gCaptain is reporting a helicopter operating from the Canadian Icebreaker Amundsen crashed in the Arctic killing the pilot, the Amundsen’s CO and a scientist.

More here.

Note: I wrote this for CIMSEC which has a broader, largely non-Coast Guard readership. It is post there as well. What goes unsaid is that cutters are well equipped to assume those few cruiser functions that can still only be handled by surface vessels. 

Looking back at Corbett’s writings, he talks a great deal about the need for cruisers, but technology and terminology have moved on and the cruisers of Corbett’s days are not what we think of as cruisers today. Corbett’s “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy” was published in 1911. There were some truly large cruisers built in the years leading up to World War I, but Corbett decried these in that their cost was in conflict with the cruiser’s “essential attribute of numbers.”

A typical cruiser that came out of the thinking of the day was the Active Class (1912). 3,440 tons, 26 knots, and ten 4″ guns. Many of the cruisers of the day were even smaller, many under 3,000 tons.

HMS Fearless, an Active class cruiser

Corbett often referred back to the Nelsonian period. His idea of a cruiser was the smallest warship that could undertake prolonged independent operations, frigates, sloops of war, and brigs, even schooners. Their missions were:

• Protection of our own maritime commerce
• Denial of the enemy’s commerce, including blockade and commerce raiding
• Scouting (ISR in the current vocabulary)
• Screening the battlefleet (both anti-scouting to deny the enemy knowledge of own battlefleet and protection for the swarm of flotilla craft with torpedoes.)
• Communications

Of these he seemed to consider scouting for and screening the battlefleet, unfortunate, if necessary distractions from their primary duty of exercising control over maritime communications and commerce.

In the hundred plus years since Corbett’s writing, the number and types of naval platforms have proliferated and the roles once the exclusive domain of these relatively small surface ships have been assumed by other systems.

Radio replaced the dispatch carrying function of Nelson’s cruisers and improvements continually reduced the importance of the role for 20th century cruisers.

The torpedo boat destroyers first grew from what we would now call FACs into cruiser roles and cruiser size and now emerged as major strategic assets in their own right.

Submarines, which were little understood in Corbett’s time, quickly emerged as the premier commerce raider. Later they took on the role of countering their own kind, just as cruisers once did. They have scouted for and screened surface ships. They also grew into additional roles that make them in some respects inheritor of the battleship mantle as well as that of the cruiser.

Airplanes, also a recent innovation when Corbett wrote his classic, quickly became effective and essential scouts. They began to screen the fleet against the opposing “flotillas” including the enemies own planes. Flying from escort carriers or in the form of long range maritime patrol aircraft that took on the cruisers role of protecting commerce. During WWII they replaced the battleships’ guns.

More recently satellites also assume roles in scouting and communications.

Small surface ships can still do the missions Corbett identified, but it seems other systems may be able to do them as well or better. Are their still roles for the smallest warships that can undertake prolonged independent operations?

There are still some things only surface ships can do. What is enemy commerce is not always obvious. In many cases only a visit and search can determine if a vessel is innocent.

While aircraft and even submarines may protect our own commerce, when ships are attacked far from shore, only surface ships (and their embarked aircraft), can save the crews or bring damage control assistance.

These are certainly not jobs for Burke class destroyers, which are now, with BMD and land attack roles, essentially Capital Ships. We need some minimum number of ships to do these tasks which are essential to the exercise of sea control. Once we establish how many wee need, we can consider if the marginal cost of adding MCM, ASW, ASuW, and/or AAW capability is worthwhile. Frigates once filled this role, in addition to others, LCS are the only ships the Navy is currently building that might do these jobs. Some Coast Guard Cutters may also be appropriate. Somehow, I doubt we have enough, and I have doubts that they are adequately armed to deal with even medium sized merchant vessels without assistance.

Essentially we have a fleet of battleships of several types, CVNs, SSBNs, SSNS, DDGs, Amphibs. Simple and numerous “cruisers,” the smallest ships that can undertake prolonged independent operations, are almost non-existent.

“In no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. Their specialization has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous enough. Even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. We should still require cruisers specialized for the work and in sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground.”

Ref: “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,” by Julian Stafford Corbett: http://eremita.di.uminho.pt/gutenberg/1/5/0/7/15076/15076-h/15076-h.htm

Photo credit: Loren, ROC Coast Guard ships in Keelung Harbor, 1 January 2007

Earlier we saw this photo and comments indicated that Derecktor, which built nine of the USCG’s 270s had sold the design to Taiwan.

(Additional photos and discussion here.)

I ran across more specifics recently. There are two ships in the class, Ho Hsing (CG-101) and Wei Hsing (CG-102). They both entered service in 1992, two years after the last 270. Compared to the Bear Class, their reported dimensions are essentially identical. They have more than twice the horsepower of our 270s, 15,470 bhp from two MTU 16V1163 TB93 diesels, but still have a maximum speed of only 22 knots (I would have expected a knot or two more). They are slightly heavier than the Bear class at 1,823 tons full load (vice 1,780) resulting in a slightly deeper draft. They do not have a medium caliber gun, fire control system, or ESM system.

The interesting thing about these ships is that they replaced the helicopter capability with four “interceptor boats” each with its own set of davits.

According to Combat Fleets of the World, “The eight interceptor craft (four for each ship–Chuck) were delivered 7-91 from Hood Military Vessels of the U.S.: 12.19 m (40 foot) overall, six crew, two 300-php Cummins diesels driving Arneson outdrives for 35 knots, range 382 nautical miles at 35 kts, 466 nautical miles at 30 knots.

The result is perhaps unique among the world’s patrol ships. We might speculate that they may use these relatively large boats to extend the search horizon of the ship. They might launch two (or even all four) at dawn and use them to search until the approach of darkness on a parallel tracks with the mother ship. Or perhaps they see the problem as, not one of finding vessels to board, but of a very target rich environment, and this is their solution for making the maximum number of boardings.

On the other hand, the result does look a little like the High Speed Transport (APD) conversions of destroyers made during WWII.

Photo: HMAS Perth

Electronics have generally gotten smaller and computing power cheaper. It looks like Aegis like capabilities may finally be following that trend.

Defense Industry Daily reports on collaboration between the US and the Australia on a new phased array radar system that have already been successfully tested on a 3,600 ton Australian frigate and may find its way onto USN littoral combat ships that are now equipped very much like the Bertholf Class Cutters and the projected Offshore Patrol Cutters. Other phased array systems have been deployed on Singapore’s 3,200 ton Formidable Class frigates and the Netherlands’ 3,750 ton Holland class Offshore Patrol Vessels.

Not that Iranian news releases have a high degree of credibility, but even they are claiming to have developed something similar, “Iran has tested its newest long-range phased array radar system, named the Asr (Era)…Rear Admiral Ali Gholamzadeh told reporters that the radar system had been designed and manufactured by Iranian experts…The radar system will be installed on a number of the Navy’s warships…”

If the weight and price comes down, there are lots of reasons to go to phased array systems. They eliminate moving parts. They include large numbers of identical parts and can normally continue to operate even if some of them fail, resulting in loss of only part of the radar’s capability rather than complete failure. They may also simultaneously serve multiple functions including surface and air search, track, and firecontrol.

Earlier we talked about Ship Designations. I recently received my new US Naval Institute “Combat Fleets or the World,” and found that it had its own set of ship designations (pp. xx-xxii) that generally follow the Navy’s conventions, so I thought I would throw out those that relate to the Coast Guard for comment.

First, they use the “W” prefix to identify ships “..not subordinated to a navy, such as coast guards, customs services, border guards, or government-owned scientific ships.” In fact they used it for the Army’s vessels as well. They also adhere to the use of “A” for all auxiliaries and “Y” for yard or service craft. Here, as in the Navy’s system, “G” (when not used at the end of the designation to indicate guided missile) frequently means miscellaneous.

To illustrate how they classify Coast Guard vessels, I will give the designation they use, its definition (as listed without the “W” prefix), and list the Coast Guard vessel classes that they include in each category.

WPS–Large Patrol Ship.  “Ships intended for offshore patrol duties and fitted with lesser armament than major combatants, often trading speed for seaworthiness and endurance. In size, they are normally greater than 1,000 tons full load displacement.”

WMSLs (NSC), WMSMs (OPC), 378′ WHECs, and all WMECs

WPC–Coastal Patrol Craft. “Gun and antisubmarine warfare weapon-equipped craft between 100 and 500 tons, not equipped to carry antiship missiles.”

154′ Webber class WPCs, 110′ Island class WPBs

WPB–Patrol Boat. “Any craft of less than 100 tons equipped primarily to carry out patrol duties in relatively sheltered waters, harbors, or rivers.”

87′ Marine Protector class WPBs

WAGB–Ice Breakers (No definition provided)

Mackinaw (WLBB 30), Healy, Polar Class

WAGL–Buoy Tender. “Vessels intended to transport, lay, retrieve, and often repair navigational and mooring buoys.  They usually also have a significant  salvage capability.”

225′ Juniper (WLB 201) class, 175′ Keeper (WLM 551) class

WATA–Ocean Tug. “Auxiliaries configured primarily for oceangoing towing, but usually also capable of secondary rescue, salvage, and firefighting missions.”

140′ Katmai Bay (WTGB 101) class icebreaking tugs

WAXT–Training Ship. “Auxiliaries equipped primarily for the training of cadets and /or enlisted personnel. Also applies to large sail training vessels in naval service.”

Eagle

WYAG–Miscellaneous Service Craft. “Service craft whose function is not covered by other definitions or that has several equally significant functions.”

32′ oil-spill control launches

WYFDM–Medium Floating Dry Dock. “Open-ended floating dry docks with a lift capacity between 5,000 and 20,000 metric tons.”

Floating Dry Dock-Medium (CG Yard) (Oak Ridge, ex-ARDM 1, ex-ARD 19)

WYFL–Launch. Small self-propelled craft for local transportation of personnel.

41′ utility boats, Hurricane RHIBs

WYGL–Small Navigational Aids Tender. “Self propelled service craft intended to service navigational aids, buoys, and other navigational markers, they may or may not be equipped to lay, recover, and service navigational aids buoys.”

Buckthorn (WLI-642), Bayberry 65′ WLIs, Bluebell 100′ WLI, Kankakee 75′ WLRs, Gasconade class 75′ WLRs, Ouachita class 65′ WLRs, Pamlico 160′ WLICs, Anvil class 75′ WLICs, Smilax (WLIC 315), 64′ AtoN boats, 55′ AtoN boats, 49’BUSL AtoN boats, 26′ trailerable AtoN boats, 20′ AtoN boats, 16′ AtoN skiffs

WYH–Ambulance Craft. “Self-propelled local service craft intend for the transport of ill or injured personnel and, in some cases, to provide emergency medical services in remote, sheltered areas.”

47’MLBs, 22′ Multiterrain airboat rescue launches, 42′ Near shore life boats, 52’MLB, 24′ Shallow-water boats, 26′ Motor Surf Boat,

WYTM–Medium Harbor Tug. “Tugs intended primarily for harbor service but capable of limited coastal operations and having a total horsepower between 400 and 1,200 bhp.”

65′ harbor tugs

WYXT–Training Craft. “Smaller, self-propelled craft intended to provide seamanship, navigational, and maneuvering training and generally not intended for sustained seagoing operations.”

38′ Special purpose craft–training boats

While I will stand by my own earlier recommendations, I at least find their system more consistent and understandable than the designations we use now, and it does provide an integrated system including vessels from the largest to the smallest.

There are some questionable calls.

• WATA may not be the best description for the 140s since it emphasizes towing instead of icebreaking.
• WYH, “ambulance craft” is probably not how we want to describe motor life boats, but if the designation were expanded to mean “lifesaving craft” it might serve.
• A number of smaller craft are not assigned one of their designations even though they are closely related to craft that were given a designation. This seemed more oversight than a problem in the system.

The “G” in WAGB, WAGL, and WYGL appears superfluous since there is no meaning already assigned to AB, AL, or YL. The “F” in WYFL also appears to serve no useful purpose.

It might benefit from a little tweaking, but generally, this appears to be a good system.

The MarineForum is reporting that, “Taking effect from 12 Oct, the Vietnam Marine Police (VMP), an agency under the Ministry of National Defence, will officially become the Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG).”

I’m going to be otherwise occupied for most of the next couple of weeks, so new material may be thin. I will try to check in occasionally. Please continue the discussions.

There has been something of an on-going debate about how to deal with the unlikely, but potentially very important possibility of a War with China, between T. X. Hammes, author of the Offshore Control (OC) Strategy (a 16 page pdf), and Elbridge Colby. a proponent of “AirSea Battle,” in the blogs “The Diplomat” and “The National Interest.” The posts are here:

Strategy for an Unthinkable Conflict, By  T.X. Hammes, July 27, 2012

Don’t Sweat AirSea Battle, Elbridge Colby, July 31, 2013

Sorry, AirSea Battle Is No Strategy, T. X. Hammes,August 7, 2013

The War over War with China, Elbridge Colby, August 15, 2013

Offshore Control vs. AirSea Battle: Who Wins?, T. X. Hammes, August 21, 2013

————–

informationdissemination.net has also noted the exchange. There has been an ongoing discussion there as well.

To some extent this is an apples and oranges debate, in that while “Offshore Control” (OC) is fairly well developed strategy, “Air Sea Battle” (ASB) is only intended as an Operational Concept, and there is no fully developed unclassified explanation of all it involves. But Offshore Control would specifically exclude attacks on Chinese territory, so it effectively negates use of Air Sea Battle concepts against China, and as always, decisions like this drive procurement, so there is much at stake here, including possibly development of a new bomber for the Air Force and long range air and missile assets for the Navy.

In any case, if there is a war with China, it is likely there will be an attempt to blockade its shipping, most probably just outside the straits between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. There is a good possibility that the Coast Guard would be ask to fill in, in this area, because the Navy will inevitably be overstretched.