sources, have reported that Adm. Alvin Holsey, the current Commander, US Southern Command will step down by the end of the year. No replacement has yet been identified.

These reports all seem to suggest that the resignation is due to disagreement with the administration about the lethal attacks on suspected drug smugglers. On the other hand neither Admiral Holsey nor DOD has made no public statement on his reasons for stepping down.

U.S. Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter aircrews conduct overflights of Kipnuk, Alaska, after coastal flooding impacted several western Alaska communities, Oct. 12, 2025. The Coast Guard continues to support the state of Alaska’s response efforts in impacted communities. (U.S. Coast Guard photo courtesy of Air Station Kodiak)

I don’t usually talk about ongoing SAR cases, we have so many, but this is something different and you are not likely to hear about on local or national news.

The nearest Coast Guard air station is on Kodiak Island, roughly 350 miles away.

U.S. Coast Guard MH-60 Jayhawk helicopter aircrews conduct overflights of Kipnuk, Alaska, after coastal flooding impacted several western Alaska communities, Oct. 12, 2025. The Coast Guard continues to support the state of Alaska’s response efforts in impacted communities. (U.S. Coast Guard photo courtesy of Air Station Kodiak)

136 Haitian refugees on the flight deck of the US Coast Guard cutter Harriet Lane

The US Naval Institute has a post that proposes a relatively radical solution to the problems the Coast Guard has had in providing maintenance for our ships.

“The first step to combat rising maintenance costs would involve decommissioning several ships, including the 210-foot Reliance– and 270-foot Famous-class WMECs, the 282-foot USCGC Alex Haley (WMEC-39), 175-foot Keeper-class buoy tenders, and 87-foot Marine Protector-class patrol boats. They should be replaced with significantly more capable ships, such as WMSLs, WPCs, and 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders.”

I don’t think that is going to happen any time soon, for a number of reasons, but in making his case he does a great job in identifying the problem.

“The Coast Guard’s budget for FY24 was $13.4 billion, a figure that severely limits the service’s operational capabilities. Consider that the Coast Guard’s budget in 2014, adjusted for inflation, was $18.5 billion—in real-dollar terms, the budget has fallen by $5.1 billion in a decade.”

If that is the case, there is no way you can maintain a fleet the same size as we had in 2014 whether the ships are new or old. Plus it is going to get worse because with the newer larger ships they will need access to dry docks that are larger and consequently more expensive and fewer in number. Increasingly we will be in competition with the Navy rather than with fishermen.

The author also points to the Coast Guard’s short planning horizon. While the Navy has a 30 year shipbuilding plan, the Coast Guard produces only a 5 year capital investment plan. The author suggests the Coast Guard return to producing a 20 year plan as was prepared for a short period. I have been recommending a 30 year plan for almost as long as I have produced the blog.

While we can’t do it in the short term, the Coast Guard needs a culture change that says we will not operate ships more than 30 years old. As they reach 30 years old, they should be declared excess property and passed to our allies who cannot afford new construction but where labor for repairs is much cheaper than here.

To make this work we have to start the process for planning for replacements when the units are 20 years old because realistically, it is 10 years from “Gee we are going to need a new WXX” to commissioning.

USCGC Bertholf was commissioned in 2008. In three years planning for her replacement should begin. That will require a real change of organizational culture.

I have seen a RFI that indicates planning has begun for the icebreaking 140 and 65 foot tug replacements.

We are probably already behind in planning replacements for the WLBs, WLMs, and WPBs.