Tag Archives: shipbuilding

The FY2012 AC&I Budget Request for Vessels

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The FY 2012 budget for “vessels” is a year without major funding for the National Security Cutter (NSC) project. It only includes $77M to finish funding the fifth ship. Consequently, even though vessel funding dropped from $851.7M in the FY2011 request to only $642M, we see the start of a program to update 140-foot WTGBs, 225-foot WLBs and 175- foot WLMs, beginning with the oldest WTGB and funding of five Mission Effectiveness Projects (MEP) for 270 foot WMECs. We also see an acceleration of the Response Boat-Medium and Fast Response Cutter Programs.

But of course the plan has been to complete the NSC program before starting the OPC program and having the first OPC delivered in 2019. I don’t see how this can happen without a major bump in AC&I funding or at least a major diversion from other areas. The funding for the first five NSCs was spread over eleven years. In the last ten budgets, from FY 2003-2012, NSC funding has averaged $312M. Only in FY 2011 did funding for the program approach the full cost of an NSC ($615M requested compared to a projected cost of $697M for NSC#5), that year, there was no funding for the Fast Response Cutter Program. The Coast Guard is unlikely to get $1.2B it needs in FY 2013/14/15 to complete the “In Service Vessel Sustainment” and WMEC Mission Effectiveness Projects and each year build:

  • one NSC (approx. $700M)
  • six FRC (approx. $350M)
  • 40 Response Boat-Medium (approx $100M)

Short of canceling one or more of the NSCs (my preferred alternative), the only way to deliver an OPC by 2019 is to build the NSCs and OPCs in parallel.

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How much do the National Security Cutters Cost?

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Earlier I asked this question regarding NSC #5 (WMSL 754 James), because what I had seen recently seemed out of line with the prices I had seen reported for #4 (WMSL 753 Hamilton). Someone from Headquarters was good enough to point me to a helpful 3,311 page document, the DHS 2012 budget justification (this is a large pdf), and even told me where to look (see page 1622 of the pdf). Turns out the total costs are pretty close. Continue reading →

LEDET, This Could be Your Ride

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Another interesting ship coming from Austal, the makers of the trimaran Littoral Combat Ship, Independence (sometimes referred to as the Klingon Battlecruiser). This is the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Army and Navy are planning to buy at least ten. I would not be surprised to see them used routinely with a LEDET on board for drug enforcement.

Joint High Speed Vessel concept.jpg

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How Much Does National Security Cutter #5 Cost?

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It’s always hard to figure out how much a ship costs, and compare prices, but I was a bit alarmed when I saw this report from the Navy Times concerning the FY2012 budget, “$615 million of the $1.4 billion set aside in the request for acquisitions will go to the fifth NSC.” I add this to the $89M for long lead time items in the previous budget, and I get $714M for NSC #5. Can this be right? Wasn’t the forth NSC $480M? The Navy’s latest contract for the admittedly smaller but high tech, LCSs came in at $440M each.

When we contracted for number four it was “fixed price with incentive” with an option for number five. Did they really give us a price of $480M for #4 and and an option for #5 of $714M? Or had we already paid for long lead time items on #4 as well. I’m so confused.

Shipbuilding–My Grand Plan–Navy and CG Work Together

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One of the criticisms of the Navy and Coast Guard’s ship building programs has been that they were not coordinated; that they should have been able to come up with a common hull. I think there may still be an excellent opportunity to do that and get the benefit of large scale series production, by combining the 25 ship Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) with the last 31 ships of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.

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Italian OPC Design

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Defense news is reporting the launch of the second of four ships being built for the Turkish Coast Guard at a total cost of $480M (same as the cost of one NSC). These ships are similar to the projected Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and are based on a design by Fincantieri also built for the Italian Navy (four ships) and the Italian Ministry of Transport (two ships).

Fincantieri is Italy’s leading shipbuilder, building a range of ships from aircraft carriers and frigates to offshore patrol vessels. Its Manitowoc Marine Group through its Marinette Marine shipyard, is one of nine shipbuilders that have expressed an interest in building the OPCs. They have also, in partnership with Lockheed Martin, recently been contracted for options to build ten additional Freedom (LCS-1) class ships for the Navy. Marinette Marine has also been building Coast Guard Response Boat, Mediums. Before being acquired by Fincantieri Marinette Marine also built 225 ft buoy tenders and the icebreaker Mackinaw (WLBB-30).

I haven’t been able to find out how the Turkish units are equipped. There seem to be very significant differences between the Italian Navy units and those built for the Ministry of Transport. The specs for the Italian Navy version are as follows:

  • Crew: 80 total including 8 officers
  • Overall Length: 88.4m (292 ft)
  • Length at Waterline: 80.3m (265 ft)
  • Beam: 12.2m (40.26 ft)
  • Draught: 4.6m (15.2 ft)
  • Full Load Displacement: 1,520 tons
  • Armament: 1×76 mm, 2x25mm
  • Speed: 25 knots
  • Range: 3,500 nmi
  • Helo deck and hanger for NH90 (essentially the same size as an MH-60)

Slightly smaller, with less endurance and probably not quite up to the level of seakeeping the Coast Guard has been looking for, but still interesting ships, and if they do make an offer on the OPC, their proposal is likely to be based on this design.

Marinette is also building a 260 foot ice capable vessel for the National Science Foundation. I’ll post about it soon.

Comparing Apples and Oranges–Ships and Cars

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Ran across a statement in gCaptain that the 378s had cost $15M each (haven’t been able to find it again). I went looking for confirmation and found another source that listed the cost as $16-20M. In any case, comparing that range, with the range of costs for the National Security Cutters suggests that the price for these admittedly nicer ships is 30 times that of the ships they are replacing.

I bought my first new car in 1971, about the same time the Coast Guard was buying 378s. It cost me $2004 for a Datsun 510, a then technically advanced, but small economy car. (Upper middle-class performance cars like the GTO were going for about $3,500) Cars in the same economy car market segment now cost seven to ten times what my ’71 cost. In fact if you look hard you can find cars (base models of the Nissan Versa or Hundai Accent) that are better in every way and only cost five times as much.

Using this inflation calculator, inflation based on the CPI from January 1971 to January 2010 was 444.44% meaning, costs are about five and a half times what they were in 1971.

Yes the NSC is better equipped and larger than the 378s, but cars in the same market segments today are also about 25-50% larger, faster, safer, have more gadgets, and even get better gas mileage. My Datsun had bias ply tires, a four speed manual transmission,rubber floor mats instead of carpeting, no power windows, no air conditioning, an AM radio, the glass was not tinted, seat covering material was a sticky vinyl, and not even a rear window defogger.

Cars and ships are not exactly analogous, but it is hard to see how the price has gone up 30 times. The high prices for the NSC are not just a Coast Guard problem. In fact, on a cost per ton basis, the price for the forth NSC, $480M, is lower than that for the Littoral Combat Ships in the recent 20 ship buy that seems to have been viewed as a shewd deal.

Looks like there is plenty of room for efficiency improvements in the shipbuilding industry.

All the fault may not be with the ship builders. The Coast Guard has been working with interested builders in preparation for the Offshore Patrol Cutter project. Hopefully they are talking about how to work the price down to something more reasonable.

How We Got in This Mess-A Short History of CG Shipbuilding

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Over the last 60 years the Coast Guard has typically fielded about 45 large patrol cutters, 1000 tons or greater (Is the Fleet Shrinking?) with as many as 36 WMECs. Theoretically we could build an average of 1.5 ships a year and maintain a fleet with an average age of about 15  years with progressive improvements introduced based on experience. This may be something to work toward, but it hasn’t been working that way. The Coast Guard’s current fleet is largely the product of two great spasms of ship building, WWII and one beginning in the 60s, a smaller bump in the 80’s, and long periods when no ships were built.

The last Lake class 255ft WPG/WHEC entered service in 1946. In the 64 years since then, this is the record of Patrol Cutter construction.

  • 1947-1963 (17 years) no new construction patrol cutters entered service. The service did acquire ex-Navy destroyer escorts (what would now be called frigates), 311 foot Barnegat Class former seaplane and torpedo boat tenders, 213 foot former submarine rescue vessels, and 205 foot former fleet tugs.
  • 1964-1972 (9 years) The 16 Reliance class 210s, built in four different yards, including five by the Coast Guard Yard, entered service 1964-1969. The 12 Hamilton Class 378s, all built at Avondale, entered  service 1967-1972. (The original plan was for 36 378s.) (28 ships/9 years=3.11 ships/year)
  • 1973-1982 (10 years) no new construction patrol cutters entered service.
  • 1983-1990 (8 years) The 13 Bear class 270s entered service between 1983 and 1990. (13 ships/8 years=1.625 ships/yr)
  • 1991-2007 (17 years) no new construction patrol cutters entered service.
  • 2008 Bertholf entered service
  • 2009 no new construction cutters entered service.
  • 2010 Waesche entered service.

45 of 64 years, no new construction patrol cutters entered service. All 43 new construction ships (210s, 378s, 270s, NSCs) were delivered in only 19 years. The current rate of construction (two ships in three years) is less than the minimum average long term construction rate (1.5 ships/year).

The program begun in the 60s was a timely effort to replace the ships built in WWII and earlier, unfortunately it was stopped short of completing their replacement.

In 1990 when construction of the 270s stopped, we still had 10 WMECs that dated from WWII: Storis, three 213s, three 205s, and three 180 ft former WLBs. Logically we should have continued building two ships a year to replace these. (In 1991 they were all at least 46 years old.) They would have all been replaced by 1995. Continuing two ships a year, the first 210s could have been replaced in 1996. When replaced, they would have all been at least 32 years old. Continuing two ship a year we could have replaced all the 210s and 378s by 2009. The first replacement for the 270s should have been contracted in 2010 to enter service in 2013.

We had an opportunity to have an orderly replacement program, but we blew it, beginning approximately FY87/88, when we failed to continue building ship, and let our engineering expertise atrophy.

Selling (and Saving) the Offshore Patrol Cutter Project

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Since seeing indications the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program may be in jeopardy (here and here), I’ve been thinking about how the program might be “sold.” There are a number of approaches that might be considered.

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

It Is a Money Saver

Get it started as an alternative to the NSC. As discussed in an earlier post (Rethinking the New Cutter Programs), we can get more new cutters on line more quickly if we truncated the NSC program at six and started the OPC program two years earlier. This could also be sold as a money saving step, in that we can probably get two OPCs for little more than the price of one NSC. There is very little the NSC can do that the OPC can’t. (If we include the features suggested below, the OPC will be able to do things the NSC cannot-further justifying the change.) This gets us “over-the-hump” of starting the program. Having built the first ships of the class it will be much harder to kill the project and much easier to revive it, if interrupted. The winning shipyard and their legislative representatives will work to keep the project going.  It will also mean the MECs and one HEC will be retiring at least a year earlier–the 210s will only be 54 to 56 years old.

Make the Consequences of Not Building Them Clear

Publish the decommissioning schedule. This should make the news in all the Congressional districts that will loose assets.

What is the performance difference. Publish an addendum to the latest “United States Coast Guard Fiscal Year 20XX Performance Report” showing the decrease in performance if there had been no MECs.

Publish a plan to scale back or delete missions if the the MECs are not replaced.

Pork with a Purpose:

An infrastructure (shipyard) program. It might be more expensive, but Congress can decide they want to spread the work around. They have been doing this, almost since the day the republic was formed. It would certainly be reasonable to say they wanted the construction contracted to more than one yard, perhaps even one West Coast, one East Coast, one Gulf Coast or some other split. As a stimulus program that also delivers a tangible good, building four a year, two each on the West and East Coasts would not be unreasonable. That this spreads the support base for the program wouldn’t hurt either. It might even promote some competition in the long term.

Mobilize our Allies

Mobilize the shipyards that hope to win contracts. They have political clout.

Get the fishing industry on our side. Some times they don’t like us, but we keep the foreign competitors out, and when there is a medical emergency or their boat starts sinking they’re mighty happy we are around.

Mobile the Navy League. Despite the name, this organization is a great ally of the Coast Guard as well, but I’ve yet to see us make the case for the OPC in the pages of their magazine.

Get the Navy to endorse the program. Not sure they will want to, but there are lots of reasons they should (Offshore Patrol Cutters, Why the Navy Should Support the Program), particularly if the design chosen has the potential to be a useful “low-end” warship. These are exactly the types of ships needed for partnership station, and they are the kind of ships many of our allies should include in their Navies and Coast Guards through Foreign Military Sales.

Strengthen the National Defense Angle

Bring back the ASW mission. Adding a passive towed array to the ship could help in our law enforcement mission, improving the chances of  detecting and tracking semi-submersibles, but the additional military capability could also make the ship easier to justify. Beyond the support for a passive sonar usable for law enforcement, the only additions needed for a credible ASW capability would be having magazine and other storage space for torpedoes, sono-buoys, etc. to support Navy MH-60R helicopters that would prosecute contacts. There is more than enough reason for rejuvenating American ASW assets. As illogical as a US/Chinese confrontation would appear, they have been acting increasingly bellicose. The Chinese Navy already has more submarines than the Germans had at the beginning of WWII, the largest submarine force in the Pacific, while we and our allies have far fewer escort ships than any time in at least the last 70 years. There seems to be a particular need for escort ships for the underway replenishment ships, normally unarmed and unescorted, as they move from the ports where they load their supplies, to the areas where they deliver them to forward deployed task forces. OPCs could perform that mission.

Use the LCS Module Concept. This is ideal for the Coast Guard because it makes the ships adaptable for war time roles without requiring the Coast Guard to maintain either the equipment or the people. It also potentially gives the ships greater flexibility to perform peacetime roles. This requires very little more than some open space, foundations, and bringing up connections for utilities.

The Back Story

As an alternative to the LCS. Not that we can take this as an official line, but if the LCS program continues to draw criticism, particularly if the OPCs are designed to accept mission modules, it is something friends of the Coast Guard can suggest. It has been suggested in the past:

On 5 July 2009, Retired U.S. Navy Adm. James Lyons, former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, suggested the LCS “program should return to its original target of $220 million per ship and combine with the U.S. Coast Guard to build a dual-purpose ship with a credible integral combat system that can meet limited warfare requirements. This very different ship should be built in large numbers as part of the coming Ocean Patrol Cutter Program…Such a change would achieve huge savings for both the Navy and the Coast Guard tied to large production numbers. The funding saved from canceling the LCS could be used to procure the most capable high-end combatant ship with margins enough to allow future modernization.” –This could ally us with those in the Navy who would like to divert Navy money from the LCS program to other purposes.

Coming Soon-How We Got In this Mess


Counting the Cutters

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Every year the Navy addresses the Congress and tells them how many ships they have and how many ships they need to do their missions. These numbers do not include Coast Guard ships, but perhaps they should.

The numbers of ships the Navy requires is, to at least some extent, based on the number of Cutters in the Coast Guard.

Protecting a nation’s coast and its ports is normally the most basic and immediate task of any navy. For the US Navy this has hardly been a consideration. Overt threats are kept at arms length by projecting power at great distance, pushing the defensive perimeter far from our shores. But for covert threats, there is also the presumption that those threats will be addressed by the Coast Guard. If there were no Coast Guard, the Navy would have to provide these ships, distracting form their forward strategy.

Additionally war plans anticipate the use of cutters for tasks other than defense of the US coast. If there were no Coast Guard, the Navy would also need to supply these ships.

What would including the Coast Guard do for us? It would

  • Identify national security implications of a shortfall in Coast Guard assets
  • Identify assets that could be either Coast Guard or Navy and result in more explicit consideration of trade-offs
  • Identify capabilities the Navy would like to see in Coast Guard vessels and recognition of the benefits of marginal improvements in cutters toward the national defense

In terms of personnel the Coast Guard is now larger than the Royal Navy. In effect it is the Navy’s closest and most reliable ally. The economic advantages of close coordination are compelling.

We have heard references to a “National Fleet.” Perhaps it is time to apply the concept to procurement planning as well as operations.