A recent article on efforts to bring USCGC Storis back to Anchorage as a museum.
A more complete history of the ship (PDF) available online. You may have to cut and paste.
A recent article on efforts to bring USCGC Storis back to Anchorage as a museum.
A more complete history of the ship (PDF) available online. You may have to cut and paste.
The Coast Guard Compass is having a video of the year contest and would like your help in judging the eleven finalists.
“The videos will be posted daily with all 11 available for viewing on December 31. Voting will stay open until January 10, 2011, and the top three videos will be announced on the Compass January 11.”
One of the topics argued over in regard to dealing with the Somalia piracy problem has been the wisdom of hiring armed guards. Lloyds is reporting that many owners are choosing to hire armed guards for economic reasons, and “So far, no vessel with armed guards on board has been successfully seized…”
D. E Reddick provided this information as a comment on an earlier post regarding tensions between Japan and China. I thought it deserved a separate posting.
“Now a Chinese fishing trawler has rammed a South Korean Coast Guard vessel. One Chinese fisherman died, two Chinese fishermen are missing, and four SK coast guardsmen have been injured. The 63 ton Chinese trawler capsized after ramming the larger SKCG vessel. Reportedly, there were 50 Chinese trawlers fishing within SK territorial waters at the time of the incident. The video from Al Jazeera (English) demonstrates just how violently the Chinese crew were acting during the incident.
“RTT News – Chinese Fisherman Killed In Clash With South Korean Coast Guard
http://www.rttnews.com/Content/MarketSensitiveNews.aspx?Id=1510141&SM=1
“A video and text report from Al Jazeera – Chinese trawler in Yellow Sea clash
“A routine check goes awry after Chinese fishermen stop South Korean coast guards from boarding trawler in Yellow Sea.”
http://english.aljazeera.net/video/asia-pacific/2010/12/20101218175020549693.html
Every year the Navy addresses the Congress and tells them how many ships they have and how many ships they need to do their missions. These numbers do not include Coast Guard ships, but perhaps they should.
The numbers of ships the Navy requires is, to at least some extent, based on the number of Cutters in the Coast Guard.
Protecting a nation’s coast and its ports is normally the most basic and immediate task of any navy. For the US Navy this has hardly been a consideration. Overt threats are kept at arms length by projecting power at great distance, pushing the defensive perimeter far from our shores. But for covert threats, there is also the presumption that those threats will be addressed by the Coast Guard. If there were no Coast Guard, the Navy would have to provide these ships, distracting form their forward strategy.
Additionally war plans anticipate the use of cutters for tasks other than defense of the US coast. If there were no Coast Guard, the Navy would also need to supply these ships.
What would including the Coast Guard do for us? It would
In terms of personnel the Coast Guard is now larger than the Royal Navy. In effect it is the Navy’s closest and most reliable ally. The economic advantages of close coordination are compelling.
We have heard references to a “National Fleet.” Perhaps it is time to apply the concept to procurement planning as well as operations.
There is an interview with Admiral Papp in the November 2010 “Homeland Security Today” that is available on line here.
When asked about his vision for the Coast Guard, Admiral Papp laid down four principles:
It appears his primary concern is to strengthen understanding of a common Coast Guard Culture, integrating the changes initiated by the last two Commandants, rather than making sweeping of his own. To use his analogy, to publish a watch, quarter, and station bill. As might be expected he discusses budget cuts, the BP oil spill, recapitalization, counter-terrorism and counter-drug operations, and the Arctic. He also talks about developing a career path for marine safety. Its an impressive interview.
Former Commandant, Adm. Thad Allen was recognized by Time Magazine as a “Person Who Mattered” in their “2010, Person of the Year” issue.
Admiral Allen continues to make us proud.
Thanks to Ryan Erickson for bringing this to my attention.
Thanks to all our readers and especially those of you who help the discussion along with your comments. You make this site a success. This morning we passed a milestone with more than a quarter million hits this year.
Thanks again,
Chuck
Ryan Erickson is reporting that a continuing resolution has passed the house and will now go to the Senate. (Hopefully the Federal Government won’t have to shutdown.) In addition to authorizing expenditures, included in the bill is language that will allow the Coast Guard to make some changes, that include decommissioning three ships.
“…the Coast Guard may decommission one Medium Endurance Cutter, two High Endurance Cutters, four HU–25 aircraft, the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, and one Maritime Safety and Security Team, and make staffing changes at the Coast Guard Investigative Service…”
There is more detail in Ryan’s article, but a couple of numbers stood our for me.
“…$73,200,000 shall be for vessels, small boats, critical infrastructure and related equipment…” in the AC&I budget, and additionally
… $1,191,502,000 shall be for the Integrated Deepwater Systems program…of the funds made available for the Integrated Deepwater Systems program, $103,000,000 is for aircraft and $933,002,000 is for surface ships.” So there is $155.5M in the Deepwater Budget that is not for aircraft or ships?
Presumably the Deepwater money for surface ships includes exercising the option for the fifth National Security Cutter (about $480M based on the last award) and four more Fast Response Cutters, #9-12 (about $166M based on the last award)
That would still leave about $287M. Could it be that the programs are accelerating? Can someone fill us in?
What is wrong with this picture? Not the artist’s concept, the word picture painted by the description found at the acquisition directorate web site, that may be the first thing, perhaps the only thing, that a person learns about the OPC?
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(Disclaimer: The conceptual renderings posted on this website are for artistic display purposes only and do not convey any particular design, Coast Guard design preferences, or other requirements for the OPC.)
The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) will complement the Coast Guard’s in-service fleet and next-generation cutters to extend operational capabilities across the mission spectrum. Learn more
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These ships are not nice to have. They are not gravy or icing on the cake. They don’t complement or extend the “fleet and next-generation cutters.” They are the next-generation cutters and in a very real sense they will be the fleet. That they are equipped, as ships are equipped in the 21st century, should be taken for granted, that is not the reason we are building these ships.
Where is the urgency? These ships will replace ships now long overage. We are 20 years behind in the procurement process, and without them, we will have almost no offshore capability.
Why aren’t we pleading our case, and not just on the web site? Where are the articles in the US Naval Institute Proceedings and the Navy Leagues’ Seapower?
We know the nations needs these ships. If we don’t make them understand why we need them, and need them yesterday, we are failing in our duties.