Britain’s New Antarctic Patrol Vessel, HMS Protector

3rd Street Promenade
The British are using unconventional means to provide for their need for a patrol vessel capable of operating in ice including patrols in the vicinity of the Falklands and supporting their Antarctic survey stations. They are taking a three year lease on an existing Norwegian vessel that has been used to support the oil industry. Additional modifications are planned including boats and weapons.
“Completed in 2001 and displacing 4,985 tons, she can act as a polar research ship or subsea support vessel, and has 100 berths.”
HMS Protector is filling an unexpected gap in their capabilities after accidental flooding almost sank the previous ice patrol vessel HMS Endurance in December 2008.

Ships vs. Areas of Responsibility

There are a lot of other considerations, but looking only at the waters under US jurisdiction, how does our large cutter fleet stack up? (All miles referred to here are nautical miles)

The US has the world’s largest EEZ, 11,351,000 km sq (3,393,921 mi sq). In addition there are 2,193,526 km sq (638,713 mi sq) of continental shelf under US jurisdiction. This is in addition to waters inside the territorial sea. The EEZ alone is larger than the total land area of the US.

Doing a little back of the envelope calculation, how well can our ships cover this area? The Coast Guard currently has 40 large patrol cutters and plans a fleet of 33. Typically, considering inport, maintenance and training, you need three ships to keep one on task. Best case, no more than half the fleet can be kept on patrol. So we can plan on having no more than about 16 ships on patrol and for the future, 11 would be more realistic.

If we consider the area of responsibility as roughly 4,000,000 mi sq, that is about 250,000 to 363,363 mi sq per ship. Thinking of the ships as response units, responding to SAR or sightings by maritime patrol aircraft, how far apart are the ships? The areas of responsibility are not square, generally they are 200 miles wide, so dividing by 200, ships are, on average 1,250 to 1,818 miles apart.

Next I looked at where our areas of responsibility are relative to the ships. Using seaaroundus.org, this is how it breaks out:

  • Location                            Area in km sq.
  • Alaska:                                      3,770,021
  • Hawaii:                                     2,474,884
  • East Coast:                                   915,763
  • West Coast:                                  825,549
  • Gulf of Mexico:                            707,832
  • Caribbean Islands:                       211,429
  • Other Pacific Islands:             3,328,925

Or by percent per fishery council:

  • New England Council 2%
  • Mid-Atlantic Council 2%
  • South Atlantic Council 4%
  • Caribbean Council 2%
  • Gulf of Mexico Council 6%
  • Pacific Council 7%
  • North Pacific Council 29%
  • Western Pacific Council 48%

Grouping these:

  • Atlantic/Gulf of Mexico: 16%
  • Pacific: 84%

If we look at where the ships are, there are 26 (65%) homeported in the Atlantic/Gulf of Mexico and only 14 (35%) in the Pacific.

If we do the same sort of exercise as above to determine average distance between cutters, we get:

  • Atlantic: 246 to 356 average miles between ships
  • Pacific: 2,400 to 3,360 miles

The Pacific areas of responsibility are getting roughly one tenth the coverage of those in the Atlantic.

It appears the areas around the islands South and West of Hawaii are particularly under served, particularly considering the scarcity of other Coast Guard assets such as WPBs, SAR stations, and aircraft in these areas.

Map of the EEZ zone.

It might be assumed there is relatively little activity out there, but while I haven’t been able to get current figures, in terms of value of fish landed, in the late 1990s, Pago Pago, American Samoa was the number one fishery port in the US, ahead of Dutch Harbor and New Bedford, and Agana, Guam was number four. (www.wpcouncil.org/documents/value.pdf)

A little time spent at this site suggest most of these areas’ fisheries need more protection.

There are a lot of considerations in determining a proper fleet mix. Congress has been waiting for the Coast Guard’s plan. I hope we see it soon. I’ve heard the Offshore Patrol Cutters are in danger because we haven’t shown a return on the investment. Basically, if there are no large patrol cutters, we are abandoning our stewardship of the EEZ. How much is that worth? Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, Fisheries, and Coast Guard, has indicated that our fisheries alone support more than 1.9 million jobs and generate $163 billion in sales impacts.

We certainly need more than 35 large cutters. To get the average distance between cutters down to an average of 1,000 miles, we would need close to 60.

But even if the size of the fleet doesn’t increase, we need to consider putting more in the Pacific, particularly the 14th District that includes almost half the US EEZ. To meet a standard of an average of no more than 1,000 miles average between ships in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico would require only ten ships. We have six WMECs (five 210s and a 270) homeported in Florida, presumably primarily for drug and migrant interdiction. As the Webber Class come on line, they may be able to take over some of this task. Yes, there are lots of other things to consider, but this needs to be part of the decision. perhaps 210s could be moved to Guam, Pago Pago, and Honolulu and some 270s into the Pacific.

The Melting Arctic

Some interesting commentary here (Science Progress, “The Arctic Sea Ice Death Spiral Continues,” by Joe Romm).

Neven

Arctic sea ice volume by month in cubic kilometers (with simple quadratic trend lines projecting to zero volume, details here).  The bottom (red) line is September volume.

A couple of interesting statements included,

In November, Rear Admiral David Titley, the Oceanographer of the Navy, testified that “the volume of ice as of last September has never been lower…in the last several thousand years.” Titley, who is also the Director of Navy’s Task Force Climate Change, said he has told the Chief of Naval Operations that “we expect to see four weeks of basically ice free conditions in the mid to late 2030s.”

Wieslaw Maslowski of the Naval Postgraduate School has “projected a (virtually) ice-free fall by 2016 (+/- 3 yrs).”

While I don’t think this means we won’t need new icebreakers, it may mean we will need Arctic Patrol Cutters sooner than we think.

Venezuela’s New Offshore Patrol Cutter

In 2005 Venezuela began a program to provide security for their Exclusive Economic Zone that they refer to as POVZEE (patrullero oceánico de vigilancia de la zona económica exclusiva). The program called for the construction of eight ships to perform what we recognize as Coast Guard functions. Four of the ships were intended to patrol the EEZ and four smaller ships were planned to patrol closer to shore.

Venezuela recently took possession of the first of four larger 99 meter Patrol ships (PC-21, 22, 23, 24) (Video here. It is almost 10 minutes, and the interview is in Spanish. It only provides a pier level, port quarter view and views of some sensors. A clearer port quarter view with the stern gate down is here along with a close up of the CIWS.) They have already received two of the four smaller 22 knot, 1,720 ton, 80 meter vessels (GC-21, 22, 23, 24) that lack hangers but are otherwise similar (pictures of these smaller ships are at the bottom of this page).

These larger ships look a lot like what we might expect the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) to look like.

  • Length: 98.9 meters (324.5 ft)
  • Displacement: 2,419 tons (full load)
  • Beam: 13.6 m (44.6 ft)
  • Draft: 3.8 m (12.5 ft)
  • Depth to main deck is 7.2 m (24 ft)
  • Accommodations for up to 92
  • Maximum speed: 25 knots
  • Endurance 3,500 nmi @ 18 knots (too low for our needs, but no one else builds conventionally powered ships with the endurance of Coast Guard cutters)
  • Combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) propulsion system using four MTU diesel engines rated at 4,440kW each for a total of 17,760kW (23,807 HP), twin Wärtsilä Propulsion controllable-pitch propellers
  • Two rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB)
  • Flight deck and hanger.
  • Armament: OTO Melara 76mm, forward,  Oerlikon 35 mm “Millennium Gun” aft,  and 2x.50 cal.

Venezuela’s EEZ is only one 23rd that of the US. If the US had a program with a proportionate level of effort to protect its EEZ, the Coast Guard would have 184 large patrol cutters.

Considering their apparently close ties, it is somewhat surprising that the Venezuelans chose a Spanish shipyard and European weapons over the Russian alternatives. Spanish shipyards used to be very inefficient, frequently taking ten years to build a warship, but Navantia, where these ships are being built, appears to be quite competitive, building ships for Norway, Australia, and Thailand as well as the Spanish Navy. Perhaps the common language had an influence, or perhaps it is because the Venezuelans have seen Russian systems in action, that they decided to go European.

The choice of the 35 mm “Millennium Gun” is a bit surprising. The only other user is the Danish Navy. But looking a little closer, it is understandable and, if the USN also adopted it, it might be a good option for the Coast Guard as well. The mount weighs is only half that of the Phalanx. Whether it is as good an anti-missile weapon as the Phalanx is debatable, but it is almost certainly better as an anti-ship weapon (Lockheed Martin video of the gun here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ogwfPrV1fk).

There is a stern gate that looks like it may be for launching a boat but I’ve seen nothing that states it’s purpose.

Libya, Innovations in Maritime Terrorism

There have been some developments in Libya that might be of interest to the Coast Guard. Pro-Qaddafi forces have been trying to cut off aid arriving through the port of Misrata. April 29 loyalists attempted to lay mines in a novel way and on May 16 they attempted to use what has been described as a “Vessel Borne Improvised Explosive Device.”

Mines have been laid by ships, airplanes, and submarines. In this case, the Libyans attempted to lay mines by transporting them to them on inflatable boats and then sinking the boats with the mines still aboard.

In their latest attempt they deployed two RHIBs, one was rigged with approximately a metric ton of explosives and mannequins while the second RHIB operated in support.

What they intended to do with boat was not clear. I can’t see it being effective against an alert warship underway. This looks a bit like the attack on the Cole, but it was not a suicide attempt. The briefing suggests that the plan might have been to lure a curious NATO warship alongside on the pretext that it was in distress, but looking at the picture of the boat with a very large makeshift box containing the explosive,  forward of the conning station makes that appear unlikely. Attacking a civilian craft, either in a channel or in port, seems more likely. Sinking an aid ship or a ferry loaded with refugees might have been the objective.

Eaglespeak has the story, pictures, and a link to the NATO briefing (scroll up, the link takes you to the foot of the post).

Eagle Cruise Facebook Page Photos

Some great photos of Eagle’s European training cruise are available on Facebook. They have already encountered some nasty weather that blew out some sails and did some minor damage (see #46). Check it out here. Looks like additional photos will be added over the duration of the cruise. Just clicking on the photos allows you to page through them quickly.

Online Float Plan Guide

The Auxiliary has come up with an online site that supports the often heard recommendation that boaters use a float plan. It looks to be very complete and well thought out. Not only does it provide a format for the float plan, it also provides guidance for the person holding the float plan on what to do if there is an apparent emergency. Access is here: http://floatplancentral.org/