Russians Have a Better Idea?–Bullet Proof Lifejackets

Seems the Russians have an innovation we might want to look into. “naval-technology.com” reports, “The Russian naval infantry is to be equipped with bulletproof life vests…(the vest)…provides full ballistic protection against light weapon threats in addition to being a floatation device. Delivery of the life vests will begin in 2011.”

Considering the drowning of ME3 Shaun Lin, Oct. 13th, during an exercise, perhaps we need to take another look at how we are equipping our boarding officers, to make sure that their flotation devices can in fact keep them afloat, even when wearing full boarding equipment.

Combining ballistic protection with the flotation device would, if nothing else, simplify preparation for boardings. It also looks like a good idea for our exposed gun crews on crew served weapons.

Icebreakers–Photos

This tread has some interesting photos of modern icebreakers. Hopefully someone is thinking about this topic in the context of what our new construction icebreakers will look like.

The US does have a couple of ice capable research vessels that are referred to in the tread that I had not been aware of, the 94 meter (310 foot) icebreaker R/V Nathaniel B. Palmer, built in 1992,

Nathaniel B. Palmer in sea ice

and the 76 meter (251 foot) ice-strengthened (Ice class ABS A1) RV Laurence M. Goul,  built in 1997. Both were built by Edison Chouest Offshore Inc., Galliano, Louisiana,

L.M. Gould in Arthur Harbor

(Thanks, Steve, for the link)

A Very Different Coast Guard

In Science Fiction, an “alternate reality” is a common plot device. It allows you to think “outside the box” and sidestep some of your preconceptions. A recent post, “Maritime Security Operations and the ‘Myth’ of Piracy,” allowed me to look at how Coast Guard missions are done in an alternate reality, the UK. I’d like to recommend it, not because I agree with the conclusions, but because they are so different.

What would be Coast Guard missions in the US, are fractured among several agencies in the UK. Many are done by the Royal Navy and fixed wing Maritime SAR has been done by RAF Nimrod ASW aircraft (Just as it is done by CP-140 Auroras in Canada). Deep defense cuts in the wake of a defense review, are taking away many of the resources that have done these missions. The RN is loosing many of its older smaller frigates that have done law enforcement. Towing vessels are being discarded. The new generation of Nimrods, now almost finished at great expense, are to be discarded. This raises the question, how will these missions be done in the future?

They have a Maritime and Coast Guard Agency, but it is very small, unarmed, civilian, and relies heavily on volunteers. They do SAR with surface assets, Merchant Vessel safety, and marine pollution prevention, but no drug or fisheries enforcement and no buoy tending (this seems to be handled locally although there seems to be a bill to establish nationwide funding and oversight). They have a UK Border Agency (analogous to Immigration Customs Enforcement) that works with police to do drug and migrant interdiction, and they have more than one fisheries enforcement agency including a separate one for Scotland. None of these agencies appear to operate aircraft.

Among the comments were calls for an American style Coast Guard, but the post proposes something the author considers less radical, using the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA, a rough equivalent of the Military Sealift Command, MSC) to man ships and put them under the authority of the Coast Guard, Customs, and Fisheries Agencies, “In UK waters Fisheries officers could be carried, and Customers officers in the same way.  In the Caribbean or off Somalia I would suggest the boarding parties should be made up of Royal Marines.

And rather than use small Offshore Patrol Vessels, he proposes using Naval Auxiliaries, “I am not a big fan of smaller less flexible vessels, so lets go to the other extreme and examine the use of really big RFA’s for these maritime security operations.

“As the RN surface fleet has shrunk, RFA tankers and the auxiliary landing ships of the Bay Class have been used on the Windies Guard Ship’ and other duties. While some have questioned the veracity of using a tanker to do anti-drug runner ops’ I say “so what?” – it’s a flexible asset, use it for whatever you can.

That is a very different view. There has been a lively response to the post with over 90 replies. We have had our own experiment with manning ships for other agencies. Depending on the National Science Foundation to fund the Icebreaker program is what got us in the current situation.  The poster never addressed who he expected to do air ops for his coast guard.

Looking at this alternate reality makes me appreciate what we have in terms of the opportunities for synergy, flexibility, coordination, and efficiency.

Leadership and Accountibility

“One day you will take a fork in the road, and you’re going to have to make a decision about which direction you want to go. If you go one way, you can be somebody. You will have to make your compromises and … turn your back on your friends, but you will be a member of the club, and you will get promoted and get good assignments. Or you can go the other way, and you can do something, something for your country and for your Air Force and for yourself. … You may not get promoted, and you may not get good assignments, and you certainly will not be a favorite of your superiors, but you won’t have to compromise yourself. … That’s when you have to make a decision: to be or to do.”

These are the words of Col. John Boyd, USAF, who never made General, but was largely responsible for the F-15, F-16, and A-10. He was also the originator of the concept of getting inside your opponent’s Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action (OODA) loop as military strategy that became the basis of the Marines’ Maneuver Warfare Doctrine.

His moral dilemma, of making the hard decisions and hurting your career, or going with the flow, came to mind when I read this post concerning where responsibility lay for the death of a sailor on one of the Navy’s troubled LPD-17 Class ships. Were the officers on scene responsible or was it the result of leadership that provided poor tools to perform the job?

Recently the the author has apologized for possibly violating the Naval Institute’s editorial policy, but still, this is a great and thoughtful read.

I can’t help but think how these concepts echo our own “Deepwater” experience, and the resulting state of our cutter replacement program, now 25 years behind schedule in the case of the MECs.

The Final Three of Fourteen Heroes

As previously mentioned, the Coast Guard Compass has been running a series providing information about the men and women the first fourteen Fast Response Cutters are to be named for. Since my last post on this subject, they have completed the series. The last three in the series are:

  • Isaac Mayo a late 19th century junior surfman who served on Cape Cod
  • Richard Dixon, a late 20th century surfboat coxswain who earned two Coast Guard Medals serving in the Pacific Northwest
  • Heriberto Herandez, a fireman who was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star with Combat “V” and the Purple Heart for action in Vietnam.

If you would like to catch up on the stories of the other men and women these vessels are named for, you can find them below.

Incidentally, I’d like to see us start referring to these as the “Hero class” cutters, a lot less awkward than “Fast Response Cutter” and more meaningful than FRC.

Cyber Security–Different, More Serious Threats

Here is an interesting bit of news about cyber security. Seems a Chinese government communications company hijacked 15% of the worlds internet traffic. There is some discussion about how this was done and the potential dangers.

Then there is this one. An amazing story of how its possible to remotely take over infrastructure control systems and possibly disable or reprogram them. More direct than simply stealing traffic, this sort of attack might result in immediate physical danger, from an unknown source, potentially more serious than 9/11.

Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) Update, Nov. 2010

We have a bit more information since the last update in July. In addition to publishing a new conceptual design, the Acquisition Directorate held an industry day presentation and posted the slides as a pdf. If you would like to see the slides go here, and select “Industry Day Presentation.” Clearly they have not been sitting on their hands the last four months; there is substantially more specificity in the new briefing.

There is more detail on how they expect to award the contracts. The first ship is still expected in FY2019, which seems an awfully long way away. I might feel better about this, if we were making more progress on the National Security Cutter (NSC). If I understand the presentation (all subject to change of course), there will be two phases in the design process, first, up to three contracts will be awarded for competing preliminary designs (a two and a half year process), then after selection, a single contract will be awarded for detail design (a two year process) and construction of the first ship (a three year process with some overlap of the design process). This contract will also include options for ships 2-9. After #9 there will be another open competition for ships 10-25 (which you can bet, if they built the first nine ships the same yard will win). So it sounds like, as had been hoped, the Coast Guard will own the design and documentation shortly after the first ship is contracted, so there is a chance for real competition and the possibility of construction by multiple yards. This makes possible the sort of options discussed in “Rethinking the New Cutter Programs.”

There is a requirement the ships will be built for a projected Operational Tempo / Service Life of up to 230 deployed days for 30 years (this seems to imply multiple crewing); a fatigue Life of 30 years (threshold) –30 years +10 years (Objective); and a traditional monohull, hull form is specified, as is a steel hull and steel or aluminum superstructure.

Surprises and clarifications: Along with the the expected clarifications there were some surprises in the briefing,

  • There was a specific statement that there would be no stern launch boat ramp
  • The towing requirement now includes up to 10,000 LT through Sea State (SS) 2, in addition to equivalent tonnage through SS5
  • There is a cargo handling requirement for an organic capability to move single 5000 lb pallets between ship & pier and internally store 2 (threshold) / 10 (objective) 4’x4’x6’ high pallets
  • The requirement for total accommodations has increased to 120 (threshold) / 126 (objective) total racks capable of supporting mix gender crews with no more than 8 individuals (threshold) / 6 individuals (objective) per space
  • There is a requirement for .50 Cal ROSAM (and crew served machine guns) in addition to an aft minor caliber gun. ROSAM is a stabilized remote controlled mount and presumably the minor caliber gun will be a 25 mm Mk38 mod 2.
  • There is a requirement for a SCIF and a small space for signals intelligence exploitation. This is at least as important for law enforcement as it is for wartime.
  • In reference to the migrant interdiction mission, there is a requirement to embark, process and sustain up to 500 migrants for 48 hours and 300 migrants for 5 days; to provide a temporary shelter for protecting migrants from the elements in a tropical climate and which can be rigged on the forecastle (primary) and flight deck (secondary); and to be able to move migrants from embarkation point to holding location without entering interior spaces.
  • There is a “Rescue and Assistance” requirement to “Embark/debark large group of people directly from the water in SS3 (e.g. capsized migrant vessel with up to 150 people in the water)” and to “Bring individuals aboard that are injured or unable to move on their own.” I’m not sure what that translates to. Will it require an opening in the hull near the waterline line, like on the NSC, with its attendant maintenance problems, or are we talking about having something like a basket and helo style powered hoist, or just J-davits and stokes litters?

There were things I did not see that I expected to. They included:

  • UNREP/Replenishment at Sea. The brief talks about underway refueling, but this is not specifically alongside. They do talk about “CG astern refueling” but that is not defined. Is the OPC being refueled or is the OPC refueling a WPB?
  • There is no stated requirement for a Helo In flight Refueling (HIFR) capability.
  • There is no stated requirement for an Air Search Radar. Its possible this could be covered by the gun firecontrol system, but rudimentary air search capability is now relatively inexpensive so choosing not to provide it is surprising.

There were things I had hoped for but didn’t see:

  • There was no provision for the support of Navy MH-60 R/S helicopters such as storage space for their sonobuoys and weapons. If these spaces were provided, they could certainly be used for storage of other items in until it becomes necessary. The specified endurance for the OPCs is already on the high side. Identifying spaces for this purpose and providing the required security systems would not necessarily take up more space. It would simply mean that when these spaces were used for support of embarked Navy helos, we would trade off some endurance in other areas.
  • 25 knots should be a minimum requirement, rather than 22 knots threshold /25 knots objective. Less than 25 knots and the ship will not be able to catch a modern cargo ship or work with an amphibious ready group.
  • There is no provision for containerized mission modules. Basically 8x8x20 CONEX boxes, the Navy is developing ASW and Mine Warfare modules for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), but modules could also be developed to support Coast Guard missions. Looking at the conceptual design for the OPC, it looks like there might be room for three or four of the boxes on the stern, in lieu of the third boat, and if properly configured, the boat crane on the stern might also satisfy both the organic cargo handling requirement and be able to launch and recover the LCS Mine Warfare and ASW mission module unmanned vehicles. Additional modules, as well a the required cargo pallets might be positioned under the flight deck.
  • Certainly the constructions standards will include some weight-moment margins, but too often these quickly disappear. I was hoping the specifications would call out some additional reservation for growth, including additional weapons for possible contingencies. Still the requirement to take on up to 500 additional people and possibly temporarily house them on the flight deck may provide such a margin, if it is recognized in the stability calculations. You would have to figure 500 people, averaging 150 pounds is 75,000 pounds or 37.5 tons on the flight deck, in addition to a helicopter and UAV(s). A Mk-144 RAM Guided Missile Launcher (GML) unit weighs only 12,736 lb 2 oz and stores 21 missiles. A Mk 15 Phalanx CIWS weighs 13,600 pounds. Presumably an 11 round “SeaRAM” with self contained fire control system should weigh about the same. A single Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile, with booster, weighs only 1,523 pounds, so presumably eight rounds with launchers or an 8 round vertical launch system would weigh less than 16 tons. In exchange for the capability of having 500 migrants on the flight deck, in wartime, the ship could carry substantial additional armament. The gun forward might even be exchanged for a 24 round vertical launch system or a 5″/62 Mk 45 to provide naval gun fire support.

The briefing talks a lot about the set of specifications the ship will be built to, “the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Guide for Building and Classing Naval Vessels (NVR) w/Coast Guard Appendix.” Generally I don’t think we are giving up much by accepting a lesser standard (or no standard) for shock, noise, and chemical, biological and radiological protection. In a naval environment, any significant hit on a ship this small is likely to take it out of action, and any torpedo hit is likely to sink it rapidly. Still, while I don’t have the specifics (or even access to the standard), I find the reduced requirement for equipment redundancy troubling and I think we need to be careful with this. It effects survivability in case of fire, grounding, or collision as well as wartime circumstances.

Today the “Cutterman” website, that I follow on facebook noted, “16 Nov 1992: The CGC Storis became the cutter with the longest service in the Bering Sea, eclipsing the U.S. Revenue Cutter Bear which had held that distinction since 1929. The Bear was decommissioned in 1929 after serving…for 44 years and two months.” It looks like long before they are replaced, over half of our existing large cutters will have broken that record.

Making the OPCs as versatile as possible, including planning in wartime potential, costs very little and gives more reason for the ships to be built, as well as increasing the potential for larger scale production in terms of foreign military sales and even possibly US Navy versions.

Whats next?

  • Specifications are to be released by the end of 2010
  • Draft RFP and pre-solicitation conference by end of June 2011

The Briefing did not talk about the rate at which these ships will be built, but there is ample evidence the thinking is two a year. As previously discussed, I think this should be reevaluated and the program accelerated. When shipbuilders bid on the contract for the detail design and lead ship, in addition to offering options for the construction of units 2-9 at the rate of two a year, I hope they will also include the options of three or four a year even if unsolicited.

New Renderings of Proposed OPC

OPC Conceptual Rendering (Unfortunately the rendering that originally appeared here is no longer available. This is a later version which appears similar.)

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

The Acquisition Directorate has given us some more information on the proposed Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), including some new renderings of its appearance and information on how it will use “green” technologies and concepts to reduce environmental impact.

I like the fact that the 57mm is up one deck from the foc’sle, because that will provide some protection from green water coming over the bow and, it will allow the weapon to train on targets at relatively close range over the bow. In fact the design looks very much like the successful Floréal class of light “surveillance frigates” designed for the French Navy in 1989.

Looks like they are planning on mounting a 25 mm Mk 38 mod 2 on top of the hanger instead of a CIWS. For our purposes, that is probably a better choice, provided we have the option of substituting a state of the art CIWS like SeaRAM should we go to war. I’d really like to know what they are anticipating for a fire control system. Radar and electro-optical or electro-optical only?

What surprises me is that there is no stern ramp, in spite of the fact that it looks like there is adequate room. I never liked the arrangement we have for launching the boat at the fantail of the 270s, because of what happens when the ship is pitching, and this does not look like an improvement. However, the fact that she has boats on both sides amidships is an improvement.

I would still like to see some space planned for interchangeable containerized mission modules. Maybe there could be an option to put these on the fantail in lieu of the third boat. Aside from the Littoral Combat Ship modules, these might include class rooms for cadet cruises, holding cells for migrant interdiction, operating rooms for disaster relief, or laboratories for scientific research.

Hopefully the larger flight deck means the ships will be capable of operating all the H-60 variants including the Navy’s MH-60 R and S versions and there will be space available to store their equipment and weapons.

Provided the price is reasonable, these ships should have definite Foreign Military Sales potential. I can see variations of this design with Harpoon launchers either on the fantail or foc’sle.

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