Alternate Weapons for New Large Cutters?

Posted on May 4, 2012 by Chuck Hill

Had an interesting discussion about why the National Security Cutter retained the Phalanx Close In Weapon System (CIWS) while the very similar weapons suite on the Freedom class Littoral Combat Ship used the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) system instead.

Mk 49 Rolling Airframe Missile Launching System Photo credit: Darkone 13 Aug, 2006, via Wikipedia

My friend contended that, while the Phalanx is very maintenance intensive, the launcher for the RAM is virtually maintenance free, which would benefit the relatively small crew. He also noted that the current models have an excellent anti-surface capability and longer range than the Phalanx.

This got me to thinking. I won’t make a recommendation, but will discuss alternatives that might be considered. I’ll talk about who is using the RAM and how, and discuss how the Coast Guard might use it, and its advantages and disadvantages as a possible replacement for the Phalanx and possibly even the 57 mm. But before we get to that, as we are always told, you have to start with the mission.

Continue reading →

Offshore Patrol Cutter–Draft Specifications, Update

Posted on May 3, 2012 by Chuck Hill

OPC Conceptual Rendering When the draft technical package for the Offshore Patrol Cutter was released, I provided what information I could glean from the attachments, but the basic specs were not available. Fortunately CG-9 were kind enough to agree to answer my questions about the basic requirements for the design. I would like to thank Ms. Maureen Schumann and Mr. Brian R. Olexy for their assistance.

The following are my questions and Mr. Olexy’s response:

Q1) What are the threshold and desired capabilities for maximum speed? Range? at what speed? Personnel accommodations? Anticipated crew size?

A1) The objective top speed is 25 knots (22 knots minimum acceptable top speed). The objective range of the OPC is 9500 nm (8500 nm minimum acceptable range) at 14 knots sustained speed.

The objective underway crew size is 90, with a threshold of 104. The objective for total number of accommodations is 126 (accommodations for 120 total personnel is the minimum acceptable capability).

Q2) Still a requirement for two enginerooms? with power equally split? Any specific requirements for the power plant other than diesels?

A2) The OPC Specification requires the propulsion plant to be arranged in at least two separate main machinery spaces so that a level of propulsion capability is retained in the event of a complete loss of one main machinery space. (Note this is a change, providing more flexibility in the design–Chuck)

Q3) Is there space and weight set aside for additional weapons in war time?

A3) The OPC will be capable of accommodating equipment and configurations needed for operations in higher threat environments.

Q4) Are there provisions for loading mission modules or containers for specific missions?

A4) The OPC will not use mission modules and is not required to carry ISO containers.

Q5) What size helicopter will be able to land on deck? What size helicopter can be hangered? UAV(s)?

A5) The OPC will be able to land H-1, H-3, H-6, H-60 and H-65 helicopter variants. The objective requirement for hangaring capability is USCG H-65 and USCG/USN H-60 variants (minimum acceptable hangaring capability: USCG H-65).

Space, weight and power allocations for future UAS operations are also included in the requirements.

Q6) Provision for only two boats? Both 7meter? No 11 meter? Capacity for 11 meter later?

A6) The OPC boat provision threshold is to deploy with and support two boats capable of over-the-horizon operations; the objective is to deploy with two OTH boats and one additional boat, for a total of three. The specification defines “over-the-horizon” as “any of a family of nominal 7+ meter aluminum hulled boats…”

Q7) Underway replenishment capability for both full and stores?

A7) The OPC will be capable of receiving fuel (DFM and JP-5) and water from a replenishment ship and solid cargo via VERTREP.

Q8) Still have the requirement for taking on 500 migrants and keeping them on deck?

A8) Yes. The specific requirement is the capability to embark, process and sustain up to 500 migrants for up to 48 hours.

Q9) Still a 10,000 ton towing capacity?

A9) Yes. The OPC shall have the capacity to tow astern up to OPC-equivalent displacement through SS5 and to up to 10,000 long tons through SS2.

Q10) Does the design specification still preclude a stern ramp?

A10) Yes, Ships Work Breakdown Structure (SWBS) section 070 of the spec precludes a stern ramp.

Q11) Does the fact that the NSC program has been cut from eight to six mean the OPC program will go from 25 to 27?

A11) The program of record for the NSC prescribes eight cutters. The program of record for the OPC prescribes 25 cutters.

Q12) Is the multi-mode radar referred to, the radar component of the gun firecontrol system? An AN/SPQ-9? Or is the fire control system electro-optic only?

A12) Yes, the multi-mode radar is envisioned to be part of the gun fire control system, but it has not been defined yet.

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The earlier post has information on the selection process and the projected government furnished equipment.

Where Is the Money Going?

Posted on April 23, 2012 by Chuck Hill

Wonder why we cannot afford NSCs 7 and 8, and why we will be building only one OPC a year? Why the Coast Guard cannot get the approximately $2-2.5B/year it needs for modernization and is making do with $1.4B? There are lots of explanations, but take a look at this chart.

Informationdissemination.net has a great discussion of this. I always knew the F-35 was a big program, but I never realized how big. The thing I find most frightening in this is that one contractor is so monopolizing the Defense Budget that it may kill off its competitors not just in the US but all over the world.

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“Among the 96 programs in DOD’s 2011 portfolio, the Joint Strike Fighter is the costliest, the poorest performer in terms of cost growth, and the program with the largest remaining funding needs. The Joint Strike Fighter accounts for 21 percent, or nearly $327 billion, of the planned total acquisition cost of the portfolio.

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“The Joint Strike Fighter program alone is expected to account for 38 percent—or almost $246 billion—of the future procurement funding needed. This amount is enough to fund the remaining procurement costs of the next 15 largest programs.

Let’s see, $70.6B in and $256B to go, without considering probable future growth, that is $326.6B, enough to buy about 467 National Security Cutters.

Naval Institute Offers Naval Wiki

Posted on April 16, 2012 by Chuck Hill

The US Naval Institute has begun an new service, hosting a Wikipedia like source. It includes Coast Guard as well as Navy and Marine topics. A list is here.

Reflections on the CNO’s Navigation Plan

Posted on April 15, 2012 by Chuck Hill

The CNO has issued a “navigation plan” for for Fiscal Years 2013-2017 that can be accessed here. (It’s only four pages.)

“The Nav Plan provides details on how we will execute this guidance, highlighting our investments through the lens of my three tenets: Warfighting First, Operate Forward, and Be Ready.”

Most of it is, of course, not Coast Guard related, but there are some that might ultimately impact the Coast Guard.

Under “Warfighting First”:

“Improve near-term capability to counter fast attack craft by fielding enhanced gun and surface-to-surface missile systems for Patrol Coastal (PC) ships and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and laser-guided rockets for helicopters and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).”

Some of this might ultimately be applicable to CG platforms.

Under “Operate Forward”:

“Sustain the “places” our forward operating forces depend on to rest, repair, refuel, and resupply in Spain, Italy, Greece, Djibouti, Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Japan, Singapore, and Republic of Korea – as well as our forward base on Guam”

“Field improved Firescout UAVs…”

“Forward station additional ships – LCS at Singapore and PCs at Bahrain – to improve our ability to cooperate with regional partners in maritime security operations.”

“Improve our ability to remain forward by studying options for rotational crewing of other classes of ships.”

We already have Patrol Boats at Bahrain. We may see an additional push to put more assets, including perhaps more than one FRC, in Guam, (maybe not a bad thing for SAR and Fisheries enforcement). The increased Navy presence in Guam may also provide opportunities to exploit their units for SAR and LE as well.

Hopefully the CG will benefit from improvements in Firescout, but the Navy is talking about increasing the size of the airframe substantially which may be problematic for CG ships.

Certainly there will the opportunity to share experience in rotational crewing, and perhaps make it work.

Under “Be Ready”:

“Improve the “wholeness” of the Aegis Weapons System through data link and software upgrades while adding the Shipboard Self Defense System to more non-Aegis ships, such as amphibious assault ships.”

“Improve operational energy efficiency by investing in new technologies such as hybrid-electric drive.”

The weapon systems on the NSCs, and presumably the OPCs, are derived from the Aegis system and, I believe, closely related to the Shipboard Self Defense System for non-Aegis ships mentioned above. As the system evolves, ultimately we might see the Rolling Airframe Missile system replace the Phalanx on the NSCs. It is essentially the same weight and is used by the very similar system on the Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship.

The Navy is already using hybrid-electric drive on the USS Makin Island (LPD-8) and a fully integrated system on the USNS Louis and Clark class T-AKEs. There may be opportunities to ride the coat tales of their experience. Fuel economy is probably even more important to the Coast Guard than to the Navy.

What was not there:

I notice there was no mention of either African Partnership station or Drug Enforcement.

Multi-crewing, Coming to a Neighborhood Near You

Posted on April 13, 2012 by Chuck Hill

Now that there are three National Security Cutters commissioned and homeported in Alameda, we will soon see the first attempts at using multiple crews to man them, the “Crew Rotation Concept.” Four crews will man three ships. Additional facilities for the fourth crew are being built on Coast Guard Island.

There is a discussion of the Navy’s current plans for doing something similar here, along with comments on their previous experience with the concept.

Photo Credit: U.S. Coast Guard photo ID: 100228-G-2129M-004, Petty Officer 3rd Class Kevin Metcalf

We have had previous posts on the concept and they always prompted a lively discussion:

The Navy’s reason for wanting to “swap” crews centers on a desire to avoid the dead time inherent in the long transit to their operating areas. In the Coast Guard case it is more a desire to reduce AC&I costs. Providing more op-days per hull even if the day to day operating cost per op-day are almost certain to be higher.

Continue reading →

Unmanned Air Systems, Small Enough for WPB?

Posted on April 12, 2012 by Chuck Hill

Flightglobal.com is reporting the Israelis are seeking an Unmanned Air System (UAS) for their Dvora class patrol boats (here, here, and here) that range in length from 71 to 86 feet and 45 to 54 tons (smaller than a CG 87 foot Marine Protector Class WPBs). Steadicopter showed its Black Eagle 50, as a possible contender.

Perhaps it would not be unreasonable for the Coast Guard to start considering unmanned systems to complement the Webber Class that are six times as large.

Photo credit: http://www.israeli-weapons.com/weapons/naval/super_dvora3/SuperDvora3.html, via Wikipedia

Philippines and China in Standoff–former USCGC Center Stage

Posted on April 11, 2012 by Chuck Hill

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Photo credit, NASA Landsat 7 image of Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea

The former USCGC Hamilton, now BRP Gregorio del Pilar, is at the center of a standoff with the Chinese over a remote atoll shaped group of rocks and shallows called variously Scarborough (or Panatag) Reef or Shoal.

Both the Chinese and the Philippines claim sovereignty.

A Philippine patrol plane located eight Chinese fishing vessels inside the atoll. With the Gregorio del Pilar now on scene, two Chinese Maritime Surveillance vessels are blocking Philippine fisheries enforcement action against the fishing vessels and the Chinese are demanding the Philippine Navy depart their waters; while the Philippines is asserting it will enforce its sovereignty. Diplomacy is given lip service, but the standoff is ongoing. The US has a treaty obligation to the Philippines (subject to interpretation of course) and there are calls for US assistance.

A long discussion from the Philippine point of view here.

Photo: Philippine flag planted on Scarborough Shoal, Photographed by Adel Rosario, 05:11, 2 May 2010 (UTC)

Black Eye for NATO and European SAR Organizations

Posted on April 10, 2012 by Chuck Hill

NATO and European SAR organizations are being blamed for the death of 63 refugees from the fighting in Libya. The voyage started with 72 refugees, 50 men, 20 women, and two babies. Fifteen days later, when the craft drifted back to Libya, only ten remained alive and one of those subsequently died.

The media (CNN story here, MailOnline (UK) here) seems to have concentrated on this case as emblematic of failure, but it does not begin to tell the story. According to Aljazeera, “The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) estimates that roughly 50,000 people attempted to cross the Mediterranean by boat in 2011 and close to 2,000 drowned.”

To the outside observer there seem to have been many opportunities to rescue the refugees. Not having done so is seen as racist. NATO and European Coast Guards are being blamed, but might simply have been overwhelmed.

Clearly rescue organizations are being held to a very high standards. It is not enough that they rescue the vast majority of those in distress, they must rescue everyone without fail. It is not unlikely that once, perhaps several times, these organizations responded to reports of the boat adrift, located a boat in the area and assumed the mission was accomplished.

Its not unlikely our Coast Guard will find itself in a similar situation again.

Off-duty Coastie Rescues Pilot at VA Beach Crash

Posted on April 8, 2012 by Chuck Hill

PilotOnline.com reports Coast Guard Petty Officer 2nd Class Nick Beane was one of two bystanders that cut one of two crewmen out of his parachute and dragged him away from fire and explosions that resulted from the crash of their disabled F/A-18.