Deepwater program “Unachievable”–GAO, Part One

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The GAO has issued a status report on the Coast Guard’s “Deepwater” programs. The Navy Times has a pretty good summary. (Note the Coast Guard has requested that the “Deepwater” designation be dropped, but it had not happened when the report was issued.)

Based on the the GAO report, we can expect that the programs will both cost more and take longer than planned. In fact these two problems appear to be mutually reinforcing. Because the costs are higher, the schedule is stretched out. Because the schedule is stretched out, the cost goes up.

Illustration below: The plan–six years ago

https://i0.wp.com/www.uscg.mil/ACQUISITION/deepwater/congressional/baseline.jpg

You can see the entire GAO report (pdf format) here. Below is the GAO’s own summary of the report taken from the “recommendations” page associated with this report on their web site.

“The Deepwater Program includes efforts to build or modernize ships and aircraft, including supporting capabilities. In 2007, the Coast Guard took over the systems integrator role from Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) and established a $24.2 billion program baseline which included schedule and performance parameters. Last year, GAO reported that Deepwater had exceeded cost and schedule parameters, and recommended a comprehensive study to assess the mix of assets needed in a cost-constrained environment given the approved baseline was no longer feasible. GAO assessed the (1) extent to which the program is exceeding the 2007 baseline and credibility of selected cost estimates and schedules; (2) execution, design, and testing of assets; and (3) Coast Guard’s efforts to conduct a fleet mix analysis. GAO reviewed key Coast Guard documents and applied criteria from GAO’s cost guide.

“The Deepwater Program continues to exceed the cost and schedule baselines approved by DHS in 2007, but several factors continue to preclude a solid understanding of the program’s true cost and schedule. The Coast Guard has developed baselines for some assets that indicate the estimated total acquisition cost could be as much as $29.3 billion, or about $5 billion over the $24.2 billion baseline. But additional cost growth is looming because the Coast Guard has yet to develop revised baselines for all assets, including the OPC–the largest cost driver in the program. In addition, the Coast Guard’s most recent capital investment plan indicates further cost and schedule changes not yet reflected in the asset baselines, contributing to the approved 2007 baseline no longer being achievable. The reliability of the cost estimates and schedules for selected assets is also undermined because the Coast Guard did not follow key best practices for developing these estimates. Coast Guard and DHS officials agree that the annual funding needed to support all approved Deepwater baselines exceeds current and expected funding levels, which affects some programs’ approved schedules. The Coast Guard’s acquisition directorate has developed action items to help address this mismatch by prioritizing acquisition program needs, but these action items have not been adopted across the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard continues to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, but is faced with several near-term decisions to help ensure that assets still in design will meet mission needs. For example, whether or not the planned system-of-systems design is achievable will largely depend upon remaining decisions regarding the design of the command and control system. Important decisions related to the affordability, feasibility, and capability of the OPC also remain. For those assets under construction and operational, preliminary tests have yielded mixed results and identified concerns, such as design issues, to be addressed prior to initial operational test and evaluation. The Coast Guard is gaining a better understanding of cost, schedule, and technical risks, but does not always fully convey these risks in reports to Congress. As lead systems integrator, the Coast Guard planned to complete a fleet mix analysis to eliminate uncertainty surrounding future mission performance and produce a baseline for Deepwater. This analysis, which the Coast Guard began in 2008, considered the current program to be the “floor” for asset capabilities and quantities and did not impose cost constraints on the various fleet mixes. Consequently, the results will not be used for trade-off decisions. The Coast Guard has now begun a second analysis, expected for completion this summer, which includes an upper cost constraint of $1.7 billion annually–more than Congress has appropriated for the entire Coast Guard acquisition portfolio in recent years. DHS is also conducting a study to gain insight into alternatives that may include options that are lower than the program of record for surface assets. A DHS official stated that this analysis and the Coast Guard’s fleet mix analysis will provide multiple data points for considering potential changes to the program of record, but Coast Guard officials stated they have no intention of examining fleet mixes smaller than the current, planned Deepwater program. GAO is making recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that include identifying trade-offs to the planned Deepwater fleet and ensuring the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) design is achievable and to the Coast Guard that include identifying priorities, incorporating cost and schedule best practices, increasing confidence that assets will meet mission needs, and reporting complete information on risks to Congress in a timely manner. DHS concurred with the recommendations.”

For those of you who don’t want to wade through the entire report, I’ll be revisiting this topic to highlight GAO’s reservations regarding costs, scheduling, and capabilities.

 

The Coast Guard We Once Knew

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For the 221st Coast Guard Day—-I don’t know who wrote this, but I got it from a friend a few years ago:

by Bill Sheretz on Wednesday, August 4, 2010 at 7:51am

The Coast Guard We Once Knew

I liked standing on the bridge wing at sunrise with salt spray in my face and clean ocean winds whipping in from the four quarters of the globe – – the cutter beneath me feeling like a living thing as her engines drove her swiftly through the sea.

I liked the sounds of the Coast Guard – the piercing trill of the boatswains pipe, the syncopated clangor of the ship’s bell on the quarterdeck, the harsh squawk of the PA system, and the strong language and laughter of sailors at work.

I liked CG vessels — nervous darting 255s, plodding buoy tenders, and light ships, sleek 327s and the steady solid hum of the twin engines on the HH16E.

I liked the proud names of Coast Guard ships: USS Bayfield, USS Cavalier, USCGC Taney, USCGC Absecon, the Wind class Icebreakers and the USCGC Bibb just to name a few.

I liked the lean angular names of CG “shallow water cutters” the 82 footers, Pt Divide, Pt lookout, Cape Trinity and the Cape Higgon. Named for locations around the states. I liked liberty call and the spicy scent of a foreign port.

I even liked the never ending paperwork and all hands working parties as my ship filled herself with the multitude of supplies, both mundane and to cut ties to the land and carry out her mission anywhere on the globe where there was water to float her.

I liked sailors, officers and enlisted men from all parts of the land, farms of the Midwest, small towns of New England, from the cities, the mountains and the prairies, from all walks of life. I trusted and depended on them as they trusted and depended on me – for professional competence, for comradeship, for strength and courage. In a word, they were “shipmates”; then and forever.

I liked the surge of adventure in my heart, when the word was passed: “Now set the special sea and anchor detail – all hands to mooring stations for leaving port,” and I liked the infectious thrill of sighting home again, with the waving hands of welcome from family and friends waiting pier side. The work was hard and dangerous; the going rough at times; the parting from loved ones painful, but the companionship of robust CG laughter, the “all for one and one for all” philosophy of the sea was ever present.

I liked the serenity of the sea after a day of hard ship’s work, as flying fish flitted across the wave tops and sunset gave way to night. I liked the feel of the CG Cutter in darkness – the masthead and range lights, the red and green navigation lights and stern light, the pulsating phosphorescence of radar repeaters – they cut through the dusk and joined with the mirror of stars overhead. And I liked drifting off to sleep lulled by the myriad noises large and small that told me that my ship was alive and well, and that my shipmates on watch would keep me safe.

I liked quiet mid-watches with the aroma of strong coffee and PBJ sandwiches– the lifeblood of the CG permeating everywhere.And I liked hectic watches when the exacting minuet of haze-gray shapes racing at flank speed kept all hands on a razor edge of alertness.

I liked the sudden electricity of “General quarters, general quarters, all hands man your battle stations,” followed by the hurried clamor of running feet on ladders and the resounding thump of watertight doors as the ship transformed herself in a few brief seconds from a peaceful workplace to a weapon of war — ready for anything. And I liked the sight of space-age equipment manned by youngsters clad in dungarees and sound-powered phones that their grandfathers would still recognize.

I liked the traditions of the CG and the men and women who served so valiantly. These few gave so much in service to their country. A sailor could find much in the CG: comrades-in-arms, pride in self and country, mastery of the seaman’s trade. An adolescent could find adulthood.

In years to come, when sailors are home from the sea, they will still remember with fondness and respect the ocean in all its moods – the impossible shimmering mirror calm and the storm-tossed green water surging over the bow. And then there will come again a faint whiff of stack gas, a faint echo of engine and rudder orders, a vision of the bright bunting of signal flags snapping at the yardarm, a refrain of hearty laughter in the wardroom and chief’s quarters and mess decks. Gone ashore for good they will grow wistful about their CG days, when the seas belonged to them and a new port of call was ever over the horizon. Remembering this, they will stand taller and say, “I WAS A COAST GUARDSMAN ONCE.”

“Crisis in the Cutter Fleet”–Protecting America’s Ocean

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Good to be seeing some public discussion of the Coast Guard’s need for new cutters.

This article appearing in the San Francisco Examiner was written by James Jay Carafano of the Heritage Foundation. (I think I saw virtually the same article appeared in other newspapers as well.)

The Naval Institute has published a good article explaining the need for recapitalization of the Cutter Fleet. It is available on line here. The article was writen by Captain Fears. Here is his bio from the article:

“Captain Fears is the U.S. Coast Guard’s chief of law enforcement. He has more than a decade of sea service in seven ships around the world, and he served as commanding officer in two of them. He is also the chairman of the U.S. Naval Institute Editorial Board.”

He does an excellent job of emphasizing the expansiveness of the areas to be patrolled.

Combating Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)

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The Administration has recently published its “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime” (TOC).

There is commentary from Stewart M. Patrick at Council on Foreign Relations here and from Chris Rawley at Informationdissemination here.

This is certainly a topic that deserves some attention, particularly with the emergence of apparent links between terrorists, criminals, and hostile state actors.

The “strategy” is fairly long and general. It includes 56 “priority actions,” so once again we have decided to do everything everywhere–When you have 56 priorities, you have no priorities.

There is only one specific reference to the Coast Guard. In the section “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Strengthen Interdiction, Investigations, and Prosecutions,” the Coast Guard does not get a mention, although ICE, CBP, and Secret Service do.  It does include the following, as one of ten priority actions in this subsection, “Strengthen efforts to interdict illicit trafficking in the air and maritime domains.” for what that is worth. The section “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Disrupt Drug Trafficking and Its Facilitation of Other Transnational Threats” includes the following reference to the CG, “We must attack these organizations as close to the source as we can by forward deploying our law enforcement and intelligence assets. All-source intelligence is used by U.S. Coast Guard assets in the transit zone to extend our borders by interdicting and apprehending traffickers.” I’m not sure why that was in a strategy, but there seem to be examples of “good work” agencies are doing throughout the document that suggest this is more PR than an actionable plan.

The Section “Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Start at Home: Taking Shared Responsibility for Transnational Organized Crime” which talks about efforts to stem the flow of guns south from the US to Mexico does raise the question in my own mind, Is the Coast Guard attempting to stop the shipment of weapons out of the US by sea?

The document has some interesting material. If it had a different title, I might have been less critical, but unfortunately this is not a strategy, which would have identified objectives, forces allocated, actions to be taken, and milestones to be achieved. There is no attempt to identify the enemy’s Center of Gravity or “Schwerpunkt.” This is just a series of laundry lists–of threats, programs that have had some success, things we hope to accomplish, and conferences to be held, without any application of judgment or priority.

 

How We Doing In the Arctic? Not Ready Yet–Commandant

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Eaglespeak has posted comments and the full text of Admiral Papp’s prepared remarks presented before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, hearing on: “Defending U.S. Economic Interests in the Changing Arctic:Is There a Strategy?” Wednesday Jul 27, 2011.

If you read the postings here regularly, probably there will be nothing surprising in the remarks, but it is a good summary. I notice again the Commandant referring to “ice-capable” vessels rather than simply icebreakers, which leads me to be to believe the Coast Guard may be considering a class of ice-strengthened vessels or small icebreakers rather than limiting consideration to full size polar breakers.

Perhaps the big news is that the “high latitude study” was presented to Congress. “You now have in hand our recently completed high latitude study.” The Coast Guard has gotten a lot of flak because of delays in presenting this, as well as other reports. I haven’t been able to find a copy of it yet, but it ought to be interesting.

 

New LCS/OPC Design?

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“Cdr. Salamander” commented on an interesting development. It seems that America’s most prominent ship designers are offering the Navy a conceptual design for a diesel powered “light frigate” that is not too far off the proposed specs for the Offshore Patrol Cutter. (Note: The illustration appears to be an early artist concept of the Australian DDG rather than of the proposed light frigate for which the design has not been made public.)

The post is based on a San Diego Union Tribune article posted on signonsandiego.com written by Gary Robbins,

“Rick Biben, the company’s president and chief executive, said Wednesday, “We are not competing with any existing design. We’re looking at what the Navy might need in the future, and we’re working to expand our portfolio of ships.”

“Biben stressed that light frigate is not meant to be a competitor to the troubled LCS. Earlier this year, Freedom experienced a crack in its hull, alarming members of Congress. More recently, the Independence was reported to have “aggressive” corrosion in and around its propulsion system.

“The problems led a bipartisan group of six U.S. senators to ask for a formal review of LCS. And Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Alpine, has suggested that it might be smart to rebid some LCS contracts because the ships will cost at least twice as much as originally planned.

“Eric Midboe, vice program of program management at Gibbs & Cox, said Wednesday that the light frigate would be a “conventional, shock-hardened ship” whose hull would be similar to those seen on modern Coast Guard frigates.”

While this may not be intended to “compete with any existing design,” it is pretty obvious not everyone is happy with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, and they may be thinking that when a new generation of Navy leadership takes over, they may be looking for alternatives.

From the CG perspective, if the Navy does decide to build something like this, it looks interesting because a lightly armed version is close to the OPC concept. Combining CG and Navy programs could result in significant economies of scale with a buy of 66 or more ships. (See Related: My Grand Plan Navy and CG Work Together ) There would be training and logistical advantages. The Cutters could be made readily adaptable to credible war time roles providing additional justification.

What We Have Here is a Failure to Communicate

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There have been several articles recently that argue for the new generation of Coast Guard assets, particularly the new ships, here, here, and here. None of them seem very confident that these assets are coming. The Coast Guard does seem to be “swimming up stream” trying to increase its AC&I budget, while the government as a whole is trying to cut funding.

Ryan Erickson at http://1790.us/ found perhaps the best in an article about how conventional thinking on acquisition backfires resulting in higher unit costs, “How to-Make USCG Modernization Unaffordable,” by former Thirteenth District Commander, Rear Admiral Jeffrey M. Garrett, UCG (Ret.). If you have followed what has happened to the Royal Navy (or the F-35) you have seen this mode of operation:

  • It begins with big plans for numerous units of an advanced type.
  • Substantial investment is made in research and development, but it will be amortized over many units.
  • Procurement is stretched out to cut annual expenditure, unit price goes up.
  • Workload is uneven, skilled workers are let go, when work begins again, new workers must be hired and trained. Unit price goes up.
  • Uncertainty about how many units will be produced, vendors hedge their bets, unit price goes up.
  • Number of units to be procured is cut to save money, unit price goes up.
  • Very few units are built, the unit costs are outrageous.

To some extent we have already seen this cycle with the National Security Cutter. I’m not sure there is a fix, but this seems to be a result of communications problems of several types both up and down, unwarranted assumptions, and perhaps a lack of historical background, that results in a mismatch of plans and execution.

The Coast Guard’s plans for large ship construction have been on the table for a very long time, and while there is still room for refinement, it seems late in the game for a complete rethink. If Congress and the Administration are not happy with what is being offered, while effected by the change of the fiscal condition of the country, it is also at least partly due to a lack of guidance on their part.

On the other hand, it appears the Coast Guard has not done its part to make a convincing case for these ships. Years after it was directed to provide one by Congress, there is still no Fleet Mix Study to support projected budget requests that the GAO calls unrealistic.

It seems there is no consensus on how many ships the Coast Guard needs or what their characteristics should be. The Coast Guard obviously sees these ships as warships on some level, otherwise the cost of redundancies and survivability features being sought would not make sense economically. If rumors are true, the DHS does not see it that way, and in fact they may not see sufficient justification for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program.

If the department really did not want the Coast Guard to build OPCs, they have not been honest and straightforward in their opposition, because the 2012 budget already has seed money to start the project. Perhaps they are simply assuming it will die, without actually arguing out an explicit decision. Meanwhile the Coast Guard is expending limited AC&I money beginning the procurement process.

I may have missed something, but at a time when the Navy’s fleet is shrinking and it is facing new challenges, the Navy seems conspicuously silent in support of the Coast Guard’s large cutter programs. Despite the “National Fleet” concept, the Navy does not seem to be advocating for ships for the Coast Guard that might be militarily useful. The Navy may see the Coast Guard programs as distracting from their own new ship programs, but that is highly unlikely, since effectively, the split within DOD, between the Air Force, Army, and Navy Departments has been essentially equal for many years and is unlikely to change so Coast Guard programs can complement, but do not threaten Navy funding.

The composition of the Coast Guard fleet does not seem to be considered in designing the Navy’s fleet. The Coast Guard contribution to the Naval balance is not generally recognized. When the Navy tells the Congress that the US fleet is 286 ships (give or take a couple), yes, they are counting CVNs, DDGs, and SSNs, but they are also counting the eleven patrol boats of the Cyclone class doing virtually the same job in Iraq as Coast Guard WPBs and will be counting the Joint High Speed Vessel which is little more than a high speed ferry. They don’t and will not count Coast Guard’s Cyclone class, the very similar Fast Response Cutters, or the more capable National Security Cutters. Why not? It is a “National Fleet” isn’t it?

The DOD is being told they have to trim at least $400B perhaps over $800B off there budget in the next ten years. The Navy alone will have to take cuts that will exceed the entire budget of the Coast Guard. Hopefully there may be opportunities born of the search for ways to make up the lost capability. As Winston Churchill is frequently quoted, “Gentlemen, we have run out of money. Now we have to think.”

The Navy needs to keep building carriers, submarines, and DDGs if we are going to maintain the construction capacity, but their is no real danger of the US loosing the capacity to build minor combatants as illustrated by the fact that twelve companies expressed an interest in building the Offshore Patrol Cutters. Perhaps it is time for the Navy, Congress and the Administration to recognize the Coast Guard as a Littoral Combat fleet in being that the Navy does not need to duplicate. With a little planning and coordination it could be even more effective in the role for at minimal cost. If a full and honest assessment of American security needs were done, they would find new Coast Guard vessels with Navy design input to meet both peacetime and wartime missions are a bargain.

The Coast Guard seems to have a serious problem communicating it’s value. To a large extent this is a failure of Congress and the Administration to look at it holistically. It is so many different things to different people. They look at the benefits individually, but when they look at the cost they see the whole cost.

The value of our SAR assets is widely recognized because it is seen on local news on a regular basis, but the Coast Guard is so much more. I like the Commandant’s explanation of the Coast Guard,

“We will protect the country against threats from the sea…
“We will protect people who use the sea…
“And, we will protect the sea itself.”

But as clear and succinct as that statement is, it still does not make clear the magnitude of the job. The message I think we need to hammer home is that the Coast Guard is the “Department of Emergency Service,” Police, Fire and Rescue, and Emergency Medical Response, for an area larger than the land area of the entire country. Even that neglects the Coast Guard’s regulatory and aids to navigation missions, but right now our large ships are the part of the organization most in jeopardy, so this is the most urgent message. Complexity is the nature of the beast.

I hesitate to suggest that we need a slogan, because our communications problems are much deeper than that, but as part of a larger communications effort I think we do. In Brendan Flynn’s recent post, “A Global Force for Good?” and the associated comments, we had some discussion of this. I’ll offer one and ask for other suggestions, “The Coast Guard–America’s Blue Chip.”

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Related:

Israeli Blockade–Lessons Applied

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You might recall the last time the Israeli Navy tried to stop a convoy of “peaceful” protesters bound for Gaza. We asked if there wasn’t a better way.

Apparently the Israelis learn fast and took a different approach, applying “lawfare” to largely eliminate the problem. When a boarding was necessary, it went a lot smoother (and here). Apparently the Israeli’s decided to take the initiative in the information war and jammed the blockade runner’s communications.

Most significantly they managed to make this a “non-event.”