GAO Responds to Fleet Mix Studies, Part 1, The Report

In my post, Irresponsibly Rebuilding the Fleet-a Look at the Future, I talked about why it was essential that the Coast Guard build at least two Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) a year, when it finally starts building them in 2016. My concern is that there is still no wide spread support for funding the Coast Guard’s “Program of Record” which includes 25 OPCs in addition to eight National Security Cutters and 58 Fast Response Cutters.

Conceptual Rendering of the OPC

The Coast Guard has recently gone public with similar concerns.

Studies are playing an important part in the effort to build consensus on what the Coast Guard’s fleet of Cutters should look like in the future and how to get there. May 28 of this year, we looked at the Executive Summary of the Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study completed in 2009, but only recently made public. The Coast Guard completed a second phase of its Fleet Mix Study which looked at the effects of two funding levels on the procurement process in May 2011 and the Department of Homeland Security completed a “Cutter Study” in August 2011.

May 31, 2012 GAO released a report to Congressional Committees titled “Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies” [PDF] along with briefing slides provided on April 20, 2012. I’m going to quote GAO’s report and slides extensively.

GAO saw there objectives as to:

  • “(1) What are the key results of the Coast Guard’s Fleet Mix Studies and DHS’s Cutter Study with respect to recapitalization and operations?
  • “(2) How useful are these studies to DHS, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Coast Guard for informing recapitalization decisions?” Continue reading

Irresponsibly Rebuilding the Fleet–a Look at the Future

I have seen several references to how the FY2013 budget is “Responsibly rebuilding the fleet,” as if we might otherwise have gone off willy-nilly building ships we don’t really need because we haven’t done prior proper planning. In fact we have been in analysis–paralysis for two decades, since we finished the last 270 in 1990, without building replacements for ten WWII vintage ships that continued to serve.

In the last 22 years the Coast Guard has taken delivery of 21 ships (one WAGB, three WMSL, one WLBB, and 16 WLBs), less than one ship a year, while we should have averaged at least two ships a year (and should do so for the foreseeable future to maintain the current fleet and replace ships at what is generally recognized as the economical end of their useful lives at 30 years).

It gets worse. Over the last eight years, since 2004 the Coast Guard has take delivery of only four ships (one WLBB and three WMSL). We are now in a situation where it may be four years between delivery of NSC#3 and #4 (funded in 2006 and 2010 respectively).

Let’s take look a what will happen if more money is not allocated to the AC&I budget.

The Problem:

By the end of 2020 the Coast Guard can expect to loose the services of at least half the existing fleet of large patrol vessels, 20 ships (six 378s and 14 WMEC 210s). During that time, if there are no changes to current budget, we can expect no more than four new ships to be added (three “National Security Cutters” (NSC) already funded and one “Offshore Patrol Cutter” (OPC)).  This will give the Coast Guard a fleet of 24 large patrol cutters (6 NSC, 3 WHECs, an OPC, the Alex Haley, and 13 WMEC 270s), down from 40 ship in the current fleet, and far less than the 33 ships in the “Program of Record.” Even this is probably overly optimistic in that it assumes all existing ships will be decommissioned only after 50 years of service, with three 378s still in service in 2020. Continue reading

D-Day Normandy Remembered

The Coast Guard Compass has an excellent post on one Coast Guardsman’s perspective as he experienced the landings on the beaches of Normandy in 1944. The Coast Guard historian has a very comprehensive index of information and stories related to the invasion available on the historian’s website.

Coast Guard participation in the invasion included three Coast Guard manned attack transports, two more that were partially CG manned, eleven Landing Ship Tanks (LST), 24 Landing Craft Infantry, Large (LCI(L)), and 60 wooden hulled 83 foot patrol boats. In addition the Coast Guard manned numerous smaller landing craft.

File:Lci-convoy.jpg

Normandy Invasion, June 1944 A convoy of Landing Craft Infantry (Large) sails across the English Channel toward the Normandy Invasion beaches on “D-Day”, 6 June 1944. Each of these landing craft is towing a barrage balloon for protection against low-flying German aircraft. Photograph from the U.S. Coast Guard Collection in the U.S. National Archives. Photo #: 26-G-2333

Sad News from Canada–Two Training Fatalities

I’ve received some sad news from one of our regular contributors, Ken White, who is a search and rescue volunteer with the Canadian Coast Guard.

“I have to tell you that Sunday June 4th 2012  was a very sad day to the maritime search and rescue organization on the west coast of British Columbia when two female members of the Royal Canadian Marine Search And Rescue of Unit 12 of Sechelt British Columbia, Canada died in a training accident when there 40 ft rigid hull inflatable rescue boat capsized on top of them when they where training in a tidal rapids. On the rigid hull inflatable rescue boat the air bags on the back transom over the twin two 250 hp outboards FAILED TO INFLATE when the rigid hull inflatable rescue boat capsized on top of them pinning them in the hull of the boat and what made it worse that the floater survival suits that they where wearing was pinning the two women underneath the hull. The accident was reported quickly on VHF-FM 16 to one of the Canadian Coast Guard Radio Stations that the government of Canada wants to close that is at Comox, British Columbia by several pleasure crafts that where in  the area and they quickly responded to the scene as well. Also dispatched was a Canadian Armed Forces Search And Rescue Helicopter that had two SARTECHS (Air Force PJs) that was fully equipped with underwater dive gear. I was working on the incident  and through the Joint Rescue Co-Ordination Center Victoria I diverted a coastal ferry to do a search of the nearby waters and we also used the coastal ferry as a barrier in a position if the two missing women were being carried in the tidal rapids past the search area. Once the Canadian Armed Forces Search And Rescue Helicopter got on scene it lowered the two SARTECHS (Air Force PJs) to do an underwater search and that is where the SARTECHS (Air Force PJs) found the bodies of the two women pinned under the hull of the 40 ft rigd hull inflatable rescue boat with there floater survival suits and one by one the SARTECHS removed there limp bodies and they transferred them to two pleasure craft which the SARTECHS (Air Force PJs) boarded and started CPR on the women and they where going to be transferred to the Canadian Armed Forces Search Rescue Helicopter that landed nearby to take the two women to Vancouver Hospital with advanced life support. On route to the hospital the SARTECHs (Air Force PJs) worked very hard on the women with CPR but when they had landed in Vancouver the two women did not have a pulse.”

Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study Published

The Coast Guard has made public the Executive Summary of its Offshore and Aviation Fleet Mix Study. “FierceHomelandSecurity” has published a short summary of the content.

They also provided a direct link to the “Executive Summary” (a 24 page pdf). It is heavy with acronyms, and there is no list of acronyms attached to the Executive Summary, although there is probably one in the full study. I’ve attached a list of those I found, at the end of the post for those who might want a little help going through the summary.

“This initial phase of the FMA (Fleet Mix Analysis-ed.) is intended to address offshore surface and aviation capabilities. Follow-on FMA phases will assess capabilities needed for coastal and inland missions as well as emerging missions, such as Arctic operations and those of the Deployable Operations Group (DOG).

“ES.5.1  SCOPE:

“The FMA explored the projected Fleet mix requirements to meet the CG’s 11 statutory missions in FY2025. Mission requirements were based on nine Mission Performance Plans (MPPs) and an assessment of critical activities, such as training and support, which consume asset mission availability.

“The FMA included all CG aviation (fixed- and rotary-wing), all white-hull cutters (FRC up to NSC), and all applicable C4ISR systems.

“The FMA focused on activities in the offshore and aviation operating environment. Offshore and aviation are defined in the FMA as being generally 50+ nautical miles offshore and/or requiring extended presence. The FMA also considered missions within 50 nautical miles that consume air asset availability.

“The FMA used the 2007 CG Fleet, as defined in the 2007 Modeled CONOPS (Concept of Operations-ed.) and the “Deepwater” POR (Program of Record-ed.) as Baselines for comparative performance and cost analysis.

“ES.5.2  ASSUMPTIONS

“Preliminary Operational Requirements Document (P-ORD) thresholds were used for the OPC (Offshore Patrol Cutter-Chuck).

“The OPC and NSC will operate 230 days away from homeport (DAFHP). No specific crewing method is assumed (i.e., crew rotation concept [CRC]).

“The HC-144A will operate at 800 programmed flight hours (PFH) per year. (This is a reduction from previous assumption–Chuck)

“U.S. Navy out-of-hemisphere (OOH) (2.0 OPC/NSC) and Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) (7.0 OPC/NSC) support was consistent with the FY2010 demand.

“Additional acquisition/next generation platforms have the same capabilities and cost as the FMA Baseline Fleet mix cutters and aircraft (e.g., the next-generation short range recovery (SRR) helicopter is an MH-65C).

“ES.5.3  CONSTRAINTS:

“The High Latitude regions of the ice shelf and Deployable Operations Group (DOG) mission requirements were not considered.

“No specific MDA performance measures have been established to model.

“87-ft coastal patrol boat (CPB), 225-ft seagoing buoy tender (WLB), Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and foreign asset contributions were considered, but force level requirements for 87-ft CPB, 225-ft WLB, DoD/DHS and foreign assets were not assessed.

“Additional shore facilities (e.g., schools, berthing, simulators/training aids, etc.) beyond those directly associated with platforms (e.g., piers, hangars, etc.) are not included in costs.

“”The need for non-operational/shore billet increases commensurate with the projected increases in operational manning was not assessed and is not included in costs.

“All cost estimates are rough order of magnitude (ROM) and are not budget quality.

“Additional specific assumptions utilized for modeling, simulation, and costing are included in their respective chapters of the final report.

“ES.3  Methodology:

“The Fleet Capacity Analysis (FCA) combined information developed in the mission validation phase, the capability definition phase, and a Warfare Analysis Laboratory Exercise (WALEX) to produce an objective Fleet mix and incremental Fleet mix alternatives. To develop the objective Fleet mix, the FMA used three independent teams with unique force projection tools or methodologies – the Database Enhanced Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) IDS Asset Assessment Tool (CIAAT) Model (DECMv2), the Mission Effectiveness Asset Needs Model (MEAN), and a qualitative analysis by a panel of CG SMEs – to develop a force structure that was aligned with MPP capability and capacity targets. Each team applied their methodology using a common set of asset characteristics and mission demands to develop a zero-based force mix (capable of meeting all mission requirements) projection. The results from these independent projections were considered as three “lines of position” (LOPs) and were consolidated to form a conceptual “fix.””

Seven Alternative Fleets:

The Study looks at seven levels of effort: Continue reading

Maritime Domain Awareness, for Us and for Them, by Google

The US Naval Institute and AFSEA have been sponsoring a “Joint Warfighting Conference.” Many of the presentations are available on line and the quality has been excellent. One of the most intriguing presentations was made by Michael Jones, Chief Technology Advocate at Google Ventures.

Using only two people and $3M, Google has begun tracking almost all the vessel traffic on the world’s oceans and they expect to start making this information available to the public. They exploit the the Marine Automatic Identification System (AIS).

There is discussion about this particular presentation here (the video is also linked there) including some discussion of the limits on the technology. If you don’t want to watch the whole presentation, the portion I refer to is from minute 23:30 to minute 31:00. AOL Defense also has a “CliffsNotes” version of the presentation here. Jones claims to have tracked military vessels (along with all other users of AIS) better than some of their commanders can, including track history, course, and speed.

It will probably take a while to sort out all the implications of this technology. It could certainly be useful for SAR, MEP, and fisheries protection. But it also means that the bad guys will have this information as well. Pirates will have better information for selecting and intercepting their targets. Unless Google deletes the information, or cutters turn off AIS, Coast Guard vessel movements will be visible to anyone with the desire to track them. Drug smugglers will know when interdiction vessels are in the area and how many there are. Vessels fishing illegally will have an easier time evading enforcement.