CG Maritime Force Protection Units

Just a short note to highlight the existence of a couple of unusual units that may not be familiar. They have an important, if largely unrecognized mission. These are the Coast Guard’s Maritime Force Protection Units Bangor, WA and Kings Bay, GA.

The units are perhaps unique in that they have only a single mission, and they are funded by the Navy. They protect Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines while they transit on the surface, to and from their homeports. The possibility of a USS Cole style attack motivated their creation. Each unit consist of approximately 200 Coasties and is commanded by an O-5. Having CG crews and carrying CG colors and markings allows them to enforce a security zone around the subs. Both units stood up in July 2007.

They have some unique equipment too, including four 87 footers that were purchased with Navy funds. They are recognizable because of the stabilized remotely controlled machine guns mounted high on the bow.

  • SEA DRAGON    WPB 87367    Delivered NOV 2007   Kings Bay, GA
  • SEA DEVIL          WPB 87368    Delivered Feb 2008    Bangor, WA
  • SEA DOG            WPB 87373    Delivered April 2009   Kings Bay, GA
  • SEA FOX             WPB 87374    Delivered May 2009    Bangor, WA
File:US Navy 090818-N-1325N-003 U. S. Coast Guardsmen man the rails as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Sea Fox (WPB 87374) is brought to life at Naval Base Kitsap.jpg
Photo Credit: KEYPORT, Wash. (Aug. 18, 2009) U. S. Coast Guardsmen man the rails as the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Sea Fox (WPB 87374) is brought to life at Naval Base Kitsap. (U.S. Navy photo Ray Narimatsu/Released)

The names chosen for these Navy purchased vessels all reprise submarines that fought in WWII. A contemporary report on the arrival of Sea Devil indicates these 87 footers are manned differently as well,

“To carry out its new mission, the Sea Devil carries more crew than most 87-footers, who require more training than most, and it packs more firepower.

“Instead of 11 “racks,” or beds, and a crew of 10, the Sea Devil will carry 12 racks and a crew of 15 because of the extra hours and training anticipated for the unique mission.

“Along with two .50-caliber automatic weapons mounted on each side of the vessel, a third is mounted near the bridge.”

They have a lot of other boats as well, including some non-standard types, like the one in which the Chairman of the Joint Chief took a ride.

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pilots a 64-foot Special Purpose Craft in Puget Sound, Oct. 04, 2012, as part of a familiarization tour of Coast Guard units in the Pacific Northwest. The special purpose craft is based at the Marine Force Protection Unit in Silverdale, Wash. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Nathan W. Bradshaw.

Photo Credit: Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pilots a 64-foot Special Purpose Craft in Puget Sound, Oct. 04, 2012, as part of a familiarization tour of Coast Guard units in the Pacific Northwest. The special purpose craft is based at the Marine Force Protection Unit in Silverdale, Wash. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Nathan W. Bradshaw.

Thanks to Tim Colton and Lee Walher for help preparing this.

Air Force Helo Buy with Possible CG Impact

Defense News reports, the Air Force is again trying to buy a new Combat SAR helicopter to replace their HH-60s. This will not be an easy program. It ran into legal problems during an earlier attempt, but this is one the CG may want to watch. The program is expected to span 14 years, and the CG MH-60s are now expected to require replacement beginning in 2022. If the program is successful, the CG may be able to ride the coattails of a mature program.

Counting Ships

The dust-up between Governor Romney and President Obama about the size of the Navy has lit off a flurry of debates. If you want to take a peak, here are some of the discussions, I’ve looked in on.

The general consensus seems to be that while comparing gross numbers to the fleet of 1916 may not be a good measure, the fleet may need more ships. Today’s fleet is enormously powerful, much more so than any of its competitors, but there simply may not be enough ships to be in all the places where they are needed for many of the relatively mundane tasks that are part of exercising command of the sea.

What does all this have to do with the Coast Guard?

  • We may be loosing some of our Navy support for drug interdiction, and
  • There may be increased reliance on the Coast Guard for low level naval tasks.

The FFGs which have been the platform of choice for drug interdiction operations are disappearing rapidly. They may be replaced by Littoral Combat ships, but LCS are being built more slowly that the FFGs are disappearing, and they are relatively short legged ships. There is the possibility of using the numerous MSC manned ships, including the new Joint High Speed Vessels, for drug interdiction, but it would require a change of policy.

The Coast Guard is an element of American Sea Power. Under Secretary of the Navy Bob Work never fails to mention the Coast Guard when he talks about American Sea Power. The Coast Guard is the US Navy’s closest ally and their most immediately available reserve. In terms of personnel, the CG is larger than the Royal Navy, but the size of our fleet has also been going down too. Additionally, because of their age, many of the ships we do have are sketchy for distant deployment.

In many situations, including maritime interdiction operations (MIO) like Market Time or the Cuban Missile Crisis Quarantine quantity can be more important than quality. As EagleSpeak notes there are, or will soon be, only 108 surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers, frigates, and Littoral Combat Ships) in the USN. In addition there are only 11 Cyclone class patrol craft (PC). If you subtract all the units that are out of area, in maintenance or workup, or required for other on-going tasks, the number of ships that might be available to undertake a new operation is pretty small and the 38 large patrol ships and the over 130 WPBs and WPCs in the Coast Guard start to look significant. (Beside, putting a $2B DDG in the vicinity of an apparently innocent but potentially hostile vessel, may not be the best use of a precious resource when a single torpedo could take it out for months, if not sink it.)

Does the Coast Guard get any visibility, or more importantly funding, for this role? Not so much. “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” talks about a “National Fleet,” but whenever fleet size is discussed, only the Navy ships are included. Why is this? Does the Navy want to avoid the possibility of Congress seeing the Coast Guard as an alternative to the Navy? Certainly there are institutional and structural impediments to thinking in those terms. Are our ships too insignificant to count? They are not aircraft carriers, but in terms of cost and capability they are in the same league as LCS, Mine Warfare, and Auxiliary ships that are included.

Within the Coast Guard itself, there is also a reluctance on the part of many to claim a wartime role and even consider it as a basis for funding either directly or through the Navy Department, even though wartime missions might justify platforms that are more capable for peacetime roles as well. Frankly, I find it galling to see how richly the Navy is endowed against imagined eventualities while the Coast Guard goes begging to fill actual everyday needs.
The Coast Guard needs to work on getting its wartime roles recognized, in the Navy Department, the DHS, and the Congress. Maritime Interdiction Operations is an obvious fit but there may be other niches the Coast Guard could fill in wartime that perhaps should be incorporated in procurement decisions.

How the Coast Guard Presents its Shipbuilding Programs to Congress

I would like to talk about an observation found here : Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress”  (pdf) Congressional Research Service, Ronald O’Rourke, July 20, 2012

“Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the adequacy of information available to Congress to support review and oversight of Coast Guard procurement programs, including cutter procurement programs. The Coast Guard has entered a period where, like the Navy, it is requesting significant funding each year from Congress to execute multiple ship procurement and modernization programs. Congress, however, lacks ready access to basic information exhibits on Coast Guard shipbuilding programs that are equivalent to those that support congressional review and oversight of Navy ship procurement programs.” (from p.32)

Could this be at least part of the reason, why we have such a problem selling our shipbuilding programs?

Quoting from p.34,

• “Although the Coast Guard’s annual budget submission includes a budget justification book, the entries in that book for the Coast Guard’s ship procurement programs do not present information as detailed and structured as that presented in the P-40, P-5, and P-27 exhibits. (note–the reference provides samples of these, see Appendix A–Chuck)
• “Reports on Coast Guard programs equivalent to DOD’s SAR reports are not readily available to Congress. (SAR=”Selected Aquisition Reports”–no sample of this–Chuck)
• “The Coast Guard’s POR (Program of Record–Chuck) is a statement of desired procurement quantities for certain procurement programs, but not a concise statement of the Coast Guard’s overall ship force structure objective, which would take into account continued service of existing ships that are not in need of immediate replacement. (Navy sample provided as Appendix C–Chuck)
• “The Coast Guard’s five-year capital investment plan shows annual funding amounts for individual programs, but not annual procurement quantities, and annual procurement quantities are not always easy to discern from annual funding amounts. (Sample in Appendix D–Chuck)
• “The Coast Guard’s budget submission does not include an equivalent of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.” (Sample in Appendix D–Chuck)

This report is addressed to Congress, but there is no reason we should not consider its findings.

Why don’t we have a statement of what our force structure objective is?

How can we have a Five Year Procurement Plan and not include procurement quantities?

And lastly why don’t we have a 30 year shipbuilding program if that is what Congress expects?

When I first heard that the Navy had a 30 year shipbuilding program, I thought it was a little ridiculous, because It is a long way out, but maybe it is a way of building consensus on where we are going. It will provide a warning when increases will be required. Patrol ships, Patrol boats, Polar Icebreakers, Buoy tenders, Icebreaking tugs, Inland construction tenders, and major renovations all have to fit into the same budget. A long term road map is needed because experience has shown that the budget is not elastic.

Among the advantages claimed for the Navy’s way of doing this (from p.33) are:

  • “identifying and evaluating cost growth and schedule delays in the execution of shipbuilding programs;
  • “understanding the relationship between annual procurement rates and unit procurement cost;
  • “evaluating whether programs are achieving satisfactory production learning curves over time;
  • “evaluating whether proposed sequences of annual procurement quantities for programs would be efficient to execute from an industrial standpoint;
  • “evaluating stability in Navy shipbuilding planning by tracking year-to-year changes in the five-year shipbuilding plan;
  • “identifying potential financial and industrial-base linkages between shipbuilding programs that are being funded in overlapping years;
  • “identifying and evaluating Navy assumptions concerning service lives and retirement dates for existing ships;
  • “evaluating whether ship procurement needs are being pushed into the future, potentially creating an expensive ship procurement “bow wave” in coming years; and
  • “understanding when the Navy will achieve its ship force level goals, and whether the Navy will experience ship inventory shortfalls relative to those goals that could affect the Navy’s ability to perform its missions in coming years.”

This all sounds like it should also apply to the Coast Guard.

The service is attempting to improve presentation of its programs, but even the planned improvements don’t address all these concerns. From a recent GAO report “COAST GUARD, Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes” (download the report, GAO-12-918 (.pdf)).

“Coast Guard acquisition officials told us that one way it is trying to address portfolio affordability is through an update to its Major Systems Acquisition Manual. According to draft language, the acquisition directorate’s Office of Resource Management will be required to maintain a chart to visually depict all competing acquisition program priorities within the capital investment plan at various points in time. Officials told us that each acquisition program will be required to include this chart in its required materials for future acquisition decision events. This update to the Coast Guard’s acquisition manual follows best practices outlined in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide with the exception that the guide notes the affordability assessment should, preferably, be conducted several years beyond the programming period. (emphasis applied) However, deferring costs could lead to what is commonly characterized as a bow-wave—or an impending spike in the requirement for additional funds—unless the Coast Guard proactively chooses to make some tradeoff decisions by re-examining requirements.

The Coast Guard has certainly encountered the “bow wave.” We need a way to address it now and avoid it in the future.

At the very least we need a “Force Structure Objective” and a 30 year shipbuilding (and disposal) Plan to identify how we intend to get there. ———————————————————————————————————-

While on the topic of selling a program the Naval Aviation has a fine example:

To view “Naval Aviation Vision, January 2012,” visit http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/nae/Vision%20Book/Naval_Aviation_Vision.pdf.)

S. Korean CG Vessel Capsizes–Five Fatalities

Officer of the Watch is reporting the S. Korean Coast Guard had rescued all 19 crewmen from a Malaysian Registered 5,436 ton freighter which subsequently sank, but one of the cutters, carrying 15 of the survivors capsized and five of the survivors (three Filipino and two Chinese) died as a result. The remaining ten survivors and the crew of the cutter were rescued by another cutter involved in the operation.

(Thanks to Lee for the heads up)

A Suggestion–How to meet the Medium Icebreaker Requirement

photo
An active duty member who is a bit shy about taking credit for it, offers us a suggestion that I think may be worth considering. He even provided the illustration above:
“I think the Coast Guard is missing an opportunity to capitalize upon an already proven platform to help fill the Arctic need for a multi-mission platform.
“The proven platform of which I speak is the current CGC Mackinaw.  This multi-missioned platform is the perfect launching point to build six Alaska specific operating platforms.  I would propose that the Coast Guard commission a redesigned version of the Mackinaw, stretching the overall design (240 to 280+ feet in length) to incorporate a flight deck and a retractable or permanent hanger.  This vessel would have light to medium ice breaking capabilities, be a buoy tender, heavy weather capable, fisheries patrol, LE, SAR and VOSS/SORS deployment platforms. 
“The optimum idea would be to build the six ships and trade them out with five the current buoy tenders residing in the 17th District.  With six of these ships, they could rotate on Arctic deployments of two ships a year on a three year rotation.  This would allow for greater flexibility in meeting expanding Arctic mission demands, present a viable pollution response platform and maintain the current level of expected AOR operations.

“On a side note, to help inspire greater understanding and respect of and from local cultures, these could be classified as Alaska Class Cutters and names after Alaska tribes or locations (maybe glaciers?).
I’ll only note that the Coast Guard has already identified a need for at least six icebreakers including three medium icebreakers.