Monthly Archives: October 2010

EURONAVAL 2010 Exhibition

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A couple of blogs allow us to see new equipment and concepts (mostly in model form) being shown at the EURONAVAL 2010 Exhibition. One of my regular reads, http://combatfleetoftheworld.blogspot.com/, has a four part series of photos. Clicking on the image gives you a better view and the blogger, Mike Columbaro (he’s French, but the blog is in English), was good enough to label the photos.

There are four pages of additional pictures and discussion here as well (http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?188289-Euronaval-news). Unfortunately the pictures are not as well labeled.

If you are interested, I would suggest you start by going directly to the Combat Fleet blog first and then moving on to the militaryphotos site. Because over time the combatfleetoftheworld posts will get buried by newer posts, I’ll provide links for each of them separately, here, here, here, and here.

Anniversary of the Loss of CG-1705

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Today marks the first anniversary of the loss of CG-1705 in a mid-air collision with a Marine helicopter over waters off San Diego.

Fellow blogger Ryan Erickson has posted a movingly personal reflection on those events. Go take a look.

(Related posts: If you search CGblog for “CG 1705” you will find eleven posts related to this event.)

Chinese and Japanese Coast Guards, Another Turn of the Screw

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Related posts:

There are more signs that tension between China and Japan is ratcheting up, and that their Coast Guards are the instruments of choice. The Chinese are reinforcing their Coast Guard in the Disputed area. The Chinese have disputes with a number of their neighbors, but I think they have several reasons for choosing to confront the Japanese first.

  1. Of all their claims to territory in dispute, claims to the islands variously know as the Senkaku, Diaoyu, Diaoyutai, or Pinnacle Islands, appear the most supportable.
  2. Both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China see the islands as part of Taiwan (which the PRC, of course, also sees as part of China). This dispute puts the people of both mainland China and Taiwan on the same side against Japan. That may be seen in Beijing as politically useful.
  3. Because of their history, the Chinese people are ready to think the worst of the Japanese, so it is not hard to generate anti-Japanese feelings. Generating the same level of hostility against the Vietnamese or the people of the Philippines would be difficult.
  4. The Chinese have significant leverage on the Japanese economy, in that they have a virtually monopoly on rare earth minerals required for manufacture of many high tech devices. Playing this card has prompted a call to diversify sources for the minerals, but alternate sources are still years away.
  5. The Chinese may believe that, because the Japanese have the strongest military among the countries who have conflicting claims with China, if China can get the Japanese to roll over–the other countries may assume they cannot resist and will also cave.

Sidbar, Handicapping the contenders: If it came to blows between the two Coast Guards, I would put my money on the Japanese, but winning that particular battle may not be in the plan. Pointedly the Chinese are sending their “fastest marine law enforcement vessel.” This ship, “China Sea monitoring 75,” is slightly smaller than a 270 and only about one knot faster. The balance is changing rapidly, but the Japanese Coast Guard is still far larger and better equipped than their Chinese counterpart. In fact the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) has more patrol vessels over 1,000 tons than the US Coast Guard, including eleven that are as large or larger than the National Security Cutter (go here and click on “pamphlet” for a pdf which includes information about the missions, organization, and assets of the Japanese Coast Guard)

In all probability, units of the nine ship Hateruma class (292 ft long, 1,300 ton, 30 knots, armed with the Mk44 Bushmaster II 30mm autocannon with laser-optical fire-control system), specifically intended to police of Senkaku Islands, will be among several vessels that will respond to any Chinese challenge.

The requirements that shape the latest vessels of the Japan Coast Guard seem to have been influenced by their experience in the “Battle of Amami-Oshima.” To call it a battle might be an exaggeration. It was a running gun-fight between an armed North Korean trawler and 20 vessels of the Japanese Coast Guard in 2001. In spite of intense machine gun fire from both sides, the North Korean vessel appears to have been scuttled, rather than sunk by fire from the Japanese vessels, the trawler’s crew choosing death rather than surrender. I find it hard to understand, in view of our experience in Vietnam, but the Japanese felt their 20mm Gatling guns were out-ranged by 9K38 Igla MANPADS and B-10 and recoilless rifle fire from the trawler. As a result they have built ships specifically intended to counter North Korean spy ships that have stabilized heavy machine guns from 20 mm M61 Gatling guns to Bofors 40mm/70s with associated fire control systems and for “High-speed, high-functionality” large patrol ships such as the three ships of the Hida class, 1,800 tons and three ships of the Aso class, 770 tons, hulls that are “bullet proof” (presumably against machine-guns up to 14.5mm–protection against anything larger would require great weight of armor).

It’s interesting to compare the JCG choices for ships of the Hateruma class and Hida class with the projected OPC. The JCG ships are much faster at 30+ knots. They have no hanger, but they can handle very large helicopters. USCG ships tend to be small naval combatants, while JCG ships appear to be built more along the lines of merchant ships. Armoring hulls is apparently not something the USCG has considered. USCG ships tend to be armed to fight at relatively longer ranges (gun ranges to 9 miles) against adversaries with sophisticated weapons including cruise missiles, while the JCG ships seem to be  optimized more for combat at relatively close, but not extremely close range (beyond 2000, but certainly less than 10,000 yards), ranges where crew served weapons and small arms are essentially useless, but their heavier weapons under electro-optic fire control can still dominate.

Sidebar, The Aftermath: Against the JCG the Chinese Coast Guard would probably loose a fight, but that might be best outcome from the Chinese point of view. If this is more about national unity and justifying sacrifice for additional weapons, nothing promotes national resolve like seeing stretchers come off a ship with wounded men to be greeted by their wives and girlfriends,  followed by body bags met by grieving widows and children. In any case, the Japanese will be portrayed as bullies–easy for the Chinese people to believe–and a strong military reaction justified. Both sides will have their cameras ready, because any encounter will be played out thousands of times on YouTube by battling videos, as we saw in the Gaza flotilla incident.

(Thanks to DER for bringing this to my attention.)


Fast Response Cutters–Named for Heroes

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Today the Coast Guard Compass announced the first fourteen names to be assigned to the Fast Response Cutters (the Bernard C. Webber Class). They are also doing a series explaining the accomplishments of each of the service members the vessels are named for. These are the first two:

Pirates Foiled by Best Practices

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The Beluga Fortune, one of the three ships we reported taken by pirates over the weekend, has been retaken as a result of the crews use of recommended countermeasures.

The US Naval Institute Blog has more details on the recapture, facilitated by HMS Montrose (a 4300 ton British Type 23 frigate–same size as the NSC). They also discuss the latest information on best practices for mariners to avoid being taken by pirates, now published as a 78 page pamphlet entitled “BMP3, Best Management Practice 3, Piracy off the Coast of Somalia and Arabian Sea Area.” A pdf copy of the manual is available here: http://www.mschoa.org/bmp3/Documents/BMP3%20Final_low.pdf

More News From the North–An Armed Canadian Coast Guard?

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Ryan Erickson’s blog pointed out an article in the Vancouver Sun reporting that the Canadians are considering arming their icebreakers as a way to “bolster Arctic sovereignty.”

This was in response to “recommendations in a report from the Senate fisheries committee about strengthening Canada’s presence in the North.”

“The government also has indicated that it will review new shipping regulations in the Northwest Passage and other Arctic waters with an eye to extending mandatory registration of foreign vessels, which currently applies only to large freighters and other heavy ships, to all foreign-ship traffic in the region, regardless of size.”

Ryan links the report to the 1985 transit of the North West Passage by the Polar Sea, in which the USCG icebreaker transited what the Canadians consider their internal waters and what the US considers an international strait, after the US gave notification of our intention, rather than asking permission.

Since then, basically the US and the Canadians have agreed to disagree. Currently the US and Canada have an agreement that allows access to US military ships. They have given us blanket permission and we have said we will give notification.

For the US Navy this is a matter of avoiding a precedence that could close off access elsewhere.

For the Coast Guard, our interests are a little different, perhaps closer to that of the Canadians. We want Maritime Domain Awareness. We want ships to give notice of their intentions, and ultimately that has to mean we need some options to deny access, but the international norms are still being set.

The talk of arming Canadian icebreakers leads to the question, will the Canadian Coast Guard be transformed by it’s new mission to more closely parallel the military organization of the USCG. There has already been a question about whether the Canadian Navy or their Coast Guard would man the proposed Arctic Patrol Ship since they would be armed, unlike current Canadian cutters.

Somali Pirates Capture Three Ships in Two Days

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NATO reports three vessels October 23/24, a Dhow; the YORK, a Singapore flagged 5,076-ton LPG tanker en route from Mombasa, Kenya to the Seychelles, was carrying 17 crew, including a German master, two Ukrainians and 14 Filipinos, and the BELUGA FORTUNE a cargo ship under charter to a German company bound from the United Arab Emirates to South Africa have been seized in two days.

It appears a South Korean flag crab boat, the GOLDEN WAVE, seized on October 9, was used as the mother ship for seizure of the YORK. When the GOLDEN WAVE was seized, she had on board 43 people, two S. Korean, two Chinese, and 37 Kenyans.

Reportedly pirates are currently holding 20 vessels and and 428 hostages.

If you would like to keep up with what is happening with regard to piracy in the Indian Ocean, it looks like “Eagle Speak” is a good source.

Raw Data is available from the NATO site here.

Offshore Patrol Cutters–Why the Navy Should Support the Program

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A number of things have happened that makes the Offshore Patrol Cutters potentially important to the national defense, and suggest that the Navy should support their design and construction, including helping with project administration if we need that and testifying before Congress to justify the additional cost of naval features.

  • The number of ships in the Navy has decreased dramatically. From almost 600 ships 20 years ago, the number has fallen to about 280, in spite of constant statements to the effect that 313 is the minimum number required. Many expect that the number of Navy ships will fall to as low as 230. Much of the decrease has been in ships at the low end of the high/low mix and the planned replacement is behind schedule, and in the eyes of many, a failure. Our allies’ fleets have also been shrinking, in many cases, more rapidly than our own, while new challenges to American naval supremacy are developing, so the importance of any Coast Guard contribution is proportionately greater.
  • Despite having entered service between 1979 and 1989, the FFGs, which are the “maid of all works” within the Navy, are being rapidly decommissioned and will soon be all gone because of maintenance problems. These are the ships that do most of the Navy’s partnerships station and drug enforcement work. (29 of 51 built currently in service)
  • The Cyclone Class Patrol Craft, that entered service between 1993 and 2000, have been found to have deteriorated much faster than expected and have been sidelined. Never quite what the Navy hoped for, too small for some roles and too large for others, they became busiest vessels in the US Navy with proportionately more underway time than any other type. (Of 14 built, 10 in service with the USN, 3 with USCG, one transferred to Philippine Navy)
  • The Littoral Combat ships (LCS) were supposed to fix some of these problems. This was a program to build 55 ships that would replace the Navy’s 14 Mine Warfare ships, the remaining FFGs, and the Cyclone Class PCs. They were to be cheap to build, minimally manned, and use removable mission modules that would allow them to become alternately mine countermeasures, anti-submarine, or anti-surface warfare ships. The LCS program is in trouble. Ship construction is behind schedule, and module development is even farther behind. The ships are much more expensive than expected. The manning concepts appears flawed and berthing limitations mean more people cannot simply be added to the crew. If the program is killed the Navy is going to need a replacement.

If the LCS project is killed, a class based on the OPC’s hull might be able to take its place. If the LCS program is terminated at less than the planned number, Navy ships based on the OPC can supplement the LCS and do many, perhaps all of it’s missions, at a lower cost. Even if all 55 LCSs are built, Coast Guard OPCs can still make a significant contribution to the Nation’s defense; particularly, if they can use systems designed for the LCS.

Navy vessels based on the OPC could cost less than half the price of an LCS. Even without mission modules, the Navy could use the class as the basis for a common hull that could be fill the partnership, patrol, presence, counter-piracy, and drug enforcement roles of the FFGs at a much lower cost and also perform many of the PCs missions with greater endurance and better sea keeping. They are potentially affordable, relatively low tech platforms, that can be exported under the Foreign Military Assistance Program to help our friends. If their aviation facilities are made adequate for MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters (not much different from our own H-60s), with LCS modules they could fill the LCS roles. (This might require them to operate in pairs to carry all the equipment planned for a LCS)

To fulfill its potential in these roles, the OPC need not be much different from current planning. The ship’s description over at the Acquisitions Directorate web site has gotten progressively fuzzier over time, but I will be specific about what I think it needs.

  • Speed: 25 knots
  • Aviation Facilities including a hanger for at least: one USCG MH-65 and one MQ-8 Firescout UAV/one USCG HH-60J or MH-60T/one USN MH-60R or 60S with magazines and storage space for independent operation with these aircraft, not just the ability to land and refuel.
  • Air Search Radar that can track our helos at least 100 miles
  • Launch/recover facilities for at least two boats, 11 meters or larger, including at least one “Long Range Interceptor.”
  • Medium caliber gun and associated radar/optical firecontrol system–presumably 57 mm Mk 110, but Mk 75 would work too and might save money
  • At least one/preferably two Mk38 mod2 auto-cannon positioned as required to cover any bearings not covered by the medium caliber gun
  • Four mounts for .50 cal. positioned to provide coverage by at least two mounts any bearing
  • Two OPC operated together, should have the sufficient space/weight reservation and necessary supporting connections/utilities/etc to take on at least one full suite of LCS MCM or ASW mission modules.
  • Fitted for but not with: CIWS, ESM/decoy systems, and anti-surface missile chosen for the LCS, ie NLOS or system chosen to replace it

Rethinking the New Cutter Programs

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Preparing to write this, I reread some older material from the Acquisition Directorate and was surprised to find that my long held assumption that the Coast Guard would be building OPCs at a rate of three a year (since that was the rate we had built the 210s they are replacing) is not the case. The plan as expressed in the CG9 Newsletter for Oct/Nov 09 by Captain Brian Perkins was to build only two ships a year.

Plus, the same newsletter notes, the OPC program is linked to the NSC program in that it will not be started until after the last NSC is contracted.

As we have discussed the progress on the National Security Cutter Program has been slow. In the nine years since the ships were ordered, only two ships have been delivered and a third is building. Instead of seeing one new ship a year as might have been expected, there was an almost two year gap between the Bertholf and the Waesche, another almost two year gap between the Waesche and the Stratton, and it looks like an almost three year gap between Stratton and the forth NSC, Hamilton. Assuming that Hamilton is awarded this year (FY 2011) and one a year after that, the eighth and last NSC won’t be awarded until FY 2015 and we probably won’t see it in service until 2019. The first OPC(s) will not be funded until FY2016. The last 210 replacement will be funded in 2023 with deliver not likely until at least 2026 at which time the last 210 will be 57 years old. When the last 270 is replaced, in 2031 it will be 41 years old.

This is a plan for disaster.  That our fleet is already in trouble was demonstrated by the difficulties we encountered during the Haiti earthquake relief. How are these same ships going to perform in 10, 15, or 20 years.

There has got to be a better way.

First it surely isn’t necessary to take four years to make a decision on the OPC design. Its been discussed and mulled over for years. Might it not be possible to truncate the NSC program at six ships, fund the first OPCs in FY2014 and build them at the rate of three or four a year? And rather than multicrew the NSCs, increase the OPC program by six to provide one for one replacements for the 378s for a total of 6 NSCs and 31 OPCs. That still leaves us four ships short of where we are now, but a lot closer than the eight ships short currently planned.

Because the OPCs are considerably smaller than the NSC and made in greater quantity, they are potentially much cheaper while providing nearly all the capability of an NSC or 378. We are typically spending around $600M per NSC. I’ve heard that the Acquisitions Directorate expects to keep the costs for the OPC around $200M/ship. The ship I think they should build would be a bit more, because it would have added value for national defense, but building three or even four instead of one NSC is not a huge increase in the total Coast Guard budget and will save money in the long run.

The OPCs will have a smaller crew than the NSCs and a much smaller crew than the 378s.  The crew may even be smaller than that on the 270s. They are also likely to be much cheaper to maintain than the legacy ships. The sooner we get them in the fleet, the more we will save in manning and maintenance.

If we truncate the NSC program at 6 and begin the OPC program in FY 2014, funding three ships a year, we will have the 33 new ships currently planned by 2025, six years ahead of the current plan, and the entire program, including four additional ships, will be finished by early 2027.

If instead, in 2014 we began funding four ships a year, we would have our 33 new ships finished early in 2024, seven years ahead of the current plan and the the entire program would be completed in early 2025. Still a long way away, but better than the current plan. If we did that, the last 210 to be replace will only be 51 years old.