Changing Operational Priorities –The Coast Guard’s Force Posture Statement and an Aside on Area AORs

The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations has issued “United States Coast Guard Force Posture 2024.” Dated October 2024, it is reportedly the first of its kind and a new edition will be published annually. I have appended the Coast Guard News Release regarding the publication below.

“This posture statement informs all audiences about the U.S. Coast Guard’s operational priorities, initiatives, requirements and future challenges across its missions and geographic regions. It conveys how we are “Advancing Mission Excellence” in accordance with the 2022 Coast Guard Strategy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan. This posture statement serves as a window into the breadth and depth of the Coast Guard’s commitments and how it is posturing our workforce, capabilities, and assets to deliver operational services that best serve the American people.

It is organized under four major topics rather than by the eleven statutory missions.

  • Operating Environment (p.3)
  • Guiding Principles (p.3/4)
  • Operating Posture (p.4-7)
  • Geographic Operating Areas (p.7-11)

I love it, but it does lack a clear summary of what we will do differently. I will try to interpret some of that. Below I provide a readers’ digest version with a few comments, looking first at the eleven Coast Guard missions as listed in 6 U.S. Code § 468, at select Geographic Operating Areas, and finally I will speculate on the long term implications. Given the increased use of the Coast Guard as a tool of foreign policy, I also suggest changes to the Area Commanders’ areas of responsibility (AOR) to make them fit more easily into the national command structure.

MISSIONS

Some of the missions are specifically addressed in the “Operating Posture” section, others are not. The Eleven missions are:

Non-homeland security missions:

  • Marine safety
  • Search and rescue
  • Aids to navigation
  • Living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement)
  • Marine environmental protection
  • Ice operations.
Homeland security missions: 
  • Ports, waterways and coastal security
  • Drug interdiction
  • Migrant interdiction
  • Defense readiness
  • Other law enforcement.

I will just address them in alphabetical order:

Aids to Navigation: 

Aids to Navigation is not called out under a separate heading.

  • “Our comprehensive approach (to the Marine Transportation System (MTS)) encompasses…Maintaining aids to navigation…” (p.4)
  • The Coast Guard is reinforcing actions to be “brilliant at the basics” that strengthen…aids to navigation.
  • The Coast Guard is in the early phase of recapitalizing an aging fleet of inland aids to navigation tenders with new Waterways Commerce Cutters, crucial to maritime commerce in our inland river system. These investments are central to maintaining service delivery in an increasingly complex MTS (Maritime Transportation System–Chuck).

Sounds like minimal changes in the near term but expect improving technology may reduce manpower requirements. Elsewhere there is indications buoy tenders may increasingly be used for non-AtoN missions. This suggests that the number of sea-going buoy tenders (WLBs) is unlikely to be significantly reduced, but their character may change–more on this below.

Defense Readiness

We are increasing attention on the Coast Guard’s defense readiness mission given the increasing threat posed by nation-state competitors. Through integration with Department of Defense efforts, refreshing defense-related plans, and preparedness exercises, we are sharpening readiness to support homeland defense requirements and force deployment commitments for major overseas contingencies. We continue to meet our commitments to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) for National Capital Region and deployable Rotary Wing Air Intercept and we are adjusting the structure of our Port Security Units (PSU) to address Reserve workforce shortages. We are also integrating PSU elements with DoD expeditionary units to increase their deployment readiness.

This is a welcome recognition of an increasingly hostile world and the emergence of non-state actors who, acting independently or as a proxy for hostile states, can impact national security.

Hopefully it also means we are considering adaptations to our cutter and air fleet to make them more useful early in a near peer conflict (i.e. with China).

Drug Interdiction:

Drug Interdiction is not called out as a separate topic. The only indication of a change is this statement under the section “Western Hemisphere,”

“We will maximize employment opportunities by conducting a mix of missions such as counter drug and combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing when appropriate.” (p.9)

Ice Operations: 

Ice operations is not called out as a separate mission, but it is addressed in the “Polar Regions” section (p.8/9) of the Geographic Operating Areas section.

Arctic and Antarctic Ice operation will get a big boost as we go from 2 polar icebreakers to eight. In the Arctic there will be a continuing need for non-icebreaking large cutters and we can expect increased exploitation of fixed wing aircraft and particularly satellite for communications and information.

Living Marine Resources

“We will increasingly favor shore-based law enforcement teams and our patrol boat fleet, supported by maritime domain awareness sensors, to ensure we best match this mission.”

Webber class WPCs have proven capable of assuming much of the fisheries protection mission. They can go anywhere fishing vessels can go and stand up to any weather they might be fishing in. So FRCs are stepping up to missions WMECs have traditionally done. Not mentioned, but on the other hand, in Alaska and the distant Pacific there is still a role for larger ships.

Marine Environmental Protection:

There was no section devoted to Marine Environmental Protection as a specific mission. MEP was referred to briefly in the Mission execution section (p.5) Arctic (p.8)

But there was this under Incident Management and Crisis Response” (p.6)

Management of large, complex incidents is a central Coast Guard competency. Employment of this capability enables success for the most consequential crises and events, builds trust, and supports DHS. However, the Coast Guard does not have a large contingency capacity “in garrison” for emergencies. We will continue to strengthen Coast Guard incident management capacity and proficiency to meet increasing demand, including in the Reserve workforce. The Coast Guard continues to respond to stakeholder requests for assistance for incident management while we prioritize incidents with a Coast Guard nexus and prevent overextending Coast Guard resources.

Marine Safety

There is a lot of activity here,

“The Coast Guard is reinforcing actions to be “brilliant at the basics” that strengthen marine inspection, investigation, Vessel Traffic Services, waterways management, and aids to navigation.”

Changes in the environment include autonomous vessels, offshore renewable energy installations, an emerging space launch and recovery industry, and alternative vessel fuels. All of which require determination of standards.

Migrant Interdiction

“The Coast Guard will deploy cutters and aircraft, and adaptive force packages where practical, sufficient to interdict migrant ventures, save lives, and deter maritime migration. We continue to prepare with partners to respond to a mass migration to mitigate a national crisis. We are also integrating new technology to better anticipate, detect, deter, and interdict migrant ventures.

No significant reprioritization here. This is an area where the Webber class WPCs (20 in D7 alone) have supplemented or replaced WMECs. It is an area where shore based Unmanned Air Systems and Unmanned surface vessels like saildrone could provide persistent initial detection and perhaps reduce demand for fixed wing search aircraft.

Other Law Enforcement

Not surprisingly there is no mention of this “mission” because the Coast Guard does it on an ad hoc incidental basis. The Coast Guard’s specific law enforcement missions, drug and migrant interdiction, marine environmental protection, and fisheries are addressed separately. It is a catchall for any illegal activities. So, no change.

Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security

The Coast Guard’s force posture for this mission was configured for the post 9/11 security environment and the Coast Guard is examining approaches to optimize our capabilities to meet emerging threats. For example, the proliferation of drones poses a growing risk to the MTS and we will continue to employ our counter-UxS technology in conjunction with DHS and other partners to prepare for this threat. We are also taking steps to ensure that our deployable specialized forces are configured for their role as threats and operational needs evolve.

Recognizing and preparing to counter the UxS threat is significant. I’ve already made several suggestions. I hope if we get a hard kill system, it will also improve effectiveness against other potential threats.

This was included under Defense Readiness,

“…we are adjusting the structure of our Port Security Units (PSU) to address Reserve workforce shortages. We are also integrating PSU elements with DoD expeditionary units to increase their deployment readiness.”

To me Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security is a subset of Defense Readiness once you understand that Defense Readiness is a full time, 24/7 job that does not wait until war is declared or the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy Department. Attacks like 9/11 or Pearl Harbor, will likely come as a surprise, there may be no time to mobilize before an attack, and our Maritime Transportation System is a likely target.

Search and Rescue:

“Search and Rescue is an enduring, no-fail mission that is deeply ingrained in the Coast Guard’s identity. As it remains a top priority, technical advances now allow us to perform the mission more effectively and with fewer resources.

SAR success standards are not being lowered, but technology is increasingly taking the search out of search and rescue. Individual units have greater capability so fewer dedicated units may be required. Expect fewer personnel to be assigned to less demanding SAR missions that are also covered by local government first responders.

GEOGRAPHIC OPERATING AREAS

The Operational Posture goes on to discuss specific operating areas. Some of this has been addressed in the mission summaries above, so I will say no more about the Arctic, Western Hemisphere, Middle East and Europe, Caribbean, and Atlantic basin that are discussed individually in the Operational Posture, but I will talk about the Indo-Pacific, Eastern Pacific, and Antarctica.

Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific is a top regional priority given its geostrategic importance, criticality to global trade, and the threat contesting a free, open, and rules-based maritime commons.

Yes, we are paying more attention to the Pacific, the Indian Ocean not so much. We expect to have six Webber class WPCs in Guam. Harriet Lane (WMEC-903) has been moved from Atlantic Area to Hawaii and it looks like a second WMEC may also be moved. Two OPCs each are expected to go to Long Beach and Kodiak. Assuming Alex Healy stays in Kodiak and the last Pacific Area 210 is decommissioned or transferred to Atlantic Area, that will give Pacific Area 13 large patrol cutters–still fewer than the 16 that were in PacArea in 2000 and only 39.4% of the 33 large cutter total I think we have now and will have for the foreseeable future.

Given the great distances involved, the fact that 84% of the US EEZ is in Pacific Area, and because we have an obligation to the Compact of Free Associated States–Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau–that together have additional EEZ equal to about 50% of the entire US EEZ, it makes no sense for 60% of the large cutters to be in Atlantic Area. More than half of all large patrol cutters should be in Pacific Area. 

Eastern Pacific:

“…with declining major cutter and maritime patrol aircraft availability, we will increasingly employ fast response cutters, ocean-going buoy tenders, and adaptive force packages supported by expeditionary logistics.” I am not surprised; this is something that was begun when Admiral Fagan was Pacific Area Commander.

“…we remain committed to supporting the Mexican Navy as they expand their Captain of the Port authorities through increased information sharing, joint training and exercises, and capacity building engagements. This expanded partnership will enhance maritime governance in the Western Hemisphere and contribute to the fight against illicit trafficking of fentanyl and precursor chemicals through Mexican ports into the U.S.”

—-Let’s talk about Areas of Responsibility–An Aside

US navy fleets areas of responsibility. Source Wikipedia.

The only mitigating rationale I see for not transferring most of the large cutters to Pacific Area is that the Eastern Pacific drug transit zone is actually closer to Atlantic Area ports than to Pacific Area ports. This is why all of South America is under 4th Fleet, which is an Atlantic Fleet command. Probably an argument should be made for realigning the Coast Guard Area geographic descriptions to match those of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. A change of name to Eastern and Western Area might be appropriate and in fact a more accurate description.

Atlantic area includes not only the Atlantic coast but also the great lakes, inland areas, the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean, and parts of the Arctic and Southern Oceans. Pacific Area also includes inland areas, the Indian Ocean (part of which is under Atlantic Fleet), and parts of the Arctic and Southern Oceans.

A realignment along Fleet dividing lines would also mean the dividing lines would more closely correspond to COCOM areas of responsibility and limit the number of cases where COCOMs would need to deal with both Coast Guard Areas to NORTHCOM. Currently there is also overlap in SOUTHCOM, AFRICOM, and CENTCOM. All three of those COCOMs would only need to deal with the Eastern (Atlantic) Area. That seems to be what is happening with AFRICOM and CENTCOM now anyway. PATFORSWA WPCs, Atlantic Area assets, operate routinely in the Indian Ocean, part of the PACAREA AOR. 

Unified Combatant Commander’s Areas of Responsibility.

As Pacific Area assumes more responsibility in the Western Pacific and potentially the Indian Ocean passing off responsibility for all Coast Guard operations in 4th Fleet’s Area of Operations to Atlantic Area might make sense.

Antarctic:

The U.S. priority for Antarctica remains maintaining “a continent reserved for peace and science in accordance with the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.”

No real change expected other than more and better icebreakers, but not everyone thinks like the US.

We should have the agility to react to a change from the present “continent reserved for peace and science.” We really have no reason for confidence that Antarctica will not become a zone of Conflict. Fortunately, actions to increase capabilities in the Arctic may also serve us well in Antarctica.

Implications for the Future

Cutter Design:

Patrol Cutters: Moving from “Patrol and Interdict” to “Target and Interdict” suggests that cruise speed endurance may become less important, and that higher max speed and an economical loiter speed may become more important. Greater emphasis on Defense Readiness would also suggest the desirability of greater speed. This suggest that we may want to build fewer than the currently planned 25 OPCs and shift investment to a new design based on a different set of priorities that we can build in greater number; ships with greater speed and increased modularity to accommodate an uncertain future.

Buoy Tenders: Improved aids to navigation may mean tenders will spend less time on routine AtoN maintenance. Still, they will need to be geographically distributed to respond to critical outages. It seems these ships will become more multi-mission by design. They should continue to be able to operate in ice. Their increased use for non-AtoN missions suggest that they may need overflow berthing and more fuel and stores capacity when supporting WPC deployments and to make them more effective in law enforcement roles–more speed, a flight deck and hangar for UAS and a deck gun such as the Mk38 Mod4.

Deployable Teams

Sounds like we will be getting more deployable Law Enforcement Detachments given the proliferation of capacity building objectives. Increased specialization and a desire for continuity in this area may someday result in a new rating.

Thanks to Paul for bringing the video to my attention. 


Oct. 25, 2024

Coast Guard unveils first Operational Posture Statement

By Zach Shapiro, MyCG Writer

The Coast Guard just released its first Operational Posture Statement, which outlines the service’s operational priorities, including its plans to adapt to personnel and resource challenges. Vice Adm. Peter W. Gautier, Deputy Commandant for Operations (DCO), unveiled the document Friday during an event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

Think of the new annual Operational Posture Statement as a tactical annual document that supports the long-term Coast Guard Strategy by providing more specificity.

To improve operational efficiency and effectiveness, for example, the Coast Guard will increasingly use intelligence and data to shift its approach from “patrol and interdict” to “target and interdict.”

And to improve readiness, the Coast Guard will focus on three key elements: the workforce, capabilities, and assets. The Operational Posture recognizes the need to meet increasing demand while addressing workforce and resource shortages. The service will also continue to recapitalize cutters, boats, aircraft, and infrastructure.

The Operational Posture “is our effort to communicate with our stakeholders and be transparent with the American people on how we will confront all of these challenges, this increasing mission demand, and provide the kind of services that Americans deserve,” Gautier said.

Six guiding principles underpin the Operational Posture Statement:

  1. Balance current operations with future readiness
  2. Strengthen maritime governance
  3. Counter strategic competitors while fulfilling our primary responsibility to secure and defend the homeland
  4. Adjust force structure and posture to maximize operational effectiveness while maintaining a high level of support for our people, platforms, and infrastructure
  5. Employ resources holistically to meet growing demands
  6. Leverage intelligence, information, and improved maritime domain awareness to shift from a “patrol and interdict” to “target and interdict” model

These priorities reflect the increasing national and global demands for Coast Guard services. As 90 percent of global trade moves by sea, maritime security is the bedrock of national security and economic prosperity. In the face of rising global maritime tensions, the Coast Guard has a unique and critical role as a law enforcement entity and military agency.

Amidst this evolving environment, Gautier emphasized, the Coast Guard remains committed to its Search and Rescue (SAR) mission. That mission is “a sacred trust with the American people and a no-fail mission. It is our primary lifesaving mission. It defines us as a humanitarian service,” he said.

Moving forward, the Coast Guard intends to release a new Operational Posture Statement annually to outline the ways in which the service is adapting to new challenges and missions to best serve the American people.

  • To read the Operational Posture Statement in full, please click here.
  • To view Vice Adm. Gautier’s remarks, click here.

Resources: 

DOD Arctic Strategy, 2024, a Critique

Screen grab from page 2 of the DOD Arctic Strategy, 2024

Here is a link to the new DOD Arctic Strategy here. I found it disappointing. There isn’t much strategy here. I would sum it up as–we are going to keep doing what we are doing, but we are going to do it better. (See critique below.)

“This strategy will strengthen the ability of the United States to build integrated deterrence and effectively manage risk to U.S. interests in the Arctic region by enhancing our domain awareness and Arctic capabilities; engaging with Allies, partners, and key stakeholders; and exercising tailored presence.”

About the US Coast Guard:

The US Coast Guard or USCG was mentioned in three places, once in a caption of a picture of USCGC Healy and these two paragraphs.

DoD will partner with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including through the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), which plays a vital role in maintaining U.S. presence in the Arctic region and supporting domain awareness. The USCG is responsible for operating and maintaining the United States’ icebreaking capability, and DoD will continue to support the USCG’s long-term acquisition of at least eight polar icebreakers that will provide needed icebreaking capability for both military and civilian purposes, including PR/SAR. While disaster response is not a force sizing or shaping requirement, DoD remains ready to support DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the event of disaster, terrorist attack, or other mass-casualty incident in the Arctic when directed by the President or when requested by a lead Federal department or agency and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Service-specific, Joint, Interagency, and Combined Exercises. Security and stability in the Arctic depend, in  part, on the Joint Force’s ability to respond rapidly and   effectively to threats in the region. Exercises increase interoperability with Allies and partners, validate plans, train our ability to rapidly deploy to all parts of the Arctic region, and provide an opportunity to test equipment in Arctic conditions. As such, the Joint Force will continue to exercise frequently in the Arctic through Service specific training, joint exercises —to include with USCG— and
combined exercises with our Allies and partners. DoD will
ensure CCMDs with Arctic equities work toward global integration through joint exercises and ensure key exercise lessons inform capability requirements and strategic planning.

That’s it.

About Icebreakers: Icebreakers are mentioned twice, it the paragraph above and here,

The PRC seeks to bolster its operational expertise in the Arctic, where its presence, while limited, is increasing. The PRC operates three icebreakers—the Xue Long, Xue Long 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—which enable the PRC’s dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic. Over the course of the PRC’s 13 Arctic research expeditions to date, the vessels have tested unmanned underwater vehicles and polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, among other activities. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have also  demonstrated the capability and intent to operate in and around the Arctic region through exercises alongside the Russian Navy over the past several years.

Critique:

“DoD will reach this end state through a monitor-and-respond approach.”

In other words, we will be reactive rather than proactive. 

The threat to Europe in the Polar regions is just part of the long running NATO defense problem. No real change there, except the formal extension of NATO into Sweden and Finland.

The Air Threat over the Pole to North America is looked after by NORAD. Apparently, NORAD does not look after Greenland, but that does not seem to be a central problem.

Ground operations in the Arctic are always going to be difficult. There may be small unit operations but no need to worry about an invasion of North America coming over the pole. NORTHCOM is exercising both land and air assets that would be needed to deal with realistic threats.

The North Slope oil fields and the associated pipeline are probably a target if we become engaged in a long-term conflict that involves combat in or over the arctic. The oil fields are not mentioned in the strategy,

What has changed?

The opening of the Arctic Ocean to maritime commerce has made it a possible avenue for logistics between Russia and China with the potential for militarily valuable shipments moving both ways between the Russian Arctic coast on one end and the Russian Pacific Coast, North Korea, or China on the other. The weakness of Russian transcontinental land transportation systems makes the Northern Sea Route particularly important.

The door to be shut or left open is the Bering Strait.

Bering Strait. 44 Nautical miles (82km) wide, with the Diomede Islands in the center.

The “strategy” mentions the Bering Straits only as a choke point,

The Arctic includes multiple strategically significant maritime chokepoints. Reduction in sea ice
due to climate change means chokepoints such as the Bering Strait between Alaska and Russia and the Barents Sea north of Norway, are becoming more navigable and more economically and militarily significant.

We would certainly want to deny use of the Strait by our enemies and ensure that we and our allies have the option to transit through the Strait.

The planned deep-water port in Nome (currently on hold) will be essential to forces that might be used to control access to the Bering Strait. We would also want to make sure St Lawrence Island and Little Diomede remain in US hands. The US might also want to seize Big Diomede. None of these strategic locations are mentioned in the plan.

Diomede Islands: Little Diomede Island or Kruzenstern Island (left) and Big Diomede Island or Ratmanov Island in the Bering Sea. Photo is from the north. Photo by Dave Cohoe.

But who is in charge?

First look at the map at the head of this post. They have divided the Arctic so that operations there are under three different Unified Combatant Commands, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USNORTHCOM. In other words, no one below the President is in charge over the whole area.

These are the Unified Combatant Commander’s Areas of Responsibility. What is not made clear in this graphic is that all of Russia including the larger Asian part is under USEUCOM.

Perhaps most critically, the Pacific interface with the Arctic is under all three COCOMs.

  • USEUCOM is responsible for the Russian land areas in spite of the fact that the Bering Strait is 4521 statute miles from the COCOM’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, and that is the shorter distance West from Stuttgart across the Atlantic and over the US, rather than over Russia. –This has got to be wrong.
  • USNORTHCOM has the Bering Strait and the Eastern half of the Bering Sea but normally they have no significant naval force. Their primary responsibility is the air defense of the US and Canada.
  • USINDOPACOM, which has the naval assets in the Pacific that might be used to attack Russian assets in Asia has responsibility for only the Western half of the Bering Sea below the Bering Strait.

This division of responsibility, placing Russian Asia under USEUCOM, also means that if the US should be at war with both China and Russia, then at least officially, conducting the war in the Pacific would be under two or perhaps three different COCOMs. I doubt this would actually work this way.

“Increased focus on combat capabilities for new Danish patrol ships” –Naval News

Flexible patrol ship scale model on Danske Patruljeskibe booth at DALO Industry Days 2024.

Naval News reports that the Danish Navy is now planning to increase the armament of a proposed class of up to six ice strengthened patrol vessels. The design has not been finalized, but they have decided the security situation demands additional installed weapon systems.

We talked about these ships earlier, Arctic Patrol Cutter, State of the Art–Revisited. Basically, they were expected to perform Coast Guard type missions around Greenland and into the Arctic, replacing the Thetis class patrol frigates.

The additions include Vertical Launch (missile) Systems (VLS).

“Runaway costs and design delays: Are Coast Guard’s new icebreakers worth it?” –The Sandboxx

Xue Long 2 on sea trials. Photo by PRIC.

The Sandboxx has a brief look at the problems the US has had in fielding replacement icebreakers.

What I think they leave out of the article is that while the Chinese seem to be planning heavy icebreakers including possibly nuclear-powered ones, the Chinese icebreakers built so far are nowhere near as powerful as Polar Star or the Polar Security Cutter. Mostly they have been ice capable research ships. Their only Chinese built medium ice breaker, Xue long-2, is smaller and a third less powerful than Healy. The three Chinese icebreakers currently in the Arctic include the much smaller 5,600-ton, 8,600 HP (6.4KW) Polar Class 6 Ji Di, smaller than the old Wind class icebreakers.

Aerial view of China’s icebreaker Ji Di berthing at the pier of Qingdao Olympic Sailing Center on July 3 in Qingdao, Shandong Province of China.
© Sun Qimeng/VCG via AP, “China and Russia to Expand Scientific Cooperation in Arctic: Report” –Newsweek

By some counts the US, and most notably Canada, have more icebreakers than China. All of China’s icebreaker construction is not directed at the Arctic. They also have interests in Antarctica (which I find more troubling), and they have ports that ice over requiring domestic icebreaking.

The Sandboxx also describes the 8,500 ton Project 23550 ice class patrol vessels as Russia’s “… first “combat icebreaker,” a small, agile, and armed-to-the-teeth escort ship with launchers installed for anti-ship and cruise missiles.” That is hyperbole. It has provision for placing two containers on the stern. Those containers could contain cruise missiles, but any ship that can mount containers in a position where the space above the container is unobstructed could have a similar capability. Other than being armed with containers, they are armed very much like a Coast Guard cutter. They have a single medium caliber gun, either 76mm or 100mm. They have no surface-to-air missile system other than perhaps man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and no CIWS of any kind. Furthermore, they are not Russia’s first armed icebreaker. Russia has had armed icebreakers since at least WWII, including the Project 23550’s predecessors, the Ivan Susanin class, eight ships completed 1973 to 1982, four of which are still in service. I went aboard one of them in San Francisco, when they came to help celebrate the 200th anniversary of the beginning of the US Coast Guard.

It would not be too difficult for the US to build counterparts to the Project 23550s for the US Coast Guard or Navy, especially after the recent ICE Pact agreement with Canada and Finland. Ships don’t have to be as capable as the Polar Security Cutters to be useful. The Chinese are proving that.

“Inside the U.S. Coast Guard’s Aleutian encounter with China’s military — and what it means” –Alaska Beacon

The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Kimball, right, and a Japanese naval training vessel travel near the island of Unalaska in 2021. (U.S. Coast Guard photo)

The Alaska Beacon reports on the local reaction to the presence of Chinese ships in the Bering Sea, July 6 and 7.

The reaction clearly favored a more powerful and more visible response than a Coast Guard cutter and C-130.

So why use a cutter? Wouldn’t a destroyer or frigate be more appropriate?

A destroyer would have been faster, but the cutter is actually faster than the frigates the Navy is currently building.

The immediate answer is that there probably were no US Navy surface combatants in the vicinity, but would that have even been desirable?

What if they had suddenly become hostile?

Well, the cutter would probably have been sunk. That is a fact, but that is probably equally true of a destroyer outnumbered and taken by surprise at close range. Losing a cutter would be less of a loss and a prompt response from the Air Force would follow, probably quickly sinking the Chinese warships that have no fighter protection. That’s assuming they had not already been sunk by a US Navy submarine that may or may not have also been following them.

The US Navy just does not routinely keep surface vessels in the area of the Aleutians. Apparently, the Chinese were only there for two days. It would probably take longer than that for a USN combatant to make a transit, putting it out of position for its normal duties.

They were probably only doing this because the US does Freedom of Navigation Exercises in their backyard. But their response just plays into our narrative that we have every right to transit the Taiwan Straits–Look, they are transiting a narrow passage between US islands, and we didn’t object.

Would I like to see the cutters better equipped to defend themselves, sure, but it probably would not make any difference if they came to blows. Meanwhile the cutter makes a pretty good AGI. 

The Chinese are unlikely to start a war in the Aleutians unless they simultaneously also start it somewhere else, like Taiwan, but we still want to keep an eye on them, to discourage mischief.

Thanks to David for bringing this to my attention.

Force Protection Unit “Coast Guard cutters Sea Dog, Sea Dragon decommissioned in St. Marys, Georgia” –News Release

Coast Guard members salute during the playing of the national anthem during a decommissioning ceremony for the Coast Guard Cutters Sea Dog and Sea Dragon in St. Marys, Georgia, May 29, 2024. Rear Adm. Douglas M. Schofield, Coast Guard District Seven Commander, presided over the ceremony honoring the years of service the Sea Dog and Sea Dragon and their crews provided to the nation. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Ryan Dickinson)

Below is a press release. The two 87 foot patrol boats were assigned to a Force Protection unit for the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) based at Kings Bay, GA.

“The Coast Guard cutters Sea Devil (WPB 87368) and Sea Fox (WPB 87374) have relocated from Bangor, Washington, to replace the Sea Dog and Sea Dragon.”

Sea Devil and Sea Fox were assigned to the Force Protection Unit that escorts SSBNs from Bangor, WA. Is that unit being decommissioned, or are they being reequipped? The two WPBs at each unit were not the only boats used by these units.

As I recall these WPBs and their operating costs were paid for by the Navy Department. In any case these decommissionings do not affect normal Coast Guard operations.

These four WPBs were equipped a bit differently from standard Marine Protector class 87 footers, including having a .50 cal. mounted in a remote weapon station on a band stand on the bow.

KEYPORT, Wash. (Aug. 18, 2009) U. S. Coast Guardsmen man the rails as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Sea Fox (WPB 87374) is brought to life at Naval Base Kitsap. (U.S. Navy photo Ray Narimatsu/Released)

Thanks to Paul for bringing this to my attention.


May 29, 2024

PHOTO RELEASE: Coast Guard cutters Sea Dog, Sea Dragon decommissioned in St. Marys, Georgia

JACKSONVILLE, Fla. — The Coast Guard decommissioned the U.S. Coast Guard cutters Sea Dog (WPB 87373) and Sea Dragon (WPB 87367), Wednesday, during a ceremony in St. Marys, Georgia.

Rear Adm. Douglas M. Schofield, Coast Guard District Seven commander, presided over the ceremony honoring the years of service the Sea Dog and Sea Dragon provided to the nation.

The Sea Dog and Sea Dragon were 87-foot marine protector-class cutters assigned to Coast Guard Maritime Force Protection Unit Kings Bay in the Coast Guard’s Seventh District.

Maritime Force Protection Unit Kings Bay is designed to support the Navy’s efforts to provide anti-terrorism and force protection for its Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines and to assist in meeting its Presidential mandates for ballistic weapon security.

The Sea Dragon was commissioned in January 2008 and the Sea Dog was commissioned in July 2009.

“The men and women of the cutters Sea Dog and Sea Dragon, past and present, have exemplified unwavering professionalism and dedication, safeguarding our nation’s waters and supporting critical defense missions,” said Capt. David Vicks, commanding officer of Maritime Force Protection Unit Kings Bay. “I extend my profound gratitude to these courageous crews as we honor their steadfast service.”

Following the decommissioning ceremony, the cutters will be transferred to Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point.

The Coast Guard cutters Sea Devil (WPB 87368) and Sea Fox (WPB 87374) have relocated from Bangor, Washington, to replace the Sea Dog and Sea Dragon.

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“US Coast Guard Cutter Eagle to Depart on Annual Summer Cruise” –Seapower

The Navy League’s online magazine, Seapower, reports the start of USCGC Eagle’s summer training program and their planned port calls.

“Eagle’s 2024 full summer schedule includes port visits to:   

  • May 11: Departs from New London 
  • May 25 – May 28: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic 
  • June 4 – June 7: Cartagena, Colombia 
  • June 14 – June 17: San Juan, Puerto Rico 
  • June 24 – June 27: Bridgetown, Barbados 
  • July 7 – July 10: Hamiliton, Bermuda 
  • July 18 – July 21: Halifax, Nova Scotia 
  • July 26 – July 29: Portsmouth, New Hampshire 
  • Aug. 2 – August 5: Rockland, Maine 
  • Aug. 9 – August 12: Boston, Massachusetts 
  • Aug. 16: Returns to New London 

Eagle is scheduled to return to New London on Aug. 16. 

“MEDIA AVAILABILITY: US Coast Guard to commission newest national security cutter, named for first Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard, in North Charleston, South Carolina” –news release

USCGC Calhoun 759 arrives Charleston.

Below is a news release from Coast Guard News.


April 16, 2024

NORTH CHARLESTON, S.C.  — The Coast Guard is scheduled to hold a commissioning ceremony for the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Calhoun (WMSL 759), the service’s newest national security cutter, Saturday, in North Charlston. The event will be presided over by Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan. The cutter’s namesake comes from the first Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard, Charles L. Calhoun. The commissioning ceremony’s date of April 20 is in honor of Calhoun’s birthday.

WHO: Coast Guard Commandant Adm. Linda Fagan; Master Chief Petty Officer of the Coast Guard Heath Jones; Capt. Timothy Sommella, the commanding officer of the Calhoun; and Calhoun crew members.

WHAT:  Commissioning ceremony for the Coast Guard’s newest national security cutter.

WHEN: Saturday, April 20, 2024, at 10 a.m.

WHERE: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, 2000 Bainbridge Ave., North Charleston, SC 29405.

Editors’ Note: Interested media are requested to RSVP by emailing a list of members’ names to Ensign Cody Meyers at Cody.L.Meyers@uscg.mil for base access no later than 5 p.m. Wednesday. Credentialed media are asked to arrive no later than 9 a.m. Saturday with a driver’s license and proof of insurance to clear security. 

Canadian Coast Guard Multi-Purpose Vessel Recapitalization

Canadian CG MPV. Credit Aker Arctic.

Below is a press release from Seaspan Shipyards regarding a contract awarded for the Canadian Coast Guard’s Multi-Purpose Vessel program. We talked about these ships earlier. I am going to repeat some of that earlier post here. Much like USCG Juniper class buoy tenders or the Great Lakes Icebreaker Mackinaw, these Canadian ships are made to both tend buoys and break ice. But these ships will be a lot bigger than the Mackinaw and it appears they can also support a helicopter and probably UAS.

CHARACTERISTICS:

  • Displacement: about 8,500 tons
  • Length, overall: 99.9 meters (328′)
  • Beam: 20.3 meters (66.7′)
  • Draft: 6.2 meters (20’4″)
  • Propulsion: diesel-electric; two azimuthing propulsion units
  • Range 12,000 nautical miles

The relatively shallow draft was a design requirement. 

Canadian CG MPV. Credit Aker Arctic.

ICE CLASS: 

These ships will be Canadian Ice Class 4, meaning they will have the capability to maintain a speed of 3 knots through ice 4 feet thick. The Canadian Coast Guard will consider these heavy icebreakers. We don’t have any figures on horsepower, but they probably will have less than 20,000 HP which, in the USCG system, would classify them as light icebreakers.

Compared to the US Coast Guard’s “heavy” Great Lakes icebreaker, Mackinaw (3,500 tons and 73m), these will be more powerful and more than twice as large. These might be a good design for the planned second USCG Great Lakes icebreaker.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USCG:

Aside from possible use of the design for Great Lakes icebreaker, these might be pretty close to what the USCG needs for their planned medium icebreakers. Certainly, consultation with Canadian counterparts will sharpen the focus of the US design effort. We might also have reasons to limit beam and/or draft.

I might add that, ships like these could make good companions (tenders/mother ships) for support of distant FRC operations, carrying fuel, supplies, and air assets.


Seaspan Shipyards Progresses to Next Phase of Designing and Building Multi-Purpose Vessels for the Canadian Coast Guard

 March 26, 2024 – North Vancouver, BC – Seaspan Shipyards (Seaspan) has been awarded the Construction Engineering (CE) and Long Lead Items (LLI) contracts for the pre-construction work of the Canadian Coast Guard’s (CCG) first six Multi-Purpose Vessels (MPV).

Following the successful completion of the vessel’s Basic Design review in late 2023, Seaspan was awarded the CE and LLI contracts to complete the design and engineering work and to procure long lead-time material and equipment to ensure readiness to proceed with the construction of the first six ships of the up to 16 vessel fleet.

“This milestone demonstrates the tremendous capabilities in marine design and engineering that have been developed through the National Shipbuilding Strategy.  Our team, along with our partners from coast to coast, are excited to move to the next phase of this program, and ultimately provide the Canadian Coast Guard with the vessels they need to manage and safeguard Canada’s coastlines. A long run of ships like the MPV program enables Seaspan to continue to drive improvement and generate greater efficiencies, while ensuring we have stability for the next generation of shipbuilders, marine engineers and designers and supply chain in Canada,” said John McCarthy, Chief Executive Officer, Seaspan Shipyards.

“The designers and the ship builders of Seaspan Vancouver Shipyard – are playing key roles in taking the Canadian Coast Guard’s new multi-purpose vessels (MPVs) out of the drawing room and into the open ocean. The contracts announced today are an important milestone to getting these ships completed and represent an important investment in North Vancouver. This will secure good jobs while advancing the delivery of the MPVs to significantly expand the operational capacity of our Coast Guard for years to come.” – The Honourable Jonathan Wilkinson, Minister of Energy & Natural Resources and MP for North Vancouver.

The MPVs will be Polar Class 4 vessels, allowing them to carry out multiple missions including icebreaking in moderate ice conditions and assisting in shipping and flood control, search and rescue, environmental response, as well as maintaining Canada’s marine navigation system composed of approximately 17,000 aids to navigation. The new fleet of MPVs will replace the existing fleet of High Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels and Medium Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessels.

“The Canadian Coast Guard saves lives at sea, maintains waterways open and safe for the movement of goods and services, protects the marine environment and supports Canadian sovereignty and security. The Multi-Purpose Vessels will be key assets for the Canadian Coast Guard’s future fleet, giving our personnel the modern, reliable tools they need to continue their vital work from coast to coast to coast,” said Mike Kelloway, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard.

Seaspan has already gained significant experience designing and building Polar Class vessels including three Offshore Fisheries Science Vessels which are now in service with the Canadian Coast Guard; an Offshore Oceanographic Science Vessel that is currently under construction; and a heavy Polar Icebreaker, the first of its kind to be designed and constructed in Canada in 60 years. Seaspan is preparing to cut steel on the Polar Icebreaker in late 2024 with the recent completion of a prototype block, ensuring that proper processes, procedures, and equipment are in place to build a vessel of this complexity.

QUICK FACTS ABOUT THE MULTI-PURPOSE VESSELS

  • With a displacement of 8,500 tonnes, the Multi-Purpose Vessels will be 99.9 metres long and 20.3 metres wide, and able to accommodate up to 50 personnel.
  • The area of operation for the MPV will include:
    • Year-round operations in Canada’s eastern and western seaboards, within Canada’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
    • Year-round operations in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the St. Lawrence River, and the Great Lakes
    • Seasonal (summer) operations in the western and lower Arctic
  • Under the NSS, Seaspan has become a major economic and job creation engine. According to an economic analysis conducted by Deloitte, Seaspan has contributed $5.7 billion to Canada’s GDP since 2012, while also creating or sustaining more than 7,000 jobs annually.

SOCIAL MEDIA

Twitter: @Seaspan
LinkedIn: Seaspan ULC
Instagram: @SeaspanULC
Facebook: Seaspan

ABOUT SEASPAN

Seaspan, a division of Seaspan ULC, is a leader in Canada’s ship design, engineering, building and ship repair industry. With modern facilities and a dedicated workforce of approximately 3,900 in North Vancouver and Victoria, the company has proven itself to be a trusted and strategic partner on a range of complex projects for both government and the private sector.

Canada’s New Icebreaker Fleet

Current Coast Guard Icebreakers:  CCGS Henry Larsen  (medium icebreaker, top photo), CCGS Terry Fox (heavy icebreaker, bottom photo)Current Coast Guard Icebreakers: CCGS Henry Larsen (medium icebreaker, top photo), CCGS Terry Fox (heavy icebreaker, bottom photo)

Below are two news releases, first a release by Chantier Davie Canada Inc. (Davie) and second a statement from the Canadian Coast Guard.

The release from Davie is new (it also has an illustration). The Canadian Coast Guard statement dates from July 2019. I added it because it outlines what is expected of the new icebreakers.

The Davie news release says these will be the “largest and most advanced icebreakers ever built in and for Canada.” Currently the largest Canadian Icebreaker is CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent which is 15,324 tons full load, 119.8 m (393.04 ft) in length, and has three electric motors, 3 × 6,714 kW, or 27,011 HP total. Presumably these will be larger and more powerful, still the new icebreakers may turn out to be medium icebreakers, at least according to the US Coast Guard classification system that is based on horsepower, e.g. 20,000 to 45,000 HP are medium icebreakers.

The Davie release also notes, “Davie is a part of Group Davie, which in November 2023 acquired Finland’s Helsinki Shipyard, the world leader in icebreaker design and construction.” Maybe a good idea to buy the expertise you need.


March 26, 2024

Lévis, Canada – March 26, 2024 – Chantier Davie Canada Inc. (Davie) today announced it has been awarded its first National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS) contract by the Government of Canada for the design of the six-ship fleet of Canada’s future Program Icebreakers. This major milestone marks the beginning of Davie’s NSS work package to replenish Canada’s Arctic fleet and each initiative under the contract will help advance upcoming design, construction, delivery and support phases for these strategic ships.

The Honourable Jean-Yves Duclos, Canada’s Minister of Public Services and Procurement (PSPC) said: “This first contract awarded to Chantier Davie under the National Shipbuilding Strategy brings us a step closer to providing the Canadian Coast Guard with the next generation Arctic ships. They will be among the most advanced, sustainable and durable vessels tailored to the world’s harshest environments. The new fleet will be symbolic of Canada’s Arctic presence and crucial to keeping our country open for business year-round.”

Davie President and CEO, James Davies, said: “This is a momentous first step in our journey to deliver a fleet of the largest and most advanced icebreakers ever built in and for Canada. My heartfelt thanks go to the dedicated teams at Davie, the Canadian Coast Guard and PSPC. They have spent countless hours preparing for this historic milestone. Now, we can’t wait to get working on renewing Canada’s Arctic fleet.”

Davie will establish a Program Icebreaker project management and design office, providing compelling opportunities for current and future generations of Canadian shipbuilders. Davie is committed to recruiting teams of highly skilled shipbuilding professionals, who will drive all aspects of constructing the world’s largest order book of heavy icebreakers.

Moreover, Davie will engage critical subcontractors to design and certify the vessel to established safety, environmental, and performance standards. Building on Davie’s proven track record of delivering vessels of exceptional quality and performance, this early phase is fundamental in guaranteeing sustained operational readiness and capability to best serve the CCG’s missions.

Julian Kenney, Program Director for the Program Icebreakers at Davie, said: “Embarking on the design and construction of Canada’s new icebreaker fleet is a great source of pride for everyone at Davie. We have a strong partnership with the Canadian Coast Guard and our top priority is to design and build the icebreakers Canada needs to keep our waterways open, protect our environment, and secure the Arctic.”

About Davie

Based in Québec, Canada since 1825, Davie is a world-class designer and builder of specialist, mission-critical ships such as icebreakers, ferries and warships for government and commercial customers. Davie became a partner in the Government of Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy on April 4, 2023. This historic agreement is for the design and construction of the largest and most technologically advanced ships ever constructed in and for Canada. The initial $8.5 billion package of work includes seven heavy icebreakers and two large hybrid-powered ferries. Davie is a part of Group Davie, which in November 2023 acquired Finland’s Helsinki Shipyard, the world leader in icebreaker design and construction. Find out more at davie.ca and helsinkishipyard.fi.

For further information, please contact: Marcel Poulin Director, External Affairs and Industrial Participation, Davie marcel.poulin@davie.ca +1 581 992-8564


Canadian Coast Guard’s new Icebreakers

Backgrounder

As part of the Government of Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy and in accordance with the Canadian Coast Guard’s fleet renewal planning, six new icebreakers will be built for the Coast Guard. These icebreakers are fundamental to year-round safe and efficient movement of ships and goods in Canadian waters.

The new program icebreakers will replace the Coast Guard’s heavy and medium icebreakers that operate in Atlantic Canada and the St. Lawrence waterways during the winter and in the Arctic during the summer.  In Atlantic Canada, these program icebreakers help ensure year-long ferry service, escort ships through ice-covered waters and the clearance of ice from harbours and wharfs, which is essential to Canada’s commercial fisheries. In the Arctic, they provide icebreaking support to ships with vulnerable cargoes, such as dangerous goods and perishable products, and support vessels transporting cargo that is a vital part of the northern communities’ sealift and resupply.

The new program icebreakers will be built at a third strategic shipyard that will be selected through a competitive process under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.